# State of U.P. & Ors. / v. Amar Singh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 246
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-07
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 135 of 2024
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Prashant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-amar-singh-anr-52309
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Rules,
1952-Ch.VIII,
Rule
5-The
appellant
was
dismissed
for
inadvertently
forwarding
an
objectionable Whatsapp message to a
group
of
government
officials,
although
he
promptly
deleted
the
message and tendered an apology,
disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated, culminating in his dismissalon appeal, the State contended that
the writ petition was wrongly filed in
the Allahabad bench instead of the
Lucknow bench as the cause of action
occurred in Lucknow-The court held
that
the
Allahabad
bench
lacked
jurisdiction
to
entertain
the
writ
petition-jurisdiction
cannot
be
conferred by consent or acquiescence
of the parties if the court inherently
lacks it.(Para 1 to 46)

The petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,913 of 60,406. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39913 for what follows._

246 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of cheating, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.

471. Using as genuine a forged
document or electronic record.?Whoever
fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine
any document or electronic record which he
knows or has reason to believe to be a forged
document or electronic record, shall be
punished in the same manner as if he had
forged such document or electronic record."

9. Section 471 IPC describes a crime if
a forged document is used as a genuine.
However, in entire documents filed by
Opposite Party No. 2 before Trial Court,
there is no such document which was forged
and later on was used as genuine. The
documents filed before school are not
available on record, therefore, no offence is
made out under Section 471 IPC.

10. Section 467 IPC describes a crime if
a document is forged and as referred above,
there is no document on record which was
forged. It is not on record, whether Aadhar
Card or Passport were forged or not. Even
particulars of Aadhar Card can be changed
since a procedure has been prescribed under
Aadhar Act.

11. So far as Section 468 IPC is
concerned, it relates to forgery for the
purpose of cheating and as referred above
since no forgery has been pointed out on
basis of any document, since even prima
facie, no offences (referred above) are made
out under Section 468 IPC also.

12. In aforesaid circumstances, this
Court is of the considered opinion that there
is no sufficient material to proceed, therefore,
no offence is made out against Applicant-1
also.

13. In the result, application is allowed.
Impugned summoning order dated 21.11.2023
and non-bailable warrant dated 26.02.2024 as
well as entire proceedings of Complaint Case
No. 201/2023 (Mohd. Faizan vs. Nazia Majid
and others), under Sections 467, 468, 471,
120B/34 IPC, Police Station Sikandrra, District
Agra, are hereby quashed.

14. However, this order will not come in
the way, if Opposite Party No. 2 places record
before school authorities to include his name as
father of child, as till date no divorce has been
taken place. Otherwise also, name of father will
remain in record till it has been disowned in a
legal way. It is also observed that in case
Opposite Party No. 2 approaches the school to
meet with Principal, for this purpose he will be
allowed and school records may be corrected
and for that Applicant-1 will also cooperate
since it would be beneficial for welfare of child.

15. A copy of this order be sent to
Principal, Kinder Academy, M-49A, Ground
Floor, Near Mother Dairy, Malviya Nagar,
New Delhi.

16. Registrar (Compliance) to take steps.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 246
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

Special Appeal No. 135 of 2024

State of U.P. & Ors.
 ...Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Amar Singh & Anr.
 ...Petitioners/Opposite Parties
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
247
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Jagannath Maurya, Sri Rama Nand
Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anil Kumar Mehrotra

A. Special Appeal-Allahabad High Court
Rules,
1952-Ch.VIII,
Rule
5-The
appellant
was
dismissed
for
inadvertently
forwarding
an
objectionable Whatsapp message to a
group
of
government
officials,
although
he
promptly
deleted
the
message and tendered an apology,
disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated, culminating in his dismissalon appeal, the State contended that
the writ petition was wrongly filed in
the Allahabad bench instead of the
Lucknow bench as the cause of action
occurred in Lucknow-The court held
that
the
Allahabad
bench
lacked
jurisdiction
to
entertain
the
writ
petition-jurisdiction
cannot
be
conferred by consent or acquiescence
of the parties if the court inherently
lacks it.(Para 1 to 46)

The petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ram Gopal Chaturvedi Vs St. of M.P.(1969) 2
SCC 240

