# State of U.P. & Ors v. Mahendra Paliwal & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 286
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-17
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 703 of 2024
- **Bench:** Siddhartha Varma, Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-mahendra-paliwal-anr-54562
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - Allahabad High Court Rules,
1952 - Chapter VIII - Rule 5 - Uttar
Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Junior
High
Schools)
(Recruitment
and
Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules,
1978 - Rule 10 & 10(1) - Intra court Appeal
- a sanctioned post of Assistant Teacher
(English) fell vacant at Junior High School - The
Committee of Management sought permission -
3 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Paliwal & Anr.
287
granted by the Basic Education Officer -
Advertisement
-
recruitment
initiated
-
candidates applied - after the selection process,
name of the petitioner/respondent no. 1 was
recommended by selection committee - The
Basic Education Officer declined approval for the
selection, citing non-compliance with Rule 10 of
Rules,
1978
-
The
rule
required
the
recommendation of three candidates, but only
two
names
were
forwarded
-
petitioner
challenged this decision - writ allowed -
application of Legal Maxims - "Doctrine of
impossibility - "Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia"
(the law does not compel the impossible) and
"Nemo Tenetur Ad Impossibilia" (no one is
bound to do the impossible) - court finds that, -
the rule is directory, not mandatory, and the
Government Order in question was issued much
after
the
Advertisement,
therefore
not
applicable in the case, therefore, it was
impossible for the Committee of Management to
have sent the names of more than 3 candidates as
only one candidate had turned up for the interview
- held, the special appeal was dismissed as the
earlier judgment had not been challenged, and the
propositions of law laid down in it were accepted
by the St. - hence, court upheld the validity of the
selection process - appeal dismissed, accordingly.
(Para - 11, 12, 13)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
forwarded to the Committee, but the same
was returned only on the ground of delayed
submission.

3. It is submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner
being a widow, the authority ought to have
taken a pragmatic view of the matter
inasmuch as husband of the petitioner
having died during treatment, the widow
was badly shocked and could recover after
sometime only.

4. From the perusal of the letter
dated 17.12.2024, I find that the petitioner's
claim for reimbursement has been returned
only on the ground that it was not be
submitted within 90 days period prescribed
under the Rules.

5. In my considered view, if an
employee has died during treatment, his
wife/heirs should not be harassed for
technical
reasons.
Such
a
rule
that
prescribes for submitting medical bills for
reimbursement may at times be put to strict
compliance where employee is alive but in
case of heirs where employee has died
during treatment, such rules should not be
permitted
to
come
in
the
way
of
reimbursement of genuine claims of
medical bills. The provision is liable to be
held directory in nature.

6. I may further observe that where
an employee and his heirs are entitled to
certain incidental benefits of service, delay
can not be permitted to operate as bar by
applying law of limitation. No provision is
placed before this Court that claims for
reimbursement after 90 days shall be liable
to be rejected compulsorily. Thus reason
given by the authorities in returning the
medical bills, therefore as such, cannot be
countenanced.
7. In view of what has been
observed and held above, this Court hereby
directs petitioner to submit again the
medical
bills
before
the
Executive
Engineer,
Public
Works
Department,
Raebareilly within a period of four weeks,
and in the event medical bills are submitted
as directed hereinabove, the concerned
respondent, this time, shall clear the same
as per relevant rules by taking appropriate
decision within a period of two weeks from
the date of presentation of medical
reimbursement bills.

8. This petition stands disposed of
as above.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 286
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE MS. NAND PRABHA SHUKLA, J.

