# Sohrab Ali v. D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 1 ILRA 236
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-01-10
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 1007413 of 2012
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sohrab-ali-v-d-m-pratapgarh-anr-51125
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Arms Act, 1959-Section
17(3)(c)-cancellation
of
licencesuppression of information with regard to
the pending criminal cases-cancellation of
licence of the petitioner on the ground of
pendency has wrongly been decided by
the Prescribed Authority as well as
Appellate
authority-Finding
being
arbitrary
are
set
aside-Prescribed
authority has not considered the aspect of
the material suppression information at
the time of granting arm licence is an
issue for which the matter is remitted to
the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh for
passing afresh orders.

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
preliminary objection of the applicant that
whether he was posted at the relevant
point in time or not at the Tanda Branch.

15.

In
view
of
the
above
discussions,
this
Court
finds
that
impugned order dated 27.05.2019 passed
by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)
suffers with material lacunae which was
not considered by the Court.

16. Hence the impugned order dated
is quashed

17. The matter is remitted to the
court concerned. The trial court shall
consider the fact whether the revisionist
was posted at the relevant point in time in
Branch Tanda or not and if it is found
that he was not posted and and he has no
complicity,
then
he
consider
the
application
of
discharge
of
the
revisionist. The trial court is also directed
to give opportunity of hearing to the
parties.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 236
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ-C No. 1007413 of 2012

Sohrab Ali ...Petitioner
Versus
D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Manish Jauhari, Ambuj Kumar Bajpai,
Dinesh Kumar Ojha, Mohit Jauhari

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
A. Criminal Law - Arms Act, 1959-Section
17(3)(c)-cancellation
of
licencesuppression of information with regard to
the pending criminal cases-cancellation of
licence of the petitioner on the ground of
pendency has wrongly been decided by
the Prescribed Authority as well as
Appellate
authority-Finding
being
arbitrary
are
set
aside-Prescribed
authority has not considered the aspect of
the material suppression information at
the time of granting arm licence is an
issue for which the matter is remitted to
the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh for
passing afresh orders.

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ram Murti Madhukar Vs D.M. Sitapur (1998)
16 LCD-905

2. Ram Karpal Singh Vs Commr.Devi Patan
Mandal Gonda & ors.(2006) 24 LCD 114

3. Ram Prasad Vs Commr. & ors.

4. Ganesh Chandra Bhatt Vs D. M. Almora
(1993) AIR All 291

5. Habib Vs St. of U.P.(2022) ACC

6. Masiuddin Vs Commr. Alld. Div. Alld. & anr.
(1972) ALJ 573

7. Chhanga Prasad Sahu Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.(1984) AWC 145 FB

8. Ilam Singh Vs Commr. Meerut Div. &
ors.(1987) ALL LJ 416

9. Habib Vs St. of U.P. & ors.(2002) 44 ACC 783

10. Satish Singh Vs D.M. Sultanpur (2009) 4
ADJ 33 LB

11. Thakur Prasad Vs St. of U.P. & ors.(2013)
31 LCD 1460 LB

12. Ram Murli Madhukar Vs D.M. Sitapur
(1998) 16 LCD 905
1 All. Sohrab Ali Vs. D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr.
237
13. Ghanshyam Gupta Vs St. of U.P &
ors.(2016) 34 LCD 3035

14. Surya Narain Mishra Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.(2015) 7 ADJ 510

15. Raj Kumar Verma Vs St. of U.P. (2013) 80
ACC 231

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

(1). Heard Shri Dinesh Kumar Ojha,
learned counsel for petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel for the State.

(2). At the very outset, learned
counsel for petitioner submits that due to
inadvertent the challenge to the impugned
orders could not be incorporated in the
prayer clause and consequently, prays
that he may be permitted to assail the
validity of the impugned orders dated
06.09.2007
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh under Section 17
(3) (b) of the Arms Act and dated
21.11.2007
passed
by
learned
Commissioner,
Allahabad
Division,
Allahabad.

(3). Learned Standing Counsel for
the State did not object the same.

