# Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 550
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-18
- **Bench:** Pramod Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sohanveer-v-chaman-lal-kapoor-43869
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Indian Easements Act, 1882 - Section 60 - Licence - Revocability -
Permanent construction - Concurrent findings of fact - Second Appeal -Section 100 CPC Where the
defendant was inducted into the disputed property as a licensee,Revocation of licence by the licensor entitles
him to seek eviction, unless the Licensee proves that, acting upon the licence, he executed a work of
permanent Character with the permission of the licensor - Mere existence of tin-shed or Minor structures, not
raised pursuant to the licence, does not render the licence Irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Easements
Act - Alleged oral agreement to sell not proved - Findings that no permanent construction was raised by the
Licensee being pure findings of fact, concurrently recorded by the trial court and First appellate court, do not
give rise to any substantial question of law - High Court, in second appeal, cannot re-appreciate evidence -
Second appeal
Dismissed.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:

## Text

550 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
44. Lastly coming to the decision of Srichand K. Khetwani Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),
there also eight licenses issued were held to be part of same conspiracy. For the reasons stated in S.
Swamirathnam Vs. State of Madras (supra) even this judgment does not help the revisionist in any
manner.

45. Further, I find that here is not a case of order of conviction or a completed trial which is
challenged on the ground of double jeopardi etc. When the principle of issue of estoppel is argued, principle
of double jeopardy stands excluded. The two principles are different. Here is a case where we have to
examine whether Sessions Court was justified in framing charge against revisionist or not. From the
discussion made by Sessions Judge in the order of framing charge, this Court is satisfied that there is
sufficient material to frame charge under Section 120B I.P.C. against revisionist. In the process of trial, if
some individual evidence is led or some evidence is led which, according to revisionist, ought not to have
been considered, it is always open to him to raise permissible arguments in the Trial Court but that will not
vitiate the charge framed against accused-revisionist so as to justify interference at this stage.

46. This revision is thoroughly misconceived and to my mind has been filed with an intention to
delay trial in which revisionist has substantially succeeded by delaying proceedings by one and half decade.
It is really unfortunate that such revision, which ought to have been decided at much earlier stage, has
remained pending in this Court for almost more than 15 years in a matter where public money from a Bank
has been looted where accused-revisionist is Bank Manager and his complicity in the matter is under trial.

47. In this backdrop, this Court is of the view that Trial Court shall now proceed with matter
expeditiously and the prosecution will also co-operate to complete trial expeditiously and, in any case, within
one year from the date of production of certified copy of this order.

48. With the aforesaid observations, revision is dismissed.

49. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

50. Certify this judgment to the Lower Court immediately.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Second Appeal No.- 1030 Of 2015

Sohanveer ...Appellant
Versus
Chaman Lal Kapoor ...Respondent
5 All. Sohanveer Vs Chaman Lal Kapoor

551
Counsel for the Appellant:
Karan Prakash Tiwari, Pradhumn Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sunil Vashisth

Indian Easements Act, 1882 - Section 60 - Licence - Revocability -
Permanent construction - Concurrent findings of fact - Second Appeal -Section 100 CPC Where the
defendant was inducted into the disputed property as a licensee,Revocation of licence by the licensor entitles
him to seek eviction, unless the Licensee proves that, acting upon the licence, he executed a work of
permanent Character with the permission of the licensor - Mere existence of tin-shed or Minor structures, not
raised pursuant to the licence, does not render the licence Irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Easements
Act - Alleged oral agreement to sell not proved - Findings that no permanent construction was raised by the
Licensee being pure findings of fact, concurrently recorded by the trial court and First appellate court, do not
give rise to any substantial question of law - High Court, in second appeal, cannot re-appreciate evidence -
Second appeal
Dismissed.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

2. It is admitted case of the parties that the appellant Sohanveer had permitted appellant to
reside over disputed property. When the respondent gave a notice of eviction to appellant, then
appellant had instituted original suit no. 439/ 2006 (Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor & Anr.)
against the respondent for the relief of permanent injunction restraining him to evict from the
disputed property. It is also admitted that the respondents had filed original suit no. 754/2006
(Chaman Lal Kapoor v. Sohanveer) against appellant for his eviction from disputed property.
Thereafter the appellant had instituted another original suit number 20/2007 (Sohanveer v. Chaman
Lal Kapoor & Anr.) for the relief of specific performance of alleged oral contract allegedly entered
between the parties for the sale of disputed property.

3. These three suits no. 439/2006, no. 754/2006 and no. 20/2007 were consolidated, and
were decided by a common judgment dated 23.10.2013 of Additional Civil Judge, (Sr. Div.), Court
number 6, Meerut. By this judgment original suit number 429/2006 and original suit no. 20/2007
were dismissed, whereas original suit no. 754/2006 (Chaman Lal Kapoor v. Sohanveer) for eviction
of appellant was decreed.

4. Against the judgment of trial Court dated 23.10.2013 three appeals were preferred by the
appellant. Against the judgment of leading case O.S. no. 439/2006 the Civil Appeal no. 270/2013
was filed, against the judgment of case no. 754/2006 the Civil Appeal no. 271/2013 was filed, and
552 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
against the judgment of original suit number 20/2007 Civil Appeal no. 272/2013 was filed by
present appellant.

5. Above mentioned three Civil Appeals were heard separately by Additional District
Judge, Court no.-1, Meerut, and were separately decided on 31.08.2015. This lower appellate Court
had afforded opportunity of hearing but the parties and dismissed the three appeals.

6. Against the judgments of lower Court dated 23.10.2013 in three appeals the appellant
had preferred three Second Appeals. Against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 270/2013 the
Second Appeal no. 1031/2015 was filed, against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 271/2013 the
Second Appeal no. 1030/ 2015 was filed, and against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 272/2013
the Second Appeal no. 1029/2015 was filed by present appellant.

