# State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors v. S.B. Singh

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 630
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-06-18
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 107 of 2019
- **Bench:** Govind Mathur, C.J. Chandra Dhari Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-bank-of-india-bombay-ors-v-s-b-singh-45870
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Law
-
Departmental
proceedings - Criminal proceedings -
Dismissal - Indian Penal Code, 1860:
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 - There is no
violation of principle of natural justice in
this case. A bank employee who had refused
to avail of the opportunities provided to him in
a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself
against the charges of misconduct involving
his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be
permitted to complain later that he had been
denied a reasonable opportunity of defending
himself of the charges levelled against him
and the disciplinary proceeding conducted
against him had resulted in violation of
principles of natural justice. (Para 22)

B. Words & Phrases - "honourable acquittal"
- It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by
the expression "honourably acquitted". When the
accused is acquitted after full consideration of
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had
miserably failed to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be said that the
accused was honourably acquitted. (Para 27)

C. Mere acquittal of an employee by a
criminal court has no impact on the
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
Department (Para 28, 40) - Acquittal in a
criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for
interfering with an order of punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority. Order of dismissal can be
passed even if the delinquent officer had been
acquitted of the criminal charge. (Para 30)

In the absence of any provision in the service rules
for reinstatement, if an employee is not honourably
acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred
on the employee to claim any benefit including
reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof
required for holding a person guilty by a criminal
Court and the enquiry conducted by way of
disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. In a
criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of
the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to
establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law
that the strict burden of proof required to establish
guilt in a criminal Court is not required in a
disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of
probabilities is sufficient. (Para 4, 41)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

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630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2020)06ILR A630
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.06.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE GOVIND MATHUR, C.J.
THE HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 107 of 2019

State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors.
 ...Appellants
Versus
S.B. Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sudeep Seth, Alok Saxena

Counsel for the Respondents:
Dharmendra Kumar Dixit

A.
Service
Law
-
Departmental
proceedings - Criminal proceedings -
Dismissal - Indian Penal Code, 1860:
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 - There is no
violation of principle of natural justice in
this case. A bank employee who had refused
to avail of the opportunities provided to him in
a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself
against the charges of misconduct involving
his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be
permitted to complain later that he had been
denied a reasonable opportunity of defending
himself of the charges levelled against him
and the disciplinary proceeding conducted
against him had resulted in violation of
principles of natural justice. (Para 22)

B. Words & Phrases - "honourable acquittal"
- It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by
the expression "honourably acquitted". When the
accused is acquitted after full consideration of
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had
miserably failed to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be said that the
accused was honourably acquitted. (Para 27)

C. Mere acquittal of an employee by a
criminal court has no impact on the
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
Department (Para 28, 40) - Acquittal in a
criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for
interfering with an order of punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority. Order of dismissal can be
passed even if the delinquent officer had been
acquitted of the criminal charge. (Para 30)

In the absence of any provision in the service rules
for reinstatement, if an employee is not honourably
acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred
on the employee to claim any benefit including
reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof
required for holding a person guilty by a criminal
Court and the enquiry conducted by way of
disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. In a
criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of
the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to
establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law
that the strict burden of proof required to establish
guilt in a criminal Court is not required in a
disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of
probabilities is sufficient. (Para 4, 41)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. St General Manager (Operations), S.B.I. Vs
R. Periyasamy, (2015) 3 SCC 101 (Para 4)

2. Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs S.
Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 (Para 4)

3. Manager, R.B.I. Vs S. Mani, (2005) 5 SCC
100 (Para 4)

4. RBI Vs Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC
541 (Para 27)

5. R.P. Kapur Vs U.O.I., AIR 1964 SC 787
(Para 28)

6. State of Assam Vs Raghava Rajgopalachari,
1972 SLR 44 (SC) (Para 28)

7. Robert Stuart Wauchope Vs Emperor, ILR
(1934) 61 Cal 168 (Para 28)

8. Southern Railway Officers Assn. Vs U.O.I.,
(2009) 9 SCC 24 (Para 30)
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 631
9. State Bank of Hyderabad Vs P. Kata Rao,
(2008) 15 SCC 657 (Para 31)