(4). Accordingly, the prayer of the
petitioner is allowed and the petitioner is
permitted
to
incorporate
necessary
amendment in the prayer clause during
the course of the day.

(5). By means of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has challenged the
impugned orders dated 06.09.2007 passed
by the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh
under Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act
and also order dated 21.11.2007 passed by
learned Commissioner, Allahabad Division,
Allahabad.

(6). It has been submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner
moved an application to the District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh to grant him SBBL
Gun Licence on account of the fact that the
father of the petitioner was murdered in the
year 1997 on 11.04.1997. It is further
submitted that a criminal case was
registered against the petitioner before the
murder of this father in Case Crime No.
148 of 1996, under Sections 307, 323 and
504 IPC, Police Station Sangipur, District
Pratapgarh. Subsequently, it seems that
petitioner was involved in another criminal
case in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006, under
Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and
Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act.

(7). In the aforesaid circumstances,
notice under Section 17 (3) of the Arms
Act was issued to the petitioner on
23.04.2007 asking him to show cause as to
why his arm licence should not be
cancelled. Apart from noticing that there
are two criminal cases lodged against the
petitioner, the licencing authority also
mentioned
that
the
petitioner
had
suppressed material information at the time
of grant of licence, inasmuch as, he had
concealed the fact that a criminal case in
Case Crime No. 148 of 1996, under
Sections 307, 323 and 504 IPC was
pending against him when he applied for
grant of arms licence. The petitioner replied
to the notice issued by the District
Magistrate
on
05.02.2007
and
after
consideration of his response, which was
found to be unsatisfactory, his licence was
cancelled.
While
cancelling
the
said
licence, the District Magistrate has invoked
the provisions of Section 17 (3) (c)/(b) of
the Arms Act. Against the order dated
06.09.2007
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh,
the
petitioner
238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
preferred
an
appeal
before
the
Commissioner,
Allahabad
Division,
Allahabad, who has also rejected his appeal
and affirmed the findings recorded by the
District Magistrate, Pratapgarh by means of
order dated 21.11.2007. Both the said
orders have been assailed by the petitioner
in the present writ petition.

(8). Learned counsel for petitioner has
submitted that in the year 1997 his father
was murdered and the petitioner faced with
the trauma of murder of his father and the
insecurity to his life and the existing threat
perception
had
to
make
an
urgent
application for grant of arms licence.
Considering the grave urgency and threat
to the life, the District Magistrate had
immediately granted him the licence. It is
stated that it is during those very dates
that the First Information Report was also
lodged against the petitioner in Case
Crime No. 148 of 1996 under Sections
307, 323 and 504 IPC where the
petitioner was implicated. He submits
that there was no deliberate suppression
of material information in his application
so as to invoke the provisions of section
17 (3) (c) of the Arms Act. he submits
that the District Magistrate has not
considered his response adequately. He
submits that on murder of his father he
was
traumatized
and
under
these
challenging
situation
hand
made
application for grant of arms licence.

(9). With regard to the involvement of
the petitioner in another criminal case in
Case Crime No. 40 of 2006, under Sections
307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section
7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, it
is submitted that there is no allegation of
use of arms by the petitioner and
consequently merely lodging of the FIR
against the petitioner cannot be a ground
for cancellation of arm licence. He further
submits that there are several judgments of
this Court and the law in this regard is
settled that merely due to pendency of
criminal cases, the arm licence cannot be
cancelled.

(10). It is further submitted that the
petitioner has been acquitted in Case Crime
No. 40 of 2006 under Sections 307, 323,
147, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 7 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act by means
of judgment dated 11.06.2010 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Pratapgarh.

(11). In support of his submission,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the judgments passed
by this Court in the cases of Ram Murti
Madhukar
vs.
District
Magistrate,
Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD-905], Ram
Karpal Singh vs. Commissioner, Devi
Patan Mandal, Gonda and Ors. [2006
(24) LCD 114] and Ram Prasad vs.
Commissioner and Ors. decided on
07.02.2020 in Writ-C No. 56378 of 2006,
wherein it has been held that mere
pendency
of
criminal
case
or
apprehension of misuse of arms are not
sufficient grounds for passing the order
of suspension or revocation of licence
under Section 17 of the Act.

(12). In Ram Murti Madhukar
(supra), this Court has held in paragraph
no. 8, is quoted as under :-

"(8) It is also well settled in law
that mere pendency of criminal case or
apprehension of abuse of Arms Act, are not
sufficient ground for passing of the order of
suspension or revocation of licence under
Section 17 of the Act. A reference in this
regard may be made to the decisions of this
1 All. Sohrab Ali Vs. D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr.
239
Court in Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. D. M.
Almora, AIR 1993 All 291"

(13). In the case of Ram Karpal
Singh (supra), this Court has held as
following in paragraph nos. 6 and 7 which
are being reproduced hereunder:-

'6, Learned counsel for the
petitioner
had
relied
upon
the
two
judgments of this Court reported in 2002
ACC; Habib v. State of U.P

7. Para 3 of the said judgment is
reproduced as under:

"Para 3: The question as to
whether mere involvement in a criminal
case or pendency of a criminal case can be
a ground for revocation of the license under
Arrns Act, has been deal with by a Division
Bench in this Court reported in Sheo Prasad
Misra v. The District Magistrate, Basti and
others, wherein the Division Bench relying
upon the earlier decision reported in Mai
Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, found
that mere involvement in criminal case
cannot be in any way affect the public
security or public interest and the order
canceling or revoking the .licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned order also suffers from the same
infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench that these
orders cannot be sustained and deserve to
be quashed and are hereby quashed.'

(14). This Court in the case of Ram
Prasad (supra) has held as under. Relevant
paragraphs of the said judgments i.e.
16,19,22,23,24,25,28,32 and 36 are being
quoted hereunder:-

"16. The matter which requires
consideration is, whether on the ground of
pendency
of
the
criminal
case
the
petitioner's fire arm licence could be
cancelled
and
his
appeal
could
be
dismissed, notwithstanding his acquittal on
17.1.2003. It also requires consideration if
the ground in the impugned orders that if
the petitioner's fire arm licence remain with
the petitioner, it would not be in the public
interest and public security, are justified for
cancellation and based on substantial
material."

19.
In
Masiuddin
Vs.
Commissioner,
Allahabad
Division,
Allahabad and another reported in 1972
A.L.J. 573 this Court held in paragraph
Nos. 4 and 7 as under:

"4. After a license is granted, the
right to hold the license and possess a gun
is a valuable individual right in a free
country. The security of public peace and
public safety is a valuable social interest.
Section 17 shows that Parliament had
decided that neither of the two valuable
interests should unduly impinge on the
other Section 17 seeks to establish a fair
equilibrium between the two contending
interests. It says: Hear the licensee first;
and then cancel the license "if necessary for
the security of the public peace or for
public safety". True, there is no express
provision for hearing. But the nature of the
right affected, the language of Sec. 17, the
grounds for cancellation, the requirement
of a reasoned order and the right of appeal
plainly implicate a fair hearing procedure.
Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate,
Azamgarh. While cancelling a licence, the
District Magistrate acts as a quasi-judicial
authority.

7. A license may be cancelled,
inter alia on the ground that it is "necessary
for the security of the public peace or for
public safety" to do so. The District
Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it
was necessary for the security of the public
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
peace or for public safety to revoke the
license. The mere existence of enmity
between a licensee and another person
would
not
establish
the
''necessary'
connection with security of public peace or
public safety. There should be something
more than mere enmity. There should be
some
evidence
of
the
provocative
utterances of the licensee or of his
suspicious movements or of his criminal
designs and conspiracy in reinforcement of
the evidence of enmity. It is not possible to
give an exhaustive list of facts and
circumstances from which an inference of
threat to public security or public peace may
be deduced. The District Magistrate will
have to take a decision on the facts of each
case. But in the instant case there is nothing
in his order to indicate that it was necessary
for the security of the public peace or for
public safety to cancel the license of the
petitioner. Mere enmity is not sufficient."

