# Sohanveer Singh Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 11 ILRA 316
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-09-29
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 1521 of 2020
- **Bench:** Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sohanveer-singh-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45402
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A.G.A., Sri Amit Daga, Sri Sandeep Kumar
Srivastava

Dischare Application dismissed by Court
below-Submission is pure questions of
fact-can be adequately adjudicated in
Trial-Charge sheet makes a prima facie
case-no justifiable ground to set aside the
impugned order.

Criminal Revision dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
themselves moved up to this Court
invoking powers under Section - 482
Cr.P.C. and this Court was kind enough to
the
parents,
while
it
accorded
full
opportunity of hearing on the issue of
custodial
order
in
question
and
its
authenticity.

11. This Court after considering the
entirety of this matter, in view of the
factual dispute and conflicting claims
raised by both the sides, concludes that
the medical examination report would
prevail
and
according
to
medical
examination report, the Medical Board
assessed the age to be around 18 to 19
years. On the basis of above, the order
impugned
is
sustained
and
no
interference is required.

12. However, it is open to the trial
court
to
scrutinise
the
aspect
of
minority/majority and that question will
remain open till evidence is adduced led
by both the sides and scrutiny is done.
This Court, accordingly, disposes of the
custodial matter and for that reason alone,
observations made hereinabove on point
of age of the victim should never come in
the way of the trial court, while
ascertaining
the
question
of
minority/majority of the victim.

13. Consequently, the lower court is
free to exercise its jurisdiction in right
perspective in accordance with law in
arriving at proper conclusion regarding
the age of the victim.

14. With the aforesaid observations,
this revision stands disposed of.
----------

(2020)11ILR A316
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.09.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1521 of 2020

Sohanveer Singh ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Amit Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Amit Daga, Sri Sandeep Kumar
Srivastava

Dischare Application dismissed by Court
below-Submission is pure questions of
fact-can be adequately adjudicated in
Trial-Charge sheet makes a prima facie
case-no justifiable ground to set aside the
impugned order.

Criminal Revision dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs St. of Mah. reported
in 2002 (44) ACC 447 SC;

2. Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Private Ltd. Vs
Sanjay Chaudhary & ors. reported in 2009 (64)
ACC 454; 4

3. P. Vijayan Vs St. of Ker. & anr. reported in
(2010) 2 SC 398;

4. L. Krishna Reddy Vs State by Station House
Officer & ors. reported in 2013 (83) ACC 947
(SC) 5. Geeta Mehrotra Vs St. of U.P. reported in
U.P. 2013 (80) ACC.

6. St. of Orissa Vs Debendra Nath Padhi
reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568,

7. State (NCT OF DELHI) Vs Shiv Charan Bansal
& ors. (2020) 2 SCC 290,
11 All. Sohanveer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
317
8. M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs C.B.I., Bengaluru
reported in 2020 AIR (SC) 331.

9.St. of Bihar Vs Ramesh Singh reported in 1977
(4) SCC 39

10.Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs, West Bengal Vs Anil Kumar Bhunja
reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 52

11. f Palwinder Singh Vs Balvinder Singh
reported in AIR 2009 SC 887

12. Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay
Choudhary reported in AIR 2009 SC 9

13. R.P. Kapur Vs St. of Punjab reported in AIR
1960 SC 866

14. St. of Har. Vs Bhajan Lal reported in 1992
SCC(Cr.) 426

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani
Chauhan, J.)

1. This criminal revision U/s 397/401
Cr.P.C. has been filed against the the order
passed
by
the
Additional
Sessions
Judge/Special Judge (POCSO-III), Amroha
in Sessions Trial No. 296 of 2019 (State
Vs. Sohanveer Singh) arising out of Case
Crime No. 93 of 2018, under Sections 420,
406, 498-A, 307, 323, 504 I.P.C. as also
under Sections 3/4 D.P. Act, Police StationDidauli,
District-Amroha,
whereby
discharge
application
filed
by
the
revisionist under Section 227 I.P.C. has
been rejected.

2. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Srivastava,
learned counsel for the revisionist, Mr.
Amit Daga, learned counsel for opposite
party no.2 and the learned A.G.A. for the
State as well as perused the entire material
available on record.

3. The facts, which are born out from
the records of the present criminal revision
are as follows:

The marriage of Sameer Malik,
son of the present revisionist, namely,
Sohanveer Singh has been solemnized on
23rd November, 2010 with opposite party
no.2, namely, Jyoti in accordance with
Hindu Rites and Rituals. However, after
some time, the relationship between the
husband and wife became strained and
incompatible due to which the opposite
party no.2 has lodged first information
report on 17th March, 2018, which has
been registered as Case Crime No. 93 of
2018, under Sections 420, 406, 498-A, 307,
323, 504 I.P.C. as also under Sections 3/4
D.P. Act, Police Station-Didauli, DistrictAmroha against revisionist (father-in-law,
Anupam Singh (mother-in-law), Sameer
Malik (husband) and Shweta Malik (sisterin-law). After registration of the aforesaid
first information report, the revisionist and
other
named
accused
persons
had
approached this Court by means of
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9838 of
2018, wherein their arrest had been stayed
till submission of the Police report by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order
dated 18th April, 2018. After completing
statutory investigation under Chapter XII
Cr.P.C. the Police has submitted chargesheet on 7th July, 2018 against the
revisionist, his wife and son, namely,
Anupam
Singh
and
Sameer
Malik
respectively under Sections 420, 406, 498A, 307, 323, 504 I.P.C. as also under
Sections 3/4 D.P. Act, whereas the
daughter of the revisionist, namely, Shweta
Malik
has
been
exonerated
by
the
Investigating Officer. On the charge-sheet
being submitted, cognizance was taken by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amroha vide
order dated 19th September, 2018 and the
case has been registered as Criminal Case
No. 9086 of 2018 (State Vs. Sameer Malik
& Others). Thereafter the revisionist has
been granted bail by a Coordinate Bench of
318 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this Court vide order dated 18th February,
2019 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 7104 of 2019. Thereafter
the revisionist has filed a discharge
application in Sessions Trial No. 296 of
2019, which has been rejected by the court
below vide order dated 2nd September,
2020. It is against this order that the present
criminal revision has been filed.

4. Mr. Amit Kumar Srivastava,
learned counsel for the revisionist submits
that the revisionist, who is 70 years old, is
the father-in-law of opposite party no.2.
Being the father-in-law, he has been falsely
implicated in the present case. Neither in
the statements of witnesses nor in the first
information report, any specific allegation
qua demand of dowry or harassment of
opposite party no.2 by the revisionist, has
been levelled against him. Only general and
vague allegations have been made against
the revisionist without any clinching
evidence.
Specific
allegations
of
harassment and attempt to kill opposite
party no.2 has been levelled against his
daughter, namely, Shweta Malik but she
has been exonerated by the Investigating
Officer, which also makes the prosecution
story doubtful. He further submits that
prima facie no offence under Sections 420,
406, 498-A, 307, 323, 504 I.P.C. as also
under Sections 3/4 D.P. Act is made out
against the revisionist. Learned counsel for
the revisionist next submits that the court
below
has
rejected
the
discharge
application of the revisionist by means of
the order impugned, only on the basis of
statements of two witnesses, namely,
Aditya Khatri and Mahendra Khatri,
whereas their names were not mentioned in
the charge-sheet as witnesses, therefore, the
order impugned is per se illegal. It is
further submitted that the prosecution story
is not supported by any medical evidence,
as the present case is a case of no injury,
whereas
the
revisionist
is
facing
prosecution under Sections 307 and 323
I.P.C., which also makes the prosecution
story doubtful. It is further submitted that
the revisionist has neither taken any dowry
from opposite party no.2 nor he harassed
her for the same, while on the other hand
the revisionist purchased a property in the
name of opposite party no.2 and gave
financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 84
lacs. to opposite party no.2 and her family
members. There is no independent or
public witnesses on the basis of which it
can be said that the revisionist has
committed any offence as alleged. It is then
submitted that the investigation in the
present case was done in a most illegal
manner. It is lastly submitted that the once
the investigation is illegal, the charge-sheet
on the basis of such illegal investigation
has no legs to stand and entire proceedings
are liable to be quashed. In support of his
plea, he has placed reliance upon following
judgments of the Apex Court and this
Court:

1. Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State
of Maharastra reported in 2002 (44) ACC
447 SC;

2.
Sanghi
Brothers
(Indore)
Private Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Chaudhary &
Others reported in 2009 (64) ACC 454;

3. P. Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala
& Another reported in (2010) 2 SC 398;

4. L. Krishna Reddy Vs. State by
Station House Officer & Others reported in
2013 (83) ACC 947 (SC) and

5. Geeta Mehrotra Vs. State of
U.P. reported in U.P. 2013 (80) ACC.

On the cumulative strength of the
aforesaid,
learned
counsel
for
the
revisionist submits that the order impugned
rejecting the discharge application is illegal
and liable to be set aside.
11 All. Sohanveer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
319

5. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the
State and Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel
for opposite party no.2 submit that the
order of the court below rejecting the
discharge application has been passed on
the basis of oral as well as documentary
evidence as collected during the course of
investigation as well as on the basis of
statements
of
independent
witnesses
recorded before the court below. Therefore,
the same is not liable to be set aside by this
Court while exercising its power in
revisional jurisdiction.

Mr. Amit Daga, learned counsel
for opposite party no.2 further submits that
the necessary ingredients which requires to
constitute the alleged offence against
accused persons including the revisionist
are available in the first information report
as well as in the statements of witnesses
recorded by the Investigating Officer
during the course of investigation and in
series of judgments, the Apex Court as well
as this Court have settled that if the
material available on record, discloses
grave suspicion against the accused, then
the charges will be framed to proceed
against the accused. Probative value of
evidence (material) as brought on record
cannot be gone into before or at the stage of
framing of charges. It is further submitted
that there are specific and ample allegations
against the revisionist that he along with
co-accused persons harassed, ill-treated and
tortured the informant (opposite party no.2)
for non-fulfillment of additional demand of
dowry. As per the version of the first
information report and the statements of the
witnesses, it is evident that the revisionist
and
other
co-accused
persons
are
responsible for harassment of opposite
party no.2 for non-fulfillment of additional
demand of dowry. As per the material
available on record, there are specific
allegations of receiving dowry to the tune
of Rs. 5 lacs by the revisionist and other
co-accused persons at the time of marriage
and for non-fulfillment of additional
demand of dowry, they harassed and
tortured her and tried to kill her also in the
month of April, 2015. It is further
submitted
that
the
statements
of
independent witnesses, namely, Rakesh
Kumar & Sm. Shobha Devi recorded by the
Investigating Officer will clearly go to
show that on 14th March, 2018 at about
06:00 p.m., the accused persons including
the revisionist visited the parental house of
opposite party no.2 and beat opposite party
no.2 and her father brutally. It is also
submitted that from the material available
on record, it will also go to show that
accused revisionist being head of his family
concealed the material fact regarding
education, employment and mental state of
his son Sameer while solemnizing his
marriage with opposite party no.2, which
makes the case of cheating and harassment
of opposite party no.2. It is lastly submitted
that entire material available on record in
the shape of first information report as well
as statement of witnesses discloses the
cognizable
offence
punishable
under
Sections 420, 406, 498-A, 307, 323, 504
I.P.C. as also under Sections 3/4 D.P. Act
against the accused persons including the
revisionist and thus, the revisionist cannot
be discharged at this stage.

In support of his case, Mr. Daga
has relied upon following judgments of the
Apex Court:

1. State of Orissa Vs. Debendra
Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568,

2. State (NCT OF DELHI) Vs.
Shiv Charan Bansal & Others reported in
(2020) 2 SCC 290, and

3. M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru
reported in 2020 AIR (SC) 331.
320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

On the cumulative strength of the
aforesaid, Mr. Daga submits that the order
passed by the court below rejecting the
discharge application of the revisionist is
within the four corners of law and does not
suffer from any illegality and infirmity.
Thus, the same deserves to upheld and the
present revision is liable to be dismissed.

