# Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors v. Smt. Chawli & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 975
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-23
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 590 of 1993
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sri-naresh-kumar-ors-v-smt-chawli-ors-45742
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

A. Civil Law-Civil Procedure Code (5 of
1908)
-
S.100
-
Second
appeal
-
Substantial
question
of
law
-
Interpretation of any document including
its
contents
or
its
admissibility
in
evidence or its effect on the rights of the
parties to the Lis constitutes a substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of
Section 100 of the Code.

Substantial question of law involved in the
second
appeal
was
about
the
correct
interpretation of the sale deeds relied upon by
the defendants, to establish that the suit
property is not part of Khasra no.113, but a
part and parcel of Khasra no.111. (Para 20)

B. Deed-Construction-Conveyance of land
- though boundaries given in the deeds of
title are the most reliable evidence about
the identity of adjoining properties, but
the rule have no application to a situation
where physical features about the
property suffer change in course of time

Plaintiff suit for possession of land, part of
Khasra no.113 - Suit property came into
existence owing to the construction of a brickworked road (kharanja) across plaintiff Khasra
no.113 in the year 1956 - Defendant relied
upon description of boundaries in sale deeds of
the year 1896 to establish that the property is
not part of Khasra no.113 but a part of Khasra
no.111- Trial dismissed the suit - Lower
Appellate court reversed the decree Held -
Appellate Court rightly held the suit property to
be a subdivision that came into existence on
account of the laying of a brick-worked road,
across Khasra no.113 after looking into
evidence that brought about certain changes to
the boundaries of Khasra nos.111 and 113,
much later in point of time than execution of
the defendants' sale deeds, dated 03.06.1896,
04.06.1896 and 26.03.1920 - description of
boundaries in the two sale deeds of the year
1896 would not have a decisive impact upon
the rights of parties to the suit property (Para
41)

Second Appeal dismissed. (E-5)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,856 of 45,216. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39856 for what follows._

2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
975
therefore, liable to be dismissed. It is
accordingly, dismissed. Cost made easy.
----------
(2020)02ILR A975

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.01.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Second Appeal No. 590 of 1993

Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Chawli & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Amit Krishna, Sri B. Dayal, Sri Chetan
Chatterjee, Sri N.K. Srivastava, Sri Neeraj
Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri N.K. Srivastava, Sri Amit Krishna, Sri
Ravi Kant, Sri Syed Wajid Ali

A. Civil Law-Civil Procedure Code (5 of
1908)
-
S.100
-
Second
appeal
-
Substantial
question
of
law
-
Interpretation of any document including
its
contents
or
its
admissibility
in
evidence or its effect on the rights of the
parties to the Lis constitutes a substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of
Section 100 of the Code.

Substantial question of law involved in the
second
appeal
was
about
the
correct
interpretation of the sale deeds relied upon by
the defendants, to establish that the suit
property is not part of Khasra no.113, but a
part and parcel of Khasra no.111. (Para 20)

B. Deed-Construction-Conveyance of land
- though boundaries given in the deeds of
title are the most reliable evidence about
the identity of adjoining properties, but
the rule have no application to a situation
where physical features about the
property suffer change in course of time

Plaintiff suit for possession of land, part of
Khasra no.113 - Suit property came into
existence owing to the construction of a brickworked road (kharanja) across plaintiff Khasra
no.113 in the year 1956 - Defendant relied
upon description of boundaries in sale deeds of
the year 1896 to establish that the property is
not part of Khasra no.113 but a part of Khasra
no.111- Trial dismissed the suit - Lower
Appellate court reversed the decree Held -
Appellate Court rightly held the suit property to
be a subdivision that came into existence on
account of the laying of a brick-worked road,
across Khasra no.113 after looking into
evidence that brought about certain changes to
the boundaries of Khasra nos.111 and 113,
much later in point of time than execution of
the defendants' sale deeds, dated 03.06.1896,
04.06.1896 and 26.03.1920 - description of
boundaries in the two sale deeds of the year
1896 would not have a decisive impact upon
the rights of parties to the suit property (Para
41)

Second Appeal dismissed. (E-5)

List of cases cited: -

1. Uma Pandey & Ors Vs Munna Pandey & Ors
AIR 2018 SC 9 1930

2. Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal Vs Smt. Ratna
Ashok Muranjan (2019) 3 SCC 378

3. Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. Vs Lehna Singh
(D) by LRs. AIR 2019 SC 1441

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a defendants' Second
Appeal from a decree of possession passed
by the Lower Appellate Court, reversing
the Trial Court.

2. Nanu Singh brought Original Suit
no.101 of 1971 against Bhupeshwar
Prasad, Rajeshwar Prasad, Ishwar Prasad,
976 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rameshwar Prasad, all sons of late Hari
Kishan Das and Smt. Shashi Prabha,
daughter of late Hari Kishan Das for
possession of land, part of Khasra no.113,
situate
at
Mauza
Khan
Alampur,
Saharanpur, as detailed and bounded at the
foot of the plaint. The Suit was instituted
on 27.01.1971. Pending Suit, the Appeal
from the Original Decree and the present
Appeal, the plaintiffs have grown to a
figure of nine on account of exiting this
mortal world. The defendants, likewise,
who were five before the Trial Court, have
grown to a figure of eighteen, with legal
representatives being substituted for the
deceased defendants, pendente lite.

