# State of U.P. & Ors v. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd

- **Citation:** (2024) 7 ILRA 1240
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-07-02
- **Case number:** First Appeal from Order Defective No. 425 of 2013
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-m-s-harish-chandra-india-ltd-52230
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Law-(The
Arbitration
&
Conciliation Act, 1996-Section 37)- The
time limit for filing appeals under Section 37 is
90 days, and a delay can only be condoned up
to a period of 30 days, an appeal filed after 120
days, no matter how sufficient the cause for
delay is, cannot be allowed
under any
circumstance by the Court. The rationale behind
such stringent timelines is rooted in the
principles of finality and efficiency, which are
paramount in arbitration. The limitation period
serves as a deterrent against undue delays and
encourages parties to act promptly, thereby
ensuring that the arbitration process remains
expeditious.

B. By setting a clear and rigid timeframe, the
law seeks to prevent the arbitration process
from becoming protracted and bogged down by
procedural delays, which would undermine its
core advantage over traditional litigation. This
approach aligns with the broader legislative
intent to make arbitration a preferred method of
dispute resolution by offering a faster and more
efficient alternative to court proceedings. The
90-day period, followed by a maximum 30-day
extension for condonation of delay, is thus a
carefully calibrated timeframe that balances the
need for promptness with a limited degree of
flexibility to accommodate genuine hardships.
(Para 10, 11 & 18)

Appeal dismissed as time barred. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:-

1.N.V. International Vs St. of Assam (2020) 2
SCC 109

2.St. of Mah. Vs Borse Bros. Engineers &
Contractors (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 460

3.Esha Agarwal & ors. Vs Ram Niranjan Ruia
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 98

## Text

1240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
11. It is very surprising
that Nodal Officer as well as
Superintendent of Police, Jaunpur
has prepared and recommended the
gang chart in the month of March,
2024 by signing the pre-typed
satisfaction and District MagistrateJaunpur, has approved the same on
30.04.2024 again by signing the
pre-typed
satisfaction
despite
issuance
of
circular
dated
19.01.2024 by the Director General
of Police, U.P. and also the circular
dated 21.01.2024 by the Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P.
regarding
compliance
of
the
direction issued in Sanni Mishra
(supra) and Asim @ Hassim
(supra) case for recommending and
approving the gang chart. This fact
shows the sheer negligence on the
part of these officers.

12. Therefore, this court is
of the view that Chief Secretary,
U.P. as well as Additional Chief
Secretary (Home), U.P. should look
into
this
matter
and
take
appropriate action.

13. From the above
analysis, it is clear that not only the
gang chart of the impugned F.I.R.
itself is prepared contrary to the
Rules, 2021 but the impugned
F.I.R. is also illegal, being contrary
to the provisions of the Gangsters
Act. Therefore, the gang chart as
well as the impugned F.I.R. are
liable to be quashed.

14. As this Court is
entertaining the present petition
only on the technical ground,
therefore, instead of keeping the
petition pending, the petition is
being finally disposed of by
quashing the impugned F.I.R. as
well as gang chart.

15. Accordingly, the writ
petition is allowed. The impugned
F.I.R. dated 01.05.2024 as well as
the gang chart dated 30.04.2024
are hereby quashed.

16.

However,
the
authority concerned is at liberty
to
lodge
fresh
F.I.R.
after
preparing the gang chart of the
impugned F.I.R. as per the Rules,
2021 as well as in view of the
direction issued by the Division
Bench of this Court in Sanni
Mishra (supra) and Asim @
Hassim (supra).

17.