6. I have considered the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties
and have gone through the records of the
present criminal revision.

7. All the contentions raised by the
revisionist's counsel relate to disputed
questions of fact. The court has also been
called upon to adjudge the testimonial
worth of prosecution evidence and evaluate
the same on the basis of various intricacies
of factual details which have been touched
upon by the learned counsel. The veracity
and credibility of material furnished on
behalf of the prosecution has been
questioned and false implication has been
pleaded.

8. Before proceeding to adjudge the
validity of the impugned order it may be
useful to cast a fleeting glance to some of
the representative cases decided by the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
which
have
expatiated upon the legal approach to be
adopted at the time of framing of the
charge or at the time of deciding whether
the accused ought to be discharged. It shall
be
advantageous
to
refer
to
the
observations made by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of State of Bihar vs.
Ramesh Singh reported in 1977 (4) SCC
39 which are as follows :-

"4. Under S. 226 of the Code
while opening the case for the prosecution
the prosecutor has got to describe the
charge against the accused and State by
what evidence he proposes to prove the
guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at
the initial stage, the duty of the Court to
consider the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith and to hear
the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has
to pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227
or u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his
reasons for so doing", so enjoined by s.
227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of
opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence
which ......................................

(b) in exclusively triable by the
court, he shall frame in writing a charge
against the accused," as provided in S. 228.

Reading
the
two
provisions
together in juxtaposition, as they have got
to be, it would be clear that at the
beginning and the initial stage of the trial
the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence
which the prosecutor proposes to adduce
are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is
any weight to be attached to the probable
defence of the accused. It is not obligatory
for the Judge at that stage of the trial to
consider in any detail and weigh in a
sensitive balance whether the facts, if
proved, would be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or not. The
standard of test and judgment which is to
be finally applied before recording a
finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of
the accused is not exactly to be applied at
this stage of deciding the matter under s.
227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the
court is not to see whether there is
sufficient ground for conviction of the
accused or whether the trial is sure to end
in his conviction. Strong suspicion against
11 All. Sohanveer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
321
the accused, if the matter remains in the
region of suspicion, cannot take the place
of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the
trial. But at the initial stage if there is a
strong suspicion which leads the court to
think that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence
then it is not open to the court to say that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The presumption of
the guilt of the accused which is to be
drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense
of the law governing the trial of criminal
cases in France where the accused is
presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is
proved. But it is only for the purpose of
deciding prima facie whether the court
should proceed with the trial or not. If the
evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused
even if fully accepted before it is
challenged
in
cross-examination
or
rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show
that the accused committed the offence,
there will be no sufficient ground for
proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list
of the circumstances to indicate as to what
will lead to one conclusion or the other is
neither possible nor advisable. We may just
illustrate the difference of the law by one
more example. If the scales of pan as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused are
something like even at the conclusion of the
trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt
the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on
the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of
making an order under S. 227 or S. 228,
then in such a situation ordinarily and
generally the order which will have to be
made will be one under S. 228 and not
under S. 227."

9. Aforesaid case was again referred
to in another Apex Court's decision
Superintendent and Remembrancer of
Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil
Kumar Bhunja reported in AIR 1980 (SC)
52 and the Apex Court proceeded to
observe as follows:

"18. It may be remembered that
the case was at the stage of framing
charges; the prosecution evidence had not
yet commenced. The Magistrate had,
therefore, to consider the above question
on a general consideration of the materials
placed before him by the investigating
police officer. At this stage, as was pointed
out by this Court in State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the
truth, veracity and effect of the evidence
which the prosecutor proposes to adduce
are not to be meticulously judged. The
standard of test, proof and judgment which
is to be applied finally before finding the
accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly
to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or
228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. At this stage, even a very strong
suspicion founded upon materials before
the Magistrate, which leads him to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of
the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged; may justify the framing of
charge against the accused in respect of the
commission of that offence."