2. U.O.I. Vs T.V. Patel (2007) 4 SCC 785

3. Manish Kumar Mishra Vs U.O.I. & ors.(2020)
6 ADJ 1

4. Nirmal Dass Kathuria Vs St. Trans. (Applt.)
Tribunal, U.P. Lko.(1972) AIR All 200

5.
Nasiruddin
Vs
St.
Trans.
Applt.
Tribunal(1975) AIR SCC 2 671

6. Rashtriya Chinni Mills Adhikari Parishad, Lko.
Vs St. of U.P. & ors.(1995) 4 SCC 738

7. Universal Insulators & Ceramics Ltd. Vs
Official Liquidator, HC Alld(2019) 19 ADJ 437
8. U.O.I. thru Secy. Ministry of Railways,
Railway Board, Rail Bhawan, New Delhi & ors.Vs
Dr. A.W. Umrdhar(2021) 2 AIR Mom. R 793

9. U.O.I. & ors.Vs T.V Patel

10. Manish Kumar Mishra & ors.Vs U.O.I. & ors.

11. Sneh Lata Goel Vs Pushplata & ors.(2019) 3
SCC 594

12. Om Prakash Agarwal Vs Vishan Dayal Rajput
& anr.(2019) 14 SCC 526

13. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs U.O.I. & anr..
(2004) 6 SCC 264

14. Shanti Devi Vs U.O.I. (2020) 10 SCC 766

15. Amar Kumar Vs CAT Lko. & ors.Service
bench No. 992 of 2010

16. U.O.I. & ors.Vs S.K. Kapoor(2011) 4 SCC
589

17. S.N. Narula Vs U.O.I. & ors.(2011) 4 SCC
591

18. Jagmittar Singh Bhagat Vs Dir. Health
Services, Haryana & ors.(2013) 10 SCC 136

19. Pioneer Traders & ors.Vs Chief Contrl. of
Imports & Exports Pondicherry (1963) AIR SC
734

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Kunal Ravi Singh,
learned Chief Standing Counsel and Sri
Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel for the State-appellants and Sri
Anil Kumar Mehrotra, learned counsel for
respondent no.1-petitioner.

2. The instant intra-court Special
Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the
Allahabad
High
Court
Rules,
1952
(hereinafter referred as the 'Rules, 1952')
has been preferred against judgment and
248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order dated 21.08.2023 passed by learned
Single Judge in Writ A No.11040 of 2020
(Amar Singh vs. State of U.P. and others).
For ready reference, the operative portion
of the judgment and order dated 21.08.2023
is reproduced as under:-

"..........65. Having gone through
the authorities cited by the learned counsel
appearing for the respective parties, I am
of the view that the propositions as
discussed in those judgments are not
contradictory to each other.

66. The principle of law is well
settled that interference by the High Court
or Tribunal in the judicial exercise of
power would not extend to appreciating the
evidence and coming to a different
conclusion than what Domestic Tribunal
has already arrived at but the question is
as to whether this decision making process
was sound and was not vitiated and that a
man of ordinary prudence would have
arrived at a decision/ conclusion which
could be said to be a rational one on the
material available. It is a case where the
department failed to present any evidence
whatsoever in support of the charge that
petitioner circulated the message to defame
the Government.

67. In the case of Union of India
v. Sardar Bahadur: (1972) 4 SCC 618, the
Court held very clearly that any statement
made in a criminal trial would have been
said to be admissible had the persons who
gave the statement were produced by the
department before the Inquiry Officer to be
cross-examined by the delinquent employee
and having failed to do so the department
could not have complained of the Inquiry
Officer not appreciating the same.

68. Coming to the authorities
cited by learned counsel for the petitioner
first
in
the
case
of
Wednesbury
Corporation (supra) I find that in the said
case the court of appeal has held that it is
entitled to investigate the action of local
authority in order to find out whether it had
taken relevant material into consideration
while arriving at a finding or conversely
refused to take into account or neglected it
even
though
available.
The
court,
therefore, held that the answer to the
question if goes to the authority or in other
words like in the present case, one can
conclude that authority's action is within
the four corners of the matter which they
ought to consider but even such a decision
if tested on the IQ of a reasonable man and
the Court concludes that such a reasonable
man could not come to such a conclusion,
the Court would still interfere. So not only
decision taking process even the conclusion
arrived at for the decision is open to
judicial review.