Registrar
(Compliance) is directed to send a
copy of this order to Chief
Secretary,
U.P.
as
well
as
Additional
Chief
Secretary
(Home) U.P., for information and
necessary compliance.
----------

(2024) 7 ILRA 1240
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.07.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

First Appeal from Order Defective No. 425 of
2013

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
 ...Respondent
7 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
1241
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Rishi Kumar, Sri R.K. Chaubey, Sri S.K.
Mehrotra

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Mohd. Arish, Sri Ashish Mishra, Sri Ambrish
Shukla

A.
Civil
Law-(The
Arbitration
&
Conciliation Act, 1996-Section 37)- The
time limit for filing appeals under Section 37 is
90 days, and a delay can only be condoned up
to a period of 30 days, an appeal filed after 120
days, no matter how sufficient the cause for
delay is, cannot be allowed
under any
circumstance by the Court. The rationale behind
such stringent timelines is rooted in the
principles of finality and efficiency, which are
paramount in arbitration. The limitation period
serves as a deterrent against undue delays and
encourages parties to act promptly, thereby
ensuring that the arbitration process remains
expeditious.

B. By setting a clear and rigid timeframe, the
law seeks to prevent the arbitration process
from becoming protracted and bogged down by
procedural delays, which would undermine its
core advantage over traditional litigation. This
approach aligns with the broader legislative
intent to make arbitration a preferred method of
dispute resolution by offering a faster and more
efficient alternative to court proceedings. The
90-day period, followed by a maximum 30-day
extension for condonation of delay, is thus a
carefully calibrated timeframe that balances the
need for promptness with a limited degree of
flexibility to accommodate genuine hardships.
(Para 10, 11 & 18)

Appeal dismissed as time barred. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:-

1.N.V. International Vs St. of Assam (2020) 2
SCC 109

2.St. of Mah. Vs Borse Bros. Engineers &
Contractors (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 460

3.Esha Agarwal & ors. Vs Ram Niranjan Ruia
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 98
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. This is an application under Section
37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act')
preferred against the order dated August 1,
2012 passed by the District Judge, Agra.

FACTS

2. I have laid down the factual
matrix of the instant lis below:

a.
An
agreement
was
entered into by the State of Uttar
Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Appellant No. 1') and M/s
Harish Chandra India Limited
(hereinafter referred to as the
'Respondent') for 'excavation of
foundation of supporting structures
of second stage pump house of
Chambal
Dal
Project,
Pinahat
Agra'.
b. Disputes and differences
arose
between
the
parties
in
relation to the aforesaid agreement
which were referred to arbitration.
The Arbitrator gave an award of
Rs. 67,42,240/- in favour of the
Respondent on July 19, 2009. If the
award remained unpaid beyond
four months from the date of
delivery of the award, the same was
to carry simple interest @ 16%
from the date of award to the date
of actual payment.
c. On May 17, 2010, the
Appellants filed an application
under Section 34 of the Act
challenging the aforesaid award
dated July 19, 2009 along with an
application for condonation of
delay under Section 5 read with
Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
1242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1963 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Limitation Act').
d. The District Judge, Agra
vide order dated August 1, 2012
rejected the application filed by the
Appellants under Section 5 read
with Article 137 of the Limitation
Act along with the application
under Section 34 of the Act.
e. Aggrieved by the order
dated
August
1,
2012,
the
Appellants
have
preferred
the
instant appeal under Section 37 of
the Act before this Court on March
13, 2013.

CONTENTIONS
BY
THE
APPELLANTS

3. Learned counsel appearing for
the Appellants has made the following
submissions before this Court:

a. Delay if any is beyond
the control and is procedural in
natural. The delay is not deliberate
and intentional and is liable to be
condoned in the interest of justice.
b.
In
the
facts
and
circumstances,
it
is
therefore
necessary in the interest of justice
that this Court may be pleased to
condone the delay filing the instant
appeal before this Court and treat
the same within time.

