# State of U.P. & Ors v. Con. 840470302 Narendra Pal Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1449
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-11-24
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 967 of 2014
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J. Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-con-840470302-narendra-pal-singh-ors-43037
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Sri
Udai
Chandani,
Sri
Amrit
Raj
Chaurasiya
Constitution of India, Art.-226-claim of
House rent allowance by Constable and
Head
Constables-staying
in
Barrack-
1450
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
allowed by Single Judge considering
violation of Art.14 of Constitution-G. O.
dated 08.11.13 not brought on recordidentical
controversy
Division
Bench
dealing with Special Appeal-remanded
the matter for fresh consideration by
learned Single Judge-till decision takendirection regarding payment of HRA kept
in
abeyance-Single
Judge
rejected
review without considering the direction
of
appellate
court-said
part
not
sustainable-to this extent appeal stand
allowed.
Held: Para-10
In our view, there is merit in the
submission which has been urged by the
learned Chief Standing Counsel that the
issue which has been raised by the State
merits close consideration by the learned
Single
Judge.
It
would
not
be
appropriate for the Court to enquire into
the correctness of the judgment and
order of a coordinate Bench dated 22
April 2014, which had allowed the earlier
appeal filed by the State to the extent
indicated in the judgment. The learned
Single
Judge
was
bound
by
those
directions and ought to have entertained
the applications filed by the State on
merits. In this view of the matter, we
allow the special appeal and set aside
the judgment and order of the learned
Single Judge dated 15 September 2014
passed in Review Application No.243656
of 2014.

## Text

3 All]. Satya Prakash Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1449
entire foundation is a misconduct which is
still to be proved.
4. The order which was impugned in
the proceedings before the learned Single
Judge dated 9 September 2014 proceeds to
suspend the appellant. Ex-facie the order is
not in contemplation of a departmental
proceeding. It is well settled that an order of
suspension of an employee can be of two
types. The first is where a suspension is
ordered in contemplation of a departmental
enquiry or proceeding. The second is where
a suspension is contemplated by service
rules as a punishment for misconduct. In the
present case, the impugned order does not
indicate that it is in contemplation of a
disciplinary proceeding. If the order was
intended to operate as a punishment for
misconduct, compliance of the principles of
natural justice in accordance with service
rules was necessary.
5. In either view of the matter, the
order of suspension that was challenged
before the learned Single Judge was
unsustainable in view of the flaw which
has been noticed above. The learned
Single Judge declined to entertain the
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution, having due regard to the
gravity of charge against the appellant.
On this aspect, we need only observe that
irrespective
of
the
gravity
of
an
allegation, the rule of law has to be
observed and an order of suspension must
necessarily abide by the fundamental
principles of service jurisprudence as
embodied in the applicable service rules.
6. For these reasons, we have come
to the conclusion that the judgment and
order of the learned Single Judge would
warrant interference in appeal. The
special appeal is, accordingly, allowed
and the impugned judgment and order of
the learned Single Judge dated 25
September
2014
is
set
aside.
In
consequence, the writ petition (Writ-A
No.52394 of 2014) filed by the appellant
shall stand allowed and the order passed
by the fifth respondent dated 9 September
2014 shall stand quashed and set aside.
7. However, we expressly make it
clear that this judgment will not come in
the way of the competent authority to pass
a fresh order of suspension, if it is
considered to be necessary and proper, in
contemplation
of
a
disciplinary
proceeding in accordance with law.
8.

The
special
appeal
is,
accordingly, disposed of. There shall be
no order as to costs.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Special Appeal Defective No. 967 of 2014
State of U.P. & Ors.
 Appellants
Versus
Con. 840470302 Narendra Pal Singh &
Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C., S.C.
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri
Udai
Chandani,
Sri
Amrit
Raj
Chaurasiya
Constitution of India, Art.-226-claim of
House rent allowance by Constable and
Head
Constables-staying
in
Barrack-
1450
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
allowed by Single Judge considering
violation of Art.14 of Constitution-G. O.
dated 08.11.13 not brought on recordidentical
controversy
Division
Bench
dealing with Special Appeal-remanded
the matter for fresh consideration by
learned Single Judge-till decision takendirection regarding payment of HRA kept
in
abeyance-Single
Judge
rejected
review without considering the direction
of
appellate
court-said
part
not
sustainable-to this extent appeal stand
allowed.