10. In yet another case of Palwinder
Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh reported in
AIR 2009 SC 887 the Apex Court had the
occasion to reflect upon the scope of
adjudication and its ambit at the time of
framing of the charge and also about the
scope to consider the material produced by
the accused at that stage. Following extract
may be profitably quoted to clarify the
situation:

"12.
Having
heard
learned
counsel for the parties, we are of the
322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
opinion that the High Court committed a
serious error in passing the impugned
judgment insofar as it entered into the
realm of appreciation of evidence at the
stage of the framing of the charges itself.
The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions
Judge while exercising power under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is limited. Charges can be
framed also on the basis of strong
suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of
evidence is not in the domain of the Court
at that point of time. This aspect of the
matter has been considered by this Court in
state of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi,
(2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as
under:

"23. As a result of the aforesaid
discussion, in our view, clearly the law is
that at the time of framing charge or taking
cognizance the accused has no right to
produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case
holding that the trial Court has powers to
consider even materials which the accused
may produce at the stage of Section 227 of
the Code has not been correctly decided."

11. The following observations made
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Sanjay Choudhary reported in AIR 2009
SC 9 also reiterated the same position of
law :-

"10.
After
analyzing
the
terminology used in the three pairs of
sections it was held that despite the
differences there is no scope for doubt that
at the stage at which the Court is required
to consider the question of framing of
charge, the test of a prima facie case to be
applied.

11. The present case is not one
where the High Court ought to have
interfered with the order of framing the
charge. As rightly submitted by learned
counsel for the appellant, even if there is a
strong suspicion about the commission of
offence and the involvement of the accused,
it is sufficient for the Court to frame a
charge. At that stage, there is no necessity
of formulating the opinion about the
prospect of conviction. That being so, the
impugned order of the High Court cannot
be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is
allowed."

12. In fact while exercising the
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. or while wielding the powers under
Section 226 of the Constitution of India the
quashing of the complaint can be done only
if it does not disclose any offence or if
there is any legal bar which prohibits the
proceedings on its basis. The Apex Court
decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of
Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 and
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported
in 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 make the position of
law in this regard clear recognizing certain
categories by way of illustration which may
justify the quashing of a complaint or
charge sheet.

13. In the case of State (NCT OF
DELHI) (Supra), which has been relied
upon by the learned counsel for opposite
party no.2, tahe Apex Court in paragraph
nos. 39 and 40 has observed as follows:

"39. The Court while considering
the question of framing charges under
Section 227 of the Cr.P.C has the power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a
prima facie case has been made out against
the accused. The test to determine prima
facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case. If the material placed before the
court discloses grave suspicion against the
11 All. Sohanveer Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
323
accused, which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in
framing charges and proceeding with the
trial. The probative value of the evidence
brought on record cannot be gone into at
the stage of framing charges. The Court is
required to evaluate the material and
documents on record with a view to find
out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at
their face value disclose the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At this
stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into
the pros and cons of the matter, the
evidence is not to be weighed as if a trial is
being conducted. Reliance is placed on the
Judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh where it has been held that
at the stage of framing charges under
Sections 227 or 228 of the Cr.P.C., if there
is a strong suspicion which leads the Court
to think that there is ground for presuming
that the accused had committed the offence,
then the Court should proceed with the
trial. (1977) 4 SCC 39.

40.
In
a
recent
Judgment
delivered in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra
Patel v. State of Gujarat and Another in
Crl. Appeal No. 714 of 2019 decided on
24.04.2019, this Court has laid down the
law relating to framing of charges and
discharge, and held that all that is required
is that the court must be satisfied with the
material available, that a case is made out
for the accused to stand trial. A strong
suspicion is sufficient for framing charges,
which must be founded on some material.
The material must be such which can be
translated into evidence at the stage of
trial. The veracity and effect of the
evidence which the prosecutor proposes to
adduce are not to be meticulously judged at
this stage, nor is any weight to be attached
to the probable defence of the accused at
the stage of framing charges. The court is
not to consider whether there is sufficient
ground for conviction of the accused, or
whether the trial is sure to end in the
conviction."