CONCLUSION
AND
ANALYSIS

4. I have heard the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and perused the
materials on record.

5. It is evident from the factual
matrix of the instant appeal that the same
has been filed with a delay of more than
120 days. The impugned order was passed
on August 1, 2012 while the instant appeal
has been filed on March 13, 2013 that is
beyond the period of 120 days.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
N.V. International v. State of Assam
reported in (2020) 2 SCC 109 espoused on
the period of limitation for filing of an
appeal under Section 37 of the Act.
Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

"3. Having
heard
the
learned counsel for both sides, we
may observe that the matter is no
longer res integra. In Union of
India v. Varindera
Constructions
Ltd. [Union of India v. Varindera
Constructions Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC
111] , this Court, by its judgment
and order dated 17-9-2018 [Union
of India v. Varindera Constructions
Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 111] held thus:
"1. Heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties.
2. By a judgment dated 194-2018
in Union
of
India v. Varindera
Constructions
Ltd. [Union of India v. Varindera
Constructions Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC
794] , this Court has in near
identical facts and circumstances
allowed the appeal of the Union of
India in a proceeding arising from
an arbitral award.
3. Ordinarily, we would
have applied the said judgment to
this case as well. However, we find
that the impugned Division Bench
judgment dated 10-4-2013 [Union
of India v. Varindera Constructions
Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 6511]
has dismissed the appeal filed by
the Union of India on the ground of
7 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
1243
delay. The delay was found to be
142 days in filing the appeal and
103 days in refiling the appeal. One
of the important points made by the
Division Bench is that, apart from
the fact that there is no sufficient
cause made out in the grounds of
delay,
since
a
Section
34
application has to be filed within a
maximum period of 120 days
including the grace period of 30
days, an appeal filed from the
selfsame proceeding under Section
37 should be covered by the same
drill.
4. Given the fact that an
appellate
proceeding
is
a
continuation
of
the
original
proceeding, as has been held
in Lachmeshwar
Prasad
Shukul v. Keshwar
Lal
Chaudhuri [Lachmeshwar Prasad
Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri,
1940 SCC OnLine FC 10 : AIR
1941 FC 5] , and repeatedly
followed by our judgments, we feel
that any delay beyond 120 days in
the filing of an appeal under
Section 37 from an application
being either dismissed or allowed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 should
not be allowed as it will defeat the
overall
statutory
purpose
of
arbitration
proceedings
being
decided with utmost despatch.
5. In this view of the matter,
since even the original appeal was
filed with a delay period of 142
days, we are not inclined to
entertain
these
special
leave
petitions on the facts of this
particular case. The special leave
petitions
stand
disposed
of
accordingly.
Pending
applications,
if
any, also stand disposed of."
4. We may only add that
what we have done in the aforesaid
judgment is to add to the period of
90 days, which is provided by
statute for filing of appeals under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, a
grace period of 30 days under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act by
following Lachmeshwar
Prasad
Shukul [Lachmeshwar
Prasad
Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri,
1940 SCC OnLine FC 10 : AIR
1941 FC 5] , as also having regard
to the object of speedy resolution of
all arbitral disputes which was
uppermost in the minds of the
framers of the 1996 Act, and which
has been strengthened from time to
time by amendments made thereto.
The present delay being beyond
120 days is not liable, therefore, to
be condoned.

7. In State of Maharashtra v.
Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P)
Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded that a
delay under the Act can only be condoned
by way of an exception and not by way of
rule. Relevant paragraph is extracted
herein:

"63. Given the aforesaid
and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under
the
Arbitration
Act
and
the
Commercial
Courts
Act,
for
appeals filed under Section 37 of
the
Arbitration
Act
that
are
governed by Articles 116 and 117 of
the Limitation Act or Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or
1244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
60 days, respectively, is to be
condoned by way of exception and
not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted
bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such
period can, in the discretion of the
court, be condoned, always bearing
in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party
may have acquired both in equity
and justice, what may now be lost
by
the
first
party's
inaction,
negligence or laches."