Held: Para-10
In our view, there is merit in the
submission which has been urged by the
learned Chief Standing Counsel that the
issue which has been raised by the State
merits close consideration by the learned
Single
Judge.
It
would
not
be
appropriate for the Court to enquire into
the correctness of the judgment and
order of a coordinate Bench dated 22
April 2014, which had allowed the earlier
appeal filed by the State to the extent
indicated in the judgment. The learned
Single
Judge
was
bound
by
those
directions and ought to have entertained
the applications filed by the State on
merits. In this view of the matter, we
allow the special appeal and set aside
the judgment and order of the learned
Single Judge dated 15 September 2014
passed in Review Application No.243656
of 2014.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)
1. This special appeal arises from a
judgment and order of the learned Single
Judge dated 8 November 2013 and an
order passed in a review petition dated 15
September 2014.
2.

The
appellants
are
Head
Constables or, as the case may be,
Constables in the Provincial Armed
Constabulary1. A writ petition had been
filed before a learned Single Judge by 237
Head Constables/Constables, seeking the
payment of House Rent Allowance2 on
the basis of a Government Order dated 14
June 1999, on the ground that they had
not
been
provided
official
accommodation. That writ petition was
disposed of by a learned Single Judge by
an order dated 8 December 2010. The
learned Single Judge was of the view that
the grievance should be examined by the
Principal Secretary (Home) of the State
Government and that in order to avoid
further litigation, it was desirable for the
State to issue a circular either for the
payment
of
HRA
to
Head
Constables/Constables, or if it was not to
be so provided, by indicating the reasons
for the decision. Following the order of
the
learned
Single Judge
dated
8
December 2010, the State Government
issued a circular on 25 April 2011 to the
effect that the Constables who are housed
in barracks would not be paid HRA.
Thereafter,
a
representation
was
submitted to the State Government which
was rejected in the month of February
2012 by the Commandant 44th Battalion
PAC, Meerut. That led to the filing of a
writ petition before the learned Single
Judge, seeking a quashing of the decision
of
the
Commandant.
Besides,
a
mandamus was sought to the State to pay
HRA to the writ petitioners together with
arrears
in
accordance
with
two
Government Orders respectively dated 11
June 1999 and 8 December 2008. These
two Government Orders apply generally
to the employees of the State. The writ
petition was allowed by the learned Single
Judge by a judgment and order dated 8
November 2013 in the following terms:-
"In the result, the writ petition is
allowed. The impugned order is quashed.
3 All]. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Con. 840470302 Narendra Pal Singh & Ors.
1451
The State Government in particular and
all the respondents in general are directed
to provide appropriate H.R.A. to all the
police officials including the petitioners,
who are made to stay in 'barracks' and are
not
allotted
appropriate
'residential
accommodation' commensurating their
status, rank and as per their entitlement.
No costs."
3. Prior to the aforesaid decision of
the learned Single Judge, a circular was
issued by the State Government on 19
October 2013 under which a provision
was made for the payment of Family
Accommodation
Allowance3
to
employees of the police department who
had been provided accommodation in
barracks. As a matter of fact, it appears
that the Sixth Pay Commission4 had, in
the course of its recommendations, dealt
with the issue as to whether HRA should
be provided to personnel of Central
Reserve Police Force5 who had not been
allotted rent free accommodation. The
recommendation of the SPC provided as
follows:-
"Recommendations -
CILQ
7.19.42, Presently, Compensation in
lieu of Quarters (CILQ) is allowed to
100% personnel in the Subordinate
Officers (Sos) grade in all CPMFs barring
CRPF where only 25% of the personnel in
the
grade
are
eligible
for
which
allowance. CRPF has demanded that the
facility should be extended to all the SOs
in their case as well. The Commission
finds merit in this demand. It is
recommended that the facility of CILQ
should be allowed to 100% personnel in
the SOs grade in CRPF as well. Another
demand has been made to extend House
Rent Allowance (HRA) to all the CPMFs
personnel who have not been allotted rent
free accommodation or are eligible for
CILQ. CILQ is given to a segment of
force personnel as per the authorized
strength who have not been provided rentfree family accommodation at the duty
station. CILQ includes the element of
HRA and license fee as per prescribed
rates. Personnel who are not eligible for
either rent free accommodation or CILQ
are expected to stay in the non-family
barracks from the functional requirement.
