# Sri Om Prakash v. Sri Anil Kumar

- **Citation:** (2012) 3 ILRA 1479
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-10-30
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sri-om-prakash-v-sri-anil-kumar-42329
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

S.C.
Sri M.K.Gupta
Sri Pankaj Agarwal

Uttar
Pradesh
Urban
Buildings(Regulation of Letting Rent and
Eviction)Act
1972-Section
20(4)-
eviction on default of payment in rent-on
refusal rent deposited under section
30(1) with permission of Court-first date
of hearing-by wrong interpretation held
defaulter-while on first date of hearing
i.e. on 25.08.95-if deposit under section
30
taken
into
consideration-tenant
deposited
much
more
excess
than
amount required-Revisional Court rightly
interfered by rejecting application for
ejectment.

Held: Para-28 & 30

The
amount
thus
deposited
by
respondent
tenant
upto
25.8.1995
exceed much more than what he was
required to deposit and there is no scope
of any argument that he has not
complied with requirement of Section
20(4) of Act, 1972.

In
view
of
the
above
discussion,
revisional order in so far as it has held
1480 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

that suit filed by landlord-petitioner was
liable to be dismissed cannot be faulted.

Case Law discussed:
2002(2) ARC 160; 1993(2) ARC 451; 1995(1)
ARC 563; (1999) 8 SCC 31; 2004(2) ARC 659;
1993 (4) SCC 406; 2002 (3) SCC 49; AIR 2002
SC 2520; 2001(2) AWC 1468; 2004 (56) ALR
460; 2004(57) ALR 233; 2005 (60) ALR 697;
2006 (3) ARC 657; 2006 (2) ARC 208

## Text

3 All] Sri Om Prakash V. Sri Anil Kumar

1479
Padarath (supra) which has been followed
by the various other court and has also
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Shri Ram (supra), the suit filed by
Masammat Aisha, mother of the petitioners
for cancellation of the sale deed before the
civil court seeking the relief of cancellation
of the sale deed on the ground that the
same was obtained by fraud by the
respondent no. 2 was maintainable before
the civil court and the civil court was fully
competent to adjudicate the matter.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further raised an objection that during
the pendency of the suit proceedings which
was earlier filed in the civil court,
Siddharth Nagar, the District Siddharth
Nagar was bifurcated and a new district
Basti was created and Tehsil Bhanpur
wherein the land in dispute is situated fell
within the jurisdiction of the civil court,
Basti and, therefore after the creation of the
new district of Basti and the allocation of
Bhanpur Tehsil to district Basti, all the
proceedings pending before the judgeship
of Siddharth Nagar would now be
cognizable by the judgeship of Basti.

12. Be that as it may, it will be open
for the petitioner to raise this objection
before the concerned court which shall
consider the same and if the court is
satisfied that the matter is cognizable by
the civil court Basti it will immediately
transfer the suit no. 637 of 1986 to the
appropriate court in the district court,
Basti.

13. For the aforesaid reasons the writ
petition is allowed and the impugned order
dated 22.2.2000 is quashed.

14. There shall be no order as to cost.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.10.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.19834 OF 2003

Sri Om Prakash

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Sri Anil Kumar

 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Madhav Jain
Sri Manish Goyal
Sri Shri Krishna Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.
Sri M.K.Gupta
Sri Pankaj Agarwal

Uttar
Pradesh
Urban
Buildings(Regulation of Letting Rent and
Eviction)Act
1972-Section
20(4)-
eviction on default of payment in rent-on
refusal rent deposited under section
30(1) with permission of Court-first date
of hearing-by wrong interpretation held
defaulter-while on first date of hearing
i.e. on 25.08.95-if deposit under section
30
taken
into
consideration-tenant
deposited
much
more
excess
than
amount required-Revisional Court rightly
interfered by rejecting application for
ejectment.

Held: Para-28 & 30

The
amount
thus
deposited
by
respondent
tenant
upto
25.8.1995
exceed much more than what he was
required to deposit and there is no scope
of any argument that he has not
complied with requirement of Section
20(4) of Act, 1972.

In
view
of
the
above
discussion,
revisional order in so far as it has held
1480 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

that suit filed by landlord-petitioner was
liable to be dismissed cannot be faulted.