22. In Chhanga Prasad Sahu Vs.
State of U.P. and others reported in 1984
AWC 145 (FB), after noticing the provisions
of Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act the Full
Bench in paragraph 5 held as follows:

"A perusal of abovementioned
provisions indicates that the licensing authority
has been given the power to suspend or revoe
an arms licence only if any of the conditions
mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (e) of subsection (3) of Section 17 of Act exists." sub
section (5) of Section 17 makes it obligatory
upon the licensing authority to, while passing
the order revoking/suspending an arms
licence, record in writing the reasons therefore
and to, on demand, furnish a brief statement
thereof to the holder of the license unless it
considers that it will not be in the public
interest to do so."

In
paragraph-9
it
has
been
emphasised as under:-

"it is true that in order to
revoke/suspend
an
arms
licence,
the
licensing authority has necessarily to come
to the conclusion that the facts justifying
revocation/suspension of licence mentioned
in grounds (a) to (e) of section 17 exist"

23.
In
Ilam
Singh
v.
Commissioner,
Meerut
Division
and
others [1987 ALL. L.J. 416] this Court
held that under Section 17(3) (b) the
licencing authority may suspend or revoke
a licence if it becomes necessary for the
security of public peace or public safety. In
this case no report was lodged against the
licensee indicating that he had used the gun
in the incident which led to the breach of
public peace or public safety. It was held
that there must be some positive incident in
which the petitioner participated and used
his gun which led to breach of public peace
or public safety and in the absence of the
use of the gun by the licencee against the
security of public peace or public safety the
licence of the gun could not be suspended
or revoked. The relevant paragraphs 4 and
5 of the judgment in Ilam Singh (supra) are
being reproduced as under:

"4. Having heard the learned
counsel for the petitioner I am of the view
that the submissions raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner cannot be said to
be without substance. Section 17(3) (b) of
the Arms Act enacts that licensing
authority may by order in writing suspend a
licence or revoke the same if it becomes
necessary for the security of public peace
or the public safety. When once a person
has been granted a licence and he acquires
a gun, it becomes one of his properties. In
the present case no incident of breach of
security of the public peace or public sfety
at the behest of the petitioner has been
pointed out. Even no report was lodged
against the petitioner indicating that he
used his gun in the incident which led to
the breach of public peace or public safety.
Even though some reports might have been
1 All. Sohrab Ali Vs. D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr.
241
lodged but that could not be said to be a
sufficient reason to cancel the licence."

5. There must be some positive
incident in which the petitioner participated
and used his gun which led to the breach of
the public peace or public safety. In the
absence of the use of the gun by the
petitioner against the security of public
peace or public safety the licence of the
gun of the petitioner was not liable either to
be suspended or revoked. The licensing
authority as well as the Commissioner
committed errors on the face of the record
in cancelling the licence of the gun held by
the petitioner in utter disregard of the
provisions of Section 17 (3) (b) of the
Arms Act. In view of these facts the
impugned orders cannot be sustained and
deserves to be quashed."

24. In Habib v. State of U.P. and
others [2002 (44) ACC 783] this Court held
that mere involvement in a criminal case
cannot in any way affect the public security
or public interest and the order cancelling
or revoking licence of fire arm was not
justified. Paragraph 3 of this judgment
reads as under:

"3. The question as to whether
mere involvement in a criminal case or
pendency of a criminal case can be a
ground for revocation of the licence under
Arms Act, has been dealt with by a
Division Bench of this court reported in
Sheo Prasad Misra Vs. The District
Magistrate, Basti and others, wherein the
Division Bench relying upon the earlier
decision reported in Masi Uddin v.
Commissioner, Allahabad, found that mere
involvement in criminal case cannot in any
way affect the public security or public
interest and the order cancelling or
revoking the licence of fire arm has been
set aside."