While staying in non-family barracks on
functional considerations is justified, it
may not be appropriate to deny any
compensation for housing the family of
these personnel. HRA at normal rates
cannot be paid to these personnel as they
are staying in barracks provided by the
Government. However, justification exists
for
providing
a
separate
family
accommodation allowance for housing the
family members of this category of
employees. In consonance with the
recommendations made for similarly
placed
defence
personnel,
the
Commission recommends that a new
Family Accommodation Allowance at the
lowest rate of HRA should be paid to all
the CPMF's personnel who are not
eligible
for
either
rent
free
accommodation/HRA or CILQ. The rates
of this allowance will increase by 25%
each time the price index increases by
50%."
4.

In
pursuance
of
the
recommendation of the SPC, eventually,
the State Government issued its Circular
dated 19 October 2013 as noted above.
The circular of the State Government
dated 19 October 2013 was not placed
before the learned Single Judge when the
writ petition was allowed on 8 November
2013. Against the decision of the learned
1452
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Single Judge, a special appeal was filed
by the State. The special appeal was
allowed by a Division Bench of this Court
on 22 April 2014 to the extent as
indicated in the judgment. The Division
Bench noted that in the grounds of appeal,
the State placed reliance on its decision
dated 19 October 2013 which provided
for a Family Accommodation Allowance
to those Constables and Head Constables
who had been provided accommodations
in barracks. The Division Bench noted
that it was an admitted position that the
decision of the State was neither annexed
before nor placed for the consideration of
the learned Single Judge. The judgment
and order of the learned Single Judge
proceeded only on the basis that barracks
could not be treated as residential
accommodation and the denial of HRA
would be in violation of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. Eventually, while
allowing the special appeal to the extent
that it did, the Division Bench in its
judgment dated 22 April 2014 observed as
follows :-
"7. Since the question raised in the
writ petition is going to affect thousands
of police personnel of the rank of
Constables and Head Constables, who
have been provided accommodation in
barracks, we find it appropriate to remand
the matter to learned Single Judge. It will
be open to the State appellants to file an
appropriate
application
annexing
therewith the Government Order dated
19.10.2013 or any other order which may
be relevant for the decision of the issue of
payment of house rent allowance to
whose
employees
of
the
police
department, who have been provided
barracks.
8. Considering the importance of the
matter and complication which may arise
if the house rent allowance is paid under
the judgment dated 8.11.2013, we also
find it appropriate to direct that until
decision of the writ petition after the
remand the operation of the order dated
8.11.2013
shall
remain
stayed.
An
affidavit annexing the Government Order
dated
19.10.2013
or
any
other
Government Orders which may concern
the issue may be filed by the State
Government before learned Single Judge
within one month.
9. The Special Appeal is allowed to that
extent as indicated above."
5. Following the judgment of the
Division Bench, the State filed a review
petition before the learned Single Judge.
The learned Single Judge has declined to
entertain the review petition on the
ground that the State had sought to reargue the case on merits which was not
permissible in law, having due regard to
the parameters of the jurisdiction in
review. In the view of the learned Single
Judge, no ground for review was made
out and hence the review petition was
dismissed on 15 September 2014.
6. On behalf of the State, it has been
submitted that the Division Bench in its
judgment dated 22 April 2014 allowed the
special appeal in part and had remanded
the proceedings to the learned Single
Judge, having due regard to the fact that
the issue raised would affect thousands of
police
personnel
of
the
rank
of
Constables and Head Constables in the
State. While remanding the proceedings,
the Division Bench directed that the order
of the learned Single Judge dated 8
November 2013 shall remain stayed.
7. In this background, it has been
submitted that the learned Single Judge
3 All]. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Con. 840470302 Narendra Pal Singh & Ors.
1453
should have taken a clear view rather than
a technical view of the matter in declining
to entertain the review petition filed by
the State. The learned Single Judge has,
by the original judgment, allowed the writ
petition in its entirety, granting the claim
for the payment of HRA together with
arrears. The date from which the arrears
are payable has not been specified.
8. On the other hand, the learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents has supported the view of the
learned Single Judge.