10. Karnataka SRTC Vs M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012)
1 SCC 442 (Para 32)

11. B.C. Chaturvedi Vs U.O.I., (1995) 6 SCC
749 (Para 33)

12. Bank of India Vs Degala Suryanarayan,
(1999) 5 SCC 762 (Para 34)

13. Union of India Vs Sardar Bahadur, (1972)
4 SCC 618 (Para 35)

14. Deport Manager, A.P. SRTC Vs Mohd.
Yusuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 (Para 36)

15. Suresh Pathrella Vs Oriental Bank of
Commerce, (2006) 10 SCC 572 (Para 37)

16. Samar Bahadur Singh Vs St. of U.P.,
(2011) 9 SCC 94 (Para 38)

17. SBI Vs Narendra Kumar Pandey, 2013
MPLJ Online (SC) 24; (2013) 2 SCC 740 (Para
39)

Appeal filed for rectification of order and
judgment dated 06.12.2018, passed by
Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2844
(SS) of 2004

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Dhari
Singh, J.)

1. The instant appeal has been filed
for correctness of order judgment and
order dated 06.12.2018 passed by learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2844
(SS) of 2004 (S.B. Singh vs. State Bank
of India and Ors.).

2. Brief facts of the case are as
follows:

(i)
Show-cause
notice
dated
22.05.2001
was
issued
by
the
appellant/Bank to the respondent/writ
petitioner
seeking
explanation
of
fraudulent
withdrawal
aggregated of
Rs.54,100/- on various dates from the
saving bank accounts of Shri V.K. Jaiswal
and Shri Udham Singh during his posting
as Passing Officer at Phulpur, Azamgarh
Branch of the Bank from 22.08.1996 to
15.06.2000.
The
respondent/writ
petitioner
submitted
his
reply
on
22.05.2001.

(ii) The Bank initiated departmental
proceedings by issuing charge-sheet to
the respondent/writ petitioner by charging
him for making fraudulent withdrawal
amounting to Rs.54,100/- from saving
bank accounts of Shri V.K. Jaiswal and
Shri Udham Singh thereby exposing the
Bank
to
substantial
loss.
The
respondent/writ petitioner did not submit
any written statement in defence. Shri
R.K. Srivastava was appointed as enquiry
officer by the appointing authority to
inquire the charges levelled against the
respondent/writ petitioner. The Bank also
lodged an FIR against the respondent/writ
petitioner bearing Crime No.23 of 2002
for committing offence under Sections
419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC on 22.02.2002
at P.S. Phulpur, District Azamgarh.

(iii) On 23.04.2003 the enquiry
officer submitted his report holding the
allegation no.1 partly proved. However,
Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary
Authority)
disagreed
and
tentatively
found the charge to be fully proved. The
disciplinary
authority
sought
representation of the respondent/writ
petitioner on findings of the enquiry
officer.
On
06.06.2003,
the
respondent/writ petitioner submitted a
representation. The disciplinary authority
imposed the punishment of dismissal
from service on 17.11.2003. Against
punishment order dated 17.11.2003, the
respondent/writ
petitioner
submitted
departmental appeal to the Chief General
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Manager
(Appellate
Authority)
on
06.01.2004. Vide order dated 05.04.2004,
the appellate authority dismissed the
departmental appeal
and found the
penalty commensurate with the lapses
held proved against the respondent/writ
petitioner. The respondent/writ petitioner
preferred a petition bearing Writ Petition
No.2844 (SS) of 2004, impugning the
order of punishment dated 17.11.2003
and order of dismissal of departmental
appeal dated 05.04.2004.

(iv) Vide order dated 07.06.2008, the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh
convicted the respondent/writ petitioner
for offence punishable under Sections
419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC in Criminal
Case No.3995 of 2006 (State of U.P. vs.
S.B. Singh). Against the said order, the
respondent/writ petitioner preferred a
criminal appeal bearing No.27 of 2008
before
Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Azamgarh. The said criminal appeal was
allowed by the appellate Court vide order
dated 24.05.2010 and the respondent/writ
petitioner was acquitted by granting
benefit of doubt.

