# State of U.P. & Ors v. Shivani Singh

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 284
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-12
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 601 of 2024
- **Bench:** Attau Rahman Masoodi, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-shivani-singh-51007
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Allahabad High Court Rules-Chapter VIII
Rule 5-U.P. Revenue Code,2006-Section
67(a)-U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms
Act,1950-Section
123(1)-
quashing
of
disciplinary
proceedings
initiated against the respondent(a Deputy
Collector)-respondent
was
issued
a
charge-sheet
and
a
supplementary
charge-sheet during her tenure as Sub-
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
285
Divisional
Magistrate-the
charges
alleged
negligence,
procedural
violations,
and
illegal
orders
favoring private individuals at the
cost
of
public
property-the
respondent was found guilty in the
inquiry
report
dated
03.08.2024Held-Disciplinary
proceedings
against public officials exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers are
permissible when there is evidence
of
misconduct,
negligence
or
malafide
intent-The
single
judge
erred in quashing the charge-sheets
without examining the evidence or
providing the State an opportunity
to file a response-The appellants are
directed to conclude the disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent
in furtherance of the chargesheets
issued against the respondent and
enquiry
report
dated
03.08.2024
expeditiously.(Para 1 to 36) (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

284 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Sub Divisional Officer and it has been
withdrawn only after the application under
Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was moved before
this court, therefore, the suit for partition
was also filed with concealment and
against the dead persons. Thus it appears
that the plaintiff-appellant is in habit of
concealment of facts before the court of
law.

29. Learned counsel for the
plaintiff-appellant, on a query being made
to him, had stated that if the sisters of the
plaintiff-appellant have went to Pakistan
and their shares have been vested in
Custodian, Enemy Property, he would be
only the co-sharer and suit can be filed by
one of the co-sharers.

30. In view of above, this court is of
the view that the additional evidence sought
to be produced by the defendant-respondent
is required to be taken on record for the just
decision of the case and pronouncement of
the judgment because it will have to be
considered as to whether the suit was filed by
material concealment of fact and the decree
was obtained by playing fraud on the court
which can be considered at any stage, if
comes to light and the suit can be dismissed
on this ground alone because no relief can be
granted in such case and as to whether the
suit could have been filed on behalf of the
Custodian, Enemy Property without his
permission or authority. Therefore the
application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC
filed by the defendant-respondent is liable to
be allowed and the additional evidence
annexed with the same are liable to be taken
on record and an additional substantial
question of law arises, which is to be
formulated.

31. In view of above, the C.M.
Application No.06 of 2022 filed under
Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. is allowed and the
documents annexed therewith as Annexure
No.A-1 to A-7 are taken on record. The
following substantial question of law is
formulated besides the two substantial
questions of law formulated by this court,
by means of order dated 23.05.2005:-

"(iii) Whether the suit for
permanent injunction filed by the
plaintiff-appellant
suffers
from
material concealment of facts and
liable to be dismissed on this
ground?"

32. List on 28th of November,
2024 for further hearing.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 284
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 601 of 2024

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Shivani Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sudhir Singh Raghuvanshi

Allahabad High Court Rules-Chapter VIII
Rule 5-U.P. Revenue Code,2006-Section
67(a)-U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms
Act,1950-Section
123(1)-
quashing
of
disciplinary
proceedings
initiated against the respondent(a Deputy
Collector)-respondent
was
issued
a
charge-sheet
and
a
supplementary
charge-sheet during her tenure as Sub-
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
285
Divisional
Magistrate-the
charges
alleged
negligence,
procedural
violations,
and
illegal
orders
favoring private individuals at the
cost
of
public
property-the
respondent was found guilty in the
inquiry
report
dated
03.08.2024Held-Disciplinary
proceedings
against public officials exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers are
permissible when there is evidence
of
misconduct,
negligence
or
malafide
intent-The
single
judge
erred in quashing the charge-sheets
without examining the evidence or
providing the State an opportunity
to file a response-The appellants are
directed to conclude the disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent
in furtherance of the chargesheets
issued against the respondent and
enquiry
report
dated
03.08.2024
expeditiously.(Para 1 to 36) (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Zunjarro Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs U.O.I. & ors.
(1999) 7 SCC 409

2. Abhay Jain Vs HC of Raj. (2022) 13 SCC 1

3. U.O.I. Vs Duli Chand (2006) 5 SCC 680

4. U.O.I. Vs K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56

5. Govt. of T.N. Vs K.N. Ramamurty (1997) 7
SCC 101

6. Ramesh Chander Singh Vs HC of Alld. &
anr.(2007) 4 SCC 247

7. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs St. of U.P. (2023) SCC
OnLine All 3185

8. Hari Om Rastogi Vs St. of U.P. (2022) SCC
Online All 2305

9. Ministry of Defence Vs Prabhash Chandra
Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565

(Delivered by Hon'ble Attau Rahman
Masoodi, J. & Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

C.M. Application No.1 of 2024
(Application for condonation of delay in
filing the Special Appeal)

1. Heard Sri Anand Kumar Singh,
the learned Standing Counsel appearing for
the appellants - State of U.P. & its Officers
and Sri Ratnesh Chandra, the learned
counsel for the sole respondent.