9. Evidently, as the record before the
Court would indicate, a special appeal
against the judgment of the learned Single
Judge dated 8 November 2013 came up
before the Division Bench. The Court was
of the view in its order dated 22 April
2014 that the issue which had been raised
by the State on the basis of the decision
dated 19 October 2013 would affect
thousands of police personnel across the
State in the rank of Constables and Head
Constables. Unfortunately, the decision of
the State dated 19 October 2013 had not
been placed before the learned Single
Judge though it had been formulated and
notified much before the judgment dated
8 November 2013. It
was in this
background that the Division Bench
remanded the proceedings back to the
learned Single Judge while allowing the
special appeal of the State in part and
directed the State to file an affidavit
together with the order dated 19 October
2013 and other Government Orders which
may concern the issue. Until then, the
judgment of the learned Single Judge was
stayed. In this background, we are of the
view that it would have been appropriate
and proper for the learned Single Judge to
entertain the application which was filed
by the State on merits. The original order
of the learned Single Judge allows the
petition in its entirety and in fact directs
the State to provide HRA to all police
officials, including the writ petitioners
who are made to stay in barracks and who
are not allotted appropriate residential
house commensurate with the status, rank
and entitlement. While allowing the writ
petition, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge appears to have also granted
relief on arrears which were claimed in
the writ proceedings.
10. In our view, there is merit in the
submission which has been urged by the
learned Chief Standing Counsel that the
issue which has been raised by the State
merits close consideration by the learned
Single Judge. It would not be appropriate
for the Court to enquire into the
correctness of the judgment and order of a
coordinate Bench dated 22 April 2014,
which had allowed the earlier appeal filed
by the State to the extent indicated in the
judgment. The learned Single Judge was
bound by those directions and ought to
have entertained the applications filed by
the State on merits. In this view of the
matter, we allow the special appeal and
set aside the judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge dated 15 September
2014 passed in
Review Application
No.243656 of 2014.
11. We clarify that though we are
not setting aside the judgment dated 8
November 2013 in the present special
appeal, that should not be construed as an
affirmation of the merits of the decision
since by the previous order of the
Division Bench dated 22 April 2014, the
learned Single Judge would be required to
consider the application filed by the State
in regard to the legality of the judgment
1454
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and order. Hence, we clarify that the
correctness of the judgment is left open to
be considered by the Learned Single
Judge. However, in terms of the earlier
order dated 22 April 2014 of the Division
Bench, we continue the operation of the
stay of the judgment dated 8 November
2013 till the matter is finally disposed of
on merits by the learned Single judge.
12. The special appeal is allowed in
the aforesaid terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Special Appeal Defective No. 995 of 2014
Shyam Narayan & Ors.
 Appellants
Versus
The Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Rajeev Misra, Sri Prashant Kumar
Tripathi
Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Vaibhav Kaushik, Sri Shesh
Mani Misra
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Service
law-termination
of
contractual
employee-appointment
for
specific
purpose-in
particular
project-claiming
engagement as per previous terms-heldno right to continue-so for appraisal of
work or stigmatic concern-not availablelearned Single Judge rightly declined to
interfere.
Held: Para-5
In this view of the matter, the appellants
being
purely
temporary
employees
appointed
under
a
contract
of
engagement, the learned Single Judge
could
not
have
ordered
specific
performance which is essentially what the
writ
petition
sought.
The
second
submission is that the termination is
stigmatic because the letter of termination
dated 7 August
2014 states that the
performance of the appellants was not
found to be satisfactory in the trade test
and similarly the appraisal was also
unsatisfactory. This appraisal for the
purpose
of
determining
whether
a
contractual employee should be continued
any further, cannot result in an order being
regarded as a punishment or of a stigmatic
nature. Where an employee is engaged for
a specified period or for a specified project,
the employer is under the terms of the
contract entitled to consider whether the
continued engagement of the employee is
in
the
interests
of
the
satisfactory
completion of the project mode. Such a
power is implicit in the very nature of the
engagement itself. Consequently, where
the employer proceeds to terminate such a
contract
on
the
ground
that
the
performance is not satisfactory, the order
cannot be regarded as being stigmatic so
as to require the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings. There is no termination for
misconduct in the present case.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)
1. The appellants had moved a writ
petition seeking three reliefs (i) the setting
aside of an order dated 7 August 2014 by
which
their
services
as
contractual
employees were terminated on 7 August
2014 by the Director of the Indian
Institute of Information Technology, the
fourth respondent; (ii) the payment of
salary for the months of July 2014 and for
the period of 1 August to 7 August 2014;
(iii) a direction that the appellants be
permitted to perform their duties as before