8. What emerges from the wisdom
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that being
a legislation for speedy disposal delay
under the Act can only be condoned if
sufficient cause is made out and not
otherwise. The principle that delays in
arbitration matters under the Act can only
be condoned on sufficient cause and as an
exception is rooted in the very essence of
why arbitration is chosen as a method of
dispute resolution. The need for timely
resolution is paramount in arbitration,
especially given its primary objective to
provide a faster and more efficient
alternative to traditional litigation. The Act
was legislated with the intent to streamline
the process, minimize court interference,
and facilitate quick resolution of disputes,
particularly in commercial contexts where
time is often a critical factor. Delaying
arbitration
can
have
profound
consequences,
disrupting
business
operations, causing financial loss, and
undermining the trust in the arbitration
process. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India, through various landmark judgments,
has
underscored
that
the
timelines
prescribed under the Act are to be adhered
to strictly.

9. Arbitration is designed to be a
time-efficient
process,
which
is
a
significant advantage over traditional court
proceedings that are often bogged down by
procedural formalities and backlogs. This
efficiency is crucial in the commercial
world, where prolonged disputes can lead
to uncertainty, financial losses, and a
significant waste of resources. The Act
aims to provide a framework that ensures
disputes are resolved swiftly, reducing the
time parties spend in litigation and
allowing them to focus on their business
operations. By setting strict timelines, the
Act seeks to prevent the arbitration process
from becoming as protracted as court cases.
However, the Act also recognizes that there
can be genuine circumstances where
adhering to these timelines might not be
possible. In such cases, the provision for
condoning delays exists, but it is clearly
stated that this can only happen if sufficient
cause is shown. This balance between
rigidity and flexibility ensures that while
the process remains fast, it does not
become unjustly stringent.

10. The term "sufficient cause" is
not explicitly defined in the Act, which
means its interpretation has largely been
shaped by judicial pronouncements. In
general, sufficient cause refers to a
legitimate reason that prevents a party from
acting within the prescribed time limits.
This reason must be beyond the control of
the party and not due to negligence or
inaction.
Courts,
when
determining
whether sufficient cause exists, consider
various factors such as the nature of the
delay, the reasons provided, the conduct of
the parties, the impact of the delay on the
arbitration process and the other party, and
whether the delay was beyond the control
of the party seeking condonation.
7 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
1245
11. However, since the time limit
for filing appeals under Section 37 of the
Act is 90 days, and a delay can only be
condoned up to a period of 30 days, an
appeal filed after 120 days, no matter how
sufficient the cause for delay is, cannot be
allowed under any circumstance by the
Court. The rationale behind such stringent
timelines is rooted in the principles of finality
and efficiency, which are paramount in
arbitration. The limitation period serves as a
deterrent
against
undue
delays
and
encourages parties to act promptly, thereby
ensuring that the arbitration process remains
expeditious. By setting a clear and rigid
timeframe, the law seeks to prevent the
arbitration process from becoming protracted
and bogged down by procedural delays,
which would undermine its core advantage
over traditional litigation. This approach
aligns with the broader legislative intent to
make arbitration a preferred method of
dispute resolution by offering a faster and
more
efficient
alternative
to
court
proceedings. The 90-day period, followed by
a
maximum
30-day
extension
for
condonation of delay, is thus a carefully
calibrated timeframe that balances the need
for promptness with a limited degree of
flexibility
to
accommodate
genuine
hardships.

12. In the instant case, the
Appellants had filed the instant appeal
under Section 37 of the Act on March 13,
2013 while the impugned order was passed
on August 1, 2012. There is a delay of 224
days in filing the instant appeal which is
beyond the prescribed period of 90 days,
and also the extendable period of 30 days,
and thus the instant appeal sacrifices itself
on the altar of limitation.

13. For the sake of argument, even
otherwise, if the instant appeal had been
filed within the time period, the same
would have failed on merits since the
application under Section 34 of the Act
filed by the Appellants was evidently time
barred and as such was rightly dismissed by
the District Judge, Agra.

14. While the award in the instant
case was passed on July 19, 2009, the
application under Section 34 of the Act was
filed only on May 17, 2010 that is beyond
the statutory time limit.