69. In the case of Gohil Vishvaraj
Hanubhai (supra) the Court discussed in
detailed the Wednesbury unreasonableness
on the point of power of judicial review.
The Court held that the irrationality of a
decision making power would account to
akin of 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'. In
support of this, the view taken by Lord
Diplock was reiterated and it was observed
that the decision should be so outrageous
in its defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that given an application of mind
by a reasonable man, it may not be
approved of.

70. In the present case I find that
second charge was not at all proved by the
Inquiry Officer. The first charge was
proved partly only and that too on the
ground that petitioner had himself made an
admission, fair enough, that while trying to
delete the message he got the same
forwarded in whatsapp group by wrongly
touching the icon. This also happened in
the midnight hours, therefore, applying the
definition of misconduct given in Strout's
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
249
dictionary (supra) there was nothing to
demonstrate that the petitioner did it
intentionally. It was a case where petitioner
did delete the message in the midnight
hoursbefore anybody could have read it,
however,
by
way
of
precaution
he
messaged other whatsapp group members
to delete the message wrongly got sent by
him. The department would have been
justified in bringing home the charge, had
it produced the persons who might have
read the message or shown to others or had
complained against the petitioner. That
being not the case, the charge itself did not
stand proved and, therefore, punishment of
dismissal from service is held to be
shockingly disproportionate. Fact position
admitted on record is that petitioner had
made a fair admission and upon the said
fair admission the department sets up an
inquiry and did not find a single employee
or the member of the group message who
were the employees to have read the
message before it was deleted in the
midnight hours. This being the admitted
factual position, I do not see petitioner to
deserve such a harsh punishment of
dismissal from service. In my considered
view, in the absence of evidence as to
circulation of message to pollute mind of
people
towards
the
government,
the
government should have appreciated his
courage to show admission and should
have warned him to be careful in future.

71. Coming to the argument
advanced by learned Additional Advocate
General that admission is the best piece of
evidence and delinquent employee having
admitted that he had forwarded the
message, nothing more required to bring
home the charge, I find that admission was
only to the extent that he got the message
forwarded due to inadvertence as he was
trying to delete the same and further I find
that admission was also that petitioner had
asked everyone to delete the message. So
admission was as to the inadvertent
mistake and not as to the intention to
forward the message to defame the Chief
Minister or his government. Eventually he
wanted and honestly attempted to delete the
questionable message. The admission is to
be read contextually and not in isolation
and so in my considered view there was no
admission as to the charge levelled against
the petitioner.

72. The principles as discussed in
authorities cited by learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as learned Additional
Advocate
General
herein
this
above
judgment, I find that the order of dismissal
deserves interference.

73. Thus the second argument as
to quantum of punishment being shockingly
disproportionate to the guilt proved though
partly also holds merit and impugned order
deserves to be quashed.

74. In view of the above, writ
petition succeeds and is allowed. The order
dated 7th September, 2020 is hereby
quashed. Petitioner shall be reinstated in
service and shall be entitled to all
consequential benefits.

75. The matter is remitted to the
extent that the respondent authority may
impose any minor punishment in its
discretion taking into consideration that
admission of the petitioner and his fairness
in reporting to the Government that he got
objectionable message forwarded in the
whatsapp group in the midnight hours
mistakenly and deleted the same within 2-3
minutes and messaged others in whatsapp
group to delete the message and also the
fact that there was no evidence available
that the message was got circulated and
was read by members of the whatsapp
group or any other member on his mobile
through whatsapp message. He can only be
just issued with a warning for his such
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conduct if otherwise his career has been
blotless but for this solitary incident.

76. Appropriate order shall be
passed by the State Government within 30
days from the date of production of
certified copy of this order.