(v) After the order of the criminal
appeal,
the
respondent/writ
petitioner
amended Writ Petition No.2844 (SS) of 2004
by bringing subsequent development on
record.
Vide
impugned
order
dated
06.12.2018, learned Single Judge allowed the
writ petition and quashed order of punishment
dated 17.11.2003 and order of appellate
authority dated 05.04.2004 with direction to
the appellant/Bank to treat the respondent/writ
petitioner in service w.e.f the date of dismissal
order dated 17.11.2003 till the date of his
superannuation i.e. 31.07.2016 and to provide
him all consequential service benefits and the
post retiral benefits.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellant has submitted that judgment and
order dated 06.12.2018 (supra) passed by
learned Single Judge is erroneous in law as
well as on facts. The learned Single Judge
erroneously presumed and proceeded in the
entire judgment on the premise that the
respondent/writ petitioner was ''honourably'
acquitted in the criminal proceedings,
although he was acquitted on benefit of doubt.

4. The learned counsel has further
submitted that it is settled law that the
departmental enquiry is independent of
criminal proceedings. So, acquittal in a
criminal court is of no help and even if, a
person stands acquitted by a criminal
court, departmental enquiry can be held,
since standard of proof required in a
departmental enquiry and in a criminal
case are different; In criminal case,
standard of proof is required beyond
reasonable doubt while in departmental
enquiry, it is proof on preponderance of
probabilities.
Judgment
of
acquittal
passed in favour of an employee by
giving benefit of doubt per se would not
be binding upon the employer. To support
his contention learned counsel for the
appellant
has
relied
on
[General
Manager (Operations), State Bank of
India vs. R Periyasamy, reported in
2015 (3) SCC 101: Deputy Inspector
General of Police Vs S.Samuthiram,
reported
in
2013
(1)
SCC
598:
Manager, Reserve Bank of India Vs S.
Mani, reported in 2005 (5) SCC 100].

5. It is further submitted that learned
Single Judge has erroneously held that the
respondent/writ petitioner had not been
afforded ample opportunity of hearing in
the departmental enquiry on the premise
that the account holders Shri Udham
Singh and Shri V.K. Jaiswal had not been
produced as witnesses in the departmental
enquiry. The learned Single Judge has
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 633
also failed to consider and appreciate that
reasonable opportunity of defence was
provided to the respondent/writ petitioner
in the departmental enquiry but the
respondent/writ petitioner neither filed
reply to the charge-sheet nor adduced oral
evidence by producing Shri Udham Singh
and Shri V.K. Jaiswal (account holders)
as defence witnesses and did not cross
examine the management witnesses Shri
Ram Aadhar Tiwari and Shri Shyam
Murari Mishra and also not engaged any
defence representative nor submitted
defence brief to the enquiry Officer.

6. It is argued that the learned Single
Judge
has
failed
to
consider
and
appreciate that sufficiency of evidence is
not a ground for judicial review in
departmental proceedings; only total
absence of evidence and non-compliance
of principles of natural justice causing
some real prejudice to the delinquent
officer are the grounds for judicial
review.

7. It is also submitted that the
learned Single Judge also failed to
consider and appreciate that an employee
of Bank is required to take all possible
steps to protect interest of the Bank and
discharge his duties with utmost integrity,
honesty devotion and diligence and do
nothing unbecoming of an officer of a
Bank. The respondent/writ petitioner
acted in breach of Bank's rules and had
lost confidence with the Bank and it was a
futile exercise of judicial review to
embark upon the decision of disciplinary
authority imposing punishment, preceded
by an enquiry.

8. It is further submitted that the
learned Single Judge had erroneously
held that the appellate authority has
rejected
the
appeal
without
considering factual legal matrix of the
issue in question and the appellate
order did not reflect application of
mind. It is submitted that in view of
the above, the impugned judgment of
the
learned
Single
Judge
being
erroneous in law as well as on facts
and is liable to be set aside.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for
the
respondent/writ
petitioner
has
vehemently opposed the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the
appellant/respondent
by
submitting
that there is no infirmity in the
impugned order/judgment passed by
learned
Single
Judge.
He
has
submitted that with respect to alleged
misconduct during the period from
04.01.1997 to 21.07.1997, charges
were issued by the Deputy General
Manager, State Bank of India, Zonal
Office, Region - II, Gorakhpur i.e.
Disciplinary
Authority
through
charge-sheet dated 08.11.2001 after
more
than
four
years
without
explaining the delay in issuing the
said charge-sheet. It is submitted that
the
enquiry
officer
conducted
preliminary hearing on 25.01.2002 and
regular
hearing
on
20.08.2002
meaning thereby only two days. On
20.08.2002,
two
management
witnesses namely Shri Ram Adhar
Tiwar and Shri Shyam Murari Misra
deposed before the enquiry officer and
gave statement contrary to Rule 24 of
Master
Circular
(Saving
Bank
Account).
The
enquiry
officer
submitted an enquiry report dated
23.04.2003 vide which Charge No.1
was
found
partly
proved.
The
disciplinary
authority
recorded
disagreement note dated 20.05.2003
634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on the finding of the enquiry officer
without disclosing any reasons.

10. The learned counsel has further
submitted
that
the
respondent/writ
petitioner requested to reopen the enquiry
for giving a proper opportunity to the
respondent/writ petitioner but the same
was not considered by the concerned
authority. It is submitted that it is the
appointing
authority
and
not
the
disciplinary authority who gave note
dated 20.05.2003 on the basis of which
the
respondent/writ
petitioner
was
dismissed from service vide order dated
17.11.2003.

11. The learned counsel for the
respondent/writ petitioner has submitted
that bare perusal of enquiry report dated
23.04.2003,
disciplinary
note
dated
20.05.2003 and dismissal order dated
17.11.2003 would reveal that the same
suffer from improper appreciation of fact
and non-application of mind to the facts
and circumstances of the case as the
materials on record do not establish/prove
the allegations against the respondent/writ
petitioner.

12. It is further submitted that the
departmental appeal which was preferred
by the respondent/writ petitioner was
rejected by the appellate authority vide
order
dated
05.04.2004
without
appreciation of facts and without applying
mind to the issues and point raised by the
respondent/writ petitioner, therefore, the
said order passed in the departmental
appeal is bad in law and liable to be set
aside.

13. The learned counsel has
submitted that in the statement made
before the criminal Court during the
criminal proceedings, Shri Udham Singh,
account holder, accepted his signatures on
withdrawal form and acknowledged the
receipt of the payment. It is further
submitted that Shri Udham Singh was
produced as prosecution witness and he
categorically stated that no fraud was
made in his account and no amount was
withdrawn by anyone. It is submitted that
since
criminal
proceedings
and
departmental proceedings were on the
same set of facts, therefore, when the
respondent/writ
petitioner
has
been
acquitted
in
criminal
proceedings
''honourably', then he cannot be held
guilty in the departmental enquiry.

14. The learned counsel vehemently
argued that the judgment of the criminal
Court
acquitting
the
respondent/writ
petitioner has to be construed as an
''honourable'
acquittal
and
that
the
respondent/writ
petitioner
cannot
be
proceeded with on the same set of facts
on which he was acquitted by a criminal
Court.

15. We have heard learned counsel
for the parties and perused the record. We
may first deal with the departmental
proceedings
initiated
against
the
respondent/writ petitioner.

Departmental Proceedings:-

16. We may indicate that the
following were the charges levelled
against the respondent/writ petitioner in
the departmental proceedings on the basis
of which charge-sheet dated 08.11.2001
was
served
on
the
respondent/writ
petitioner:

"1.
You
fraudulently
obtained
payments
through
withdrawal
forms
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 635
Rs.49,000/- on various occasions from
Savings Bank Account of Shri Vinod
Kumar Jiswal (S.B. A/c No.15508) and
Rs.5,100/- on two occasions from Savings
Bank Account of Sri Udham Singh (S.B.
A/c No.3135).

All the said withdrawals were posted
and passed by you. The payment of
withdrawals were received by you. The
payment of withdrawals were received
from the teller counter/paying cashier."

17. The disciplinary authority vide
letter dated 08.11.2001 had required the
respondent/writ
petitioner
to
submit
statement of defence in response to the
charge-sheet, in terms of service rules,
within 10 days of receipt of the said letter.
Similarly, vide letter dated 11.10.2002,
the disciplinary authority required the
respondent/writ
petitioner
to
submit
defence brief by 27.10.2002 but the
respondent/writ petitioner did not submit
the same. The respondent/writ petitioner
had also chosen not to cross-examine the
witnesses
in
the
departmental
proceedings, inspite of being afforded the
said opportunity. The respondent/writ
petitioner himself expressed his desire to
engage defence representative and sought
permission to advise his name but he did
not do so. The respondent/writ petitioner
wrote a letter dated 28.11.2002 and
sought
permission
for
defence
representative
and
also
sought
for
reopening of the departmental enquiry.
After giving ample opportunity to the
respondent/writ
petitioner,
the
disciplinary authority passed order dated
17.11.2003 by imposing penalty of
dismissal from service.