15. The District Judge, Agra had
squarely dealt with the issue of limitation in
its order dated August 1, 2012 as follows:

"I am not in agreement
with the submission of the learned
counsel for the applicants because
the said Act is applicable to those
proceedings where no limitation is
provided.
On the contrary, under
Section 34 (3) of the Act, the
following law has been embodied
to make it clear:-
"34(3). An application for
setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the
date on which the party making
that application had received the
arbitral award or, if a request had
been made under Section 33, from
the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court
is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from
making the application within the
said period of three months it may
entertain the application within a
further period of thirty days, but
not thereafter."
1246 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The Hon'ble Apex Court in
'A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 4010,
Union of India vs. M/s Popular
Construction
Co.'
dealt
the
situation in detail and has observed
as under:-
"The provisions of Section
5 Limitation Act, 1963, are not
applicable
to
an
application
challenging
an
award,
under
Section 34 and as such there was
no scope for assessing sufficiency
of the cause for the delay beyond
the period prescribed in proviso to
Section 34. The crucial words in
Section 34 are 'but not thereafter'
used in the proviso to sub- section
(3). This phrase would amount to
an express exclusion within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation
Act
and
would,
therefore, bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament
did not need to go further. To hold
that the Court could entertain an
application to set aside the Award
beyond the extended period under
the proviso would render the
phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly
otiose. Apart from the language,
'express exclusion' may follow from
the scheme and object of the
special or local law. The history
and scheme of the 1996 Act support
the conclusion that the time limit
prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an Award is absolute and
unextendable
by
Court
under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
It
has
been
further
observed as under:-
"By virtue of Section 34(1),
recourse to the court against an
arbitral award cannot be made
beyond the period prescribed. The
importance of the period fixed
under Section 34 is emphasized by
the provision of Section 36. It is a
significant
departure
from
the
provisions of the Arbitration Act,
1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the
time to set aside the award expired,
the court was required to "proceed
to pronounce judgment according
to the award and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree
shall follow." Now the consequence
of the time expiring under Section
34 of the 1996 Act is that the award
becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the court.
If there were any residual doubt on
the interpretation of the language
used in Section 34, the scheme of
the 1996 Act would resolve the
issue in favour of curtailment of the
court's powers by the exclusion of
the operation of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act."
The above observation of
the Hon'ble Apex Court makes it
clear
that
Section
5
of
the
Limitation Act is not applicable to
these proceedings and that they are
to be governed by section 34(3) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
In the circumstances, the
application to condone the delay in
filing the objections against the
arbitral Award is not legally
maintainable and this court is not
competent to condone the delay
occasioned in filing the objections
against the arbitral Award.
Coming to the factual side
of the controversy, it is evident that
the delay has occasioned due to the
latches and inaction and lethargy
of the applicant himself. They had
7 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
1247
the knowledge of the award within
time but failed to file the petition in
time rather they wasted their time
in consultation and departmental
proceedings.
In the circumstances, the
application 4C under Section 5
read with Article 137 of the
Limitation Act is liable to be
rejected
and
is
rejected
accordingly."

16. In Esha Agarwal and Ors. -v-
Ram Niranjan Ruia reported in 2023
SCC OnLine Cal 98, I had dealt with the
question of limitation under Section 34(3)
of the Act as follows:

"6. The
question
of
limitation takes centre stage in the
present application and needs to be
adjudicated
upon
first
and
foremost. With respect to limitation
for filing a challenge to an arbitral
award,
Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,
1996 provides
that
an
application
under
the
section
cannot be made after 'three months
have elapsed from the date on
which
the
party
making
that
application
had
received
the
arbitral award'. The courts can
condone the delay within a further
period of thirty days, provided
sufficient cause is present, but not
'thereafter'. I believe the term
'thereafter' used in the section does
not need any further interpretation.
A plain reading of the said section
and the proviso makes it as clear as
the sky on a summer morning that
courts cannot condone a delay
beyond the extendable period of
thirty days provided in the section.
7. It is necessary at this
point to make reference to the
recent decision of the apex court
in Mahindra
and
Mahindra
Financial
Services
Limited v. Maheshbhai
Tinabhai
Rathod reported in (2022) 4 SCC
162 wherein the restricted scope of
the courts' power to condone the
delay in case of an application
under Section 34 was reiterated by
the
Supreme
Court.
Relevant
portions have been extracted below
-
9. The scope available for
condonation of delay being selfcontained in the proviso to Section
34(3)
and
Section 5 of
the Limitation
Act not
being
applicable has been taken note by
this Court in its earlier decisions,
which we may note. In Union of
India v. Popular Construction Co.
[Union
of
India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC
470] it has been held as hereunder:
"12. As far as the language
of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are
"but not thereafter" used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our
opinion, this phrase would amount
to an express exclusion within the
meaning
of
Section 29(2) of
the Limitation
Act,
and
would
therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did
not need to go further. To hold that
the
court
could
entertain
an
application to set aside the award
beyond the extended period under
the proviso, would render the phrase
"but not thereafter" wholly otiose.
No principle of interpretation would
justify such a result.
1248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
14. Here the history and
scheme of the 1996 Act support the
conclusion
that
the
time-limit
prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and
unextendible
by
court
under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
Arbitration and Conciliation Bill,
1995 which preceded the 1996 Act
stated as one of its main objectives
the
need
"to
minimise
the
supervisory role of courts in the
arbitral process" [Para 4(v) of the
Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.]. This objective has
found expression in Section 5 of the
Act which prescribes the extent of
judicial
intervention
in
no
uncertain terms:
'5.
Extent
of
judicial
intervention.-Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in
matters governed by this Part, no
judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in this
Part.'
16. Furthermore, Section
34(1) itself provides that recourse
to a court against an arbitral
award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such
award "in accordance with" subsection (2) and sub-section (3).
Subsection (2) relates to grounds
for setting aside an award and is
not relevant for our purposes. But
an application filed beyond the
period mentioned in Section 34,
subsection (3) would not be an
application "in accordance with"
that sub-section. Consequently by
virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to
the court against an arbitral award
cannot be made beyond the period
prescribed. The importance of the
period fixed under Section 34 is
emphasised by the provisions of
Section 36 which reads as under:
'36.
Enforcement.-Where
the time for making an application
to set aside the arbitral award
under Section 34 has expired ... the
award shall be enforced under
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5
of 1908) in the same manner as if it
were a decree of the Court.'
This
is
a
significant
departure from the provisions of
the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under
the 1940 Act, after the time to set
aside the award expired, the court
was
required
to "proceed
to
pronounce judgment according to
the award, and upon the judgment
so pronounced a decree shall
follow" (Section 17). Now the
consequence of the time expiring
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
that
the
award
becomes
immediately enforceable without
any further act of the court. If there
were any residual doubt on the
interpretation of the language used
in Section 34, the scheme of the
1996 Act would resolve the issue in
favour of curtailment of the court's
powers by the exclusion of the
operation
of
Section 5 of
the Limitation Act.'
8. While
I
express
my
sympathy towards the petitioner, my
judicial hands are curtailed by the
law, as mentioned above. There is
no runway of merit for the present
application to land on. The present
application has been filed forty-two
days after the prescribed period of
limitation under the Act, and given
7 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd.
1249
that the court has the power to
condone a delay of only up to thirty
days, the present application fails
and is bound to be sacrificed at the
altar of limitation."

17. What is evident is that the
language used in Section 34(3) of the Act
leaves no room for condoning the delay
beyond
what
is
permissible.
The
Applicants' application under Section 34 of
the Act having been filed beyond the
statutory
limitation
period
(prescribed
period of 3 months + extendable period of
30 days) could not have been admitted by
the District Judge, Agra. Therefore, even on
merits, the Appellants had no case before
this Court.