Case Law discussed:
2002(2) ARC 160; 1993(2) ARC 451; 1995(1)
ARC 563; (1999) 8 SCC 31; 2004(2) ARC 659;
1993 (4) SCC 406; 2002 (3) SCC 49; AIR 2002
SC 2520; 2001(2) AWC 1468; 2004 (56) ALR
460; 2004(57) ALR 233; 2005 (60) ALR 697;
2006 (3) ARC 657; 2006 (2) ARC 208

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J)

1. Heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Pankaj
Agarwal, holding brief of Sri M.K.Gupta,
learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The landlord, having failed in his
attempt to evict his tenant on the ground
that there has been default in payment of
rent, has come to this Court by means of
present writ petition, filed under Article
226 of the Constitution.

3. The petitioner, Om Prakash, is
owner and landlord of shop No.2/27, Seth
Gali,
Agra.
Anil
Kumar,
the
sole
respondent, is the tenant. The petitioner
filed suit no.47 of 1995 alleging that
respondent-tenant has committed default in
payment of rent since 1.4.1989 and despite
issuance
of
registered
notice
dated
19.1.1991,
served
upon
the
tenant
personally on 23.1.1991, rent has not been
paid hence his tenancy stood terminated
and he is liable for eviction. He also sought
a decree of recovery of arrears of rent,
damages and mesne profit.

4. The respondent-tenant contested
suit stating that rent sent by money order
but landlord declined to accept the same
whereafter it was deposited under Section
30(1) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act,
1972") in Misc. Case No.93 of 1989. The
notice received from landlord was duly
replied and information of aforesaid
deposit was also given, hence, the suit is
liable to be dismissed.

5. The Trial Court i.e. Judge Small
Cause Court, Agra vide judgment dated
14.3.1997, decreed the suit holding that
whatever amount was paid by tenant up to
the date of "first hearing" in order to seek
benefit under Section 20(4) of Act, 1972, it
comes to Rs.8,137/- though he was
supposed to pay Rs.8,257=15. There was a
deficiency of Rs.120.15 which is a
substantial amount, hence tenant is not
entitled for benefit under Section 20(4) of
the Act.

6. The matter was taken in the Court
of Additional District Judge, Court No.3,
Agra in Civil Revision No.76 of 1997 by
tenant, where he succeeded and revision
was allowed. Hence this writ petition.

7. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel
for the petitioner submitted that entire
dues, as contemplated in Section 20(4) of
Act, 1972 were not paid by tenant on the
first date of hearing and therefore,
Appellate Court has erred in law in
reversing decision of Trial Court. He
pointed out that suit was registered on
22.5.1995. Summons were issued fixing
25.7.1995,
for
hearing.
The
written
statement dated 17.7.1995 was taken on
record by Trial Court on 25.7.1995 and
then fixed 24.8.1995 for hearing. It is said
that
tenant
deposited
Rs.913/-
on
11.7.1995 vide tender dated 11.7.1995 and
Rs.6800/- on 25.8.1995. Subsequently, he
deposited Rs.424.40 on 5.12.1995.
3 All] Sri Om Prakash V. Sri Anil Kumar

1481

8. It is said that Rs.424.40, deposited
on 5.12.1995 would not come to rescue
respondent-tenant for the purpose of
benefit under Section 20(4) of Act, 1972
and the revisional Court has erred in law
by giving credit to the said payment
without looking into the fact that first date
of hearing could be 25.7.1995 and any
deposit made thereafter shall not give any
advantage to the tenant for the purpose of
Section 20(4) of Act, 1972. Further, he
said that even Rs.6800/- deposited on
25.8.1995 would not call for any credit for
the purpose of attracting Section 20(4) of
Act, 1972. The Court below in treating 1st
May 1996 as "first date of hearing" has
erred in law and therefore, impugned
revisional judgment is liable to be set
aside. In order to demonstrate as to what
constitute "first date of hearing" he cited
several authorities of Apex Court i.e.
Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Rishi Ram &
Ors, 2002(2) ARC 160; Siraj Ahmad
Siddiqui Vs. Prem Nath Kapoor, 1993(2)
ARC 451, Advaita Nand Vs. Judge,
Small Causes Court, Meerut & Ors.,
1995(1) ARC 563; Sudershan Devi &
Anr. Vs. Sushila Devi & Anr., (1999) 8
SCC 31, and this Court's judgment in
Krishna Kumar Gupta Vs. XIVth
Additional District Judge, Allahabad &
Ors., 2004(2) ARC 659.

