# State Of U.P. & Anr v. Ram Nayan Yadav & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 267
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-14
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 345 of 2025
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Rajeev Bharti
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-anr-v-ram-nayan-yadav-ors-52650
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Dr. Shivji Shukla, Dr. Shivji Shukla, Prabhat
Narayan Srivastava, Puneet Chandra

Issue for consideration
 Whether delay in the present circumstances
should be condoned or not?

Headnotes
A. Limitation Law - Limitation Act, 1963:
Section 5 - Condonation of delay is to
remain
an
exception,
not
the
rule.
Governmental
litigants,
no
less
than
private
parties,
must
demonstrate
bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for
delay. Absent such justification, delay
cannot be condoned merely on the ground
of the identity of the applicant. Firstly, that
State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
accorded preferential treatment in matters
concerning condonation of delay u/s 5 of the
Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the
same standards as any private litigant. To do
otherwise would compromise the sanctity of
limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of
Government departments on bureaucratic red
tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative
inefficiencies
as
grounds
for
seeking
condonation of delay cannot always, invariably
accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such
reasons were to be accepted as a matter of
course, the very discipline sought to be
introduced by the law of limitation would be
diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in
litigation. (Para 9)

In the present case, firstly that the delay is
inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in
this regard which is hardly an explanation is
certainly not an acceptable one and is not
satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause
shown by the appellants for entertaining the
appeal which has been filed with such delay.
(Para 10)
Application for Condonation of delay is rejected.
Special Appeal Defective No.345 of 2025 also
stands dismissed.

B. Where negligence, want of good faith,
or a casual approach is discernible,
condonation has been refused - In the
affidavit in support of the application for
condonation of delay in connected Special
Appeal Defective No.418 of 2024, the
explanation offered in the affidavit is quite
casual. It only demonstrates the apathetic
attitude of the appellants. No promptness is
evinced from a reading of the said affidavit. The
appellants acted with leisure. Not only the delay
is inordinate but it is also not satisfactorily
explained. Appellants have failed to put forth
and
demonstrate
sufficient
cause
for
condonation of delay. (Para 7, 12 to 14)

Application
for
condondation
of
delay
is
rejected.

Special Appeal Defective No.418 of 2024 is also
dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited

## Text

10 All. State Of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Ram Nayan Yadav & Ors.
267
the removal of encroachment as well
as action taken against the erring
officials every year.

43.
Accordingly,
this
Public
Interest Litigation is disposed of with
no order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 267
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJEEV BHARTI,J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 345 of 2025
&
Special Appeal Defective No. 418 of 2024

State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Ram Nayan Yadav & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Dr. Shivji Shukla, Dr. Shivji Shukla, Prabhat
Narayan Srivastava, Puneet Chandra

Issue for consideration
 Whether delay in the present circumstances
should be condoned or not?

Headnotes
A. Limitation Law - Limitation Act, 1963:
Section 5 - Condonation of delay is to
remain
an
exception,
not
the
rule.
Governmental
litigants,
no
less
than
private
parties,
must
demonstrate
bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for
delay. Absent such justification, delay
cannot be condoned merely on the ground
of the identity of the applicant. Firstly, that
State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
accorded preferential treatment in matters
concerning condonation of delay u/s 5 of the
Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the
same standards as any private litigant. To do
otherwise would compromise the sanctity of
limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of
Government departments on bureaucratic red
tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative
inefficiencies
as
grounds
for
seeking
condonation of delay cannot always, invariably
accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such
reasons were to be accepted as a matter of
course, the very discipline sought to be
introduced by the law of limitation would be
diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in
litigation. (Para 9)

In the present case, firstly that the delay is
inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in
this regard which is hardly an explanation is
certainly not an acceptable one and is not
satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause
shown by the appellants for entertaining the
appeal which has been filed with such delay.
(Para 10)
Application for Condonation of delay is rejected.
Special Appeal Defective No.345 of 2025 also
stands dismissed.

B. Where negligence, want of good faith,
or a casual approach is discernible,
condonation has been refused - In the
affidavit in support of the application for
condonation of delay in connected Special
Appeal Defective No.418 of 2024, the
explanation offered in the affidavit is quite
casual. It only demonstrates the apathetic
attitude of the appellants. No promptness is
evinced from a reading of the said affidavit. The
appellants acted with leisure. Not only the delay
is inordinate but it is also not satisfactorily
explained. Appellants have failed to put forth
and
demonstrate
sufficient
cause
for
condonation of delay. (Para 7, 12 to 14)

Application
for
condondation
of
delay
is
rejected.

Special Appeal Defective No.418 of 2024 is also
dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors., Civil Appeal No.11794 of
2025 (Para 7)
268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 (Para 9)
3. State of W.B. Vs. Administrator, Howrah
Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 (Para 9)
4. Lanka Venkateswarlu Vs. State of A.P.,
(2011) SCC Online SC 403 (Para 9)
5. State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Bal Kishan
Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative,
(2014) 1 SCC 592 (Para 9)
6. Sheo Raj Singh Vs. Union of India, (2023) 10
SCC 531 (Para 9)

List of Acts
 Limitation Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
 Condonation, delay.

Appearances for Parties
For Appellant(s): C.S.C.
For Respondent(s): Dr. Shivji Shukla, Dr.
Shivji Shukla, Prabhat Narayan Srivastava,
Puneet Chandra

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.)
&
(Hon'ble Rajeev Bharti, J.)

(C.M. Application No.1 of 2025 In
re: Special Appeal Defective No.345 of
2025)

(C.M. Application No.1 of 2024 In
re: Special Appeal Defective No.418 of
2024)

1. Heard Sri Sudeep Kumar, learned
Additional Advocate General assisted by
Sri Ranvijay Singh, learned Addl. C.S.C.
for the appellant and Sri Sudhir Pandey and
Sri Puneet Chandra, learned counsel for
respondent no.1.

2. These are two appeals one bearing
Special Appeal Defective No.345 of 2025
by the State challenging judgment and
order dated 21.07.2023 passed in Writ-A
No.3696 of 2005. The other appeal bearing
Special Appeal Defective No.418 of 2024
is by the Committee of Management of the
Institution. Both the appeals are belated.
Special Appeal Defective No.345 of 2025
has been filed with a delay of 533 days
whereas Special Appeal Defective No.418
of 2024 has been filed with a delay of 348
days. First of all, we may consider the
explanation for the delay.

3. Learned counsel for the appellantState had appeared and argued the matter
before the writ court, so did the counsel for
Committee
of
Management,
meaning
thereby,
both
the
appellants
were
represented before the writ court, therefore,
it is not a case where they did not know
about the judgment. Now, we proceed to
consider the explanation offered by the
appellant-State in its appeal for filing it
belatedly. But before doing so, we may
mention that the limitation for filing special
appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is thirty
days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules,
1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule
appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. When we peruse the affidavit of the
State, it is said therein that judgment dated
21.07.2023 was corrected on 06.02.2024.
We
have
perused
the
order
dated
06.02.2024
correcting
the
aforesaid
judgment. We find that the corrections
were merely in respect of typographical
errors
pertaining
to
certain
dates.
Moreover, it is not the case of the
appellant-State that they had moved the
application for correction. Such correction
application
had
been
filed
by
the
respondent-petitioners. Therefore, this by
itself may not be a sufficient explanation
for the delay. Nevertheless, we proceed to
consider other facts stated in the said
affidavit. According to it, copy of the said
10 All. State Of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Ram Nayan Yadav & Ors.
269
orders which are impugned herein was not
sent to D.I.O.S., however, there is no
disclosure as to who was required to bring
it to the knowledge of the D.I.O.S. After all
the D.I.O.S. was represented before the
High Court when the writ was decided.
Learned Standing Counsel who had argued
the matter or one who was present in Court
when the judgment was pronounced, as the
case may, be must have noted the disposal
of the writ petition on the file. It is not the
case of the appellant that no such
information was received from the office of
Chief Standing Counsel, categorically so.
Even if it was so, that is a matter to be seen
by the State and that by itself will not
explain the delay. According to the
appellants, the D.I.O.S. came to know
about
the
said
judgment
only
on
12.08.2024 after filing of the contempt
petition and issuance of notice therein.
Even if this fact is taken at its face value
though we do not accept it as such, we find
that even from such date, the appeal is
considerably delayed as it was filed only on
21.08.2025 that is a good more than one
year from the alleged date of knowledge.

5. In fact, we have been informed that
on 19.07.2024 a contempt petition was
filed for non-compliance of the judgment
referred hereinabove wherein after issuance
of notice, charges were framed on
09.08.2025 and only then the State
authorities woke up and filed this appeal on
21.08.2025. Till then, they were sitting
pretty over the matter neither complying it
nor challenging it. This is how negligent
and apathetic they have been. There is
abject absence of promptness on the part of
the State in challenging the impugned
judgments. The affidavit goes on to state
that on 01.08.2025, legal opinion had been
sought from the Chief Standing Counsel
which was provided on 12.08.2025 and
thereafter, permission was granted by the
State for filing the appeal on 13.08.2025.
On 14.08.2025, the appeal was allotted to a
Standing Counsel and then it was filed on
21.08.2025. A vague assertion has been
made in para 10 that after obtaining copy of
the order under challenge, it was realized
that since the order under appeal had been
passed without considering the case of the
appellant, therefore, for further action in
the matter and for filing special appeal
against
the
order
under
appeal,
communication
was
done
with
the
concerned officials. Assuming that it was
so, all this happened after 14.08.2025. No
other details have been given as to what
communication was made and for what
purpose. The affidavit goes on to state that
after the aforesaid exercise, paperbook was
handed over to counsel for the appellant in
the first week of August, 2025. The appeal
was thereafter prepared and filed on
21.08.2025.

6. On a bare reading of the affidavit in
support of the application for condonation
of delay, what comes out is that not only
the
delay
is
inordinate
whatever
explanation has been offered is not at all
satisfactory.

7. We have gone through the recent
decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court
dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal
No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By
LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors' wherein most of the decisions relied
upon by learned counsel for the appellant
as mentioned in para 14 of the affidavit
aforesaid have been considered and the law
with regard to condonation of delay and
ancillary issues have been elucidated by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The period of
limitation for filing the appeal being thirty
days, there is hardly any explanation for the
270 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
said period in the affidavit in support of the
application. At least, it is not satisfactory.
As regards the period after expiry of
limitation also, hardly any acceptable
explanation has been offered. Hon'ble the
Supreme Court has held in the case of
Shivamma
(Dead)
(supra)
that
the
expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. The expression
is to be construed with justice-oriented
flexibility so as not to punish innocent
litigants for circumstances beyond their
control. Courts must not condone gross
negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual
indifference, for to do so would undermine
the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium and destabilise the certainty that
limitation law seeks to secure. The
expression "sufficient cause" must be
construed in a manner that advances
substantial justice while preserving the
discipline of limitation. The courts are not
to be swayed by sympathy or technical
rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal
of whether the applicant acted with
reasonable diligence in pursuing the
remedy. Where explanation is bona fide,
plausible, and consistent with ordinary
human conduct, courts have leaned towards
condonation. Where negligence, want of
good faith, or a casual approach is
discernible, condonation has been refused.
We are of the opinion that these latter
observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
apply on all its fours to the facts of this
case. The appellants have not acted with
reasonable diligence nor is the explanation
offered by them plausible and consistent
with ordinary human conduct. There is
negligence, want of good faith and casual
approach on their part for the reasons
already noticed hereinabove. Preference of
such appeal with inordinate delay certainly
prejudices the rights of the opposite parties
under the judgment impugned herein.
Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be
taken into consideration in view of the
judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead)
(supra).

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has
further observed that the courts must be
mindful that strong case on merits is no
ground for condonation of delay. When an
application for condonation of delay is
placed before the court, the inquiry is
confined to whether "sufficient cause" has
been demonstrated for not filing the appeal
or proceeding within the prescribed period
of limitation. The merits of the underlying
case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry.
If courts were to look into the merits of the
matter at this stage, it would blur the
boundaries between preliminary procedural
questions and substantive adjudication,
thereby conflating two distinct stages of
judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5
of the Limitation Act is not to determine
whether the claim is legally or factually
strong, but only whether the applicant had a
reasonable justification for the delay. Test
of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted
by an examination of the merits of the case.
Condonation of delay is a matter of
discretion based on explanation for the
delay, not on the prospects of success in the
case. If merits are considered, a litigant
with a stronger case may be favoured with
condonation despite negligence, while a
weaker case may be rejected even if
sufficient cause is made out. This would
lead to an inequitable and inconsistent
application of the law, undermining the
uniform standard that the doctrine of
limitation is designed to maintain. Yet
another practical reason has been given by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why
merits must not be considered at the stage
of delay condonation that is it risks
10 All. State Of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Ram Nayan Yadav & Ors.
271
prejudicing the mind of the court against
one party even before the matter is
substantively heard. By glancing into
merits
prematurely,
the
court
may
inadvertently form a view that colours the
fairness of the subsequent adjudication.
The judicial discipline required at this stage
demands that only the cause for delay be
scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore,
we cannot consider the merits of the matter
at this stage.

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also
considered as to whether there was any
room for largesse for State lethargy and
leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. After considering various earlier
decisions on the subject, ultimately, it
opined that prior to the decision of
'Postmaster General v. Living Media
India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563,
the approach was characterised by judicial
sympathy towards the State and its
instrumentalities in matters of condonation
of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of
their functioning. At the same time, there
also existed contrary views such as 'State
of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah
Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC
366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State
of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC
403 which held that, irrespective of
whether the litigant is a Government entity
or a private individual, the provisions of
limitation would apply uniformly, and any
leeway shown by the courts would also
remain the same. The law as it presently
stands post the decision of Postmaster
General (supra) as unambiguous and clear.
Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental
litigants, no less than private parties, must
demonstrate
bonafide,
sufficient,
and
cogent cause for delay. Absent such
justification, delay cannot be condoned
merely on the ground of the identity of the
applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has
further observed that on a combined
reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs.
Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through
Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1
SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union
of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it
is equally manifest that the ratio of
Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence,
twofold. First, that State or any of its
instrumentalities
cannot
be
accorded
preferential treatment in matters concerning
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The State must be judged
by the same standards as any private
litigant.
To
do
otherwise
would
compromise the sanctity of limitation.
Secondly, that the habitual reliance of
Government departments on bureaucratic
red
tape,
procedural
bottlenecks,
or
administrative inefficiencies as grounds for
seeking condonation of delay cannot
always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient
cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be
accepted as a matter of course, the very
discipline sought to be introduced by the
law of limitation would be diluted,
resulting
in
endless
uncertainty
in
litigation. We have perused other parts of
the said judgment including para 214 and
onwards.

10. Considering the facts of this case,
we are of the opinion, as already expressed,
firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly,
the explanation offered in this regard which
is hardly an explanation is certainly not an
acceptable one and is not satisfactory as
there is no sufficient cause shown by the
appellants for entertaining the appeal which
has been filed with such delay.

11. We, accordingly, reject the
application for condonation of delay.
272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Consequently, the appeal bearing Special
Appeal Defective No.345 of 2025
also stands dismissed.

12. We are now considering the
affidavit
in
support
of
the
application for condonation of delay
in
connected
Special
Appeal
Defective No.418 of 2024.

13.
This
appeal,
as
already
stated, has been filed with a delay of
348 days. Para 2 of the said affidavit
mentions
that
judgment
dated
06.02.2024 was communicated to the
Manager of
the
Institution
vide
covering
letter
dated
17.05.2024
copy of which is annexed, however,
the appellant has not disclosed as to
whether its counsel in the said writ
proceedings who was heard had
communicated disposal of the writ
petition to the appellants or not. It is
silent on this issue. Thus, there is no
explanation much less a satisfactory
one for the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal i.e.
30
days.
Now,
we
proceed
to
consider
as
to
what
is
the
explanation, if any, for the period
after
expiry
of
the
limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal.

14. It is said that after receiving
the letter dated 17.05.2024, the
appellants arranged the paperbook
and sent a letter dated 05.07.2024 to
D.I.O.S. seeking his instructions.
Simultaneously, the deponent asked
her counsel to get the certified copy
of the judgment which was received
on 10.07.2024. Now, here again after
receipt of letter dated 17.05.2024,
instead of challenging the judgment,
the appellants waited for almost one
and a half months to write a letter to
the D.I.O.S. and to seek certified
copy of the judgment through her
counsel. The said certified copy of
the
judgment,
as
claimed
was
received on 10.07.2024. Thereafter
again, the deponent approached the
office of D.I.O.S. and inquired about
compliance of judgment and order
dated 21.07.2023 passed by the High
Court. This itself shows that the
appellants did not have the intent of
challenging the judgment which has
subsequently been impugned. It is
said that D.I.O.S. expressed some
views on merits. Thereafter, the
appellants
met
her
counsel
on
22.07.2024 and asked him to prepare
the appeal. Thereafter, some time
was
consumed
in
collecting
documents and getting the appeal
prepared by 03.08.2024 when it was
filed. Here again, the explanation
offered in the affidavit is quite
casual. It only demonstrates the
apathetic attitude of the appellants.
No promptness is evinced from a
reading of the said affidavit. The
appellants
acted
with
leisure.
Keeping in mind the judgment of
Hon'ble
the
Supreme
Court
in
Shivamma (Dead) (supra) which we
have already referred extensively in
the earlier part of the judgment, not
only the delay is inordinate but it is
also not
satisfactorily explained.
Appellants have failed to put forth
and demonstrate sufficient cause for
condonation of delay. We are not
persuaded to condone the delay in
this appeal also.

15. Accordingly, the application
for
condondation
of
delay
is
rejected. Consequently, the appeal
10 All. Anand Kumar Vs. Union Of India & Anr.
273
bearing Special Appeal Defective
No.418 of 2024 is also dismissed.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 273
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ A No. 1738 of 2025

Anand Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Arvind Kumar Yadav, Narendra Kumar
Chaturvedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Pranjal Mehrotra

Issue for Consideration
Permissibility of concurrence continuance of
disciplinary enquiry and criminal prosecution on
the same allegation against an employee.

Headnotes
(A)
Service
law
-
Suspension
-
Disciplinary proceedings - Allegation of
attempting to steal 13 coins was leveled
against the petitioner, while working as
the Assistant Grade - Chargesheet was
filed before trial court in criminal case -
Disciplinary enquiry was also initiated -
Validity challenged - Distinction between
object
of
criminal
prosecution
and
departmental enquiry explained :

Held : Criminal trial is instituted to bring
offenders of criminal laws to justice before a
criminal court. The offences which are the
subject matter of criminal trials are against the
society at large and are determined by the
legislature. The standard of evidence for proving
the guilt in a criminal trial is beyond reasonable
doubt - On the other hand departmental
enquiries have a narrower jurisdiction and
impact. Disciplinary enquiries are initiated
against delinquent employees for various acts of
departmental misconduct - The purpose of
departmental
enquiries
is
to
ensure
maintenance of overall institutional discipline
and integrity of the employees - The standards
of evidence in a departmental enquiry by which
guilt can be established is preponderance of
probability - The procedures of a disciplinary
enquiry are summary in nature, however, the
same
are
consistent
with
the
judicially
established norms of fairness and principles of
natural justice. [Paras 40, 41 and 42]

Further held: Staying on departmental enquiry
in the facts of this case will promote a culture of
lack of accountability, and create a sense of
immunity in the delinquent official who has
prima
facie
committed
gross
acts
of
departmental
misconduct
-
The
India
Government Mint is engaged in very sensitive
transactions, it will not be conducive in the
interest of justice to permit the enquiry to be
held in abeyance or delayed in any manner. It is
both
desirable
and
advisable
to
hold
departmental enquiry and prosecute the criminal
trial simultaneously. [Paras 52 and 54] (E-1)

Case Law Cited
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal
Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.
v. Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 155; Jang Bahadur
Singh v. Brij Nath Tiwari, AIR 1969 SC 30;
Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.,
(1988) 4 SCC 319; State of Rajasthan v. B.K.
Meena and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 417; Depot
Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation
v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors., (1997) 2 SCC
699; Capt.M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines
Ltd. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 679; Kailash ChandraII
v.
State
of
U.P.
and
ors.,
2005(2)ESC1158(All); Abhai Raj Singh v. Bank
of Baroda and Ors., ILR (2005) 1 All 126; G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC
446; The Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. M.G.
Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442; State of Rajasthan
and Ors. v. Phool Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4176;
State Bank of India and Ors. v. P. Zadenga,
(2023) 10 SCC 675; Eastern Coalfields Limited
and Ors. v. Rabindra Kumar Bharti, (2022) 12
SCC
390;
Karnataka
Power
Transmission
Corporation Limited v. C. Nagaraju and Ors.,
(2019) 10 SCC 367; Shashi Bhusan Prasad v.