3. Sri Shamsher Bahadur Singh, the
then Munsif City, Saharanpur, who tried
the Suit, dismissed it with costs by his
judgment and decree dated 11.07.1989.
The plaintiffs appealed to the District
Judge, Saharanpur, where the Appeal was
registered on the file of the learned District
Judge as Civil Appeal no.70 of 1989. The
Appeal on assignment came up for
determination before Sri Naresh Kumar
Bahal, the then IVth Additional Civil
Judge, Saharanpur on 26.03.1993. The
learned Additional Civil Judge by his
judgment and decree of the date last
mentioned, allowed the Appeal with costs,
set aside and reversed the decree of the
learned Munsif, ordering the Suit to be
decreed with costs. It is ordered by the
Appellate Decree that the defendants shall
hand over the plaintiffs possession of the
suit property within a month of the
judgment.

4. Aggrieved, the defendants have
brought this Second Appeal.

5. To clarify reference to parties in
this judgment, the plaintiff-respondents,
who are now nine in number, all heirs and
legal representatives of the original and
sole plaintiff, Nanu Singh, shall be
hereinafter referred to as the 'plaintiff'. The
defendant-appellants, multiple in number,
as they are from the institution of the Suit,
shall be hereinafter referred to as the
'defendants'.

6. The Suit was brought on facts that
the suit property is part of Khasra no.113,
formally numbered as Khasra no.126, part
of Mahaal Asha Ram, situate at Village
Khan Alampura, Saharanpur, of which the
plaintiff is owner in possession. The
defendants have no right, title or interest in
the suit property. The suit property, that is
part of Khasra no.113, has been detailed at
the foot of the plaint. Towards the East of
Khasra no.113, there is a house (kothi) and
quarters located in Khasra no.111, that are
the defendants' ownership. Also, a Mosque
and Madarsa annexed to the Mosque
Shahjahani, besides a Temple (Mandir)
etc., are also located in Khasra no.111.
The suit property lies within the local
limits of Municipal Board, Saharanpur,
which is in possession of the plaintiff since
20 years past. The plaintiff has planted and
nurtured two trees over the suit property, a
Bel and another Barna, the fruits and
shade whereof the plaintiff utilises to his
benefit. The plaintiff also utilises the suit
property for the purposes of processing his
dung based fuel (Uple), stacking firewood
and manure, besides using it to bask in the
Sun and tether cattle. The plaintiff also
exploits the suit property for agriculture,
which is a part of the plaintiff's Khasra
no.113.

7. The defendants since a long time
have been harassing and troubling the
plaintiff. To the West of the defendants'
Kothi and quarters, there is no land in the
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
977
title and possession of the defendants, or
do they have any drain, window, ventilator
or door opening into the suit property. The
defendants never had or have any
connection or possession of the suit
property since 12 years past.

8. It is then pleaded by the
plaintiff that in Khasra no.112, there
was formerly a way (rasta), which
terminated at the western end of
Khasra no.115 and the eastern and
southern ends of Khasra no.113. This
terminus of the way, that was an
avenue for natives of the village to
proceed to the river, Dhamola, located
towards the north of Khasra no.113,
caused inconvenience to the local
populace
in
accessing
the
river
themselves and with their cattle. It is
pleaded that some respectable natives
of the village requested the plaintiff to
give passage across Khasra no.113,
that was his ownership in order to
enable
the
existing
passage
terminating there to be extended to the
river, to the North. For the purpose,
the
plaintiff's
permission
was
requested to lay a brick-worked road
(kharanja) across his property. The
plaintiff permitted construction of a
brick-worked
road
across
Khasra
no.113, licensing the Municipal Board
to lay out that road as a straight
stretch across his land. Since the road
that was laid out was a straight
stretch, the brick-worked road divided
the plaintiff's Khasra no.113 in the
manner that some part of it towards
the North and East was cut-off from
the main part of 113. It is this land
lying to the East and North of the road
permitted by the plaintiff to be laid
across Khasra no.113, that is the suit
property. This suit property has been
pleaded to be in the plaintiff's use and
occupation
for
the
purposes
hereinbefore detailed.

9. It is, in particular, pleaded on
behalf of the plaintiff that through an
order dated 13.01.1971 passed by the
City Magistrate, Saharanpur in Case
no.26 of 1969, under Section 145
Cr.P.C.,
possession
of
the
suit
property was delivered to defendant
no.1, which the plaintiff says is in
derogation of his title.

10. Defendant nos.1, 3, 4 and 5
filed
a
single
written
statement
traversing the plaintiff's case. The
crux of the defendants' case is that the
suit property is located to the East of
the Road that divides Khasra no.111
and Khasra no.113. Khasra no.111 is
the
defendants'
property,
lawfully
acquired through a consistent chain of
title passed on from the previous
recorded owners. It is asserted that the
suit property located to the East of the
Road is part of Khasra no.111, and,
therefore, in the defendants' title, of
which
they
have
been
lawfully
entrusted
possession
by
the
Magistrate, upon a sham dispute being
raised by the plaintiff about it.