Special Appeal No. 703 of 2024

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Mahendra Paliwal & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
S.C., Tej Bhanu Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Kunal Shah, Prabhakar Awasthi, Shailendra
Kumar Gupta

Civil Law - Allahabad High Court Rules,
1952 - Chapter VIII - Rule 5 - Uttar
Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Junior
High
Schools)
(Recruitment
and
Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules,
1978 - Rule 10 & 10(1) - Intra court Appeal
- a sanctioned post of Assistant Teacher
(English) fell vacant at Junior High School - The
Committee of Management sought permission -
3 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Paliwal & Anr.
287
granted by the Basic Education Officer -
Advertisement
-
recruitment
initiated
-
candidates applied - after the selection process,
name of the petitioner/respondent no. 1 was
recommended by selection committee - The
Basic Education Officer declined approval for the
selection, citing non-compliance with Rule 10 of
Rules,
1978
-
The
rule
required
the
recommendation of three candidates, but only
two
names
were
forwarded
-
petitioner
challenged this decision - writ allowed -
application of Legal Maxims - "Doctrine of
impossibility - "Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia"
(the law does not compel the impossible) and
"Nemo Tenetur Ad Impossibilia" (no one is
bound to do the impossible) - court finds that, -
the rule is directory, not mandatory, and the
Government Order in question was issued much
after
the
Advertisement,
therefore
not
applicable in the case, therefore, it was
impossible for the Committee of Management to
have sent the names of more than 3 candidates as
only one candidate had turned up for the interview
- held, the special appeal was dismissed as the
earlier judgment had not been challenged, and the
propositions of law laid down in it were accepted
by the St. - hence, court upheld the validity of the
selection process - appeal dismissed, accordingly.
(Para - 11, 12, 13)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Neelima Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. reported in
AIR 2021 SC 3884 Nishith Rai v. St. of U.P.:
(2018) 3 All.L.J. 683,

2. Smt. Rani Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation
reported in 1959 RD 102 : AIR 1959 ALL 525,

3. St. of M.P. Vs Narmada Bachao Andolan &
anr. reported in AIR 2011 SC 1989.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.
&

Hon'ble Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, J.)

1. When in the institution known by
the name of the Junior High School, Sayer,
Maudaha, District - Hamirpur, a sanctioned
post of assistant teacher in the subject in
English fell vacant, the Committee of
Management had sought the permission of
the Basic Education Officer to initiate the
proceedings for recruitment on the said
post. The permission for recruiting on the
post of assistant teacher was granted vide
order
dated
18.5.2018.
In
pursuance
thereof, advertisements were issued in
newspapers having wide circulation on
23.5.2018. The petitioner/respondent no.1
along with other candidates applied for
interview and after a due process of
selection,
the
petitioner's
name
was
recommended
for
selection
vide
recommendation dated 12.3.2019. The
select committee, comprising the principal
of the school, Manager of the Committee of
Management of the Institution and the
Block Education Officer, who was the
nominee of the Basic Education Officer,
had made the necessary recommendation.
However, when the Basic Education
Officer had declined on 23rd November,
2021, to grant the approval of the selection
of the petitioner/respondent no.1 on the
ground that the process of selection as was
adopted by the Selection Committee was
contrary to the provisions of Rule 10(1) of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Recognised
Basic
Schools
(Junior
High
Schools)
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service of
Teachers) Rules, 1978, (hereinafter referred
to as "the Rules of 1978) stating that only
two names were recommended in the panel
of selected candidates by the Select
Committee instead of 3 names as was
mandatorily provided in the Rule 10 of the
Rules of 1978, Writ - A No. 404 of 2022
(Mahendra Paliwal vs. State of U.P. & 4
others) was filed.

2. The procedure for selection is
provided in Rule 10 (1) of the Rules of
288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1978 and since the learned counsel for the
appellants took the Court through the Rule
10 of the Rules of 1978, it is being
reproduced here as under:-

"10. Procedure for selection. (1)
The Selection Committee shall, after
interviewing such candidates as appear
before it on a date to be fixed by it in this
behalf, of which due intimation shall be
given to all the candidates, prepare a list
containing as far as possible the names, in
order of preference, of three candidates
found to be suitable for appointment.

(2) The list prepared under
clause (1), shall also contain particulars
regarding the date of birth, academic
qualifications and teaching experience of
the candidates and shall be signed by all
the members of the Selection Committee.

