# State of U.P. and Anr v. Ram Lal and Ors

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 760
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-01-11
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 297 of 2007
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-and-anr-v-ram-lal-and-ors-42588
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Act,
Section
23(2),28- entitlement of the benefit of
amended provision-even though award
made prior to amendment?held-'Yes'

Held: Para-10
In view of the law noticed above, it is
clear that where the Reference Court
passes its award after 24-9-1984 the
amended provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 23 and section 28, being already
in the statute book, ought to be applied
to provide benefit to the landloser, even
though the Collector's award was passed
before
the
introduction
of
the
Amendment Bill in the House of the
People. It is thus held that the claimantrespondent was entitled to the benefit of
the amended provisions of Section 23(2)
and Section 28 of the Act even though
the award of the Collector was made
much before the introduction of the Land
Acquisition Act (Amendment) Bill, 1982,
in the House of the People and the
Reference Court's award was passed
after the commencement of the Act No.
68 of 1984.

Case Law discussed:
(1990) 1 SCC 277; (2004)1 SCC 467; (2004)
12 SCC 430; (1995) 3 SCC 316; (1996) 4 SCC
533; (2005) 9 SCC 123; (2001) 4 SCC 181;
(1999) 3 SCC 500; (2004) 1 SCC 328; (2011)
11 SCC 198

(B)Code
of
Civil
Procedure-Section
151,152- Power of Review-whether can
be exercised in garb of Review?-held-
"No"-when final award made-if such
legal position omitted-proper cause to
either
more
review
stricts
under
provision of Section 47 of the code on
proper on appeal.

Held:Para-18
The powers under Section 152 of the
Code are neither to be equated with the
power of review nor can be said to be
akin to review. Similarly, in view of the
decisions noticed above, the power
under Section 151 CPC is not available to
modify / alter / review a judgment /
decree/
award,
which
has
attained
finality.

## Text

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760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
consideration
of
the
case
of
the
complainant on merit."

16. In the present case, what
emerges from the pleading of the petition
that earlier criminal case was initiated on
the basis of the application 156(3) Cr.P.C.
which was investigated by the police and
after
investigation,
the
Investigating
Officer submitted the final report. Against
the final report, protest petition was filed
by the complainant which was rejected by
the
court
below
vide
order
dated
20.11.2001 after perusing the statements
of the complainant and his witnesses.
Thereafter, the revision petition filed
against the said order was also dismissed
by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on
merits. The order passed by the learned
Addl. Sessions Judge in revision was not
challenged by the complainant before this
Court. Thus, the second complaint on
similar facts is not maintainable.

17. Perusal of the impugned
summoning order further indicates that
the learned magistrate has not even
considered that he was taking cognizance
of the matter on the basis of second
complaint on same set of facts. No
exceptional circumstances have been
mentioned in the impugned order. This
court finds that the facts of both the cases
are the same. Nothing new has been
disclosed in the second complaint. In such
situation no case is made out for
summoning
the
revisionists
as
the
allegations in both the complaints are
identical. Therefore, the second complaint
is
not
covered
within
exceptional
circumstances explained in Pramatha
Nath (supra). In that view of the matter
the second complaint on same set of facts
cannot be entertained.

18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj
Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238, has
held that it is equally true that chagrined and
frustrated litigants should not be permitted
to give vent to their frustration by enabling
them to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal
courts by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction
of the criminal court. In such a factsituation, the court must not hesitate to
quash criminal proceedings.

19. In Criminal Appeal No. 67 of
2013 (Ravinder Singh Vs. Sukhbir
Singh & Ors) decided on 11.1.2013, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"It may be so necessary to curb the
menace of criminal prosecution as an
instrument of operation of needless
harassment. A person cannot be permitted
to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in
the inherent power of the court and the
whole idea is to do real, complete and
substantial justice for which the courts
exist. Thus, it becomes the paramount
duty of the court to protect an apparently
innocent person, not to be subjected to
prosecution on the basis of wholly
untenable complaint."

20. In view of above, the revision
petition
is
allowed.
The
impugned
summoning
order
dated
30.11.2002
passed in Case No. 446 of 2002 (Mishri
Lal Vs Jai Ram) under Section 147/50
IPC, P.S. Sajeti, District Kanpur Dehat,
pending in the court of Addl. Civil Judge
(JD) Court No. 1/Judicial Magistrate,
Kanpur Dehat is hereby quashed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.05.2013
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
761
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.

First Appeal No. 297 of 2007

State of U.P. and Anr.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Ram Lal and Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
S.C.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri N.C. Rajvanshi
Sri P.C. Shukla

(A)Land
Acquisition
Act,
Section
23(2),28- entitlement of the benefit of
amended provision-even though award
made prior to amendment?held-'Yes'

Held: Para-10
In view of the law noticed above, it is
clear that where the Reference Court
passes its award after 24-9-1984 the
amended provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 23 and section 28, being already
in the statute book, ought to be applied
to provide benefit to the landloser, even
though the Collector's award was passed
before
the
introduction
of
the
Amendment Bill in the House of the
People. It is thus held that the claimantrespondent was entitled to the benefit of
the amended provisions of Section 23(2)
and Section 28 of the Act even though
the award of the Collector was made
much before the introduction of the Land
Acquisition Act (Amendment) Bill, 1982,
in the House of the People and the
Reference Court's award was passed
after the commencement of the Act No.
68 of 1984.

Case Law discussed:
(1990) 1 SCC 277; (2004)1 SCC 467; (2004)
12 SCC 430; (1995) 3 SCC 316; (1996) 4 SCC
533; (2005) 9 SCC 123; (2001) 4 SCC 181;
(1999) 3 SCC 500; (2004) 1 SCC 328; (2011)
11 SCC 198

(B)Code
of
Civil
Procedure-Section
151,152- Power of Review-whether can
be exercised in garb of Review?-held-
"No"-when final award made-if such
legal position omitted-proper cause to
either
more
review
stricts
under
provision of Section 47 of the code on
proper on appeal.

Held:Para-18
The powers under Section 152 of the
Code are neither to be equated with the
power of review nor can be said to be
akin to review. Similarly, in view of the
decisions noticed above, the power
under Section 151 CPC is not available to
modify / alter / review a judgment /
decree/
award,
which
has
attained
finality.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J.)

1. I have heard learned Standing
Counsel for the appellant and Sri P.C.
Shukla
holding
brief
of
Sri
N.C.
Rajvanshi for the claimant-respondents
and perused the record.

2. This appeal, under Section 96 of
the Code of Civil Procedure read with
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), has
been filed against the judgment and order
dated 16.04.1988 passed by the District
Judge, Muzaffarnagar in Misc. Case No.
243 of 1986 whereby the application of
the claimant-respondents to modify the
award dated 15.02.1985 passed in L.A.R.
No. 164 of 1978 has been allowed and the
award
dated
15.02.1985
has
been
modified by increasing the awarded
solatium from 15% to 30 % and the
interest payable under Section 28 of the
Act from 6% p.a. to 9% p.a.

3. The undisputed facts are that land
acquisition proceedings were initiated
vide notification dated 05.05.1976, under
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
Section 4(1) of the Act, followed by
notification
dated
06.05.1976,
under
Section 6(1) of the Act. Possession was
taken on 29.06.1976 and 27.04.1977,
followed by an award of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer dated 30.03.1978.
The claimant-respondent objected to the
proposed compensation, consequently, a
reference, under Section 18 of the Act,
was made, which was registered as L.A.R.
No. 164 of 1978. The reference Court, on
15.02.1985, passed an award thereby
awarding Rs. 4,47,906/- as compensation
along with 15% as solatium on the
amount with proportionate cost and
interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the
date of possession up to the date of
payment or deposit in the Court. Later, on
22.09.1986, an application was filed by
the
claimant-respondent,
purportedly,
under Section 151 read with Sections 152
and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
for modification and amendment in the
judgment and award dated 15.02.1985 on
the ground that by virtue of the
Amendment Act No. 64 of 1984, the
claimant was entitled to solatium, under
amended Section 23(2) of the Act, at the
rate of 30% on the market value as also
interest, under amended Section 28 of the
Act, at the rate of 9%. The court below
took the view that as the reference Court
passed the award after the Act No. 68 of
1984 had come into force i.e. 24.09.1984,
the claimant was entitled to the benefit of
the amended provisions of Sections 23
and 28 of the Act and as, due to oversight,
the benefit of the amended provisions was
not provided to the claimant, the operative
portion
of
the
award
required
modification. Accordingly, the solatium
was enhanced from 15% to 30% and the
interest was enhanced from 6% p.a. to 9%
p.a. As neither party could inform the
Court, despite opportunity, whether any
appeal was preferred against the award,
accordingly, it is assumed that the award
of the Reference Court attained finality.

4. The modification order dated
16.04.1988, has been challenged in this
appeal on two grounds:

(a) that the award dated 15.02.1985 had
become final, therefore, the same could not
have been modified/altered in exercise of
power under Sections 151, 152 and 153 CPC
as such powers are exerciseable only when
there is any clerical or arthmetical mistake
arising
from
any
accidental
slip
or
ommission and it cannot be used to review/
modify a judgment or award, which has
already become final; and

(b) that as the award of the Collector
was passed on 30.03.1978 and that of
reference Court on 15.02.1985, the benefit
of the amended provisions of sub-section
(2) of Section 23 and of Section 28 of the
Act were not available, inasmuch as, by
sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Land
Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 (Act
No. 68 of 1984), the benefit of the
amended provisions were available only
where the Collector's or Court's award
was made after 30th day of April, 1982
and before the commencement of the Act
No. 68 of 1984 i.e. 24.09.1984.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for
the claimant-respondent submitted that by
several decisions of the Apex Court it has
been settled that where proceedings are
pending before the Reference Court on
the date of commencement of the Act No.
68 of 1984, then the benefit of the
amended provisions are available to the
claimant and, therefore, the claimantrespondent is entitled to solatium at the
rate of 30% and to interest at the rate of
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
763
9% as provided by amended section 23(2)
and section 28 respectively. It was also
submitted that since the Court, by
mistake, did not take into consideration
the amended provisions of the Act, at the
time of passing of the award, it had full
jurisdiction to correct/modify its award in
exercise of power under Sections 151 and
152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6.

Having
considered
the
submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties as also on perusal of record, two
points arise for determination in this
appeal: -

(1) whether the claimant-respondent
is entitled to the benefit of the amended
provisions of Section 23(2) and Section
28 of the Act even though the award of
the Collector was made much before the
introduction of the Land Acquisition Act
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of
the People and the Reference Court's
award
was
passed
after
the
commencement of the Act No. 68 of
1984; and

(2) whether the court below after
passing of the award dated 15.02.1985
had become functus officio and had no
jurisdiction to modify the award and
increase the solatium from 15% to 30%
and interest from 6% to 9% in exercise of
power under Sections 151 and 152 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

POINT No.1

7. So far as the entitlement to the
enhanced solatium, under the amended
section 23(2) of the Act, as also the
enhanced interest under the amended
section 28 of the Act, is concerned, it is
already settled by various decisions of the
Apex Court that the benefit of the
amended provisions would also be
available
where
the
reference
was
pending in the Reference Court at the
time when the Act No. 68 of 1984 came
into force, even though the award of the
Collector might have been passed before
30.04.1982. The Apex Court had the
occasion to interpret the provisions of
Section 30(2) of the Act No. 68 of 1984 in
the case of Union of India and others v.
Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama : (1990) 1 SCC 277, where, in
paras 17 and 18 of the judgment, the
Apex Court observed as follows:-

"17. Section 30(2) provides that
amended provisions of Section 23(2) shall
apply, and shall be deemed to have
applied, also to, and in relation to, any
award made by the collector or Court
between 30 April 1982 and 24 September
1984, or to an appellate order therefrom
passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court. The purpose of these provisions
seems to be that the awards made in that
interregnum must get higher solatium
inasmuch as to awards made subsequent
to September 24, 1984. Perhaps it was
thought that awards made after the
commencement of the Amending Act 68 of
1984 would be taken care of by the
amended Section 23(2). The case like the
present one seems to have escaped
attention by innocent lack of due care in
the drafting. The result would be an
obvious anomaly as will be indicated
presently. If there is obvious anomaly in
the application of law the Court could
shape the law to remove the anomaly. If
the strict grammatical interpretation gives
rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the
Court could discard such interpretation
and adopt an interpretation which will
give effect to the purpose of the
legislature. That could be done, if
764 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
necessary even by modification of the
language
used.
[See:
Mahadeolal
Kanodia v. The Administrator General of
West Bengal, [1960] 3 SCR 578]. The
legislators do not always deal with
specific controversies which the Court
decide. They incorporate general purpose
behind the statutory words and it is for
the courts to decide specific cases. If a
given case is well within the general
purpose of the legislature but not within
the literal meaning of the statute, then the
court must strike the balance.

18. The criticism that the literal
interpretation of Section 30(2), if adhered to
would lead to unjust result seems to be
justified. Take for example two acquisition
proceedings of two adjacent pieces of land,
required for the same public purpose. Let us
say that they were initiated on the same day--
a day sometime prior to 30 April 1982. In
one of them the award of the Collector is
made on 23 September 1984 and in the other
on 25 September 1984. Under the terms of
Section 30(2) the benefit of higher solatium
is available to the first award and not to the
second.
Take
another
example:
the
proceedings of acquisition initiated, say, in
the year 1960 in which award was made on
1 May 1982. Then the amended Section
23(2) shall apply and higher solatium is
entitled. But in an acquisition initiated on 23
September 1984, and award made in the
year 1989 the higher solatium is ruled out.
This is the intrinsic illogicality if the award
made after 24 September 1984, is not given
higher solatium. Such a construction of
Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack
under Article 14 of the Constitution and it
should be avoided. We, therefore, hold that
benefit of higher solatium under section
23(2) should be available also to the present
case. This would be the only reasonable
view to be taken in the circumstances of
the case and in the light of the purpose of
Section 30(2). In this view of the matter,
the higher solutium allowed by the High
Court is kept undisturbed."

8. In the case of Panna Lal Ghosh and
others v. Land Acquisition Collector and
others : (2004) 1 SCC 467, in paras 12, 13
and 14, the apex court observed as follows:-

"12. In Union of India V. Filip Tiago
De Gama the issue was whether the
amendment would apply to an award
made subsequent to 24.9.1984 even
though the acquisition proceedings had
commenced prior to the date. This Court
looked at the intention behind the
retrospective effect to the amending
section. If the literal interpretation is
taken, it was held, it will result in
anamoly. In order to avoid it, regard must
be had to the purpose of Section 30(2).
Consequently, this Court awarded higher
solatium even though Reference Court
made the award in 1985.

13. Again in K.S. Paripooran case
this
Court
widened
the
restricted
interpretation given in Raghubir Singh
case. It held that the enhanced solatium
would apply even to a case pending at the
time the Act came into force.

14. Following this train of thought,
the benefit of enhanced solatium would
extend to the present case. During the
period between 30.4.1982 and 29.9.1984,
the
reference
was
pending
in
the
Reference Court. The court's award was
passed in 1985. Following the above
interpretation, the appellants are thus
entitled to enhanced solatium @ 30% and
interest under Section 23(2) of the Act."

9. In the case of Communidade of
Morombi-O-Pequeno v. State of Goa :
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
765
(2004) 12 SCC 430, in para 9, the Apex
Court observed as follows:-

"9. It was next submitted that the
Reference Court was not right in
awarding solatium under Section 23(2)
and interest under Section 28 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. In support of this,
reliance was placed upon the case of
Union of India v. Raghuvir Singh and also
upon
Section
30(2)
of
the
Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. It
was submitted that the notification was of
11-11-1977 and the award of the
Collector had been passed on 23-3-1978.
It was submitted that since this award was
not between the period 30-041982 to 249-1984, retrospective effect could not
have been given and these amounts could
not have been awarded. We see no
substance in this submission. The award
of the Reference Court is dated 27-021990. When the Reference Court was
considering this matter Sections 23(2) and
28 as amended were already on the
statute-book. Therefore, the Reference
Court was bound to take note of these
provisions. In such a case no question
arises of any retrospectivity. In Raghubir
Singh case the notification had been
issued on 13.11.1959, the award had been
made on 30-3-1963 and the Reference
Court award was of 10-6-1968. It was
only the High Court's decision which was
after the amendment i.e. on 6-12-1984.
Therefore, question of retrospectivity had
arisen in that case. In this case no such
question arises."

10. In view of the law noticed
above, it is clear that where the Reference
Court passes its award after 24-9-1984 the
amended provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 23 and section 28, being already
in the statute book, ought to be applied to
provide benefit to the landloser, even
though the Collector's award was passed
before the introduction of the Amendment
Bill in the House of the People. It is thus
held that the claimant-respondent was
entitled to the benefit of the amended
provisions of Section 23(2) and Section
28 of the Act even though the award of
the Collector was made much before the
introduction of the Land Acquisition Act
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of
the People and the Reference Court's
award
was
passed
after
the
commencement of the Act No. 68 of
1984.

POINT No.2

11. Now the question that arises is
whether
the
court
below
had
the
jurisdiction to provide the benefit of the
amended provisions in purported exercise
of its power under sections 151 and 152
CPC even though no appeal or review
was filed, by either side, against the
award of the Reference Court dated
15.02.1985. The record reveals that
instead of filing an appeal or a review,
within the period of limitation provided
for the purpose, an application was filed,
purportedly, under sections 151, 152 and
153 CPC, on 22.09.1986, for modification
of the award. Although the provisions of
Section 153 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were also invoked but there is
no doubt that the power under Section
153 is not exerciseable for modifing/
altering/ amending a judgment or an
award
that
has
attained
finality.
Therefore, the question which arises is
whether the Court had jurisdiction to
amend or modify its award, after it
became final, and provide solatium and
interest at a higher rate, by giving the
benefit of the amended provisions, in
exercise of its power under Sections 151
766 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This question has been a subject matter of
adjudication in several decisions of the
apex court and it no longer remains res
integra.

12. In the case of State of
Maharastra
v.
Maharau
Srawan
Hatkar : (1995) 3 SCC 316, the facts of
the case were that under a Notification
dated 13.08.1979, under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, proceedings were
initiated and an award was passed by the
Land Acquisition Officer on 17.12.1981
and, on a reference under Section 18 of
the Act, the Reference Court enhanced the
compensation
by
its
award
dated
25.10.1983 against which no appeal was
preferred.
After
Land
Acquisition
(Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 came into
force, the claimant made an application to
the Reference Court for awarding the
enhanced
solatium,
additional
compensation and interest payable under
the Amendment Act. The Reference Court
by its order dated 31.03.1986, allowed the
application in exercise of its power under
Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Dissatisfied with the order
passed by the Reference Court, the State
preferred an appeal before the High Court
which was summarily dismissed against
which an appeal came before the Apex
Court. The apex court, in paragraphs 3 to
9 of its judgment, observed as follows:-

"3. The only question that arises for
consideration is whether the Civil Court
has power and jurisdiction to award the
benefits of the Amendment Act 68 of
1984. Shri Bhasme, the learned counsel
for the State contended that the Civil
Court gets jurisdiction to determine
compensation under section 23(1) of the
Act only on reference. On its making the
award enhancing the compensation under
sub-section (1) of section 23, it would be
a decree under section 26(2). The Court
thereafter has no power to amend the
decree except in accordance with law.
This is not either a clerical or arithmetical
mistake for correction under section 152
of CPC or under section 13-A of the Act,
but is an independent exercise of power.
Unless the Court is empowered to do so
by law, the civil court is devoid of
Jurisdiction to give the benefits under the
Amendment Act.

4. Shri G.K. Bansal, learned counsel,
on the other hand, contended that since
the CPC is made applicable to the
proceedings of reference under Section
18, by operation of Section 53 of the Act,
the civil court gets the inherent power
under Section 151 CPC to grant the
benefits and that, therefore, the court can
pass fresh order giving the benefits under
the Amendment Act.

5. We find no force in the contention
of Shri Bansal. On receipt of reference
under s. 18, the procedure prescribed
under sectionss. 19 and 20 of the Act is
required to be followed and the civil court
determines the compensation in the
manner indicated under sub-s.(1) of
section 23 of the Act which envisages that
in
determining
the
amount
of
compensation to be awarded for the land
acquired under the Act, the court shall
take into consideration clauses first to
sixthly
mentioned
thereunder
while
determining
the
compensation.
Subsection (1A) of section 23, which was
brought by the Amendment Act, and subs.(2) of s.23 provide that:

"(1-A) In addition to the market
value of the land, as above provided, the
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
767
Court shall in every case award an
amount calculated at the rate of twelve
per centum per annum on such market
value for the period commencing on and
from the date of the publication of the
notification under section 4, sub-section
(1), in respect of such land to the date of
the award of the Collector or the date of
taking possession of the land whichever is
earlier.

(2) In addition to the market value of
the land as above provided, the Court
shall in every case award a sum of thirty
per centum on such market value, in
consideration of the compulsory nature of
the acquisition"

Section 28 envisages that:

"28. Collector may be directed to pay
interest on excess compensation ...If the
sum which, in the, opinion of the Court,
the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum
which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the Court
may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of nine
per centum per annum from the date on
which he took possession of the land to
the date of payment of such excess into
court:

Provided that the award of the Court
may also direct that where such excess or
any part thereof is paid into Court after
the date of expiry of a period of one year
from the date on which possession is
taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per
centum per annum shall be payable from
the date of expiry of the said period of
one year on the amount of such excess or
part thereof which has not been paid into
Court before the date of such expiry."

6. It would thus be seen that the
additional amounts envisaged under subsections (1A) and (2) of section 23 are not
part
of
the
component
of
the
compensation awarded under sub-section
(1) of section 23 of the Act. They are only
in addition to the market value of the
land. The payment of interest also is only
consequential to the enhancement of the
compensation. In a case' where the Court
has not enhanced the compensation on
reference, the Court is devoid of power to
award any interest under section 28 or the
spreading of payment of interest for one
year from the date of taking possession at
9% and 15% thereafter till date of
payment into the court as envisaged under
the proviso.

7. Section 26 of the Act envisages
that:

"(1) Every award under this Part shall
be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall
specify the amount awarded under clause
first of sub- section (1)of section 23, and also
the amounts (if any) respectively awarded
under each of the other clauses of the same
sub-section, together with the grounds of
awarding each of the said amounts.

(2) Every such award shall be
deemed to be a decree and the statement
of the grounds of every such award a
judgment within the meaning of s.2,
clause (2), and section 2, clause (9),
respectively, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)."

8. Thus, it would be seen that a
decree having been made under section
26(2), the civil court is left to correct only
either clerical or arithmetical mistakes as
envisaged expressly under section 13-A
of the Act or under section 152 CPC.
Though section 151 CPC gives inherent
power to the Court, it is intended only to
768 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
prevent abuse of the process of the court
or to meet the ends of justice. The present
is not a case of such nature. Further, since
section 23 is an express power under
which the civil court has been conferred
with
the
jurisdiction
to
determine
compensation, and in addition to the
market value certain percentage of the
amount is directed to be awarded as
envisaged under section 23(1A) and 23(2)
and the interest component under section
28, the invocation of section 151 CPC by
necessary implication stands excluded.

9. Thus, we hold that the civil court
had inherent lack of jurisdiction and it
was devoid of power to entertain the
application to award additional benefits
under the Amendment Act. The order
thereby is clearly a void order. The High
Court has not applied its mind to this
crucial
consideration
but
summarily
dismissed the appeal."

13. The aforesaid judgment was
followed by the Apex Court in the case of
Bai Shakriben (dead) by Natwar
Melsingh and others v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer and another :
(1996) 4 SCC 533, wherein in paragraph
6 of the report, it was observed as
follows:-

"....................But having allowed the
decree to become final, the question
emerges whether it would be open to the
executing Court or the reference court to
go behind the decree which become final
to amend the self-same decree by
exercising the power under Order 47 rule
1 and Section 151 CPC. We feel that the
executing Court cannot go behind the
decree. It would have been appropriate for
the claimants to have gone in appeal and
have
the
matter
corrected,
but
unfortunately they did claim of the
appellate remedy and allowed the decree
to become final. The omission to award
additional amounts under section 23(1-A),
enhanced interest under section 28 and
solatium under Section 23(2) are not
clerical or arithmetical mistake crept in
the award passed by the reference Court
but amounts to non-award. Under those
circumstances, the reference Court was
clearly in error in entertaining the
application for amendment of the decree
and is devoid of power and jurisdiction to
award the amounts under Sections 23(2),
23(1-A) and 28 of the Act."

14. Likewise, in the case of Union
of India v. Swaran Singh and others :
(1996) 5 SCC 501, in para 8, it was
observed as follows:-

"8. The question then is whether the
High Court has power to entertain
independent applications under Sections
151 and 152 and enhance solatium and
interest as amended under Act 68 of 1984.
This controversy is no longer res integra.
In State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh & Ors.
[1995 Supp.(4) SCC 626] and also in
catena of decisions following thereafter in
Union of India & Ors. vs. Pratap Kaur
(dead) through LRs. & Anr. [(1995) 3
SCC 263]; State of Maharashtra vs.
Maharau Srawan Hatkar [JT 1995 (2) SC
583]; State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Babu
Singh & Ors. [1995 Supp. (2) SCC 406];
Union of India s Anr. etc. vs. Raghubir
Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc. [(1989) 2 SCC
754]; and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of
Kerala & Ors. [(1994) 5 SCC 593], this
Court has held that reference Court or
High Court has no power or jurisdiction
to entertain any applications under
Sections 151 and 152 to correct any
decree which has become final or to
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
769
independently pass an award enhancing
the solatium and interest as amended by
Act 68 of 1984. Consequently, the award
by the High Court granting enhanced
solatium at 30% under Section 23 (2) and
interest at the rate of 9% for one year
from the date of taking possession and
thereafter at the rate of 15 % till date of
deposit under Section 28 as amended
under Act 68 of 1984 are clearly without
jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity. The
order being a nullity, it can be challenged
at any stage. Rightly the question was
raised in execution. The executing Court
allowed the petition and dismissed the
execution petition. The High Court,
therefore, was clearly in error in allowing
the revision and setting aside the order of
the executing Court."

15. In Jaya Chandra Mahapatra v.
Land Acquistion Officer, Rayagada
(2005) 9 SCC 123, the apex court in
similar fact situation, took a liberal view.
In paragraph 8 of its judgment, the apex
court observed that in law there is no bar
in
filing
applications
for
review
successively if the same is otherwise
mantainable in law. It observed that it is
one thing to say that the omission to
award additional amount under Section
23(1-A), enhanced interest under Section
28 and solatium under Section 23(2) may
not amount to clerical or arithmetical
mistake in relation whereto an executing
court will not be entitled to grant relief
but it is another to say that the grant
thereof would be impermissible in law
even if the Reference Court on an
appropriate application made in this
behalf and upon application of its mind
holds that the statutory benefits available
to the claimant had not been granted to
him and pass an order in that behalf by
directing amendment of decree. In a case
of former nature, an executing court may
not have any jurisdiction to pass such an
order on the ground that it cannot go
behind the decree, but in law there does
not exist any bar on a Reference Court to
review its earlier order if there exists an
error apparent on the face of the record in
terms of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

16. In the case of Jayalakshmi
Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho :
(2001) 4 SCC 181, the Apex Court had
occasion to deal with the power of a Court
under Section 152 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and it observed that in a matter
where it is clear that something which the
Court intended to do but the same was
accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps
in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it
would only advance the ends of justice to
enable the Court to rectify such mistake.
But before exercise of such power the
Court must be legally satisfied and arrive
at a valid finding that the order or the
decree contains or omits some thing
which was intended to be otherwise, that
is to say, while passing the decree the
court must have in its mind that the order
or the decree should be passed in a
particular manner but that intention is not
translated into the decree or order due to
clerical, arithmetical error or accidental
slip. The court further held that the facts
and circumstances may provide clue to
the fact as to what was intended by the
court but unintentionally the same does
not find mention in the order or the
judgment or something which was not
intended to be there stands added to it. It
was also held that the power of
rectification of clerical, arithmetical errors
or accidental slip does not empower the
court to have a second thought over the
matter and to find that a better order or
770 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
decree could or should be passed. There
should not be re-consideration of merits
of the matter to come to a conclusion that
it would have been better and in the
fitness of things to have passed an order
as sought to be passed on rectification. It
was held that on a second thought court
may find that it may have committed a
mistake in passing an order in certain
terms but every such mistake does not
permit its rectification in exercise of
Court's inherent powers as contained
under Section 152 C.P.C., which is to be
confined to something initially intended
but left out or added against such
intention.

17. Similar view has been expressed
in the case of Dwaraka Das v. State of
M.P and another : (1999) 3 SCC 500,
wherein in paragraph 6, it was observed
as follows:-

"6. Section 152 C.P.C. provides for
correction
of
clerical
arithmetical
mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders
or errors arising therein from any
accidental slip or omission. The exercise
of this power contemplates the correction
of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial
actions and does not contemplate of
passing effective judicial orders after the
judgment, decree or order. The settled
position of law is that after the passing of
the judgment, decree or order, court or the
tribunal becomes functus officio and thus
being not entitled to vary the terms of the
judgments, decrees and orders earlier
passed. The correction contemplated are
of correcting only accidental omission or
mistakes and not all omissions and
mistakes
which
might
have
been
committed by the Court while passing the
judgment, decree or order. The omission
sought to be corrected which goes to the
merits of the case is beyond the scope of
Section 152 for which the proper remedy
for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or
review application. It implies that the
Section cannot be pressed into service to
correct an omission which is intentional,
how erroneous that may be. It has been
noticed that the courts below have been
liberally construing and applying the
provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of the
CPC even after passing of effective order
in the lis pending before them. No Court
can under the cover of the aforesaid
sections modify, alter or add to the terms
of its original judgment, decree or order."

17. Reiterating the view expressed in
Dwaraka Das case (supra), in the case
of State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh
(2004) 1 SCC 328, explaining the power
of a Court under section 152 CPC, the
apex court observed, in paragraph 12, as
follows:

"12.
Section
152
provides
for
correction of clerical or arithmetical
mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders
arising therein from any accidental slip or
omission. The exercise of this power
contemplates the correction of mistakes
by the court of its ministerial actions and
does not contemplate passing of effective
judicial orders after the judgment, decree
or order. The settled position of law is
that after the passing of the judgment,
decree or order, the same becomes final
subject to any further avenues of remedies
provided in respect of the same and the
very court or the tribunal cannot and, on
mere change of view, is not entitled to
vary the terms of the judgments, decrees
and orders earlier passed except by means
of
review,
if
statutorily
provided
specifically therefor and subject to the
conditions or limitations provided therein.
2 All] State of U.P. and Anr. Vs. Ram Lal and Ors.
771
The powers under Section 152 of the
Code are neither to be equated with the
power of review nor can be said to be
akin to review or even said to clothe the
court concerned under the guise of
invoking after the result of the judgment
earlier rendered, in its entirety or any
portion
of
it.
The
corrections
contemplated are of correcting only
accidental omissions or mistakes and not
all omissions and mistakes which might
have been committed by the court while
passing the judgment, decree or order...."

In a recent decision after examining
the entire law on this point, including the
law laid down in Dwaraka Das Case
(supra), the Apex Court in the case of
Sarup Singh and another v. Union of
India and another: (2011) 11 SCC 198,
in para 31, observed as follows:-

"31. In the light of the aforesaid
settled position of law, when we examine
the facts of the present cases it is patently
obvious that the reference case and the
matter of payment of compensation to the
appellants became final and binding after
the award was passed and the judgment
was pronounced by the reference court
and further by the High Court and
thereafter, no appeal having been filed in
this Court. Such a judgment and decree
which has become final and binding could
not have been reopened by the High Court
on the basis of revision applications filed
under Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C."

18. Taking a conspectus of the
various decisions of the apex court
noticed hereinabove, it is settled that the
power under section 152 of CPC is to be
exercised to correct arithmetical or
clerical mistakes arising out of accidental
slip or omission. In a matter where it is
clear that something which the Court
intended to do but the same was
accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps
in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it
would only advance the ends of justice to
enable the Court to rectify such mistake.
But before exercise of such power the
Court must be legally satisfied and arrive
at a valid finding that the order or the
decree contains or omits some thing
which was intended to be otherwise, that
is to say, while passing the decree the
court must have in its mind that the order
or the decree should be passed in a
particular manner but that intention is not
translated into the decree or order due to
clerical, arithmetical error or accidental
slip. There should not be re-consideration
of merits of the matter to come to a
conclusion that it would have been better
and in the fitness of things to have passed
an order as sought to be passed on
rectification. The Court's inherent powers
as contained under Section 152 C.P.C.,
are
confined
to
something
initially
intended but left out or added against such
intention.