11. It is the defendants' case that
their property located in Khasra no.111
comprises a house (kothi) together with its
appurtenant land and outhouses, including
servant quarters. The aforesaid property
was purchased by one Jyoti Prasad from a
certain Lala Ganga Ram through sale
deeds dated 03.08.1896 and 04.06.1896,
paper nos. 78ग and 79ग, respectively. The
said property, together with the House and
its appurtenant land, was purchased by
Hari Kishan Das, father of defendant nos.1
978 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to 5 through a sale deed dated 26.03.1920,
paper no.262ग. The crux of the defendants'
case is that all property to the East of the
Road, hereinabove referred, is theirs and
part of Khasra no.111 and that the Road is
located in Khasra no.112, that divides
Khasra no.111 from Khasra no.113, that is
the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff
purchased Khasra no.113 through two sale
deeds. First of these is from one Chameli,
dated 07.08.1946, paper no.28ग and the
other was executed in his favour by Abdul
Aziz, dated 07.01.1949.

12. The Trial Court framed the
following issues, on which the parties
went to trial:

"1.
Whether
khasara
abadi
No.113 is the disputed property?

2. Whether the plaintiff is owner
of the disputed property?

3.
Whether
the
suit
is
undervalued and Court fees paid is
insufficient?

4. Whether the suit is barred by
Sec. 41 of Specific Relief Act?

5. Whether the defendant no.2
Sri Rajeshwar Prasad is an unnecessary
party?

6. To what relief if any is the
plaintiff entitled?"

13. The varying events in the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court have
already been detailed hereinbefore. It must
be mentioned here, however, that issue
no.1 that was dealt with in Appeal was
corrected to read, on basis of reasons
recorded by the Lower Appellate Court,
Khasra no.113 for Khasra no.111 there.
The first issue considered by the Appellate
Court, rendered in Hindi from the original
in English, reads as follows:

"1- क्या िसरा आबाि सों0 113
कववाकित है?"

14. The Appellate Court has
examined the matter in great detail to
opine that in fact the Trial Court, while
framing issues, mentioned Khasra no.113
as the suit property in issue no.1, and not
111, as appears from the judgment of the
Trial Court. He has recorded his reasons to
conclude about the correct contents of
issue no.1, with reference to the Khasra
number of the suit property mentioned
there, in the following words:

"अप लािी के कवद्वान अकधवक्ता
का कहना है कक कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय
ने कववाकित सम्पकत्त को ि0न0111 का
कहस्सा मानकर गलत कनणमय किया है
जबकक
प्रत्युरिातागण
के
कवद्वान
अकधवक्ता का यह कहना है कक कवद्वान
अवर न्यायालय ने वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1
ि0न0 113 से सम्बोंकधत बनाया िा। इस
सम्बोंध में मेरे द्वारा मूल आिेिपत्र का
अवलोकन ककया गया। कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय द्वारा किनाोंक 11-1-71 को वाि
कबन्िु आिेिपत्र पर अग्रेंज भािा में
बनाए गए िे परन्तु यह आिेिपत्र लगभग
20 विम से अकधक पुराना होने के कारण
कनचले व िाकहने हाकिये क ओर से कुछ
गला एवों फटा हुआ है। कजस थिान पर
वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 में िसरा नम्बर का
कजि आया है उस थिान से आिेिपत्र
फटा हुआ है। कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय
द्वारा मूलवाि में जो कनणमय कलिा गया है,
उसमें आिेिपत्र से जो वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या
1 उतारा गया है उसमे पहले ि0न0 113
कलिा हुआ है और उसके उपर
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
979
ओवरराइकटोंग करके ि0न0 111 बनाया
गया है, परन्तु इस ओवरराकटोंग पर
तत्काल न
प िास न
अकधकार
के
हस्ताक्षर नह ों है। मेरे द्वारा पक्षगण के
अकभवचनो को ध्यानपूवमक अवलोकन
ककया गया। वाि पक्ष ने कववाकित
आराज को ि0न0 113 का भाग बताया है
जबकक प्रकतवाि -गण ने कववाकित सम्पकत्त
को ि0न0 111 का भाग बतलाया है।
कानून क न्धथिकत बहुत ह स्पष्ट है कक
वाि कजस िसरा नों0 में कववाकित आराज
न्धथित होना कहता है, उसको साकबत
करने का भार वाि पर ह है और वाि
कबन्िु भ वाि के अकभवचनो के अनुसार
ि0न0 113 से सम्बकधोंत बनाया जाना
कचकहए िा। चूककों कववाकित सम्पकत्त को
वाि ने ि0न0 113 में न्धथित होना बतलाया
है और इस बात को साकबत करने का
भार भ वाि पर ह है। मेरे द्वारा कवद्वान
अवर न्यायालय द्वारा वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 व 2
पर किए गए कनणमय का ध्यानपूवमक
अवलोकन ककया गया। कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय द्वारा इन िोनो वाि कबन्िुओों पर
जो कववेचना क गय है, उसे पढ़ने से
यह स्पष्ट है कक अवर न्यायालय ने
कववाकित सम्पकत्त को िसरा नों0 113 में
न्धथित होने का वाि कबन्िु अपने मन्धस्तष्क
में रिकर कववेचना क परन्तु अन्त में
वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 सकारात्मक रुप से
तय होना कलि किया। कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय का यह भ कनष्किम है कक
कववाकित सम्पकत्त वाि के िसरा नों0 113
का भाग नह ों है बन्धि वह प्रकतवाि गण
क आराज ि0नों0 111 का भाग है। इस
प्रकाि में कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय को वाि
कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 नकारात्मक रूप से तय
करना चाकहए िा, और यकि कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय के द्वारा वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1
ि0न0 111 से सम्बन्धित बना होना
मानकर कववेचना क जात तो उसका
अिम यह होता कक कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय
ने कववाकित आराज को ि0न0 111 में
न्धथित होना यकि माना है तो कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय ने इस वाि कबन्िु को साकबत
करने का भार प्रकतवाि गण पर रिकर
कनणमय किया है जबकक अकभवचनो के
अनुसार वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 को साकबत
करने का भार वाि पर पर ह है और
वाि पक्ष पर ह होना चाकहए। कवद्वान
अवर न्यायालय द्वारा जो कनणमय कलिा
गया है वह कनणमय कहन्द में टाईपिुिा है
परन्तु इस कनणमय में जो छः वाि कबन्िु
कलिे गए है उनको तत्काल न प िास न
अकधकार द्वारा अपने लेि में अग्रेंज में
ह कलिा गया है। ऐसा सम्भवतः उन्होने
इसकलए ककया है कक मूल आिेिपत्र पर
वाि कबन्िु अग्रेज भािा में बनाए गए है।
वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 को अपने कनणमय में
उतारते समय कवद्वान प िास न अकधकार
ने उसमें ि0न0 113 कलिा है और उस
पर ि0न0 113 के अोंकतम अोंक 3 पर
ओवरराइकटोंग करके उसे 1 बनाया गया
है। मेर राय मे यकि प िास न अकधकार
ने वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 पर कववाकित सम्पकत्त
को ि0न0 111 में न्धथित होना मानकर
कववेचना कलिन होत तो वह अवश्य ह
इस ओवरराकटोंग पर अपने हस्ताक्षर
करते, परन्तु इस ओवरराइकटोंग पर
कवद्वान प िास न अकधकार के हस्ताक्षर
अिवा लघु हस्ताक्षर उपलब्ध नह ों है,
जबकक इस कनणमय में अन्य जगहोों पर
जहाों ककटोंग अिवा ओवरराइकटोंग हुई है
980 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
उस पर कवद्वान प िास न अकधकार ने
अपने लघु हस्ताक्षर ककए हैं परन्तु वाि
कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 में जहाों पर ि0न0 113 पर
ओवरराइकटोंग करके ि0न0 111 कलिा है
उस पर प िास न अकधकार के लघु
हस्ताक्षर नह ों है। पूरे कनणमय को पढ़ने से
भ ऐसा प्रत त होता है कक कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय द्वारा वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 को
यह मानकर कनणमय कलिा गया है कक
"क्या िसरा आबाि सोंख्या 113 में
कववाकित सम्पकत्त न्धथित है? अतः मैं
अप लािीगण के इस तकम से सहमत नह ों
हूाँ कक कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय ने वाि
कबन्िु सों0 111 से सम्बोंकधत बनाकर उसे
कनणीत ककया है। िोनो पक्षोों क बहस को
सुनने के पश्चात और पत्रावल पर उपलब्ध
अकभवचनोों एवों कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय
द्वारा कलिे गए कनणमय का अवलोकन
करने के पश्चात मैं इस कनष्किम पर पहुाँचा
हूाँ कक कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय द्वारा वाि
कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 इस आिय का बनाया िा
कक "क्या कववाकित सम्पकत्त िसरा आबाि
सोंख्या 113 में न्धथित है और कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय द्वारा इस वाि कबन्िु को ि0न0
113 से सम्बोंकधत बना हुआ मानकर ह
अपना कनणमय कलिा गया, हालाोंकक कवद्वान
अवर न्यायालय का कनष्किम यह है कक
कववाकित सम्पकत्त वाि के ि0न0 113 में
न्धथित न होकर प्रकतवाि गण के िसरा नों0
111 में न्धथित है। यकि कवद्वान अवर
न्यायालय द्वारा कलिे गए वाि कबन्िु पर
कलि गय कववेचना को सह मान कलया
जाए तो वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 नकारात्मक रूप
से तय होना चाकहए िा, जबकक कवद्वान
अवर न्यायालय द्वारा वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 को
सकारात्मक रूप से तय ककया गया है।
पक्षगण के मध्य वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 से
सम्बोंकधत उत्पन्न सोंिय को िूर करने के
कलए यह बात पुनः कलिना मैं न्यायसोंगत
समझता हूाँ कक कवद्वान अवर न्यायालय ने
वाि कबन्िु सोंख्या 1 यह बनाया िा कक
क्या कववाकित सम्पकत्त िसरा आबाि
सोंख्या 113 में न्धथित है और इस वाि
कबन्िु पर उन्होने अपन कववेचना एवों
कनणमय भ कलिा है। इस अप ल का
कनस्तारण भ यह मानकर ककया जा रहा
है कक वाि कबन्िु सों0 1 िसरा नों0 113 से
सम्बोंकधत बनाया गया िा और वाि के
अकभवचनोों के अनुसार वाि पर ह यह
भार है कक वह यह साकबत करे कक
कववाकित सम्पकत्त ि0नों0 113 का भाग है।"