25. In Satish Singh v. District
Magistrate, Sultanpur 2009 (4) ADJ 33
(LB), this Court elaborately explained what
is detrimental to the security of the public
peace or public safety and held that mere
involvement in criminal case cannot in any
way affect the public security or public
interest. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Satish Singh
case (supra) are being reproduced as under:

"6. A plain reading of section 17
indicates that the arms licence can be
cancelled or suspended on the ground that
the licensing authority deems it necessary
for security of the public peace or the
public safety. In the present case, while
passing the impugned order, neither the
District Magistrate nor the appellate
authority has recorded the finding as to
how and under what circumstance, the
possession
of
arms
licence
by
the
petitioner, is detrimental to the public peace
or the public security and safety. Merely
because criminal case is pending more so,
does not seem to attract the provisions of
section 17 of the Arms Act. To attract the
provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act
with regard to public peace, security and
safety it shall always be incumbent on the
authorities to record a finding that how,
under
what
circumstances
and
what
manner, the possession of arms licence
shall be detrimental to public peace, safety
and security. In absence of such finding
merely on the ground that a criminal case is
pending
without
any
mitigating
circumstances with regard to endanger of
public peace, safety and security, the
provisions contained under Section 17 of
the Arms Act, shall not satisfy.

7. Needless to say that right to
life and liberty are guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India and the arms
licences are granted for personal safety and
security after due inquiry by the authorities
in accordance with the provisions contained
in Arms Act, 1959. The provisions of
section 17 of the Arms Act with regard to
242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
suspension or cancellation of arms licence
cannot be invoked lightly in an arbitrary
manner. The provisions contained under
Section 17 of the Arms Act should be
construed strictly and not liberally. The
conditions provided therein, should be
satisfied
by
the
authorities
before
proceeding ahead to cancel or suspend an
arms licence. We may take notice of the
fact that any reason whatsoever, the crime
rate is raising day by day. The Government
is not in a position to provide security to
each and every person individually. Right
to possess arms is statutory right but right
to
life
and
liberty
is
fundamental
guaranteed
by
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India. Corollary to it, it is
citizen's right to possess firearms for their
personal safety to save their family from
miscreants. It is often said that ordinarily in
a civilised society, only civilised persons
require arms licence for their safety and
security and not the criminals. Of course, in
case the government feels that arms licence
are abused for oblique motive or criminal
activities, then appropriate measures may
be adopted to check such mal-practice. But
arms licence should not be suspended in a
routine
manner
mechanically,
without
application of mind and keeping in view
the letter and spirit of Section 17 of the
Arms Act."

28. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State
of U.P. and others reported in 2013(31)
LCD 1460 (LB) this Court after referring to
the earlier pronouncements in the case of
Ram
Murli
Madhukar
Vs.
District
Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD 905]
and Habib Vs. State of U.P., 2002 ACC
783, held in paragraphs 10 and 11 as
follows:

"10. "Public peace" or ''public
safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of
law and order public safety means safety of
the public at large and not safety of few
persons only and before passing of the
order of cancellation of arm license as per
Section 17 (3) of the Act the Licensing
Authority is under an obligation to apply
his mind to the question as to whether there
was eminent danger to public peace and
safety involved in the case in view of the
judgment given by this court in the case of
Ram
Murli
Madhukar
v.
District
Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 916) LCD 905],
wherein it has been held that license can
not be suspended or revoked on the ground
of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the
registration of an F.I.R. and pendency of a
criminal case."

11. Further, this Court in the case
of Habib v. State of U.P. 2002 ACC 783
held as under:

"The question as to whether mere
Involvement in a criminal case or pendency
of a criminal case can be a ground for
revocation of the licence under Arms Act,
has been dealt with by a Division Bench of
this Court in Sheo prasad Misra Vs. District
Magistrate, Basti and Others, 1978 AWC
122, wherein the Division Bench relying
upon the earlier decision in Masi Uddin Vs.
Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573,
found that mere involvement in criminal
case cannot, in any way, affect the public
security or public interest and the order
cancelling or revoking the licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned orders also suffer from the same
infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench that these
orders cannot be sustained and deserves to
be quashed and are hereby quashed.

There is yet another reason that
during the pendency of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has been acquitted
from the aforesaid criminal case and at
present there is neither any case pending,
1 All. Sohrab Ali Vs. D.M. Pratapgarh & Anr.
243
nor any conviction has been attributed to
the petitioner, as is evident from Annexure
SA-I and II to the supplementary affidavit
filed by the petitioner. In this view of the
matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the
fire-arm licence."