7. The pleading of appellant in trial court was that defendant respondent had entered into in
an agreement for sale with the plaintiff appellant, under which the defendant respondent had
received amount of Rs. 50,600/- cash on 7.02.1985 from plaintiff appellant and handed over the
possession of disputed property to plaintiff. At that time it was agreed between the parties that after
obtaining permission from a authorities concerned, the defendant will execute registered sale-deed
of said property in favour of plaintiff. After that, plaintiff had developed the land in question and
the started business of dairy. Defendant had been promising to execute a sale-deed of disputed
property in favour of plaintiff, but had never executed the same. On 14.05.2006 the defendant
asked the plaintiff to vacate the disputed land and threatened to evict, then plaintiff had filed an suit
no. 439/2006 for permanent injunction.

8. After the institution of original suit number 439/2006 (Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor
& Anr.), the respondent had filed original suit number 754/2006 (Chaman Lal Kapoor v.
Sohanveer) for eviction of appellant Sohanveer from disputed property. In the suit it was pleaded
that Sohanveer was admitted on disputed property as licensee, but his lisense had been the revoked,
therefore he is liable for eviction.

9. After the institution of original suit number 439/2006 and original suit number
754/2006; the appellant Sohanvee had instituted another original suit number 20/2007 for the
specific performance of an alleged oral agreement of sale, and prayed that defendant respondent be
directed to execute the sale deed of disputed property in favour of plaintiff. In the suit alternative
relief of a refund of alleged advance sale consideration of Rs. 50,600/-was sought.

10. The trial Court had admitted written-statements in aforesaid three original suits, framed
issues, consolidated them, accepted evidences of the parties and then, after affording opportunity of
hearing parties, and decided that the three suits against appellant Sohanveer. In this judgment trial
Court had given specific finding that appellant has failed to prove his case of oral agreement of sale
in his favour.
5 All. Sohanveer Vs Chaman Lal Kapoor

553
11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant/defendant was admitted in
disputed property as licensee and has raised permanent construction over it. Therefore, his license
cannot be revoked by licensee plaintiff/respondent. These points were not considered by lower
courts who passed erroneous judgment, therefore appeal should be admitted for being allowed.

12. Learned counsel for the respondent refuted the contention of appellant side and
submitted that no permanent construction was raised by defendant/appellant and there are
concurrent findings of two lower courts on this point. He further submitted that defendant/appellant
was admitted in disputed property as licensee, and admittedly his license has been revoked,
therefore he is liable to be evicted. He contended that there has been concurrent finding of facts that
defendant/appellant cannot restrain plaintiff/respondent from evicting him and both the courts have
given correct findings of fact on this point. The judgments of lower courts are not erroneous or
perverse; so appeal should be dismissed.

13. A perusal of the record reveals that defendant/appellant had been taking defences about
his alleged oral agreement to sell and raising the permanent construction etc. but the same could not
be proved by him. From the evidences, it was found that initial constructions present on disputed
property were raised by plaintiff/respondent which are at present in form of tin-shed . Only putting
tin-shed on the walls constructed by the plaintiff cannot be treated as construction raised by
defendant/appellant. It is pertinent to mention that after appreciating the evidences, both the courts
had given concurrent finding that no construction of permanent nature was raised by appellant.
Even in his pleading he had not taken any specific plea of raising specific constructions. The
finding in this regard of two lower courts are based on appreciation of evidences and are correct
and acceptable.

14. Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act reads as under:-

"60. License when revocable.-- A license may be revoked by the grantor, unless-

(a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force;

(b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent
character and incurred expenses in the execution."

15. In present matter, from the adduced evidences, plaintiff could not prove that he had
raised the constructions on disputed property. Apart from it had not pleaded that any such alleged
construction was with permission of plaintiff or was in accordance with the terms of license or
acting upon the license. As discussed in Section 60 (b) that a license may be revoked by the
character by the grantor unless the licensee has executed a work of permanent character, acting
upon the license. "Acting upon the license" means acting upon right granted to do upon premises of
grantor something which would have been unlawful in absence of such right. The construction of
permanent works itself would not render a license irrevocable unless such construction had been
made by the licensee in pursuance of the license granted to him. Construction of building on land,
554 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
when the license was not granted for building purposes, would not attract the provisions of Section
60 and render license irrevocable.

16. The only dispute in this matter is as to whether the defendant/appellant being licensee
is liable for eviction of disputed property or not ,and this point has been rightly decided by the two
lower courts that defendant/appellant cannot get relief of injunction restraining his eviction and
plaintiff/respondent cannot get relief of injunction restraining his eviction and plaintiff/respondent
having revoked his license, is entitled for relief of eviction of defendant. The other point to be
determined in this matter was relating to alleged permanent construction raised by
defendant/appellant. This was not a question of law but was a question of fact that could be decided
on the basis of evidences as has been done by the lower courts. Although, it has been mentioned in
written-statement that defendant/appellant had filled some pit but there is no specific pleading that
constructions present over disputed property were raised or constructed by appellant, and that too
acting upon the license or with permission of the grantor of the license. Therefore, status of
defendant/appellant is that of trespasser, who was earlier a licensee but whose license had been
revoked, so he is liable for eviction. There appears no error or infirmity in judgment of both the
lower courts.

17. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the
learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial court as
well as the first appellate court are well reasoned, based upon proper appreciation of the entire
evidence on record. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law was involved in the
case before the High Court. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference
in this appeal. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant- plaintiffs can be
sustained.

18. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this
appeal. The second appeal is dismissed.
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REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.5.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.

Criminal Revision No.- 1168 Of 2016

Manoj Kumar & Ors. ...Revisionists
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists: