# State of U.P. & Ors v. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 2 ILRA 635
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-02-13
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 459 of 2023
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C.J. Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-md-sameer-rao-ors-53017
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 14, 19, 19(1)(a), 21 & 226 -
Allahabad
High
Court
Rules,
1952-
Chapter VIII - Rule 5, - U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 - Chapter - III, XII,
Regulation - 7, 40, 40(b) & 40(c)- Intra
Court Appeal - assailing the validity of judgment
and order passed by Single Judge - Writ Petition
- writ petitioner Md. Sameer Rao was earlier
known as Shahnawaz - who has cleared High
School & Intermediate Board in year 2013 and
2015 respectively - by means of an application
in year 2020 based upon some newly issued
Adhar Card & PAN card in the name of Md.
Sameer Rao and also a gazette notification
approached to Board to incorporate his new
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
name in High School & Intermediate Certificates
and issue a new certificates - Board rejected his
request being time barred - writ petition -
single judge set aside the impugned order -
instant appeal - court finds that, the learned
Single Judge has held Regulation 40(c) as
arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of
fundamental
right
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution of India - further, various other
directions have also been issued like surrender
of public documents of identity like Adhar card,
Ration card, Driving Licence, Passport, Voter
I.D. card etc. to the competent authorities with
a direction to them to register the change of
name, dispose off or destroy the earlier identity
documents as per law and issue fresh
documents consistent with his changed name -
and - Learned Single Judge has also issued a
direction to the Secretary, Ministry of Home,
Government of India and the Chief Secretary,
Government
of
U.P.,
Lucknow
to
create
appropriate legal and administrative framework
to ensure that both Governments work in
concert to achieve the end of making identity
related identity documents removing anomalies
therein -- held, (i) in fact, these are policy
matters exclusively in legislative/ executive
domain and on factual matrix of the matter, the
writ petitioner had no case on merits, - (ii) in
view of specific administrative order, the
jurisdiction to read down or hold any regulation
as arbitrary, unconstitutional and/or violative of
fundamental
right
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution only vests with the division bench
in appropriate cases - hence, judgment of the
learned single judge cannot be sustained -
Special Appeal stands allowed - writ petition
dismissed, accordingly. (Para - 31, 32, 35)

Special Appeal Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,804 of 47,574. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39804 for what follows._

2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
635

24. The question involved in the
present writ petition is that whether against
the order of revision passed by the
Additional Commissioner dated 3.8.1987,
second appeal lies before the Board of
Revenue or that can be converted into
revision in view of the provision contained
under Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950. The
order under challenge dated 6.9.1994. In
view of the above fact, the order passed in
appeal
by
the
Settlement
Officer
(Consolidation) cannot be taken into
account in the order which is challenged in
the year 1994.

25. In view of the provisions contained
under Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950, the
appeal cannot be converted into revision,
therefore, the order passed by the Board of
Revenue suffers from apparent illegality
and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
In the counter affidavit, recital has been
made that against the order of the
Consolidation Officer, holding that the
petitioners are Seerdars, some amendment
was incorporated in the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act to the effect
that Seerdars shall be treated as Bhumidars
with transferable rights. A suit under
Section 229-B was filed by the petitioners,
which was allowed holding the petitioners
to be Bhumidars with non-transferable
rights, against which first appeal was filed
before the Commissioner, which was
allowed, holding the petitioners to be
Bhumidars with transferable rights vide
judgment dated 4.3.1982.

26. Against the order passed in the
first appeal, the second appeal lies before
the Board of Revenue, but that was not
filed by the respondents, rather a review
was filed, which was dismissed on
25.1.1990 and against the order passed in
the review, second appeal was filed, which
was converted into revision, which is not
permitted in the eyes of law, therefore, the
order impugned suffers from apparent
illegality and is liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, the order dated 6.9.1994 is
hereby set aside. The writ petition succeeds
and is allowed.

27. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 635
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Special Appeal No. 459 of 2023

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Md. Sameer Rao & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Kunal Ravi Singh, Rama Nand Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
In Person, Shreyas Srivastava

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 14, 19, 19(1)(a), 21 & 226 -
Allahabad
High
Court
Rules,
1952-
Chapter VIII - Rule 5, - U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 - Chapter - III, XII,
Regulation - 7, 40, 40(b) & 40(c)- Intra
Court Appeal - assailing the validity of judgment
and order passed by Single Judge - Writ Petition
- writ petitioner Md. Sameer Rao was earlier
known as Shahnawaz - who has cleared High
School & Intermediate Board in year 2013 and
2015 respectively - by means of an application
in year 2020 based upon some newly issued
Adhar Card & PAN card in the name of Md.
Sameer Rao and also a gazette notification
approached to Board to incorporate his new
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
name in High School & Intermediate Certificates
and issue a new certificates - Board rejected his
request being time barred - writ petition -
single judge set aside the impugned order -
instant appeal - court finds that, the learned
Single Judge has held Regulation 40(c) as
arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of
fundamental
right
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution of India - further, various other
directions have also been issued like surrender
of public documents of identity like Adhar card,
Ration card, Driving Licence, Passport, Voter
I.D. card etc. to the competent authorities with
a direction to them to register the change of
name, dispose off or destroy the earlier identity
documents as per law and issue fresh
documents consistent with his changed name -
and - Learned Single Judge has also issued a
direction to the Secretary, Ministry of Home,
Government of India and the Chief Secretary,
Government
of
U.P.,
Lucknow
to
create
appropriate legal and administrative framework
to ensure that both Governments work in
concert to achieve the end of making identity
related identity documents removing anomalies
therein -- held, (i) in fact, these are policy
matters exclusively in legislative/ executive
domain and on factual matrix of the matter, the
writ petitioner had no case on merits, - (ii) in
view of specific administrative order, the
jurisdiction to read down or hold any regulation
as arbitrary, unconstitutional and/or violative of
fundamental
right
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution only vests with the division bench
in appropriate cases - hence, judgment of the
learned single judge cannot be sustained -
Special Appeal stands allowed - writ petition
dismissed, accordingly. (Para - 31, 32, 35)

Special Appeal Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. A.K. Gopalan Vs St. of Madras: AIR 1950 SC 27,

2.
Jigya
Yadav
(Minor)
(Through
Guardian/Father Hari Singh) Vs. Central Board
of Secondary Education and others: (2021) 7
SCC 535,

3. Pooja Yadav Vs. St. of U.P. & ors.: 2023 (10)
ADJ 176.
4. Anand Singh Vs U.P. Board of Secondary
Education & ors,: 2014 (3) ADJ 443 (DB)

5. Subramanian Swamy & ors. Vs Raju through
Member, Juvenile Justice Board & another:
(2014) 8 SCC 390,

6. D.T.C. Vs Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1)
SCC 600,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, C.J.
&
Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

1. State of U.P., U.P. Board of High
School and Intermediate Education (for
short the 'Board') and its Regional
Secretary are in intra court appeal under
Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court
Rules, 1952 assailing the validity of the
judgment and order dated 25.05.2023
whereby the learned Single Judge, while
allowing Writ-C No. 3671 of 2022 (Md
Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. and 2 others),
has set aside the order dated 24.12.2020
passed by the Regional Secretary of the
Board and has also issued a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents of
the writ petition to allow the application of
the writ petitioner to change his name from
"Shahnawaz" to "Md Sameer Rao" and,
accordingly, issue fresh High School and
Intermediate Certificates incorporating the
said change. Learned Single Judge has also
issued
various
other
directions
like
surrender of public documents of identity
like Adhar card, Ration card, Driving
Licence, Passport, Voter I.D. card etc to the
competent authorities with a direction to
them to register the change of name,
dispose off or destroy the earlier identity
documents as per law and issue fresh
documents consistent with his changed
name. Learned Single Judge has also issued
a direction to the Secretary, Ministry of
Home, Government of India and the Chief
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
637
Secretary, Government of U.P., Lucknow
to
create
appropriate
legal
and
administrative framework to ensure that
both Governments work in concert to
achieve the end of making identity related
identity documents removing anomalies
therein.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

2. Admittedly, the writ petitioner Md
Sameer
Rao
was
earlier
known
as
Shahnawaz. He appeared in and cleared the
High
School
and
Intermediate
Examinations conducted by the Board,
respectively in the year 2013 and 2015 by
the same name. He had all identity cards
issued in his name as Shahnawaz. Copies
of Adhar card and PAN card were brought
on record of the proceedings. In the year
2020, based upon some newly issued Adhar
card and PAN card in the name of Md.
Sameer Rao and also a gazette notification
published in Gazette of India bearing
Gazette No. 39 New Delhi, Saturday,
September 26 - October 2, 2020 (Asvina 4,
1942) Part-IV, Page 1091, he approached
the Board to incorporate his new name in
the
High
School
and
Intermediate
Certificates and issue new certificates
having his name printed as "Md. Sameer
Rao". The said application was rejected by
the Regional Secretary of the Board by
order dated 24.12.2020 on the ground that
as the case fell with the category of "time
barred matter" and, as per Regulation 7 of
Chapter III of the Regulations framed
under U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921 (for short the Act, 1921), request for
change cannot be considered after a
period of three years. It is this order
which was challenged by the writ
petitioner and has been set aside by the
learned Single Judge and is impugned in
the instant appeal.

3. THE ORDER DATED 24.12.2020
IMPUGNED BEFORE THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE

"प्रेिक,

क्षेत्रीय सचव,

माध्यसमक सशक्षा पररिि, उ०प्र०

क्षेत्रीय कायागिय, बरेिी।

 ेवा में,

प्रधानाचायग/ प्रधानाचायाग,

उमर इण्र्र कािेि

ििािपुर मुरािाबाि

पत्रांकः मा०सश०प०/ हाई०/इण्र्र प्रमाण-पत्र/व/
10231-32 सिनांक 24.12.20

महोिय/ महोिया,

आपके पत्र ंख्या ............. सिनांक
............ के ंिभग में हाईस्कुि/ इण्र्र परीक्षा, 2013 के
सनमनांसकत प्रमाण-पत्र ंशोधन हस्तिेखन के पिात परीक्षासथगयों के
हेतु भी िा रहे है। कृप्या क्रा सिस्र् में ंशोसधत प्रमाण-पत्र के
अनु ार अंकन कर िघु हस्ताक्षर कर िें।

कृप्या प्रासि की ूचना तुरतत भेिने का कष्ट करें।

अनुक्रमांक नाम परीक्षाथी अशुद्ध सववरण शुद्ध
सववरण

0819050 शाहनबाि

नोर्- प्रकरण कालवाधित की श्रेणी में है
आपका प्रार्थनापत्र इस कार्ाथलर् में धि० 26.11.2020 को
प्राप्त हुआ है। पररपक्षीर् धनर्मानुसार प्रमाण पत्र धनर्थमन धतधर्
के तीन वर्थ बाि प्राप्त प्रकरण पर इण्टरधमधिएट धिक्षा
अधिधनर्म 1921 के अध्र्ार् तीन के धवधनर्म-7 के अनुसार
संिोिन पर धवचार धकर्ा जाना सम्भव नहीं है। अतः प्रमाण
पत्र मूल रूप मे वापस प्रेधर्त।

GIST
OF
JUDGMENT
OF
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE

4. The learned Single Judge has, with
reference to some traditional and literary
books and dealing with Articles 19 and 21
of the Constitution of India, held that
intimacy of human life and person's name
is undeniable, the right to keep a name of
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
choice or change the name according to
personal preferences comes within the
mighty sweep of the right to life guaranteed
under Article 21 and restrictions contained
in Regulation 40 of Chapter XII of the
Regulations framed under the Act, 1921 are
disproportionate and fail the test of
reasonable restrictions on fundamental
rights under Article 19 (1)(a) and Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution and the same
are arbitrary and infringe the fundamental
rights to choose and change own's name.
The learned Single Judge, by invoking the
doctrine of "reading down" read down
Regulation
40(ग)
observing
that
the
petitioner's new name gives him a higher
sense of self-worth.

ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS

5. Shri Rama Nand Pandey, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel, mainly
made following submissions:-

(i)
Fundamental
freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution of India are
not absolute and the same are subject to
reasonable restrictions.

(ii) Change of name recorded in
High School and Intermediate Certificates
issued by the Board is regulated by
Regulation 40 of Chapter XII of the Act,
1921 and the same is not against any
individual liberty.

(iii) Change of name after more
than seven years cannot, otherwise, be
accepted in view of Regulation 7 of
Chapter III of the Regulations framed
under the Act read with Regulations 40(b)
and 40(c) of Chapter XII of the Regulations
which are reasonable restrictions in the
matter.

(iv) Learned Single Judge has
exceeded his power of judicial review in
policy matters and has transgressed the
legislative
functions
extending
the
directions to the State Government which
exclusively lie in the executive domain.

(v) The Supreme Court, in A.K.
Gopalan Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1950
SC 27, held that reasonable restrictions are
imposed on the enjoyment of fundamental
right due to the fact that in certain
circumstances, individual liberty has to be
subordinated to certain other larger interest
of the society.

(vi)
Changing
name
from
Shahnawaz to Md. Sameer Rao, if
permitted, would create chaos and open a
new pandora box with an unending process.

(vii)
Issuing
directions
to
executive authorities of the Union and State
to create a legal framework amounts to
violation of the federal structure of the
Constitution as such rights and powers are
vested with the Union Government and
State Government as per the constitutional
provisions, particularly under Article 245
read
with
7th
Schedule
providing
legislative competence in various matters.

(viii) The Supreme Court, in Jigya
Yadav (Minor) (Through Guardian/Father
Hari
Singh)
Vs.
Central
Board
of
Secondary Education and others: (2021) 7
SCC 535, has laid down broadly two
categories under which change of name is
permissible and in case the writ petitioner
wanted to get his name changed even by
choice, he could have first obtained declaration
from civil court and then get publication in
official gazette and then approach the Board
within the prescribed period of limitation and
only in that event, a right for consideration of
his claim on merits could arise. In this regard,
reliance was placed upon judgment of one of
us (Kshitij Shailendra, J.) sitting singly in
Pooja Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and 3 others:
2023 (10) ADJ 176.

(ix) None of the regulations
framed under the Act, 1921 being under
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
639
challenge in the writ petition, or if
challenged by amendment, learned Single
Judge was not competent to impliedly
strike down the same by applying the
principle of "reading down a provision"
and, hence, the judgment impugned in the
appeal is without jurisdiction.

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT

6. Per contra, Shri Shreyas Srivastava,
learned counsel who was appointed under
the order of this Court by Legal Services
Authority, made following submissions:-

(i) The case of the writ petitioner
is fully covered by Jigya Yadav (supra),
para
171(b)
(citing
reference
Manu/SC/0362/2021)
[equivalent
paragraph nos.194, 194.1 and 194.2 of
(2021) 7 SCC 535], inasmuch as the writ
petitioner had changed his name 'by
choice' without any supporting school
record but since he got few public
documents issued in his new name and a
gazette notification, the Board was under
an obligation to allow the prayer for
correcting/ changing the name in the High
School and Intermediate Certificates and
issue the same to the writ petitioner.

(ii) There is no need to obtain a
declaration from any court as public
documents and official gazette would
suffice for grant of prayer.

(iii) Regulation 40 has been
rightly read down by the learned Single
Judge as it is in teeth of fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India to acquire a new
name.

(iv)
Learned
Single
Judge,
pragmatically interpreting the provisions of
Regulation 40 of Chapter XII, Part II-B, of
the
regulations
framed
under
the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921, has read
down the said regulation in a bid to save its
constitutionality.

(v) Learned Single Judge was
competent to read down the provision as
the educational matters were cognizable by
Single Judge Bench as per the roster
designed by Chief Justice under High Court
Rules, 1952.

(vi) The right to change a name
has been recognised as being a fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India.

(vii)
The
reasoning
behind
acknowledging the right to name as a
fundamental right flows from the fact that
identity has been held to be an amalgam of
various internal and external characteristics
which includes the name of an individual,
which is the principal expression of
identity.

(viii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Paragraph No. 171(a) of Jigya Yadav
(supra) has held that the public documents
have a legal presumption operating in their
favour and the CBSE cannot ignore such
documents. Though the observations were
made with regard to CBSE, the same apply
with full vigour to the Board of High
School and Intermediate Education, U.P.

(ix) The Board has absolutely no
jurisdiction in curtailing the exercise of
fundamental rights of an individual which
have
been
effected
to
in
other
public/statutory
documents
having
a
presumptive value.

(x) Since no specific challenge
had been made to the constitutionality of
abovesaid regulation, the matter was not
required to be placed before the Bench
authorised
to
hear
matters
wherein
constitutionality of delegated legislation
had been challenged as per the roster
formulated by Hon'ble The Chief Justice
under Chapter 5 Rule 1 of the Allahabad
High Court Rules.
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

DISCUSSION

7. The issue involved in the instant
case is of quite significance and wider
implications. Interestingly, both sides have
placed reliance upon judgment of Supreme
Court in Jigya Yadav (supra). The case of
Jigya Yadav (supra) had arisen from a
situation where the concerned candidate
had applied before the Central Board of
Secondary
Education
to
carry
out
correction of her parent's name in the
mark-sheet. According to that petitioner,
name of her father Hari Singh was
incorrectly recorded as Hari Singh Yadav
and mother as Mamta Yadav instead of
Mamta. The claim was based upon certain
documents of identity of her parents. CBSE
rejected the prayer and writ petition filed
against the said rejection was dismissed by
Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court,
while dealing with permissibility of getting
correction
of
names
in
educational
certificates
and
dealing
with
the
constitutional provisions as well as certain
Bye-laws/ Rules/ Regulations, observed as
under:-

"Courts
need
to
be
extra
cautious and alive to the immediate
factual
position
before
permitting
changes. No two requests for change of
name or change in date of birth can be
viewed with the same judicial eye.
Sometimes, change of name could be a
necessity, sometimes it could be a pure
exercise of freewill without any need. As
long as Bye-laws or the applicable rules
permit so, there is no occasion for any
court to deny such relief. But when Byelaws do not permit for the same, the
Court must be circumspect before
issuing directions, that too without
commenting upon the validity of the
Bye-laws and without demonstrating the
rights which are at stake - constitutional
or legal."

8. The Hon'ble Court further observed
as under:-

"162. The provision for "change"
of name is far more stringent and calls for a
thorough review to settle the correct
position. As per the present law, change
of name is permissible upon fulfilment of
two prior conditions - prior permission
of the Court of law and publication of
the proposed change in Official Gazette.
These conditions co-exist with another
condition predicating that both prior
permission and publication must be done
before the publication of result. What it
effectively means is that change of name
would simply be impermissible after the
publication of result of the candidate even
if the same is permitted by a Court of law
and published in Official Gazette. In other
words, once the examination result of the
candidate has been published, the Board
would only permit corrections in name
mentioned in the certificate. Further,
changing the name out of freewill is simply
ruled out."

9. Lastly, the Court classified such
cases of seeking correction in name or
other details in two broad categories and
held as under:-

"171. As regards request for
"change" of particulars in the certificate
issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the
particulars intended to be recorded in the
CBSE certificate are not consistent with the
school records. Such a request could be
made in two different situations. The first
is on the basis of public documents like
Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election
Card, etc. and to incorporate change in the
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
641
CBSE certificate consistent therewith. The
second possibility is when the request for
change is due to the acquired name by
choice at a later point of time. That change
need not be backed by public documents
pertaining to the candidate.

(a) Reverting to the first category,
as
noted
earlier,
there
is
a
legal
presumption in relation to the public
documents as envisaged in the 1872 Act.
Such public documents, therefore, cannot
be ignored by the CBSE. Taking note of
those documents, the CBSE may entertain
the request for recording change in the
certificate issued by it. This, however, need
not be unconditional, but subject to certain
reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the
applicant as may be prescribed by the
CBSE, such as, of furnishing sworn
affidavit containing declaration and to
indemnify the CBSE and upon payment of
prescribed fees in lieu of administrative
expenses. The CBSE may also insist for
issuing Public Notice and publication in the
Official Gazette before recording the
change in the fresh certificate to be issued
by it upon surrender/return of the original
certificate (or duplicate original certificate,
as the case may be) by the applicant. The
fresh certificate may contain disclaimer and
caption/annotation against the original
entry (except in respect of change of name
effected in exercise of right to be forgotten)
indicating the date on which change has
been recorded and the basis thereof. In
other words, the fresh certificate may retain
original particulars while recording the
change
along
with
caption/annotation
referred to above (except in respect of
change of name effected in exercise of right
to be forgotten).

(b)
However,
in
the
latter
situation where the change is to be effected
on the basis of new acquired name without
any supporting school record or public
document, that request may be entertained
upon
insisting
for
prior
permission/declaration by a Court of law in
that regard and publication in the Official
Gazette
including
surrender/return
of
original certificate (or duplicate original
certificate, as the case may be) issued by
CBSE and upon payment of prescribed
fees. The fresh certificate as in other
situations referred to above, retain the
original entry (except in respect of change
of name effected in exercise of right to be
forgotten) and to insert caption/annotation
indicating the date on which it has been
recorded
and
other
details
including
disclaimer of CBSE. This is so because the
CBSE is not required to adjudicate nor has
the mechanism to verify the correctness of
the claim of the applicant."

10. The present case is not the one
falling in first category, i.e., changing name
from Shahnawaz to Md. Sameer Rao,
which, in fact, amounts to altogether
acquiring a new name. The petitioner did
not approach the Board to correct his name
based upon documents of identity like
Adhar Card/ Birth Certificate/ Voter I.D.
Card etc. pre-existing in his new name, i.e.
Shahnawaz. The case falls in second
category where the change is to be effected
on the basis of new acquired name BY
CHOICE without any supporting school
record or public document. Dealing with
that category, the Supreme Court has
clearly observed that such a request may be
entertained upon insisting prior permission/
declaration by a court of law in that regard
and publication in the official gazette
including surrender/ return of original
certificate (or duplicate original certificate,
as the case may be) and upon payment of
prescribed fees. The Supreme Court has
also observed that fresh certificate would
retain the original entry and a caption/
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
annotation inserted indicating the date on
which it has been recorded and other details
because the Board is not required to
adjudicate nor has the mechanism to verify
the correctness of the claim of the
applicant.

11. Once the Supreme Court has
emphasized upon "insisting for prior
permission/ declaration by a court of
law", this Court may deal with the said
aspect of the matter with reference to the
civil law of the land. Section 9 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that the
courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a
civil nature except suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly
barred. Suits of different nature are
provided under Specific Relief Act, 1963,
which is divided into different Chapters.
Chapter-I contains provision for suits for
recovering possession of property, ChapterII speaks of specific performance of
contracts, Chapter-III relates to rectification
of instruments, Chapter-IV relates to
rescission of contracts, Chapter-V governs
cancellation of instruments, Chapters-VII
and VIII speak of injunctions. However, in
the instant case, Chapter-VI of the Act of
1963 needs a mention. It contains only two
provisions, i.e. Section 34 and 35, which
are quoted as under:-

"34. Discretion of court as to
declaration of status or right.- Any
person entitled to any legal character, or to
any right as to any property, may institute a
suit against any person denying, or
interested to deny, his title to such
character or right, and the court may in its
discretion make therein a declaration that
he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not
in such suit ask for any further relief:

Provided that no court shall make
any such declaration where the plaintiff,
being able to seek further relief than a mere
declaration of title, omits to do so.

Explanation.-A
trustee
of
property is a "person interested to deny" a
title adverse to the title of some one who is
not in existence, and for whom, if in
existence, he would be a trustee.

35. Effect of declaration.- A
declaration made under this Chapter is
binding only on the parties to the suit,
persons
claiming
through
them
respectively, and, where any of the parties
are trustees, on the persons for whom, if in
existence at the date of the declaration,
such parties would be trustees."

12. A perusal of Section 34 would
show that a civil court is competent to grant
a declaration of status or right which
includes a legal character of any person.
Acquiring a new name by choice is covered
by Chapter-VI of the Act in the sense that a
person seeking to acquire a new name, may
obtain a decree of declaration from the civil
court to the effect that, henceforth, he
would be known as a person by his newly
acquired name. In such event, the date of
decree would be relevant and would
operate from the said date, prior whereto,
the plaintiff seeking declaration would be
known by his previous name. Though it is
true that, as per Section 35, a declaration
made under Chapter-VI would be binding
only on the parties to the suit, it does not
affect the validity of the decree qua
acquiring a new name as, in such event, the
decree would operate against the world at
large as a decree in rem, provided the
plaintiff chooses his opponents in that
manner, like public in general, Union of
India, State of U.P., the Board or
Department
concerned
etc.
etc.
The
declaration so obtained would, then, bind
every department of Union and State and
also the public at large.
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
643

13. At this juncture, Section 41 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 also needs reference.
The said section finds place in Chapter-III,
titled as "of the relevancy of facts" and
reads as under:-

"41.
Relevancy
of
certain
judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.-
A final judgment, order or decree of a
competent Court, in the exercise of probate,
matrimonial,
admiralty
or
insolvency
jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes
away
from
any person
any
legal
character, or which declares any person to
be entitled to any such character, or to be
entitled to any specific thing, not as against
any specified person but absolutely, is
relevant when the existence of any such
legal character, or the title of any such
person to any such thing, is relevant.

Such judgment, order or decree is
conclusive proof -

that any legal character which
it confers accrued at the time when such
judgment, order or decree came into
operation;

that any legal character, to
which it declares any such person to be
entitled, accrued to that person at the
time when such judgment, [order or
decree] declares it to have accrued to
that person;

......................................."

14. Words "which confers upon or
takes away from any person any legal
character or which declares any person to
be entitled to any such character" used in
section 41 are of much significance and also
of binding nature of such declaration made
against the world at large. The provision
speaks of judgments in rem. A judgment in
rem is defined in English Law as "an
adjudication pronounced (as its name indeed
denotes) by the status, some particular subject
matter by a tribunal having competent
authority for that purpose". It declares,
defines or otherwise determines the status of
a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural
relation of the person or thing to the world
generally.

15. We may also observe that one of us
(Kshitij Shailendra, J.), while referring to the
aforesaid paragraphs of the Supreme Court
judgment in Jigya Yadav (supra) and
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
held in Pooja Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and 3
others: 2023 (10) ADJ 176 that obtaining a
declaration from civil court is a pre-requisite
to acquiring a new name by choice and only
when such a decree is obtained and placed
before the Board, request can be entertained.

16. One may visualize a situation
where a person is having certain documents
of identity, like Adhar card, Voter I.D. card,
PAN card etc. mentioning a particular name
on which basis he appeared in High School
and Intermediate Examinations and got
certificates. After a certain number of years,
the said person wants to acquire a new name
and again obtains new Adhar card, Voter I.D.
card, PAN card, etc. On that basis, even if,
for one reason or the other, the Board issues
fresh educational testimonials incorporating
his new name, then, if after some time, that
person wants to acquire a third name and
again obtains fresh documents of identity
issued in that third new name and again
approaches
the
Board
to
issue
fresh
testimonials incorporating his new name,
such a recourse would become an endless
process. Such an obligation cannot be
imposed on Board particularly when it is
contrary to statutory regulations.

17. We may, however, clarify that we
are not examining validity of Adhar card,
PAN
card
or
any
other
document
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
subsequently obtained by the writ petitioner
in the name of Md. Sameer Rao, inasmuch
as the issue involved in the instant appeal is
quite different. We are focused on the
obligation on the part of the Board to
adhere to or refuse the request of a
candidate like the writ petitioner to change
his name in educational records or to get
new testimonials issued in the new name.
Therefore, any observation made in this
judgment
may
not
be
treated
as
validating/invalidating any document of
identity obtained by the writ petitioner at
any point of time.

18. As far as gazette notification
published in Gazette No. 9 New Delhi,
Saturday, September 26 - October 2, 2020
(Asvina 4, 1942) Part-IV, Page 1091 is
concerned, the Court may refer certain
important aspects in relation thereto. The
gazette begins with a notice in following
words:-

"NO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY IS
ACCEPTED FOR THE PUBLICATION
OF
ADVERTISEMENTS/PUBLIC
NOTICES IN THIS PART OF THE
GAZETTE
OF
INDIA.
PERSONS
NOTIFYING
THE
ADVERTISEMENTS/
PUBLIC
NOTICES WILL REMAIN SOLELY,
RESPONSIBLE
FOR
THE
LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES AND ALSO FOR
ANY OTHER MISREPRESENTATION
ETC.

BY ORDER
Controller of Publication"

19. The said gazette contains
information of change of names of various
persons in identical language. As far as the
petitioner is concerned, following is the
notice:-
"I hitherto known as SHAHNAWAZ son
of MAUVEEN HUSAIN, residing at
village Mehloli, Post Jalalpur Khas, Tehsil
Bilari, Disstt. Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh244411, have changed my name and shall
hereafter be known as MD. SAMEER
RAO.

It is certified that I have complied with
other legal requirements in this connection.

SHAHNAWAZ
[Signature (in existing old name)]"

20. Words "it is certified that I have
complied with other legal requirements
in this connection" written at the end of
the notice, do not amount to a certificate
issued by Government of India, rather it is
the certification made by the candidate
himself that he has complied with other
legal requirements. What are those 'legal
requirements' is nowhere mentioned in the
gazette, rather, when read with the notice
quoted above, it would mean that the
Government of India itself has made a
disclaimer saving itself from any legal
responsibility/ liability/ consequences or
any other misrepresentation etc, which may
occur pursuant to notifying a new name in
the gazette.

21. In India, a Gazette Notification
and a civil court decree serve different
purposes and while they can complement
each other, they are not interchangeable. A
Gazette
Notification
is
an
official
publication that announces a change in an
individual's name. It is typically published
after the individual has followed the
necessary procedures, such as filing an
affidavit and publishing the name change in
local newspapers. A civil court decree, on
the other hand, is a formal order passed by
a court of law, which can provide a binding
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors.Vs. Md. Sameer Rao & Ors.
645
declaration regarding an individual's name
change. A Gazette Notification primarily
serves as public notice, while a civil court
decree
provides
a
legally
binding
declaration, a Gazette Notification is issued
by the government, whereas a civil court
decree is passed by a judicial authority, a
civil court decree is enforceable by law,
whereas a Gazette Notification, though
official, might not be sufficient to resolve
disputes or establish rights. In general, a
Gazette Notification cannot replace a civil
court decree. In situations where a binding
declaration or enforcement is required, a
civil court decree is essentially necessary.

22. In the opinion of the Court,
gazette publication must be preceded by
fulfilment of some legal requirements and
not by mere filling up a form seeking
publication of such an intimation/notice
regarding
change
of
name.
Such
requirement can be only in the nature of a
decree obtained from civil court and in no
other manner, otherwise any person would
get such a notice published in the official
gazette and would impress the Government
departments
to
incorporate
a
newly
acquired name changing all the records.
Even if there are certain provisions in the
Evidence Act, 1872 attaching presumption
in favour of gazettes, the same are referable
to only admissibility of such gazettes in
evidence but the contents of the gazette, in
absence of any legal sanctity attached to
them, cannot be treated as a conclusive
proof of the very nature and character of
such publication.

23. It is not the case of the writ
petitioner here that prior to getting
intimation of his changed name published
in official gazette, he had obtained any
decree from a competent civil court and,
therefore, when words "that request may
be entertained upon insisting for prior
permission/ declaration by a Court of
law in this regard and publication in the
Official Gazette" used by the Supreme
Court in paragraph No.171 (b) of Jigya
Yadav (supra), are examined in depth and
in factual matrix of the present case, we
find that in absence of decree from civil
court even gazette publication alone, as
relied upon by the writ petitioner, would be
of no consequence.

24. Since learned Single Judge read
down Regulation 40(c) of the Regulations,
the same first needs reproduction as under:-

 "40. प्रमाण पत्र में नाम पररवतगन पररिि् फि
उममीिवारों द्वारा सवसहत प्रसक्रयानु ार आवेिन पत्र िेने तथा इ
अध्याय के सवसनयम 22 (13) में सनधागररत शुल्क िेने पर प्रमाण
पत्र में धनम्नांधकत प्रधतबन्िों के अिीन नाम पररवतगन कर कती
है-

(क) आवेिन पत्र उसचत ारणी द्वारा सिया िायेगा
तथा सि विग में परीक्षा हुई थी. उ की 31 माचग े तीन विग के
भीतर पररिि के सचव के कायागिय में पहुुँचिाना चासहए। आवेिक
को एक सर्कर् िगे हुए कागि पर शपथ-पत्र िेना होगा, िो प्रथम
श्रेणी के मसिस्रेर् अथवा नोर्री द्वारा यथासवसध प्रमासणत होना
चासहए. सि में नाम में पररवतगन के वैध कारण सिये होंगे तथा िो
एक रािपसत्रत असधकारी द्वारा यथा सवसध प्रमासणत होगा और
परीक्षाथी िहाुँ वह सनवा करता है, वहाुँ के स्थानीय िैसनक पत्र की
तीन सवसभतन सतसथयों के ंस्करणों में अपने नाम के पररवतगन को
सवज्ञासपत करेगा, इ े पूवग सक उ े पररवसतगत नाम का नया प्रमाणपत्र प्राि हो । मबसतधत सतसथयों के माचार पत्रों की प्रसतयाुँ
आवेिन पत्र के ाथ ंिग्न करना असनवायग है।