15. It must be remarked here that the
lower Appellate Court has done a very
meticulous exercise, to set the record
straight about the plot number of the suit
property, mentioned in issue no.1. This
Court must record straight away that the
reasoning of the lower Appellate Court
about
the
contents
of
issue
no.1,
particularly, the Khasra number of the suit
property is based on flawless reasoning,
that is self-evident. This Court approves
the same and proceeds on the basis that it
was Khasra no.113, which is the subject
matter of issue no.1, as it is that Khasra
number, a part of which is claimed to be
the suit property by the plaintiff.

16. Both parties led evidence before
the Trial Court, that includes a good
number of documents, cited on both sides,
that find detail in the judgments of the
Courts below. Three witnesses were
examined on behalf of the plaintiff and
two on behalf of the defendants. These
include the plaintiff, Nanu Singh, who
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
981
deposed as PW-1 and defendant no.1,
Bhupeshwar Prasad, who testified as DW2. This evidence has been considered by
both the Courts below, to reach discordant
conclusions, already mentioned.

17. This appeal was admitted to
hearing, vide order dated 16.04.1993, on
the following substantial questions of law:

"1. WHETHER the lower appellate
court misinterpreted the sale deeds produced
by the appellants?

2. WHETHER the lower appellate
court illegally and wrongly discorded (sic
discarded)
a
number
of
important
documentary evidence by the appellants.

3. WHETHER plaintiffs having
failed to locate the disputed land by survey
report, even though several opportunities were
provided by the court, the suit out to have been
dismissed.

4. WHETHER the lower appellate
(sic court) has omitted to consider that there
was a (sic an) old road in Khasra no.113 in the
same place when (sic where) the new
Kharanja road of the Nagarpalika exists?

5. WHETHER the lower appellate
court has illegally reversed the judgment and
decree passed by the learned Munsif."

18. At the hearing of this appeal, learned
Counsel for the defendants confined his
submissions to substantial question nos.1 and
4.

19. Heard Sri B. Dayal, learned Counsel
for the defendant-appellants and Sri Syed
Wajid Ali, learned Counsel for the plaintiffrespondents.

20. The first substantial question of law
is about the correct interpretation of the sale
deeds relied upon by the defendants, to
establish that the suit property is not part of
Khasra no.113, but a part and parcel of Khasra
no.111. Learned Counsel for the defendants,
Sri B. Dayal has urged that interpretation of the
sale deeds produced by him and their impact
on the rights of the parties, is a substantial
question of law that merits adjudication in this
second appeal. This submission has been
advanced in answer to the contentions
advanced by Sri S. Wajid Ali, learned Counsel
for the plaintiff that this appeal is concluded by
findings of fact, recorded by the lower
Appellate Court. For one, it is not readily open
to this Court to say that the substantial
questions of law that this Court has approved
to admit this appeal are not substantial
questions of law, as envisaged under Section
100 CPC. But, that is one part of it and not
much. Mr. B. Dayal is right in his submission
that interpretation of a document and its impact
on the rights of parties is indeed a substantial
question of law, which has to be decided under
Section 100(5) CPC, at the hearing of the
Appeal. In this connection Sri Dayal has
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court
in Uma Pandey and others vs. Munna
Pandey and others, AIR 2018 SC 1930,
where it has been held:

"14. It is not in dispute that the
defendants (respondents) filed one document
(EX-A)-(Annexure-P-1
of
SLP).
This
document was relied on and appreciated by the
two Courts below for deciding the rights of the
parties. The Trial Court decreed the suit and
the First Appellate Court reversed it on
appreciating the evidence including EX-A.

15. It is a settled principle of law
that interpretation of any document including
its contents or its admissibility in evidence or
its effect on the rights of the parties to the Lis
constitutes a substantial question(s) of law
within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code.

16. Whenever such question arises
in the second appeal at the instance of the
982 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appellant, it deserves admission on framing
appropriate substantial question(s) on such
questions to enable the High Court to decide
the appeal on merits bi-party."

21. Learned Counsel for the defendants
has placed further reliance on a decision of
their Lordships in Rajendra Lalitkumar
Agrawal vs. Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan,
(2019) 3 SCC 378, where it has been held
thus:

"10. It cannot be disputed that
the interpretation of any terms and
conditions of a document (such as the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case)
constitutes a substantial question of law
within the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code. It is more so when both the parties
admit the document."

22. The interpretation of a document and
its impact on the valuable rights of parties has
been always regarded as a substantial question
of law, that merits consideration in an appeal
from an appellate decree, under Section 100
CPC. The very recent decision of their
Lordships in Uma Pandey and others (supra)
and Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal (supra)
reinforces that principle beyond cavil.

23. This Court is, therefore, not in
agreement with the contention of the learned
Counsel for the plaintiff that this appeal is
concluded by findings of fact, in the sense that
may prohibit this Court, within the confines of
its jurisdiction in a second appeal, to
pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise
of the conclusions drawn by the Lower
Appellate Court regarding rights of parties,
based on interpretation of the title deeds, that
the defendants have relied upon.

24. In order to persuade this Court that
on a true construction of the title deeds relied
upon by the defendants, the suit property
would fall in Khasra No. 111 and not 113, as
urged by the plaintiff, learned counsel for the
defendant has drawn the attention of the Court
to the boundaries of the suit property, as
detailed at the foot of the plaint. These
boundaries are extracted below:

East : Quarters and Kothi of
Defendant & Masjid Shah Jahani.

West: Kharanja and Arazi of
Plaintiff of Khasra no. 113

North : Patri Dhamola Nadi

South : Arazi talab and Rasta

25. Learned Counsel for the defendants
has pointed out that the western boundary of
the suit property shown in the plaint is of
particular significance, as that is part of the
plaintiff's pleadings. It is indicated in the details
of boundaries that to the west of the suit
property lies a Kharanja and Arazi of plaintiff
of Khasra No. 113. It is contended by learned
counsel for the appellant that if to the west lies
the Kharanja and Arazi of the plaintiff that is
part of Khasra No. 113, the suit property
would be located to the east of the Kharanja.

26. The case of the plaintiff
specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of the
plaint by contrast is that upon the plaintiff
permitting the construction of a brick
worked road across Khasra No. 113, in
order to provide access to natives of the
village to river Dhamola, the straight
stretch of the brick worked road divided
the petitioner's Khasra No. 113 in a
manner that some part of it towards the
East and North was cut off from the main
part of Khasra No. 113. It is pointed out in
this paragraph that it is this part of Khasra
No. 113, which has been described to be
the suit property. According to learned
Counsel for the defendants, if this be the
case of the plaintiff, the Western boundary
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
983
of the suit property ought to have shown
land of Khasra No. 111 and the Eastern
boundary,
the
brick
worked
road
(kharanja).

27. It is argued that this apparent
contradiction in the plaintiff's pleadings ex
facie shows that his case is not consistent in his
pleadings about the precise location of the suit
property. It is pointed out that by contrast, in
the two sale deeds of 1896, through which the
predecessor-in-interest
of
the
defendant
acquired title to Khasra No. 111, that is to say,
the two sale deeds executed by Gangaram in
favour of Jyoti Prasad, Paper Nos. 78 Ga and
79 Ga, there is a clear mention of the western
boundary of the Kothi that was purchased as
Rasta Deh. Rasta Deh translates to "village
road". It is urged that it is the same Kothi and
land transferred through sale deeds of 1896 to
Jyoti Prasad that was purchased by Harikisan
Das, the father of original defendants Nos. 1 to
5, through a registered sale deed of 26th
March, 1920.

28. It is pointed out that it is common
ground between parties that the Kothi stands
on Khasra No. 111, the old number of which
was 124. It is urged also that the plaintiff
claims that he came into possession of the suit
property some 20 years prior to institution of
this suit. The suit was instituted in the year
1971, and, therefore, the plaintiff's possession
would date back to the year 1951. It is asserted
that the plaintiff has not specifically disclosed
when he was actually dispossessed from the
suit property. It is emphasized by Sri Dayal,
learned Counsel for the defendants, that the
plaintiff
claims
purchase
of
the
land
comprising Khasra No. 113, of which the suit
property is a part, through two sale deeds: one
from Chameli dated 07.08.1946; and the other
from Abdul Aziz, dated 07.01.1949.

29. Learned Counsel for the defendants
endeavored to point out that these dates of
acquisition of title on a comparison with the
date when the plaintiff came into possession of
Khasra No. 113, as reckoned hereinbefore,
would show that he entered upon Khasra No.
113 after a few years of its purchase from
Chameli and Abdul Aziz.