18. In light of the aforesaid, the
instant appeal under Section 37 of the Act
is dismissed as time barred. There shall be
no order as to the costs.

19. Before I part with this
judgment, I would like to sound a word of
caution.

20. The government often cites
bureaucratic and procedural delays as
reasons for not filing an appeal within the
prescribed time limits. While these reasons
might seem compelling due to the complex
and
often
cumbersome
nature
of
governmental operations, the law applies to
all parties in the same manner, and any
delay by the government cannot be treated
as special or condoned beyond what is
permissible under the Act. This principle is
crucial for maintaining the rule of law,
ensuring equality before the law, and
preserving the integrity and efficiency of
the arbitration process. The idea that the
government
should
not
be
given
preferential treatment in legal matters is
fundamental to the concept of justice,
which dictates that all parties, regardless of
their status or resources, must adhere to the
same
legal
standards
and
timelines.
Bureaucratic and procedural delays are a
common issue within government bodies
due to various factors such as the
hierarchical decision-making processes, the
need for multiple approvals, and the often
extensive
internal
review
procedures.
While these factors can indeed slow down
the process of filing appeals, they cannot be
accepted as valid reasons for extending the
statutory time limits prescribed under the
Act. The law is designed to ensure that
arbitration remains a swift and efficient
method of dispute resolution, and allowing
exceptions for governmental delays would
undermine this objective.

21. The justice system is based on
the notion that all individuals and entities,
regardless of their status, should be treated
equally. Granting the government special
privileges in the form of extended time
limits would violate this principle and
create a perception of bias. Such a
perception
could
undermine
public
confidence in the legal system, as it would
suggest that the government is above the
law and not subject to the same rules as
everyone else. Treating government delays
differently
would
set
a
dangerous
precedent. If the courts were to condone
delays by the government based on
bureaucratic and procedural reasons, it
would open the door for other parties to
seek similar leniency, thereby eroding the
strict timelines established by the Act. This
would defeat the purpose of having a clear
and rigid timeframe for filing appeals and
could lead to a significant increase in
delayed appeals, ultimately undermining
the efficiency and finality of the arbitration
process.
1250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
22. While the government may
face certain administrative and procedural
challenges, it must take adequate measures
to ensure that appeals are filed within the
prescribed time limits. Private parties, who
often operate with fewer resources and less
bureaucratic infrastructure than government
entities, are required to comply with the
same strict timelines. If the government
were allowed to bypass these timelines due
to internal delays, it would place private
parties
at
a
distinct
disadvantage,
undermining the principle of fairness that is
central to the arbitration process. This
would also create an environment where
private parties might lose faith in the
arbitration process, viewing it as biased in
favor of the government.

23. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the government to create a specialized
procedure to expedite the filing of appeals
within the prescribed time period. It is the
taxpayers' money that the government deals
with, and such a cavalier and lackadaisical
approach in preferring appeals cannot be
allowed. The efficient handling of legal
matters, including the timely filing of
appeals, is a crucial aspect of governance
that directly impacts public trust and the
proper utilization of public resources.
Given the significant volume of legal cases
that government departments and agencies
are involved in, it is essential that the
government establishes robust mechanisms
to
ensure
compliance
with
statutory
timelines, particularly under the Act.

24. One of the key elements of
such specialized procedures could be the
creation of dedicated legal teams within
each government department. These teams
can be responsible for monitoring legal
matters and ensuring that all necessary
actions, including the filing of appeals, are
taken within the prescribed time limits. By
having a dedicated team in place, the
government can ensure that there is a clear
line of accountability and that legal matters
are handled with the urgency they deserve.
These teams should consist of experienced
legal professionals who are well-versed in
the relevant laws and procedures. They
should also have the authority to make
quick decisions and act promptly to avoid
unnecessary delays.