(3) The Selection Committee
shall, as soon as possible, forward such
list, together with the minutes of the
proceedings of the Committee to the
management.

(4) The Manager shall within one
week from the date of receipt of the papers
under clause (3) send a copy of the list to
the District Basic Education Officer.

(5) (i) If the District Basic
Education Officer is satisfied that-

(a) the candidates recommended
by the Selection Committee possess the
minimum qualifications prescribed for the
post;

(b) the procedure laid down in
the rules for the selection of Headmaster or
assistant teacher, as the case may be, has
been followed he shall accord approval to
the recommendations made by the Selection
Committee and shall communicate his
decision to the management within two
weeks from the date of receipt of the papers
under clause (4).

(ii)
If
the
District
Basic
Education Officer is not satisfied as
aforesaid, he shall return the papers to the
management with the direction that the
matter shall be reconsidered by the
Selection Committee.

(iii)
If
the
District
Basic
Education Officer does not communicate
his decision within one month from the date
of receipt of the papers under clause (4), he
shall be deemed to have accorded approval
to the recommendations made by the
Selection Committee."

3. The writ petition i.e. Writ - A No.
404 of 2022 was after the exchange of
affidavits
allowed
vide
order
dated
11.7.2022,
whereby
the
order
dated
23.11.2021 was quashed and a mandamus
was issued to the District Basic Education
Officer to revisit the issue pertaining to the
grant of approval of the petitioner's
selection. After the matter was remanded
back, the Basic Education Officer once
again decided the issue afresh and by an
order
dated
14.11.2022
once
again
disapproved the appointment as was made
by the Committee of Management of the
Institution. The petitioner again, therefore,
filed Writ - A No. 19311 of 2023
challenging the order dated 14.11.2022.
When that writ petition on 10.1.2024 was
allowed, the instant Special Appeal has
been filed by the State of U.P. and others
essentially on the following two grounds:-

i. As per the Rule 10 of the Rules
of 1978, the Selection Committee after
3 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Paliwal & Anr.
289
interviewing the candidates who had
appeared before it had to intimate the
District Basic Education Officer by means
of a select list which had to contain as far
as possible, in order of preference, the
names of three candidates who were found
to be suitable for the appointment on the
vacant post.

Learned Standing Counsel who
appeared for the appellants stated that the
language of the Rule 10 of the Rules of
1978 was mandatory in nature and that if
less than three names were sent then it
would nullify the entire selection process.

ii. Learned counsel for the
appellants Sri Tej Bhanu Pandey also
submitted that as per the Government order
dated 31.10.2019 since the entire process
had undergone a change, the appointment
as was made vis-a-vis the advertisement
dated 23.5.2018 could not be sustained in
the eyes of law.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner respondent Sri Kunal Shah,
however, opposed the Special Appeal and
supported the order of the learned Single
Judge. He submitted that the Special
Appeal was not at all maintainable as
earlier the High Court had, vide order dated
11.7.2022, already held that there was no
error in the procedure adopted by the
respondents in the writ petition. It was held
by the High Court that when only two
names were available with the Selection
Committee then despite their best efforts
"three names" could not have been sent
and, therefore, he had submitted that the
respondents in the Writ Petition once when
had accepted the judgment and order of the
High Court dated 11.7.2022 and had not
filed any Special Appeal etc. against it and
had also not filed any Appeal before the
Supreme Court then it was evident that the
State - Appellant which was the State of
U.P. had accepted the order of the learned
Single Judge along with all the propositions
of law as were laid down therein by it. He
submits that in the judgment and order of
the learned Single Judge dated 11.7.2022 it
was categorically held that the provisions
of Rule 10 of the Rules of 1978 were
directory in nature and not mandatory and
since on the date fixed for interview out of
7 candidates who had applied for selection
when only two candidates had appeared
including the petitioner then as per the Rule
10(1) of the Rules 1978, the Selection
Committee could have forwarded the
names of only two candidates who had
appeared for the interview before the
Selection
Committee.
He
submits,
therefore, that the concept of 'as far as
possible' stood fulfilled in the said
selection process with the recommendation
of the names of the two candidates.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants
to bolster his argument that the appellant
had forfeited his right to file the appeal
after it had accepted the judgement and
order of the learned Single Judge dated
11.7.2022 passed in Writ - A No. 404 of
2022, relied upon a judgement of the
Supreme Court in Neelima Srivastava vs.
State of U.P. reported in AIR 2021 SC
3884
and
specifically
relied
upon
paragraphs no. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36
and
therefore
the
same
are
being
reproduced here as under:

"31. The Division Bench of the
High Court proceeded as if it was hearing
an appeal against the judgment dated 23-12006 [Neelima Srivastava v. State of U.P.,
WP (SS) No. 7890 of 2003, order dated 231-2006 (All)] of the learned Single Judge
which had already attained finality. The
290 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal filed under the Rules of the Court
was filed against the judgment dated 15-52014 rendered in Neelima Srivastava v.
State of U.P. [Neelima Srivastava v. State
of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16618] It is
a well-settled principle of law that a letters
patent appeal which is in continuation of a
writ petition cannot be filed collaterally to
set aside the judgment of the same High
Court rendered in an earlier round of
litigation ignoring the principles of res
judicata and doctrine of finality.

32. By a majority, the decision in
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of
Maharashtra [Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v.
State of Maharashtra, 1966 SCC OnLine
SC 10 : AIR 1967 SC 1] has laid down the
law in this regard as under : (AIR p. 11,
para 38)

"38. ... When a Judge deals with
matters brought before him for his
adjudication, he first decides questions, of
fact on which the parties are at issue, and
then applies the relevant law to the said
facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded
by the Judge are right or wrong, and
whether the conclusion of law drawn by
him suffers from any infirmity, can be
considered and decided if the party
aggrieved by the decision of the Judge
takes the matter up before the appellate
court."

33. In Rupa Ashok Hurra v.
Ashok Hurra [Rupa Ashok Hurra v.
Ashok Hurra, (1999) 2 SCC 103] , while
dealing with an identical issue this Court
held that reconsideration of the judgment
of this Court which has attained finality
is not normally permissible. The decision
upon a question of law rendered by this
Court was conclusive and would bind the
Court in subsequent cases. The Court
cannot sit in appeal against its own
judgment.

34. In Union of India v. S.P.
Sharma [Union of India v. S.P. Sharma,
(2014) 6 SCC 351] , a three-Judge Bench
of this Court has held as under : (SCC p.
389, para 76)

"76. A decision rendered by a
competent court cannot be challenged in
collateral proceedings for the reason that
if it is permitted to do so there would be
'confusion and chaos and the finality of
proceedings would cease to have any
meaning'."

35. Thus, it is very well-settled
that it is not permissible for the parties to
reopen the concluded judgments of the
court as the same may not only
tantamount to an abuse of the process of
the court but would have far-reaching
adverse effect on the administration of
justice.

36. It is undisputed that in
compliance of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 15-5-2014
[Neelima Srivastava v. State of U.P.,
2014 SCC OnLine All 16618] vide order
dated
31-10-2015
the
respondents
regularised the services of the appellant
subject to the outcome of the proceedings
in the LPA and the appellant now stands
superannuated having attained the age of
superannuation after about 33 years of
continuous service."

6. Additionally, learned counsel for
the respondents submitted that the words
"as far as possible" as had been used in
Rule 10 of the Rules, 1978, definitely could
not specifically mandate the Selection
Committee to abandon the Selection if on
3 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Paliwal & Anr.
291
the date fixed for interview only two
candidates had appeared when 7 candidates
had been intimated to appear before the
selection committee.