14. Illumined by the case law referred
to herein above, this Court has adverted to
the entire record of the case.

15. The submissions made by the
revisionist's
learned
counsel
call
for
adjudication on pure questions of fact
which may be adequately adjudicated upon
only by the trial court and while doing so
even the submissions made on points of
law can also be more appropriately gone
into by the trial court in this case. This
Court does not deem it proper, and
therefore cannot be persuaded to have a
pre-trial before the actual trial begins. A
threadbare discussion of various facts and
circumstances, as they emerge from the
allegations made against the accused, is
being purposely avoided by the Court for
the reason, lest the same might cause any
prejudice to either side during trial. But it
shall suffice to observe that the perusal of
the F.I.R. and the material collected by the
Investigating Officer on the basis of which
the charge sheet has been submitted makes
out a prima facie case against the accused
at this stage and this Court does not find
any justifiable ground to set aside the
impugned order refusing the discharge of
the accused. This court has not been able to
persuade itself to hold that no case against
the accused has been made out or to hold
that the charge is groundless.

16. The prayer for quashing or setting
aside the impugned order is refused as I do
not see any illegality, impropriety and
incorrectness in the impugned order or the
proceedings under challenge. There is
absolutely no abuse of court's process
perceptible in the same. The present matter
324 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
also does not fall in any of the categories
recognized by the Apex Court which might
justify interference by this Court in order to
upset or quash them.
----------
(2020)11ILR A324
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.11.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAM KRISHNA GAUTAM, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1858 of 2020

Anup Sahani ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri S.K. Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Impugned
order
passed
directiong
Rs.3000/- as maintainance to wife-alleged
violation of natural justice as objection was
not considered-alleges mandatory provision
of calling report from District probation
Officer not complied-3000/- is a meagre
amount and Revisionist is duty bound to
maintain his wife.

Revision dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases Cited:-

1. Kirtikant D adodaria Vs St. of Guj. (1996) 4 SCC

2.Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel Vs Vatslaben Ashokbhai
Patel & ors. (2008) 4 SCC

3.Bhuwan Mohan Singh Vs Meena & ors. (2015) 6
SCC 353

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ram Krishna Gautam, J.)

1. This Criminal Revision, under
Section 397/401 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, has been filed by Anup Sahani,
with a prayer for setting aside the
impugned orders dated 12.10.2020 passed
by the Court of Additional District and
Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, P.O.C.S.O.
Act-3, Gorakhpur, in Criminal Appeal No.
19 of 2018, Anup Sahani vs. State of U.P.
and another, under Section, 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, as well as order dated
08.02.2018 passed by the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate/Additional Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Court No. 4, Gorakhpur,
in case No. 61 of 2016, Smt. Sangam Devi
vs. Anup Sahani and others, under Section
12 of the Domestic Violence Act, Police
Station-Gorakhnath, District-Gorakhpur.

2. Learned counsel for applicant
argued, that both of the Courts below failed
to appreciate facts and law placed before
them and passed impugned orders, which
are apparently erroneous on the face of it.
There is under exercise of jurisdiction
vested in both the above Courts. The
impugned order is under violation of
natural justice. Objection was raised before
the trial Court. But the same were not
considered and an amount of Rs. 3,000/-, as
maintenance, per month, was directed to be
paid to the opposite party no. 2 from the
date of application i.e. 30.10.2017 and it
was illegal. There is mandatory provision
under the provisions of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, that
firstly the report of District Probation
Officer is to be called for and thenafter,
case is to be initiated. But, this was not
obeyed, hence, the order was challenged
before the appellate Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 19 of 2018, Anup Sahani vs.
State of U.P., wherein, again reiteration
was
there
but,
the
appellate
Court
dismissed the appeal. Hence this revision,
with above prayer.