18. As per the documentary
evidence, the respondent/writ petitioner
had withdrawn money from one Shri
Udham Singh's Account. The account
holder, Shri Udham Singh, wrote letter
dated 20.08.1997 to the Bank authorities
wherein he denied having withdrawn
money from his account. He clearly stated
in the said letter that neither does the
withdrawal form bear his signatures nor
was withdrawn money on the concerned
dates. The charge relating to withdrawals
of
money
by
the
respondent/writ
petitioner from the account of Shri V.K.
Jaiswal was also duly proved during the
enquiry
proceedings.
The
signatures
borne on the withdrawal forms do not
tally with the signature on the account
opening form. Hence, it is evident that the
said account holders did not withdraw
money from their account.

19. It would be pertinent to sum up
the reasons why the Presenting Officer
(Shri V.K. Srivastava) in his brief
concluded
that
the
withdrawals
by
respondent/writ petitioner from accounts
of the two account holders stood proved.
The reasons are as follows:-

"i)
Perusal
of
Cash
Payment
Register of relevant dates shows name of
the respondent/writ petitioner as being
the person who received payments from
the said account holders;

ii) Deposition during the course of
enquiry by the payment cashiers who
worked at Cash Counter during the
relevant time, namely Ram Adhar Tiwari
and Shyam Murari Verma who examined
themselves as PW1 and PW2 respectively.

iii) The fact that the respondent/writ
petitioner did not cross examine the
payment cashiers PW1 and PW 2.

iv) The account holders Shri Vinod
Kumar
Jaiswal
vide
letters
dated
14.06.2000 and 24.11.2000 and Shri
Udham
Singh
vide
letter
dated
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
26.08.2007,
denied
having
received
payments or withdrawn money form their
accounts on the alleged dates.

v) Amount had been debited to the
account stood confirmed from Relative
Day Book, Day Book Summary and
Saving Bank Account, General Ledger
Head.

vi) Petitioner produced letter dated
03.06.2000 which has no relation with
charge leveled against him.

20. On 23.04.2003, the enquiry
officer submitted enquiry report partly
proving the sole charge except the
allegation
that
the
respondent/writ
petitioner has posted 14 withdrawals.
Vide order dated 20.05.2003, Deputy
General
Manager
(Disciplinary
Authority) disagreed with the enquiry
report dated 23.04.2003 and fully proved
the sole charge. Deputy General Manager
(Disciplinary Authority) sent a letter
dated 20.05.2003 to the respondent/writ
petitioner alongwith enquiry report dated
23.04.2003 and disagreement note dated
20.05.2003
for
representation.
The
respondent/writ petitioner submitted reply
dated 06.06.2003 and requested for
reopening the enquiry as was earlier
requested through letter dated 28.11.2002.
Vide order dated 17.11.2003 passed by
General Manager (Appointing Authority),
the
respondent/writ
petitioner
was
dismissed from service as the charges
levelled
against
the
respondent/writ
petitioner was duly proved.

21. A departmental appeal was
filed against order dated 17.11.2003
passed by the appellate authority i.e.
General Manager on 06.01.2004. The
said appeal was also rejected by the
appellate authority on 05.04.2004.

22. In view of the facts as
discussed above, it is evident that the
respondent/writ
petitioner
did
not
participate in the departmental enquiry
and he also did not submit his
reply/written
submission
to
the
enquiring
officer.
There
is
no
violation of principle of natural justice
in this case. The records of the
disciplinary proceedings show that the
respondent had avoided filing of the
written explanation for the charges of
misconduct levelled against him and
also had for no valid reason refused to
co-operate
in
the
disciplinary
proceedings. A bank employee who
had
refused
to
avail
of
the
opportunities provided to him in a
disciplinary proceeding of defending
himself
against
the
charges
of
misconduct involving his integrity and
dishonesty, cannot be permitted to
complain later that he had been denied
a reasonable opportunity of defending
himself of the charges levelled against
him and the disciplinary proceeding
conducted against him had resulted in
violation of principles of natural
justice.

Criminal Proceedings:-

23. We have indicated in the abovementioned paragraphs that a criminal case
was
also
registered
against
the
respondent/writ petitioner being Crime
No.23 of 2002, under Sections 419, 420,
467 & 468 IPC at Police Station Pulpur,
District Azamgarh by one Shri Manoj
Kumar Das, the then Manager, State Bank
of
India,
Branch
Pulpur,
District
Azamgarh against unknown persons with
respect to same 14 withdrawal forms
amounting to Rs.54,100/-.
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 637

24.

After
completion
of
investigation, the investigating agency
filed a charge-sheet before the Court of
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh.
After filing the charge-sheet the case was
registered as Criminal Case No.3995 of
2006 (State of U.P. vs. S.B. Singh). The
respondent/writ petitioner was convicted
for offence punishable under Section 419,
420, 467 & 468 IPC vide order dated
07.06.2008 passed by Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Azamgarh.

25. Against order dated 07.06.2008
(supra), the respondent/writ petitioner
filed a criminal appeal bearing no.27 of
2008 before Additional Sessions Judge,
Court No.1, Azamgarh. Vide order dated
24.05.2010,
the
Additional
Sessions
Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh acquitted
the respondent/writ petitioner from all the
charges levelled against him on the
ground that the prosecution has failed to
prove his case beyond reasonable doubt.
Benefit of doubt was given to the
respondent/writ
petitioner
by
the
Additional
Sessions
Judge
while
acquitting him. Therefore, it is crystal
clear that he was convicted by Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh vide order
dated 07.06.2008 (supra), however, was
acquitted subsequently by giving benefit
of doubt vide order dated 24.05.2020
(supra). In such circumstances, acquittal
of the respondent/writ petitioner cannot
be said as ''honourable acquittal'.

26. We may indicate that before
order of acquittal dated 24.05.2010
(supra), the departmental enquiry was
concluded
and
the
respondent/writ
petitioner was dismissed from service on
17.11.2003. Now the question is when the
departmental enquiry has been concluded
resulting in dismissal of the delinquent
from service, whether the subsequent
finding recorded by the criminal court
acquitting the respondent/delinquent will
have any effect on the departmental
proceedings?

Honourably acquittal:-

27. The meaning of the expression
"honourable acquittal" came up for
consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal -
(1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered
the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing
with honourable acquittal by a criminal
court on the disciplinary proceedings. In
that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the mere acquittal does not
entitle an employee to reinstatement in
service, the acquittal, it was held, has to
be
honourable.
The
expressions
"honourable acquittal", "acquitted of
blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown
to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the
Penal Code, which are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define
precisely what is meant by the expression
"honourably
acquitted".
When
the
accused
is
acquitted
after
full
consideration of prosecution evidence and
that the prosecution had miserably failed
to prove the charges levelled against the
accused, it can possibly be said that the
accused was honourably acquitted.

28. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India
-AIR 1964 SC 787, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that even in the case of
acquittal, departmental proceedings may
follow where the acquittal is other than
honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava
Rajgopalachari -1972 SLR 44 (SC), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with
approval the views expressed by Lord
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope
v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168]
which is as follows: (Raghava case [1972
SLR 44 (SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8)

"8. ... ''The expression "honourably
acquitted" is one which is unknown to
courts of justice. Apparently it is a form
of order used in courts martial and other
extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our
judgment
that
we
accepted
the
explanation given by the appellant,
believed it to be true and considered that
it ought to have been accepted by the
government
authorities
and
by
the
Magistrate. Further, we decided that the
appellant had not misappropriated the
monies referred to in the charge. It is thus
clear that the effect of our judgment was
that the appellant was acquitted as fully
and completely as it was possible for him
to be acquitted. Presumably, this is
equivalent to what government authorities
term "honourably acquitted".'" (Robert
Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168], ILR
pp. 188-89)

Effect of judgment of acquittal:-

29.
Contention
of
the
respondent/writ petitioner is that since the
criminal proceedings and departmental
proceedings were on the same set of facts
and when the respondent/writ petitioner
was acquitted in criminal proceedings
honourably, then he should be reinstated
in service.

30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Southern Railway Officers
Assn. v. Union of India - (2009) 9 SCC
24 has held that acquittal in a criminal
case by itself cannot be a ground for
interfering with an order of punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority.
The Court reiterated that the order of
dismissal can be passed even if the
delinquent officer had been acquitted of
the criminal charge.

31. In State Bank of Hyderabad v. P.
Kata Rao - (2008) 15 SCC 657, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that
the jurisdiction of the superior Courts in
interfering with the finding of fact arrived
at by the enquiring officer is limited and
that the High Court would also ordinarily
not interfere with the quantum of
punishment and there cannot be any doubt
or
dispute
that
only
because
the
delinquent employee who was also facing
a criminal charge stands acquitted, the
same, by itself, would not debar the
disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh
departmental proceeding and/or where the
departmental proceedings had already
been initiated, to continue therewith. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held
as follows in Para - 20:

"20. The legal principle enunciated
to the effect that on the same set of facts
the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a
departmental proceedings and in a
criminal
case
simultaneously,
has,
however, been deviated from. The dicta of
this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat
Gold Mines Ltd. - (1999) 3 SCC 679 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 810 however, remains
unshaken
although
the
applicability
thereof had been found to be dependent
on the fact situation obtaining in each
case."

32. In the case of Karnataka SRTC
v. M.G. Vittal Rao - (2012) 1 SCC 442,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court after a
detailed survey of various judgments on
the issue with regard to the effect of
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 639
criminal proceedings on the departmental
enquiry,
held
that
the
disciplinary
authority imposing the punishment of
dismissal from service cannot be held to
be disproportionate or non-commensurate
to the delinquency.

33. The scope of departmental
inquiry and criminal cases have been
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in number of cases. The said issue is no
longer res integra. In B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India - (1995) 6 SCC 749, the
Supreme Court has held as under:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the
Court. When an inquiry is conducted on
charges of misconduct by a public
servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned
to determine whether the inquiry was held
by a competent officer or whether rules of
natural
justice
are
complied
with.
Whether the findings or conclusions are
based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry
has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But
that finding must be based on some
evidence. Neither the technical rules of
Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or
evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary
proceeding.
When
the
authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom,
the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of
the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its
power of judicial review does not act as
appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent
officer
in
a
manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where
the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no
eviden
criminal
appeal
ce.
If
the
conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere
with the conclusion or the finding, and
mould the relief so as to make it
appropriate to the facts of each case."

34. In Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayan - (1999) 5 SCC 762, it is
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
under:

"11. Strict rules of evidence are not
applicable
to
departmental
enquiry
proceedings. The only requirement of law
is
that
the
allegation
against
the
delinquent officer must be established by
such evidence acting upon which a
reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding
upholding the gravamen of the charge
against the delinquent officer. Mere
conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in departmental
enquiry
proceedings.
The
Court
exercising the jurisdiction of judicial
review would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the
departmental
enquiry
proceedings
excepting in a case of mala fides or
perversity i.e. where there is no evidence
to support a finding or where a finding is
such that no man acting reasonably and
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
with objectivity could have arrived at that
finding. The Court cannot embark upon
reappreciating the evidence or weighing
the same like an appellate authority. So
long as there is some evidence to support
the
conclusion
arrived
at
by
the
departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel, the Constitution Bench has held:

The High Court can and must
enquire whether there is am evidence at
all in support of the impugned conclusion.
In other words, if the whole of the
evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as
true does the conclusion follow that the
charge in question is proved asainst the
respondent? This approach will avoid
weighing the evidence. It will take the
evidence as it stands and only examine
whether on that evidence legally the
impugned conclusion follows or not."