77. Cost made easy."

FACTUAL
MATRIX
OF
THE
CASE

3. Respondent no.1-writ petitioner
was appointed on 05.02.2001 on the post of
Personal Assistant in U.P. Secretariat,
Lucknow on being selected by U.P. Public
Service Commission 1. His services were
governed by the U.P. Secretariat Personal
Assistant Service Rules, 2001 2, U.P.
Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956
3 and U.P. Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999 4. Respondent
no.1-petitioner
claimed
that
he
had
received
an
objectionable
Whatsapp
message, which he was trying to delete but
inadvertently it got forwarded to the
Whatsapp group of Additional Private
Secretary Cadre. Having realized his
mistake, he immediately deleted the said
message from the group. Thereafter,
respondent
no.1-petitioner
for
his
inadvertent mistake, on his own accord,
tendered an unconditional apology to the
State Functionaries of the Government of
U.P. with an assurance that no such mistake
will be made by him in future.

4. On his application, wherein he has
tendered
unconditional
apology,
the
Secretary,
Administration
initiated
a
disciplinary proceedings against him under
the Rules, 1999. In the disciplinary enquiry
the
charge
sheet
was
served
upon
respondent no.1-petitioner, to which he
gave
a
reply.
On
25.12.2019,
the
disciplinary authority sent a proposal to the
Additional Chief Secretary, Department of
Secretariat,
Administration
with
the
recommendation to end the departmental
proceedings against the respondent no.1petitioner giving him warning not to repeat
such act in future. The matter was placed
before the Chief Secretary, who did not
agree with the said proposal. Thereafter, a
different proposal was placed to the
Hon'ble Chief Minister by the Chief
Secretary seeking his consent on two
proposed alternate punishment against the
petitioner (respondent no.1 herein), i.e. the
first proposal was "award punishment of
censure entry and revert him on the grade
of basic salary" and second proposal was
"removal from service which does not
disqualify from future employment".

5. Hon'ble Chief Minister (as
Minister concerned) had accorded approval
on 24.02.2020 on second proposal i.e.
removal from service of respondent no.1petitioner, which does not disqualify him
from future employment. Consequently, the
order dated 7.9.2020 was passed, whereby
the services of respondent no.1-petitioner
was dispensed with. However, dismissal
would not disqualify him from future
employment.

6. Aggrieved with the said dismissal
order, the respondent no.1-petitioner had
invoked the writ jurisdiction by preferring
Writ-A No.11040 of 2020 (Amar Singh vs.
State of U.P. and others) precisely on the
ground that the entire procedure so adopted
during disciplinary proceeding was dehors
the procedure prescribed under the relevant
service rules, with the following reliefs:-

"(A) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Certiorari
quashing
the
impugned
order
dated
07.09.2020 passed by respondent no.2.
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
251

(B) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Mandamus
commanding and directing the respondents
to not interfere in the working of the
petitioner as Additional Private Secretary in
the
Department
of
Secretariat
Administration, Section-2 (Establishment),
Government of U.P. Lucknow and pay his
regular salary month to month."

7. In the writ proceeding, it was
pressed by the State-respondents that the
petitioner therein had admitted to have
circulated the Whatsapp message. It was
further argued that the termination order
does
not
dis-entitle
the
petitioner
(respondent no.1 herein) from seeking
appointment elsewhere, so there was
nothing illegal, which would call for
interference by the writ Court.

8. After hearing the parties, learned
Single Judge vide judgment and order
dated 21.08.2023 had allowed the writ
petition and held that the alleged enquiry
was in gross violation of principle of
natural justice and the procedure, which
was adopted during the enquiry was also
dehors
the
Rules.
Accordingly,
the
impugned order of dismissal from service
was struck down. It was also opined that
the quantum of punishment was shockingly
disproportionate to the guilt proved though
partly holds merit. Learned Single Judge
had set aside the termination order and
directed for reinstatement of petitioner in
service
along
with
all
consequential
benefits. Further the matter was remitted
with observation that the respondent
authority
may
impose
any
minor
punishment in its discretion taking into
consideration
the
admission
of
the
petitioner and his fairness in reporting to
the Government that he got objectionable
message, forwarded in the whatsapp group.

9. Aggrieved with the judgment and
order passed by learned Single Judge, the
State-appellants have preferred the instant
intra Court appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF
STATE-APPELLANTS

10. The basic ground taken in the
instant appeal is that the dispute pertains to
District Lucknow as the respondent no.1petitioner was employed as Addl. Private
Secretary in the Department of Secretariat
Administration, Section 2 (Establishment),
Civil
Secretariat,
Lucknow;
entire
disciplinary proceedings were initiated and
culminated at Lucknow and consequently
the order dated 7.9.2020 (impugned in the
writ petition) was passed by the Authority
constituted at Lucknow namely Addl. Chief
Secretary,
Department
of
Secretariat
Administration, Section-2 (Establishment),
Government of U.P., Lucknow.

11. Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, learned
Chief Standing Counsel and Sri Fuzail
Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel
have
vehemently
submitted
that
the
aforementioned facts are sufficient enough
to highlight the fact that no cause of action
arose at Prayagraj, which could confer
jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to
entertain the writ petition. All cause of
action falls within the territorial jurisdiction
of Lucknow Bench of this Court. As such
the judgment and order passed by learned
Single Judge is without jurisdiction and
liable to be set aside. Learned Standing
Counsel submitted that the respondent
no.1-petitioner had heavily relied upon
paragraph 67 of the writ petition, wherein it
is averred that part cause of action arose at
Prayagraj as the U.P. Public Service
Commission, Allahabad (respondent no.4
in the writ petition) had consented for
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
imposition
of
punishment
upon
the
respondent no.1-petitioner as per Rule 16
of Rules, 1999. He submitted that the claim
set up by the respondent no.1-petitioner for
pressing the relief at Allahabad High Court
as part cause of action arose at Prayagraj is
wholly incorrect. He submitted that Rule 16
of Rules, 1999 is similar to Article 320 (3)
(c) of the Constitution of India. Rule 16 of
the Rules, 1999 and Article 320 (3) (c) of
the
Constitution
of
India
refers
to
consultation with the Public Service
Commission in all disciplinary matters. In
such a situation, it is to be seen merely as a
consultation. It would not give any legal
right to the person with regard to
jurisdiction.

12. He submitted that the said
question is no longer res integra and the
Supreme Court in State of U.P. v.
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 5 has held
that Article 320 (3) does not afford the
public servant any cause of action, which
would confer any rights on the public
servant so as to enable him to relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The Apex Court had categorically held that
"it is not a right which can be recognized
and enforced by a writ". He has also placed
reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Apex Court in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v.
State of M.P.6, wherein three Judges
Bench had approved the ratio laid down in
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (Supra) and
reiterated that the consultation with the
Commission did not confer any right on the
public servant. Similar view has also been
taken by the Apex Court in Union of India
v. T.V. Patel 7, which also approved that
Article 320 (3) (c) does not confer any right
upon the public servant to challenge the
same. In the said case, the consultation was
done from the Public Service Commission
and upon advice of the Commission, the
final order was passed. Shri Ansari
submitted that even in the said case,
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
unequivocally
approved the ratio laid down in Manbodhan
Lal Srivastava (Supra) and held that no
cause of action arose to the public servant
upon consultation from the Commission.

13. Shri Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel, in this backdrop, submitted that
consultation or the lack of same with the
Public Service Commission does not confer
any cause of action upon the public servant
so as to confer him any right to challenge
the same in writ jurisdiction. Even
otherwise, the respondent no.1-petitioner
did not challenge the advice given by the
Commission inspite of the fact that the
same has been reiterated while passing the
punishment order. Safely it can be argued
that the advice of the Commission merged
with the final punishment order, which was
passed at Lucknow. He further assertively
argued that every fact pleaded in the writ
petition would not constitute a cause of
action at Allahabad. The fact, which is
enumerated in para 67 of the writ petition
would have no bearing on the lis and that
so does not give cause of action so as to
confer territorial jurisdiction upon the
Court concerned. In support of his
submissions, he has placed reliance upon
the Full Bench judgment of this Court in
Manish Kumar Mishra v. Union of India
& Ors.8, wherein similar question was
considered and it was held as follows:-

"....59. The expression "cause of
action" has been defined in Halsbury's
Laws of England19, as follows:-

"20. Cause of action. "Cause of
action" has been defined as meaning simply
a factual situation, the existence of which
entitles one person to obtain from the court
a remedy against another person. The
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
253
phrase has been held from earliest time to
include every fact which is material to be
proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed,
and every fact which a defendant would
have a right to traverse. "Cause of action"
has also been taken to mean that a
particular act on the part of the defendant
which gives the plaintiff his cause of
complaint,
or
the
subject-matter
of
grievance founding the action, not merely
the technical cause of action.

The same facts or the same
transaction or event may give rise to more
than one effective cause of action.

A cause of action arises wholly or
in part within a certain local area where
all or some of the material facts which the
plaintiff has to prove in order to succeed
arise within that area."

14. Shri Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel stated that the writ petition was filed
for a writ of certiorari against the order passed
by Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of
Secretariat
(Administration)
situated
at
Lucknow and the writ petition was entertained
at Allahabad and was finally decided. He
submitted that since there was no order as
contemplated by second proviso to Article 14
of the U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation)
Order 1948, hence writ petition pertaining to
jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench of this Court
could neither have been entertained much less
decided by this Court. In support of the
submissions, he has relied upon Full Bench
judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmal
Dass
Kathuria
v.
State
Transport
(Appellate) Tribunal, U. P., Lucknow 9,
wherein five questions were referred for the
opinion of the Full Bench, which for ready
reference are reproduced as under-

"1. Can a case falling within the
jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of this
Court be presented at Allahabad ?

2.Can the Judges sitting at
Allahabad summarily dismiss a case
presented at Allahabad pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench.

3.Can a case pertaining to the
jurisdiction
of
the
Lucknow
Bench,
presented and entertained at Allahabad, be
decided finally by the judges sitting at
Allahabad, without there being an order as
contemplated by the second proviso to
Article 14 of the U. P. High Courts
(Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ?

4.What is the meaning of the
expression "in respect of cases arising in
such areas in Oudh" used in the first
provision to Article 14of the High Courts
(Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ? Has this
expression reference to the place where the
case originated or to the place of sitting of
the last court or authority whose decree or
order is being challenged in the proceeding
before the High Court ?

5.Whether this writ petition can
be entertained and heard by the Judges
sitting at Lucknow ?"

15. He submitted that the Full Bench
by majority answered the question nos.1, 2
and 3, which are relevant for the present
matter, as follows :

"Question no. 1. A case falling
within the jurisdiction of the Judges at
Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow
and not at Allahabad".

"Question No. 2. However, if
such a case is presented at Allahabad the
Judges at Allahabad cannot summarily
dismiss it only for that reason. The case
should be returned for filing before the
Judges at Lucknow, and where the case has
been
mistakenly
or
inadvertently
entertained at Allahabad a direction should
be made to the High Court office to
254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
transmit the papers of the case to
Lucknow."

"Question
No.
3.
A
case
pertaining the jurisdiction of the Judges at
Lucknow and presented before the Judges
at Allahabad cannot be decided by the
Judges at Allahabad in the absence of an
order contemplated by the second proviso
to Article 14 of the of the U. P. High Courts
(Amalgamation) Order, 1948."

16. He submitted that the findings
given by the Full Bench of this Court on
aforesaid
three
questions
have
been
affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal 10. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in the said case had observed as
under :

"37. To sum up, our conclusions
are as follows. First, there is no permanent
seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The
seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be
changed in accordance with the provisions
of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of
the High Court has no power to increase or
decrease the areas in Oudh from time to
time. The areas in Oudh have been
determined once by the Chief Justice and,
therefore, there is no scope for changing
the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has
power under the second proviso to
paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his
discretion that any case or class of cases
arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at
Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are
those which are instituted at Lucknow. The
interpretation given by the High Court that
the word "heard" confers powers on the
Chief Justice to order that any case or
class of cases arising in Oudh area shall be
instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of
Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard"
means that cases which have already been
instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the
discretion of the Chief Justice under the
second proviso to paragraph 14 of the
Order be directed to be heard at
Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause
of action" with regard to a civil matter
means that it should be left to the litigant to
institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at
Allahabad Bench according to the cause of
action arising wholly or in part within
either of the areas. If the case of action
arises wholly within Oudh areas then the
Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction.
Similarly, if the cause of action arises
wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh
then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the
cause of action in part arises in the
specified Oudh areas and part of the cause
of action arises outside the specified areas,
it will be open to the litigant to frame the
case
appropriately
to
attract
the
jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at
Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises
where the offence has been committed or
otherwise as provided in the Criminal
Procedure Code. That will attract the
jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or
Lucknow. In some cases depending on the
facts
and
the
provision
regarding
jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

"38. Applications under Article
226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or
at Allahabad as the applicant will allege
that the whole of cause of action or part of
the cause of action arose at Lucknow
within the specified areas of Oudh or part
of the cause of action arose at a place
outside the specified Oudh area."