9. Sri Pankaj Agarwal, Advocate
holding brief of Sri M.K.Gupta, Advocate
however supported the revisional judgment
on the strength of reason contained therein.

10. The expression "first hearing" has
been
explained
in
Section
20(4)
Explanation (a) and reads as under:

"the expression "first hearing" means
the first date for any step or proceeding
mentioned in the summons served on the
defendant."

11. This expression has been
considered by Apex Court in Ved Prakash
Wadhwa (supra). It was held that the date
of "first hearing would not be before a date
fixed for preliminary examination of
parties and framing of issues". Similar was
the view taken in an earlier judgment also
in Advaita Nand (supra).

12. A three-Judge Bench of Apex
Court also considered this issue in Siraj
Ahmad
Siddiqui
Vs.
Prem
Nath
Kapoor, 1993 (4) SCC 406 and said as
under

"The date of first hearing of a suit
under the Code is ordinarily understood to
be the date on which the court proposes to
apply its mind to the contentions in the
pleadings of the parties to the suit and in
the documents filed by them for the
purpose of framing the issues to be decided
in the suit. Does the definition of the
expression 'first hearing' for the purposes
of Section 20(4) mean something different?
The "step or proceedings mentioned in the
summons" referred to in the definition
should we think, be construed to be a step
or proceeding to be taken by the court for
it is, after all, a "hearing" that is the
subject matter of the definition, unless
there be something compelling in the said
Act to indicate otherwise; and we do not
find in the said Act any such compelling
provision. Further, it is not possible to
construe the expression "first date for any
step or proceeding" to mean the step of
filing the written statement, though the
date for that purpose may be mentioned in
the summons, for the reason that, as set out
earlier, it is permissible under the Code for
the defendant to file a written statement
1482 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

even thereafter but prior to the first
hearing when the court takes up the case,
since there is nothing in the said Act which
conflicts with the provisions of the Code in
this behalf. We are of the view, therefore,
that the date of first hearing as defined in
the said Act is the date on which the court
proposes to apply its mind to determine the
points in controversy between the parties
to the suit and to frame issues, if
necessary."

13. Again it was considered in
Sudarshan Devi (supra) and held that the
date fixed for hearing of the matter is the
date of first hearing and not the date fixed
for filing of written statement. The Court
observed that emphasis in the relevant
provision is on the word "hearing". The
Court also relied on its earlier decision in
Ved Prakash Wadhwa (supra).

14. The matter again came to be
considered in Mam Chand Pal Vs. Shanti
Agarwal (Smt.), 2002 (3) SCC 49.
Therein the suit was filed on 5.12.1988 and
summons were issued fixing 19th January,
1989 for filing of written statement and
27th January, 1989 for hearing. The
defendant was not served. The order was
passed for service of notice on the
defendant by publication fixing 3.7.1989
for hearing. By mistake in the publication,
the date of hearing was shown as
26.4.1989
instead
of
3.7.1989.
On
26.4.1989, Presiding Officer was not
available having proceeded for training.
The case was thereafter adjourned to
11.5.1989
and
further
gone
on
adjournment for one or the other reasons
on several dates. The Court held that in the
present case 26th April, 1989 would not be
regarded as "first date of hearing" since on
that date the Presiding Officer was not
available. In para 7 the court said, "where
the Court itself is not available it could not
be treated as the date of first hearing".