30. It is also emphasized that both
Courts below have found for a fact that
there was a village road between plot No.
111, whereon the defendants' Kothi stands
and plot No. 113, the land purchased by
the plaintiff, of which the suit property is a
part. It is pointed out that defendant No. 1,
who was old enough to have witnessed the
transactions leading to the cause of action
has said in his dock evidence, that in place
of the old village road between Khasra
No. 111 and no. 113 (Kothi of defendant
and land of the plaintiff) a brick worked
road (kharanja) has been laid by the
Municipal Board. It is also urged that the
Trial Court relied upon the description of
boundaries in the sale deed of 3rd June,
1896 and survey sheet of the Municipal
Board 1914-1915, filed as paper No. 125A and exhibited without any objection as
exhibit 84A-1, to come to the conclusion
that all land up to the site of the village
road, over which the brick worked road
(kharanja) has now been laid by the
Municipal Board, is part of the defendants'
Kothi and not the plaintiff's land. Learned
counsel submits that on these findings, the
Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit. It is
also argued by learned Counsel for the
defendants that the plaintiff's case of
possession has not been vindicated in the
proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., a
position which remained undisturbed in
those proceedings up to this Court.
984 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

31. Sri Dayal, learned Counsel for
the defendants urged that the Lower
Appellate
Court
has
done
a
misconstruction about the description of
boundaries in the sale deeds of 1896, to
conclude that there was land of the
plaintiff between the Kothi of the
defendants and its appurtenant land, and
the old village road (Rasta Deh). It is also
argued by Sri Dayal that the Lower
Appellate
Court
has
committed
a
substantial error of law in reversing
findings of the Trial Court on the ground
alone that neither the area or the Khasra
number is mentioned in the two sale deeds
of 1896, in favour of Jyoti Prasad executed
by Lala Gangaram. His conclusions,
drawn from the absence of dimensions and
boundaries of land sold way back in the
year 1896, to the effect that it is not proved
that the Kothi and land of the defendant's
exists over khasra No. 111, although
admitted to be so to the parties, is
manifestly illegal.

32. Sri S. Wajid Ali, learned Counsel
for the plaintiff on the other hand has
played down the involvement of any
substantial
question
of
law
as
to
interpretation of recitals in the two title
deeds of 1896, or the subsequent deeds,
relied upon by the defendants. He has
pointed out that the plaintiff's case is based
on a division of his land, comprised of
Khasra no.113, with one part of it towards
the eastern side being separated from the
rest of it, on account of the construction of
a brick worked road, that the plaintiff
himself lincenced the Municipal Board to
construct across his land bearing no. 113,
for convenience of natives of the village to
access the River Dhamola. The part of
Khasra no.113 that went to the other side
of the road, on account of the extension of
the old village road with a brick worked
Kharanja across Khasra no.113, is the suit
property, of which the defendants took
possession through summary proceedings
under Section 145 Cr.P.C., that is not in
accordance with rights of parties.

33. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff
has relied upon a decision of the Supreme
Court in Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. v.
Lehna Singh (D) by LRs., AIR 2019 SC
1441. He has drawn the attention of this
Court to paragraphs 14, 15 and 15.1 of the
report in Gurunam Singh (supra), where
it is held:

"14. When a substantial question
of law can be said to have arisen, has been
dealt with and considered by this Court in
the case of Ishwar Dass Jain (AIR 2000
SC 426) (Supra). In the aforesaid decision,
this Court has specifically observed and
held : "Under Section 100 CPC, after the
1976 amendment, it is essential for the
High Court to formulate a substantial
question of law and it is not permissible to
reverse the judgment of the first appellate
court without doing so. There are two
situations in which interference with
findings of fact is permissible. The first
one is when material or relevant evidence
is not considered which, if considered,
would have led to an opposite conclusion.
The second situation in which interference
with findings of fact is permissible is
where a finding has been arrived at by the
appellate court by placing reliance on
inadmissible evidence which if it was
omitted, an opposite conclusion was
possible. In either of the above situations,
a substantial question of law can arise."

15. Applying the law laid down
by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to
the facts of the case on hand, we are of the
opinion that the High Court has erred in
reappreciating the evidence on record in
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
985
the second appeal under Section 100 of the
CPC. The High Court has materially erred
in interfering with the findings recorded by
the First Appellate Court, which were on
reappreciation of evidence, which was
permissible by the First Appellate Court in
exercise of powers under Section 96 of the
CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of
the evidence, were given by the First
Appellate Court. First Appellate Court
dealt
with,
in
detail,
the
socalled
suspicious circumstance which weighed
with the learned Trial Court and thereafter
it came to the conclusion that the Will,
which as such was a registered Will, was
genuine and do not suffer from any
suspicious circumstances. The findings
recorded by the First Appellate Court are
reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while
passing the impugned judgment and order,
the High Court has exceeded in its
jurisdiction while deciding the second
appeal under Section 100 CPC.

15.1.
As
observed
hereinabove and as held by this Court
in a catena of decisions and even as per
Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of
the High Court to entertain the second
appeal under Section 100 CPC is
confined only to such appeals which
involve a substantial question of law.
On going through the substantial
questions of law framed by the High
Court, we are of the opinion that the
question of law framed by the High
Court
while
deciding
the
second
appeal, cannot be said to be substantial
questions of law at all. The substantial
questions of law framed by the High
Court are as under :

"(i) Whether the Appellate
Court can reverse the findings recorded
by the learned trial court without
adverting to the specific finding of the
trial Court?

(ii) Whether the judgment
passed by the learned lower Appellate
Court is perverse and outcome of
misreading of evidence?"