7. Learned counsel for the petitionerrespondents states that the words "as far as
possible" would mean that the Selection
Committee had to stick to the principle of
sending of three names unless it was
impossible to send the names of three
candidates. In the instant case, learned
counsel submitted that since out of 7
persons who had been called for the
interview only two had appeared to face the
interview then it was impossible for the
Selection Committee to send the names of
three or more persons. Learned counsel for
the petitioner-respondents relied upon a
judgement of this Court in Smt. Rani vs.
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
reported in 1959 RD 102 : AIR 1959
ALL 525 to support this proposition of
law. The relevant portion of that judgement
is being reproduced here as under:-

" It is true that each one of the
sections contains the qualifying words "as
far as possible". This phrase really means
that the principles are to be observed
unless it is not possible to follow them in
the particular circumstances of a case.
This qualification was absolutely necessary
in view of the fact that the process of
compulsory consolidation is a very difficult
and complicated one in the peculiar
conditions
prevailing
in
this
State.
Fragmentation of holdings has, through a
process of centuries, reached such a stage
that there is no straight road back towards
consolidation. What can be done in one
village may not be possible in another.
Therefore, in view of the fact that
consolidation is a pressing necessity, it was
necessary to add these qualifying words. "

8. Learned counsel for the petitionerrespondent also elaborated on the concept
of "lex non cogit ad impossibilia" meaning
that the law does not compel a man to do
what he cannot possibly perform and also
relied upon the maxim "impossibillium
nulla obligatio est" (the law does not expect
a party to do the impossible). He still
further relied upon the maxim "Nemo
Tenetur ad Impossibilia" meaning that no
one is bound to do an impossibility. By
bringing to the notice of the Court the three
maxims, learned counsel for the petitionerrespondent essentially submitted that the
three maxims were such which meant that
the Selection Committee when had called
for 7 candidates for interview and when
only two appeared then it was absolutely
impossible to have sent more than two
names.

9. In this regard, learned counsel for
the petitioner also relied upon a judgement
of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan
and another reported in AIR 2011 SC
1989. From this judgment of the Supreme
Court, learned counsel for the petitioner
relied upon heavily on paragraphs no. 36,
38 and 39. The same are being reproduced
here as under:

"36. The Court cannot strike
down a policy decision taken by the
Government merely because it feels that
another decision would have been fairer or
more scientific or logical or wiser. The
wisdom and advisability of the policies are
ordinarily not amenable to judicial review
unless the policies are contrary to statutory
or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or
irrational or an abuse of power. (See Ram
Singh Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P.
[(2007) 6 SCC 44] , Villianur Iyarkkai
Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India
292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
[(2009) 7 SCC 561] and State of Kerala v.
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties [(2009) 8
SCC 46] .)

"As far as possible"

38.
The
aforesaid
phrase
provides
for
flexibility,
clothing
the
authority concerned with powers to meet
special situations where the normal process
of resolution cannot flow smoothly. The
aforesaid phrase can be interpreted as not
being prohibitory in nature. The said words
rather connote a discretion vested in the
prescribed authority. It is thus discretion
and not compulsion. There is no hard-andfast rule in this regard as these words give
a discretion to the authority concerned.
Once the authority exercises its discretion,
the court should not interfere with the said
discretion/decision unless it is found to be
palpably arbitrary. (Vide Iridium India
Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. [(2005) 2
SCC 145 : AIR 2005 SC 514] and High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Veena
Verma [(2009) 14 SCC 734 : (2010) 1 SCC
(L&S) 452 : AIR 2009 SC 2938] .) Thus, it
is evident that this phrase simply means
that the principles are to be observed
unless it is not possible to follow the same
in the particular circumstances of a case.

"Doctrine of impossibility"

39. The court has to consider
and understand the scope of application
of the doctrines of lex non cogit ad
impossibilia (the law does not compel a
man to do what he cannot possibly
perform); impossibilium nulla obligatio
est (the law does not expect a party to do
the impossible); and impotentia excusat
legem in the qualified sense that there is
a necessary or invincible disability to
perform the mandatory part of the law or
to forbear the prohibitory. These maxims
are akin to the maxim of Roman law
nemo tenetur ad impossibilia (no one is
bound to do an impossibility) which is
derived from common sense and natural
equity and has been adopted and applied
in law from time immemorial. Therefore,
when it appears that the performance of
the formalities prescribed by a statute
has
been
rendered
impossible
by
circumstances over which the persons
interested had no control, like an act of
God, the circumstances will be taken as a
valid excuse. (Vide Chandra Kishore Jha
v. Mahavir Prasad [(1999) 8 SCC 266 :
AIR 1999 SC 3558], Hira Tikkoo v. UT,
Chandigarh [(2004) 6 SCC 765 : AIR
2004 SC 3649] and HUDA v. Dr.
Babeswar Kanhar [(2005) 1 SCC 191 :
AIR 2005 SC 1491"].

10. So far as the second argument of
the
appellants
that
there
was
a
Government Order dated 31.10.2019
which had absolutely changed the method
of appointment, learned counsel for the
petitioner states that while the Writ - A
No. 404 of 2022 was being argued, the
State had given up that ground. The
relevant paragraph stating so is being
reproduced here as under:-

"Upon
consideration
of
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for parties and perusal of material on
record, it is evident that the respondents
have given up the ground that the selection
process was not in accordance with
government order dated 31st October,
2019. Moreover it is settled proposition of
law that any administrative of government
order issue would be applicable only
prospectively until and unless specifically
made retrospective. In the present case
since the advertisement was issued on 23rd
3 All. Registrar Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Rohilkhand University, Bareilly & Anr. Vs. Firoz Ahmad
 & Ors.
293
May, 2018, the respondents have rightly
given up the aforesaid proposition."

11. Learned counsel for the petitionerrespondent states that even if that argument
had not been given up, definitely the
advertisement was made on 23.5.2018 and
it was much before the date "31.10.2019"
that the selection process was initiated. He
also submitted that an administrative
government
order
could
only
be
prospectively
applied
unless
it
was
specifically made retrospective. In this
case, learned counsel for the petitionerrespondent submitted that the Government
Order
was
issued
much
after
the
advertisement and, therefore, under no
circumstance was the Government Order
applicable in the instant case.

12. Having heard the learned counsel
for the appellants and the learned counsel
for the respondent-petitioners, we are
definitely of the view that when the
advertisement was published on 23.5.2018
then the Government Order issued on
31.10.2019 could not have any effect on the
appointment process. What is more, we
find that the State had when the Writ A No.
404 of 2022 was being argued surrendered
this argument of theirs. So far as the
question with regard to there being three
names in the list which had to be sent by
the Selection Committee as per the Rule 10
of the Rules of 1978 was there, suffice it to
say that on the relevant date of interview,
out of 7 candidates who had been called
only two had appeared and, therefore,
nobody
under
any
law
could
have
compelled the Selection Committee to do
an impossible thing and that was to include
a 3rd name. The maxim "lex non cogit ad
impossibilia" and "Nemo Tenetur ad
Impossibilia" applied on all fours in the
instant case. Also, we are of the view that
when the proposition of law as had been
laid down in the judgment and order
dated11.7.2022 in Writ - A No. 404 of
2022 had not been assailed in any court of
law then that proposition could not be
challenged in this Special Appeal. We,
therefore, categorically hold that the instant
special appeal was not maintainable at all.

13. We also hold that it was
impossible
for
the
Committee
of
Management to have sent the names of
more than 3 candidates as only one
candidate had turned up for the interview.
That being the case, we are definitely of the
view that there is no merit in the special
appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No
interference is warranted in the order dated
10.1.2022 and it is accordingly upheld.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 293
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Special Appeal No. 996 of 2024

Registrar
Mahatma
Jyotibha
Phule
Rohilkhand University, Bareilly & Anr.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Firoz Ahmad & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Shambhavi Tiwari for Rohit Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Vijeta Singh, Alok Shukla, C.S.C.

Civil Law - Allahabad High Court Rules,
1952 - Chapter VIII - Rule 5 - U.P. St.
University Act, 1973 - Chapter IV -
Sections 13(1)(e), 16(4) & 51- Mahatma