15. In Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs.
Rishi Ram and others, AIR 2002 SC
2520,
the
Court
noticed
distinction
between the phraseology in Order XV,
Rule 5 C.P.C. and Explanation (a) to subsection (4) of Section 20 of Act, 1972 and
in para 8, said:

"Rule 1 of Order V speaks of issue of
summons. When a suit has been duly
instituted a summons may be issued to the
defendant to appear and answer the claim
on a day specified therein. Rule 2 thereof
enjoins that the summons shall be
accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if
so permitted, by a concise statement. Rule
5 of Order V says that the Court shall
determine, at the time of issuing the
summons, whether it shall be for the
settlement of issues only, or for the final
disposal of the suit which shall be noted in
the summons. However, in every suit heard
by a Court of Small Causes, the summons
shall be for the final disposal of the suit. It
may be apt to notice here that Sub-section
(3) of Section 20 of the Act was deleted in
U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972
with effect from September 20, 1972 and
Rule 5 was inserted in Order XV of the
Civil Procedure Code which deals with
disposal of the suit at the first hearing.
Explanation 1 to Rule 5 of Order XV
defines the expression "first hearing" to
mean the date for filing written statement
or for hearing mentioned in the summons
or where more than one of such dates are
mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned.
But the said expression, as noticed above,
is defined in Clause (1) of Explanation to
Sub-section (4) of Section 20. Section 38 of
the U.P. Act says that the provisions of the
said Act shall have effect notwithstanding
3 All] Sri Om Prakash V. Sri Anil Kumar

1483
anything inconsistent therewith contained
in the Transfer of Property Act or in Code
of Civil Procedure, therefore, the definition
contained in Clause (a) of Explanation to
Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act will
prevail over the definition contained in
Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code of Civil
Procedure as applicable to the State of
U.P. It is too evident to miss that in contradistinction to the "filing of written
statement" mentioned in the definition of
the said expression contained in Rule 5 of
Order XV, the language employed in
Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section
20(4) of the U.P. Act, refers to 'the first
date for any step or proceeding mentioned
in the summons served on the defendant'.
In our view those words mean the first date
when the court proposes to apply its mind
to identify the controversy in the suit and
that stage arises after the defendant is
afforded an opportunity to file his written
statement." (emphasis added)

16. In para 12 of the judgment in
Ashok Kumar (supra), considering the
above observation and also relying on its
earlier decisions in Sudershan Devi
(supra), Advaita Nand (supra) and Siraj
Ahmad Siddiqui (supra), the Court said:

"Now adverting to the facts of the
case on hand it has been noticed above
that the suit was posted on May 20, 1980
for final disposal but that date cannot be
treated as the first hearing of the suit as
the Court granted time till July 25, 1980 to
the tenant for filing written statement. On
July 25, 1980 time was extended for filing
written statement and the suit was again
adjourned for final disposal to October 10,
1980. Inasmuch as after giving due
opportunity to file written statement the
suit was posted for final disposal on
October 10, 1980 it was that date which
ought to be considered as the date fixed by
the Court for application of its mind to the
facts of this case to identify the controversy
between the parties and as such the date of
first hearing of the suit."

17. It also held that once the date of
"first hearing" is determined and thereafter
the case is adjourned, the date of first
hearing of the suit would not change on
every adjournment of the suit for final
hearing.

18. Thus the effective date of first
hearing of the suit should be, when the
Court proposed to apply its mind.
Therefore it would be the date fixed
earliest for final disposal/hearing and not
adjourned for reasons attributable to the
defendant-tenant.
There
are
certain
decisions of this Court also and I need not
to burden this judgment giving in detail all
such
judgments
except
of
making
reference of some of those hereto i.e
Mohd. Salim alias Salim Uddin Vs. 4th
Addl. District Judge, Allahabad & Ors.
2001(2) AWC 1468, Har Prasad Vs. Ist
A.D.J., Etah 2004 (56) ALR 460, Jai
Ram Dass Vs. Iind Addl. District Judge,
Jhansi & Ors. 2004(57) ALR 233,
Chaturbhuj Pandey Vs. VI A.D.J.,
Kanpur & Ors. 2005 (60) ALR 697,
Hira Lal & Ors. Vs. Ram Das 2006 (3)
ARC 657 and Saadat Ali Vs. J.S.C.C.,
Moradabad & ors. 2006 (2) ARC 208.

19. In the present case the written
statement
was
filed
on
25.7.1995
whereafter 24.8.1995 was fixed as the date
for first hearing but on that date there was
some holiday and the matter was taken up
on 25.8.1995 which, in my view, should
have been the first date of hearing. All
deposits made thereon or till that date are
liable to be given due credit to find out
1484 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

whether
there
is
compliance
of
requirement of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972
or not.

20. The Revisional Court has found
that there was some discrepancy in the
calculation of total dues and exact amount
comes to Rs.8043/-, which ought to have
been deposited by tenant upto the first date
of hearing, but he had deposited Rs.8137/-.
While arriving at the figure of Rs.8137/- he
(revisional Court) has included Rs.424.40
deposited by tenant on 5.12.1995. If the
amount of Rs.424.40 is excluded from total
deposit, it comes to Rs.7712.60 showing a
deficiency of Rs.331/- if the computation
of required amount is found correct.
Whether the deficiency of such amount
would constitute a negligible amount or
not is a separate issue. In my view,
probably that would not be required to be
looked into in the present case in view of
the argument advanced by learned counsel
for
the
respondent
which
is
more
substantive and has enough weight to
prevail over the entire case.

21. Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned
counsel
for
the
respondent-tenant
contended that a tenant would be said to be
in default to attract liability of eviction
only if the conditions under Section
20(2)(a) of Act, 1972 are satisfied. It reads
as the tenant must be in arrears of rent for
not less than four months and has failed to
pay the same to landlord within one month
from the date of service upon him of the
notice of demand. He pleaded that landlord
did not receive rent from April, 1989
whereafter it was remitted by money order.
That was also declined, hence in Misc.
Case No.93 of 1989, rent was deposited
under Section 30(1) of Act, 1972. The
aforesaid deposit was recognized and
honoured by landlord by issuing rent
receipt No.306 dated 3.9.1989. The
monthly rent thereafter continued to be
paid in Misc. Case no.93 of 1989 and in
view of Section 30(6), the amount
deposited by respondent-tenant has to be
"deemed payment" made to the landlord.
Therefore, on 19.1.1991, when notice was
issued, respondent-tenant was not in
arrears of any amount of rent. The question
of termination of his tenancy by notice
dated 19.1.1991 would not arise. He
further contended that it is not the case of
petitioner-landlord
that there
is
any
subsequent default on the part of tenant in
respect whereto his tenancy has been
terminated.

22. Sri Manish Goyal, in reply to the
above
contention,
stated,
that
such
payment under Section 30(1) can be
honoured only till the demand is not made
by landlord. In the present case, even after
receipt of notice dated 19.1.1991, tenant
continued to make deposit in Misc Case
No.93 of 1989 and therefore, entire deposit
made shall not qualify for any purpose as it
is wholly illegal.

23. As a proposition of law, what has
been contended by Sri Manish Goyal
cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, deposit
of rent under Section 30(1) is permissible
only till landlord expressed his willingness
to accept rent. The notice dated 19.1.1991
was served upon the tenant on 23.1.1991.
Therefore the rent payable for the month of
February, 1991 and onwards ought to have
been paid to the landlord directly and for
that purpose deposit made under Section
30(1) cannot be looked into. But the
deposit
made
for
the
month
upto
December, 1990 cannot be said to be
vitiated in law for any purpose. Therefore,
to find out whether there is any default on
the part of tenant or not, what one has to
3 All] Sri Om Prakash V. Sri Anil Kumar

1485
look into is deposit made under Section
30(1) after December, 1990, and not for
earlier period.

24. If the first date of hearing is taken
to be 25.8.1995, it would mean that in
order to comply requirement of Section
20(4), besides other expenses, tenant was
required to deposit rent payable for the
month upto July, 1995. Since the deposit
of rent upto December, 1990 under Section
30(1) was liable to be taken into account,
the tenant was liable to deposit rent from
January, 1991 to July,1995 and other
expenses in the Court below. It means that
rent of 55 months besides other expenses
was to be deposited with the Trial Court.

25. In the present case Court below
has looked into the date of first hearing as
1.5.1996 and thereupon has calculated
entire dues. This is apparently not correct.
If the date of first hearing is taken to be
21.8.1995, one has to find out whether the
amount payable upto that date stood paid
or not.