35. In Union of India v. Sardar
Bahadur - (1972) 4 SCC 618, the
Supreme Court has held as under:

"15.
A
finding
cannot
be
characterized as perverse or unsupported
by any relevant materials if it is a
reasonable inference from proved facts.
Now what are the proved facts : Nand
Kumar as representative of Ram Sarup
Mam Chand and Mam Chand and
Company
of
Calcutta
filed
five
applications for licences to set-up steel
re-rolling mills on 14th June, 1956. On
25th June, 1956, a cheque drawn in
favour of P.S. Sundaram was given to the
respondent by Nand Kumar for Rs 2500;
the cheque was endorsed and the amount
credited in the account of the respondent.
When the respondent borrowed the
amount in question from Nand Kumar, he
was not working in the Industries Act
section. Nand Kumar knew that the
respondent was working in the Steel &
Cement section of the Ministry and the
applications for the grant of licences for
setting up the steel plant re-rolling mills
would go to that section. Even if the
applications were to be dealt with at the
initial stage by the Industries Act section
the respondent at least was expected to
know that in due course the section in
which he was working had to deal with
the same. This is borne out by the fact
that in July, 1956 copies of the
applications were actually sent to the
Steel & Cement section where the
respondent was working. If he, therefore,
borrowed money from Nand Kumar a few
days earlier it seems rather clear that he
placed
himself
under
pecuniary
obligation to a person who was likely to
have official dealings with him. The
words likely to have official dealings take
within their ambit the possibility of future
dealings between the officer concerned
and the person from whom he borrowed
money. A disciplinary proceeding is not a
criminal
trial.
The
standard
proof
required is that of preponderance of
probability
and
not
proof
beyond
reasonable doubt. If the inference that
Nand Kumar was a person likely to have
official dealings with the respondent was
one which a reasonable person would
draw from the proved facts of the case,
the High Court cannot sit as a Court of
appeal over a decision based on it. Where
there are some relevant materials which
the authority has accepted and which
materials may reasonably support the
conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is
not the function of the High Court
exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226 to review the materials and to arrive
at
an
independent
finding on
the
materials. If the enquiry has been
properly held the question of adequacy or
6 All. State Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. Vs. S.B. Singh 641
reliability of the evidence cannot be
canvaased
before
the
High
Court
(See: State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree
Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723) No doubt
there was no separate finding on the
question whether Nand Kumar was a
person likely to have official dealings
with the respondent by the Inquiring
Officer or the President. But we think that
such a finding was implied when they said
that Charge No. 3 has been proved. The
only question was whether the proved
facts of the case would warrant such an
inference. Tested in the light of the
standard of proof necessary to enter a
finding of this nature, we are satisfied
that on the material facts proved the
inference and the implied finding that
Nand Kumar was a person likely to have
official dealings with the respondent were
reasonable."

36. In Deport Manager, A.P. SRTC
v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya - (1997) 2 SCC
699, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
expressed its view as under:

"8. We are in respectful agreement
with the above view. The purpose of
departmental enquiry and of prosecution
are two different and distinct aspects. The
criminal prosecution is launched for an
offence for violation of a duty, the
offender owes to the society or for breach
of which law has provided that the
offender shall make satisfaction to the
public. So crime is an act of commission
in violation of law or of omission of
public duty. The departmental enquiry is
to maintain discipline in the service and
efficiency of public service. It would,
therefore,
be
expedient
that
the
disciplinary proceedings are conducted
and
completed
as
expeditiously
as
possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to
lay down any guidelines as inflexible
rules
in
which
the
departmental
proceedings may or may not be stayed
pending trial in criminal case against the
delinquent officer. Each case requires to
be considered in the backdrop of its own
facts and circumstances. There would be
no bar to proceed simultaneously with
departmental enquiry and trial of a
criminal case unless the charge in the
criminal trial is of grave nature involving
complicated questions of fact and law.
Offence generally implies infringement of
public (sic duty), as distinguished from
mere private rights punishable under
criminal law. When trial for criminal
offence is conducted it should be in
accordance with proof of the offence as
per the evidence defined under the
provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse
is the case of departmental enquiry. The
enquiry in a departmental proceedings
relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
delinquent officer to punish him for his
misconduct defined under the relevant
statutory rules or law. That the strict
standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled
legal position. The enquiry in the
departmental proceedings relates to the
conduct of the delinquent officer and
proof in that behalf is not as high as in an
offence in criminal charge. It is seen that
invariably the departmental enquiry has to
be conducted expeditiously so as to
effectuate
efficiency
in
public
administration and the criminal trial will
take its own course. The nature of
evidence in criminal trial is entirely
different
from
the
departmental
proceedings. In the former, prosecution is
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
on the touchstone of human conduct. The
standard of proof in the departmental
proceedings is not the same as of the
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
criminal trial. The evidence also is
different from the standard point of the
Evidence Act. The evidence required in
the departmental enquiry is not regulated
by the Evidence Act."

37. In the case of Suresh Pathrella
v. Oriental Bank of Commerce - (2006)
10 SCC 572, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held as under:

"11. In our view, the findings
recorded by the learned Single Judge are
fallacious. This Court has taken the view
consistently that acquittal in a criminal
case would be no bar for drawing up a
disciplinary
proceeding
against
the
delinquent officer.