32. In Ghanshyam Gupta v. State
of U.P. and others [2016 (34) LCD 3035]
this Court has again held that the necessary
ingredients to invoke jurisdiction of the
licencing authority in terms of Section 17
were clearly lacking and no finding had
been returned on the basis of materials
produced in that regard by the licencing
authority, which must justify passing of the
order of cancellation. Paragraph 9 of the
said judgment is being quoted as under:

"9. In a recent decision of
Lucknow Bench of this court in Surya
Narain Mishra v. Stae of U.P. and others,
reported in 2015 (7) ADJ 510, similar view
has been taken by this Court relying upon
subsequent decisions. Para-14 of the
judgment is reproduced:

"14. In the case of Raj Kumar
Verma v. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC
231 this court in paragraph No.3 held as
under:-

"The ground for issue of showcause notice, suspension and ultimately
cancellation of the licence is that one and
precisely one criminal case was registered
against
the
petitioner.
The
District
Magistrate has also held that the petitioner
has been enlarged on bail. He has gone
further to observe that if the licence
remained intact, the petitioner, may disturb
public peace and tranquility. The same
findings
have
been
given
by
the
Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that
this Court is repeating the law of the land,
but the deaf ears of the administrative
officers do not ready to succumb the law of
the land. The settled law is that mere
involvement in a criminal case without any
finding that involvement in such criminal
case shall be detrimental to public peace
and tranqulity shall not create the ground
for the cancellation of Armed Licence. In
Ram Suchi v. Commissioner, Devipatan
Division reported in 2004 (22) LCD 1643,
it was held that this law was relied upon in
Balram Singh Vs. Satate of U.P. 2006 (24)
LCD 1359. Mere apprehension without
substance is simply an opinion which has
no legs to stand. Personal whims are not
allowed to be reflected while acting as a
public servant.

36. In the present case the
petitioner's licence was cancelled by the
District Magistrate on the ground of
pendency of criminal case against him. The
petitioner was later on acquitted of the
criminal case by order dated 17.1.2003. A
perusal of the order of acquittal does not
show the use of fire arm. After acquittal the
very basis of the order of cancellation
vanished. The finding of the District
Magistrate
as
affirmed
by
the
Commissioner, that it was not in the
interest of public peace and the public
security that the licence remained with the
petitioner/licencee, is not based on any
evidence/material, except the police reports
which in their turn were in view of the
pendency of the criminal case against the
petitioner. On mere apprehension expressed
in the impugned orders that the petitioner
would misuse the fire arm and would
extend threat to the persons of the weaker
section of the society, the arm licence could
not be cancelled"

(15). Learned Standing Counsel for
the State on the other hand has opposed the
writ petition. It is submitted that the arm
licence of the petitioner has been cancelled
on the ground that at the time of applying
for arm licence, the criminal prosecution
against the petitioner in Case Crime No.
244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
148 of 1996 under Sections 307, 323 and
504 IPC was pending against the petitioner,
which the petitioner did not disclose in the
said application.

(16). He submits that there is no
infirmity in the finding recorded by the
District Magistrate in this regard and
accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.

(17). I have heard learned counsel for
the parties and perused the material
available on record.

(18). It seems that father of the
petitioner was murdered on 11.04.1997 and
it was a very traumatic experience for the
petitioner and security was provided to him
and his family under the conditions that had
prevailed.
It
is
in
the
aforesaid
circumstances, the petitioner had to move
an application for grant of arm licence and
also for security for his person. The arm
licence was provided to him within six days
i.e. on 17.04.1997 and it is during this
period it seems due to oversight he did not
disclose about the pendency of the criminal
case pending against him.

(19).

Undoubtedly,
there
was
suppression information by the petitioner
with regard to the pending criminal cases
against him but the same has been sought
to be justified by the petitioner on account
of the peculiar circumstances, which he
was faced at the time when the application
was moved. Though the power is vested
with the District Magistrate to cancel the
arm licence, in case licence was obtained
by the suppression of material information
and on the basis of wrong information
provided by the holder of the arm licence
and accordingly, it was incumbent upon the
District Magistrate to consider whether
suppression of fact that an FIR No. 148 of
1996 was lodged against the petitioner
amounts to material suppression of fact or
not.

(20). The Legislature in its wisdom
has provided for material suppression of
fact to be a condition for cancellation of
arms licence as per Section 17 (3) (c) of the
Arms Act. Clearly, the "suppression"
would
be
different
from
"material
suppression of fact". Accordingly, materiel
suppression has to be some what more
grave than mere material suppression of
facts.

(21). This Court is of the considered
view that material suppression would be
deliberate and intentional suppression of
such facts, which if had been disclosed,
would have lead to rejection of application
for grant of arms licence. Accordingly,
whenever, the authority is considering the
case for cancellation of arms licence on the
ground of suppression of fact it is
incumbent to return finding that firstly
there
was
deliberate
and
intentional
suppression of facts and secondly, had the
suppressed fact been brought to the
knowledge of the licencing authority at the
time of grant of arms licence, it would have
materially interfered with his discretion
regarding grant of the licence.

(22). Though the Prescribed Authority
has duly considered the circumstances
under which the arm licence was granted
but he has failed to consider the relevant
aspect of the matter while rejecting the
application of the petitioner. The District
Magistrate has duly taken into account of
the fact that at the time of cancellation of
arm licence, the petitioner had already been
acquitted by the competent court and
consequently at the stage of cancellation
1 All. Maneesh Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
245
 whether the pendency of the said criminal
case would be a material consideration of
cancellation is an issue which had to be
considered by the Prescribed Authority as
per the provisions of Section 17 (3) (c) of
the Arms Act, 1959.

(23). In light of the aforesaid
judgments it is clear that the ground for
cancellation of the licence of the petitioner
on the ground of pendency of Criminal
Case in Case Crime No. 40 of 2006 under
Sections 307, 323, 147, 148 & 149 IPC and
Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act is clearly indicate that the said issue
has
wrongly
been
decided
by
the
Prescribed Authority as well as appellate
authority and the finding in this regard of
both the authorities being arbitrary are set
aside.

(24). In light of the above, especially
considering the fact that the Prescribed
Authority has not considered the aspect of
the material suppression information at the
time of granting arm licence is an issue for
which the matter is remitted to the District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh for passing afresh
orders in light of the directions given
hereinabove by this Court.

(25). The petitioner is granted liberty
to file a fresh reply before the District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh within a period of
two weeks from today and the District
Magistrate, Pratapgarh is directed to
conclude and decide the matter afresh
within two months thereafter by a reasoned
and speaking order.

(26). In light of the above, the writ
petition is allowed.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 245
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application u/s 482 No. 3 of 2024

Maneesh Kumar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Alok Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A., Abhishek Singh

Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973
-Section
482
-
The
Protection
of
Children
from
Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 - Section 5(ñ)(ii)/6 -
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 376,
323, 504 & 506 -Inherent Powers of High
Court - The applicant sought quashing of a
charge sheet and summoning order under
Sections 376, 323, 504, 506 IPC, Section
5(ñ)(ii)/6 The Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012, and Section 3/4 Dowry
Prohibition Act, based on a compromise with the
victim - Held, the High Court's inherent powers
under
Section
482
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 are to prevent abuse of process
or secure justice, but quashing proceedings
based on compromise depends on the nature
and gravity of the offence, as per Parbatbhai
Aheer Vs St. of Guj.. (Paras 2, 6, 10)

Compromise
in
Serious
Offences
-
Limitations - The applicant and victim entered
a compromise, with the victim marrying the
applicant and expressing unwillingness to
pursue the case - Held, offences under Section
376 IPC (rape) and Section 5(ñ)(ii)/6 The
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act,2012(aggravated penetrative sexual assault
on a minor) are grave and heinous, impacting
society, and cannot be quashed merely on
compromise, as they are not private disputes,
following Parbatbhai Aheer Vs St. of Guj.. (Paras
5, 6, 9, 10)