The aforesaid cannot be said
to be substantial questions of law at
all. In the circumstances, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High
Court cannot be sustained and the same
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
At this stage, decision of this Court in
the case of Madamanchi Ramappa v.
Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC
1633, is required to be referred to.

In the aforesaid decision, this
Court has observed and held as under:

"Whenever
this
Court
is
satisfied that in dealing with a second
appeal, the High Court has, either
unwittingly and in a casual manner, or
deliberately
as
in
this
case,
contravened the limits prescribed by
S.100, it becomes the duty of this
Court to intervene and give effect to
the said provisions. It may be that in
some cases, the High Court dealing
with the second appeal is inclined to
take the view that what it regards to be
justice or equity of the case has not
been served by the findings of fact
recorded by Courts of fact; but on such
occasions it is necessary to remember
that what is administered in Courts is
justice
according
to
law
and
considerations of fair play and equity
however important they may be, must
yield to clear and express provisions of
the law. If in reaching its decisions in
second
appeals,
the
High
Court
contravenes the express provisions of
S.100, it would inevitably introduce in
such
decisions
an
element
of
disconcerting unpredictability which is
usually associated with gambling; and
that is a reproach which judicial
986 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
process
must
constantly
and
scrupulously endeavour to avoid."

34. This Court has keenly considered
the submissions advanced on both sides.

35. A perusal of the findings
recorded by the lower Appellate Court in
reversal of the Trial Court do show that the
lower Appellate Court has gone about the
task of evaluating evidence in meticulous
detail. But, that is not what the concern of
this
Court
is
while
answering
the
substantial questions of law, under Section
100(5) CPC. The question in hand is about
the interpretation of the sale deeds, relied
upon by the defendants, to establish that
the property is not part of Khasra no.113
but a part and parcel of Khasra no.111.

36. The lower Appellate Court in
holding the suit property to be a
subdivision that has come into existence
on account of the laying of a brick-worked
road,
across
Khasra
no.113,
with
permission of the defendants, has looked
into evidence that brought about certain
changes to the boundaries of Khasra
nos.111 and 113, much later in point of
time than execution of the defendants' sale
deeds, dated 03.06.1896, 04.06.1896 and
26.03.1920.

37. It has been held for a fact by the
lower Appellate Court on appreciation of
evidence that the old village road located
in Khasra no.112, mentioned in the sale
deeds conferring title on the defendants,
terminated at Khasra no.113. The plaintiff
permitted laying of a brick-worked road
(kharanja) extending the old village road
across Khasra no.113, in order to provide
access to natives of the village to the River
Dhamola. This event has been recorded for
a fact by the lower Appellate Court to have
happened in the year 1956 when on
permission by the plaintiff, the Nagar
Palika laid a 10 feet wide brick-worked
road, extending the old village road
through Khasra no.113 to the River
Dhamola. Now, in the face of this change
in physical features that earlier demarcated
Khasra no.113 from 111, the description
of boundaries in the sale deeds of the
defendants, dated 03.06.1896, 04.06.1896
and 26.03.1920, would not be very
relevant.

38. The mention in those boundaries
of a village road (rasta deh) to the west of
the kothi (Khasra no.111), that is the
defendants' property, would bear reference
to a geographical subdivision of these two
adjoining Khasra numbers on the premise
that the village road ended at Khasra
no.112, at the time when the deeds under
reference relied upon by the defendants
were executed. There was no existence of
the
brick-worked
road
(kharanja),
permitted by the plaintiff, lateron to be
constructed across Khasra no.113. The
description of boundaries, therefore, in
these deeds would not have a decisive
impact upon the rights of parties to the suit
property, the suit property having come
into existence subsequent in point of time,
owing to the construction of a brickworked road (kharanja) in the year 1956.

39. The lower Appellate Court has,
therefore, rightly looked into and done a
comparison of the revenue records over a
course of time, comparing the Khasra for
the Fasli Years 1296 and 1324, and
appreciated these together with the oral
evidence of parties. The lower Appellate
Court on the basis of a further comparison
done with the Khasra Mauza Khan
Alampura, Pargana, Tehsil and District
Saharanpur for the year 1324F, concluded
2 All. Sri Naresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Chawli & Ors.
987
that the old number of Khasra no.111 in
1297F was 124, the old Khasra number of
the village road that now bears Khasra
no.112 was 125 and that of the plaintiff's
which is no.113, used to be no.126. He has
recorded on the basis of these revenue
records, a detailed measurement and
dimensions of these adjoining Khasra
numbers.

40. The lower Appellate Court has then
concluded that when the old village road in
Khasra no.112 (old no.125) was extended into
113 and laid as a brick-worked road
(kharanja), across no.113 by the Nagar Palika,
it was a 10 feet wide passage. It was extended
backwards across Khasra no.112 to join a
much wider road, accessing the Dehradun
road, also part of Khasra no.112, that is 33 feet
wide. However, the extension in Khasra
no.113 was just 10 feet wide, that resulted in
subdivision of no.113, leaving some part of it
on the eastern side of the brick-worked road,
adjoining Khasra no.111, owned by the
defendants.

41.