25. In addition to dedicated legal
teams,
the
government
could
also
implement robust tracking and monitoring
systems to oversee the progress of legal
cases. These systems could provide realtime updates on the status of each case,
including key deadlines and any actions
that need to be taken. By having a
centralized
tracking
system,
the
government can ensure that all stakeholders
are aware of the critical timelines and can
take timely action to comply with them.
Such systems can also help identify any
potential bottlenecks or delays in the
process, allowing for swift corrective
action to be taken.

26. Furthermore, the government
can also establish clear guidelines and
protocols for the handling of legal matters.
These guidelines should outline the steps
that need to be taken at each stage of the
process, including the filing of appeals, and
should provide clear instructions on how to
comply with statutory timelines. By having
standardized procedures in place, the
government can reduce the risk of errors
and ensure that all legal matters are handled
in a consistent and efficient manner. These
guidelines can also include provisions for
regular
training
and
capacity-building
programs for government officials involved
in legal matters, ensuring that they are fully
7 All. State of U.P. Vs. Rajdeo Singh & Ors.
1251
aware of their responsibilities and the
importance
of
adhering
to
statutory
deadlines.

27. Accordingly, a direction is
issued upon the Principal Secretary (Law),
Government of Uttar Pradesh, to take
necessary steps, in order to avoid the filing
of appeals beyond the statutory time limits,
by
the
Government.
The
Principal
Secretary (Law) is also directed to submit a
report before this Court on the action taken
in this regard within 6 months from the
date of this judgment. The Principal
Secretary (Law) may take assistance of a
committee of experts as may be required.

28. Registrar (Compliance) is
directed to communicate this order to the
Principal Secretary (Law) forthwith.
----------
(2024) 7 ILRA 1251
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.07.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJIV GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE SURENDRA SINGH-I, J.

Government Appeal No. 3087 of 1986

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Rajdeo Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
A.G.A., G.D. Mekavi

Counsel for the Respondent:
Uttar Kumar Goswami, Pulak Ganguly, Ravi
Bhushan Singh, Sharda Chauhan, Praveen
Kumar Singh

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 147, 148, 149, 395, 436, 323,
325 & 506 - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Sections 82, 83, 145,
161 & 313 - Appeal against acquittal -
According to prosecution case, deceased
was going to his School, respondents
assaulted him - Incident witnessed by
P.W.-1, P.W.-2 - Gun used for attracting
witnesses, two shots fired, no injury
caused to deceased, injuries are lathi
injuries - P.W.-2, reached house of
deceased for complaining about damage,
not earlier mentioned, first time in court -
P.W.-2
reached
place
of
incident
alongwith P.W.-1, highly doubtful, showed
himself as an eyewitness - Pending civil
and criminal litigations, enmity between
respondents and family of deceased -
P.W.-1, highly inimical and interested
witness, chances of false implication of
respondents
can't
be
ruled
out
-
Testimony
of
P.W.-1
suffers
from
inconsistencies,
embellishments
-
FIR
lodged by P.W.-1 himself, in his testimony,
he denied the version, but narrated as his
father told him after the incident - Not
mentioned in FIR - In the entire testimony
of P.W.-1, bringing police constables at
his
house,
action
taken
by
police
personnels,
not
explained
by
him,
police
constables
has
not
been
examined - P.W.-1 St.d assailants after
assaulting
his
father,
looted
jewelleries, set house on fire - Before
trial court, he St.d that this was not
personally viewed by him, but narrated
to him by his sister-in-law, mother and
father, not mentioned in FIR - Postmortem
report
doesn't
corroborate
prosecution
story
- After
receiving
injuries, particularly on head, difficult
to believe that on narration of incident
given by injured, the prosecution case
has been developed as St.d by PW-1 -
Ornaments not disclosed nor recovered
during investigation. (Para 61, 64, 68,
71, 76, 77, 79, 83, 84, 97, 100, 101)

Appeal dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Darshan Singh Vs St. of Pun., (2024) 3 SCC
164