"39. The answers given by the
High Court to the first three questions are
correct
save
as
modified
by
our
conclusions aforesaid."

"40. The answer given by the
High Court to the fourth question is set
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
255
aside. The meaning of cases arising in
Oudh areas will be found by appropriate
courts in the light of this judgment."

"41. The answer to the fifth
question is discharged. The matters are
sent back to the High Court for disposal in
accordance with this judgment."

17. Shri Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel submitted that admittedly, in the
present case, the entire cause of action falls
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
Lucknow Bench of this Court as the dispute
pertains
to
territorial
jurisdiction
of
Lucknow Bench. It cannot even remotely
be said that the part cause of action arose at
Allahabad so as to confer jurisdiction upon
this Court to entertain and decide the
petition.

18. Reliance, in this regard, has also
been placed on the judgment in Rashtriya
Chinni
Mills
Adhikari
Parishad,
Lucknow v. State of U.P. & Ors.11.
Emphasis has been given on paragraph 16
of the said judgment, which for ready
reference, is reproduced as under:-

"Mr. Satish Chandra, learned
senior advocate appearing for the appellant
has contended that even on the reasoning of
the Division Bench judgment itself the
conclusions reached by the Bench are
erroneous. We see force in the contention.
The Division Bench of the High Court in
Ram Rakh Vyas vs. Union of India AIR
1977
Rajasthan
243
(the
judgment
delivered by A.P. Sen , J. as the learned
Judge then was), came to the conclusion
that the words "arising in " in the context,
mean "pertaining to the districts of" or
"arising from". It is not disputed that in the
present case the order/notification and the
advertisement were issued by the State
Government at Lucknow. Without there
being
an
order/notification
by
the
Government there could be no cause of
action at all. The petitioner got aggrieved
only from the order/notification which
"arose" from Lucknow. The grievance of
the petitioner "arose" at Lucknow which is
within the Oudh area and as such on the
plain reading of the relevant provisions of
clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, the
Bench at Lucknow had the jurisdiction to
deal with the matter."

19. He has also placed reliance on the
judgment in Universal Insulators and
Ceramics Ltd. v. Official Liquidator,
High Court, Allahabad 12. He has relied
upon paragraph 140 of the said judgment,
which for ready reference, is reproduced as
under:-

"140. In the present case, this
issue is not at all involved, hence, we do
not find that judgment in Dr. Manju Verma
(supra) takes us any further on the question
with which we are concerned. We,
therefore, answer question (2) holding that
since jurisdiction of cases to be entertained
at Lucknow and Allahabad are distinct and
exclusive over demarcated territories, it
renders an order passed by Judges sitting
at a place in a matter over which they have
no jurisdiction, as nullity."

20. He further elaborated that even in
case, the approval of the Commission dated
21.08.2020 would have been assailed at the
initial stage while pressing the writ petition
even that could not have conferred a
territorial jurisdiction in favour of the
petitioner to press the relief before this
Court as the advice of the Commission is
not mandatory and it does not give cause of
action to the employee concerned. The
reliance has also been placed on the
judgment passed by the Division Bench of
256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Bombay High Court in the case of
Union of India through Secretary,
Ministry of Railways, Railway Board,
Rail Bhawan, New Delhi and others vs.
Dr. A.W. Umrdkar 13, paragraphs-6 and
7 of the same are being reproduced herein
as under :