(ख) पररर्ि् द्वारा नाम पररवतथन के आवेिन-पत्र
धनम्नधलधित को छोड़कर अन्र् धकन्हीं कारणों से स्वीकार नहीं
धकर्े जार्ेंर्े।

नाम में भद्दापन हो अर्वा नाम से अपिब्ि की
ध्वधन धनकलती हो अर्वा नाम असम्मान प्रतीत होता हो
अर्वा अन्र् ऐसी धस्र्धत होने पर।

(ग) परीक्षाधर्थर्ों द्वारा नाम के पहले र्ा बाि में
उपनाम जोड़ने िमथ अर्वा जाधत सूचक िब्िों के जोड़ने
अर्वा सम्मानजनक िब्ि र्ा उपाधि जोड़ने जैसे धकसी भी
प्रकार के आवेिन पत्रों को स्वीकार्थ नहीं धकर्ा जार्ेर्ा। इसी
646 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
प्रकार िमथ अर्वा जाधत पररवतथन के आिार पर अर्वा
धववाधहत छात्र / छात्राओं के नाम में भी धववाह के फलस्वरूप
नाम पररवधतथत हो जाने पर पररर्ि द्वारा नाम में पररवतथन नहीं
धकर्ा जार्ेर्ा।"

25. What we find is that the order
impugned in the writ petition is referable to
Regulation 7 of Chapter-III Part-II(b) of the
Regulations framed under the Act, 1921.
The said regulation is extracted as under:-

"सवसनयम-7 ंशोसधत स्वरूप

 सचव पररिि के ओर े फि उममीिवारों को
पररिि की परीक्षा में उत्तीणग होने का प्रमाण-पत्र सवसहत प्रपत्र में िेगा
और बाि में उ की प्रसवसष्टयों में कोई शुसद्ध करेगा, बशते की प्रमाणपत्र में सक ी ऐ ी गित प्रसवसष्ट सक ी असभचाररत सिसपसकय भूि
या िोप के कारण या सक ी ऐ ी सिसपसकय भूि के कारण की गयी
हो, िो अ ावधानी े पररिि के स्तर के या उ ंस्था के िहाुँ े
असततम बार सशक्षा प्राि की हों स्तर पर असभिेख में हो गयी हों।

यह शुसद्ध सचव द्वारा उ ी सस्थसत में की िा केगी,
िबसक अभ्याथी ने मबसतधत परीक्षा के प्रमाण-पत्र को पररिि द्वारा
धनर्थमन की धतधर् से तीन वर्थ की धलधपकीर् त्रुधट की ओर
ध्यान आकृष्ट करते हुये मबसतधत प्रधानाचायग/अग्र ारण असधकारी
के त्रुसर् के ंशोधन प्राथगना पत्र प्रस्तुत कर सिया गया हो। और उ की
प्रसत पंिीकृत डाक े सचव पररिि को भी प्रेसित की हों।

प्रधतबन्ि र्ह है धक अभ्र्र्ी के अंकपत्र तर्ा
प्रमाण-पत्र में अभ्र्र्ी के नाम, धपता के नाम अर्वा माता के
नाम में र्धि कोई वतथनी त्रुधट है, तो अभ्र्धर्थर्ों द्वारा आवेिन
करने पर उसे पररर्ि के सम्बधन्ित क्षेत्रीर् कार्ाथलर्ों के क्षेत्रीर्
सधचवों द्वारा पुधित एवं प्रमाधणक साक्ष्र्ों के आिार पर
तत्काल िुद्ध कर धिर्ा जार्ेर्ा।"

26. As far as the limitation of 3 years
provided under Regulation 7 is concerned,
reference to a Division Bench judgment of
this Court in Anand Singh Vs. U.P. Board
of Secondary Education and others: 2014
(3) ADJ 443 (DB) may be made. The
Division Bench, while dealing with the
limitation of three years as regards
correction, held that rejection for correcting
the name on the ground of delay is
unsustainable as the claim was found to be
bona fide. However, a careful examination
of the said judgment would show that the
nature of correction in the light of
Regulation 7 was examined by this Court
and the same are confined to some
inadvertent clerical error or omission in
the name of the candidate or the name of
his parents. Same is altogether different
from a situation where completely new
name is sought to be acquired and then
request is made for issuance of new
certificate incorporating said name.

27.