26. As is already discussed above,
tenant paid Rs.7713/- upto 25.8.1995 with
the Trial Court i.e. Rs.913/- on 11.7.1995
and Rs.6800/- on 25.8.1995, which comes
to Rs.7713. Against it, rent payable upto
25.8.1995 from January 1991 comes to
Rs.3300/- and water tax @ Rs.7 per month
comes to Rs.385/-. The total comes to
Rs.3685/-. The amount of expenses have
been taken as Rs.496.75 towards Court
fees, Advocate fees Rs.124/-, clerkage
Rs.12.50,
Rs.240/-
towards
notice
expenses and Rs.1470.32 towards interest.
This interest has been calculated for a
much longer period i.e. upto December,
1995. Even if all these expenses, as they
are, are taken, it would come to
Rs.2343.57. The total amount, thus, comes
to Rs.6028.57 (Rs.3685/- + Rs.2343.57).

27. With the aforesaid amount, rent
paid by the tenant for the period of April,
1989 to December, 1990 under Section
30(1) is also liable to be given due credit in
view of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of
Act, 1972.

28. The amount thus deposited by
respondent tenant upto 25.8.1995 exceed
much more than what he was required to
deposit and there is no scope of any
argument that he has not complied with
requirement of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972.

29. Therefore, it cannot be said that
respondent-tenant was liable for eviction
from accommodation in question. The
Revisional Court, therefore, has rightly
allowed revision though in ultimate
calculation of amount required to be
deposited under section 20(4) of Act, 1972
etc., I find some glaring irregularity in
orders of both the courts below and have
discussed herein above from what is
apparent and evident from record without
disturbing the actual amount, date of
payment etc.

30. In view of the above discussion,
revisional order in so far as it has held that
suit filed by landlord-petitioner was liable
to be dismissed cannot be faulted.

31. The writ petition therefore, lacks
merit.

32. Dismissed.

33. Interim order, if any, stands
vacated.
----------
1486 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.11.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SIBGHAT ULLAH KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26493 of 2006

Reetesh Kumar Singh

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Regional Secretary Board of High School
& Intermediate Edu.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Arvind Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226Principle of Natural Justice-cancellation
of
Intermediate
marks
sheet-with
direction to returned the mark sheet-on
ground
petitioner
was
caught
redhanded using unfair means-rejection of
representation challenged on ground of
opportunity if hearing as well as on
equity as petitioner had passed B.A.-II
year examination-petitioner unable to
show
if
opportunity
provided
what
plausible explanation would be given
about using unfair means-even after
getting marks sheet under "W.A." took
admission in B.A. Part I and II-inference
drawn about uses of unfair meansperfectly justified.

Held: Para-8

Learned counsel for the petitioner has
further argued that petitioner has passed
B.A. and cancellation of intermediate
result would cause irreparable loss to
him. This argument cannot be accepted.
If petitioner did not pass intermediate
and was found using unfair means then
no sympathetic view can be taken.
Moreover,
such
sympathy
would
encourage cheating in examination and
approaching the authorities and the
courts after several years so that records
may be weeded out and a student may
say whatever he likes.
Case Law discussed:
2000 (3) U.P.L.B.E.C. 2760; AIR 2000 SC
2783; 2007 (4) SCC 54

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sibghat Ullah Khan, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned standing counsel
for the respondents.

2. Petitioner appeared in the
intermediate examination in the year 2002
conducted by U.P. Board of High School
and Intermediate as an student of
Mahabodhi
Inter
College,
Sarnath
Varanasi from examination centre S.G.
Inter College, Gaurakala, Charigaon,
Varanasi.
Petitioner's
computerised
marksheet showing him passed had been
sent to the college in question however
through order dated 27.12.2002 issued by
the Board, the marksheet was required to
be sent back. The letter was written to the
principle of the college. The earlier
marksheet had been issued under the
category ''WA'. The marksheet was
directed to be returned on the ground that
petitioner while attempting Physics-II
paper had been caught red handed using
unfair means. The allegation of the
petitioner is that he was not aware of
cancellation of his result and in the year
2003 he wanted intermediate certificate
which was not made available to him by
the clerk of the college. It is mentioned
that thereafter on 10.02.2004 petitioner
approached the Principal again who asked
him to file application before the Board
therefore on the said date he filed
application to the respondent No.1,
Regional Secretary, Board of High School
and Intermediate Education, Regional
Office, Varanasi through the Principal