"6. The only point falls for
consideration is about non-supply of advice
sought from UPSC by the respondent. In
this regard, the appellant would urge that,
there is no legal requirement of supplying
the copy of UPSC advice before passing the
order of punishment. It is brought to our
notice that the copy of advice was provided
by the Department at the time of serving
punishment order. In support of said
submission the appellant has relied on the
decision of Karnataka High Court in the
case
of
The
Secretary,
Ministry
of
Railways, New Delhi v. Sh. Norman David
Fernandez and anr. (Writ Petition No.
15852 of 1998) decided on 27.08.2001. In
said case, while deciding similar issue, the
Division Bench of Karnataka High Court
held that obtaining advice from UPSC
under Article 320(3)(c) is not mandatory
requirement.
Coincidentally,
the
said
petition was also relating to Railway Board
based on similar Rules. Besides that, the
petitioner relied on the decision of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. T.V. Patel 2007 Lawsuit(SC)466.
In said case, it is ruled that non-supply of
copy of advice tendered by UPSC before
passing final order does not afford the
rights nor gives cause of action to the
employee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by
referring it's earlier decision in the case of
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava
1958 SCR 533 ruled that, order of
punishment passed without looking to the
consultation report of UPSC is valid. In
other words, supply of consultation report
to the delinquent is not a mandatory
requirement.

7 Reverting to the impugned
order we find that non-supply of UPSC
consultation report was sole ground for
allowing the Original Application. In view
of the law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court as well as view taken by the
Karnataka High Court the issue is no
longer res integra. There is no legal
requirement
to
furnish
the
copy
of
consultation report as the UPSC to the
employee."

21. He has also placed reliance upon
the judgment passed by the Apex Court in
Union of India and others vs. T.V. Patel
(Supra), for ready reference paragraphs-14
and 17 of which are also reproduced herein
under:

"14. A Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Manbodhan
Lal
Srivastava
Manu/SC/0123/1957:
(1958)IILLJ273SC,
considered the question as to whether the
consultation of the Commission under
Article 320(3)(c) is mandatory and binding
on the appropriate authority.

17. In view of the law settled by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Srivastava (supra) we hold that the
provisions of Article 320(3)(c) of the
Constitution of India are not mandatory
and they do not confer any rights on the
public servant so that the absence of
consultation
or
any
irregularity
in
consultation process or furnishing a copy
of the advice tendered by the UPSC, if
any, does not afford the delinquent
government servant a cause of action in a
court of law." (Emphasis supplied)

22. Reliance has also been placed
upon Full Bench decision of this Court in
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr.
257
Manish Kumar Mishra and others vs.
Union of India and others (Supra), of
which paragraphs 11, 12, 20 and 21 for
ready reference are being reproduced
herein as under:

"11. From the above, it is evident
that there can never be an encyclopedic
exposition as to what would constitute
cause of action in a case. The decisions of
the Full Bench and the Division Benches of
this Court and the Apex Court should not
be read to exhaustively enunciate as to
when and how the Court should determine
in a case that the cause of action, wholly or
in part, has arisen within its territorial
limits. Peculiar facts in the context of the
subject matter of the litigation, and relief
claimed are the only guiding factors for the
learned Judge(s) to decide. It is to be
entirely left at the discretion of the Judge(s)
considering the petition to ascertain
whether the cause of action did exist
entitling the petitioner to approach the
High Court concerned.

12. Each and every fact pleaded
in the writ petition cannot by itself
constitute a cause of action. Facts which
have no bearing on the lis or the dispute
involved in the case, do not give rise to a
cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the Court concerned. In
view of the expression used in clause (2) of
Article 226 of the Constitution, even if a
small fraction of cause of action accrues
within the jurisdiction of the Court, the
Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.
Integral facts pleaded must have nexus or
relevance with the lis so as to constitute a
cause of action.

20. 'Cause of action' implies a
right to sue. The material facts which are
imperative for the suitor to allege and
prove constitutes the cause of action. It has
been interpreted to mean that every fact
which would be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of the Court. The
question as to whether the Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition, has to be decided on the basis of
averments
in
the
petition,
truth
or
otherwise thereof, however, would be
immaterial.

21. As cause of action is the
bundle of facts to examine the issue of
jurisdiction it is necessary that one of the
interlinked fact must have occurred in a
place where the case has been instituted.
All necessary facts must form an integral
part of the cause of action. The fact must
have direct relevance in the lis involved. It
is not that every fact pleaded can give rise
to a cause of action so as to confer
jurisdiction on the Court in whose
territorial jurisdiction it has occurred."

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO.1- PETITIONER

23. Sri Anil Kumar Mehrotra, learned
counsel
appearing
for
respondent
no.1/petitioner submitted that no such
objection of territorial jurisdiction was
taken before the Single Judge, and hence, it
is not open for the State-appellant to raise
such objection at this stage.