2. Vakalatnama filed on behalf of
the sole respondent by Sri Ratnesh chandra,
Advocate is taken on record.

3. The instant intra-Court Appeal
filed by the State is delayed by 53 days as
on 07.11.2024.

4. The appeal is accompanied with
an application seeking condonation of
delay supported by an affidavit. In the
affidavit filed in support of the delay
condonation application, we find that just
and plausible reasons have been disclosed
by
the
applicants-appellants
seeking
condonation of delay.

5. In absence of any objection and
the explanation offered being bona fide, the
application for condonation of delay is
allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is
condoned.

6. The appeal may be assigned a
regular number.

Order
on
memo
of
Special
Appeal

7. By means of the instant intraCourt Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule
5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, the
appellants have challenged the validity of a
judgment and order dated 08.08.2024
passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge of this
286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court in Writ A No.6001 of 2024, whereby
a charge-sheet dated 08.09.2022 and a
supplementary
charge-sheet
dated
29.11.2022 issued against the respondent
have been quashed and the Inquiry Officer
has been mandated not to proceed further in
pursuance of the aforesaid charge sheet and
the supplementary charge-sheet.

8. Briefly stated, facts of the case
are that the respondent was appointed as a
Deputy Collector in the year 2015 and by
means of an order dated 23.10.2021, she
was
posted
as
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate/Deputy Collector, Tehsil Tiloi,
District Amethi. An Office Memorandum
dated
16.07.2022
placed
her
under
suspension
in
contemplation
of
departmental disciplinary proceedings. The
Commissioner, Ayodhya Division, Ayodhya
was appointed as Inquiry Officer as to
conduct inquiry against the respondent.
Upon a representation dated 05.08.2022
submitted by the respondent, the Inquiry
Officer was changed and Commissioner,
Prayagraj
Division,
Prayagraj
was
appointed the Inquiry Officer.

9. On 08.09.2022, the Inquiry
Officer issued a charge-sheet containing as
many as eleven charges against the
respondent. A supplementary charge-sheet
containing two additional charges was
issued to her on 29.11.2022.

10. An office memorandum dated
29.05.2023 was issued during pendency of
the enquiry whereby her suspension was
revoked in furtherance of a representation
dated 03.03.2023.

11. Charge Nos.1 to 10 related to
the numerous suits for declaration under
Section 144 of the U.P. Revenue Code,
2006, some of which had been decided
without issuing the mandatory 60 days'
notice to the State/Gaon Sabha under
Section 80 C.P.C. and Section 106
Panchayati Raj Adhiniyam, through some
suits Banjar Lands or Naveen Parti Lands
were declared to have vested in certain
private individuals on the basis of their
illegal possession against the relevant legal
provisions and evidence in order to provide
undue benefit to them, in some cases public
utility lands vesting in the State were
recorded in the revenue records as
Bhoomidhari Land of certain private
individuals, in some cases Forest land was
recorded in the name of private individuals
in illegal occupation thereof and numerous
cases were decided without hearing the
version of the State/Gaon Sabha, against
the evidence on record and established
legal position, in a clandestine manner after
coming into direct contact with the litigants
outside the Courts and, thus, illegal orders
were passed by recording wrong facts in
order to provide benefit to the claimants,
thereby causing loss of public property.

12. The first charge in the
supplementary charge-sheet was that the
respondent had misused her position and
the judicial process for granting undue
benefit to the various persons, without
hearing
the
version
of
the
State
Government in as many as 34 cases under
Section 67 (a) of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006
/ Section 123 (1) U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The second
supplementary
charge
against
the
respondent was that she had allotted
numerous Abadi sites in favour of various
ineligible persons named in the charge.

13. The respondent had filed the
writ petition seeking quashing of the
aforesaid charge-sheet dated 08.09.2022
and supplementary charge-sheet dated
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
287
29.11.2022, on 29.07.2024. On 01.08.2024,
the learned Counsel for the State of U.P.
was granted time to seek instructions on the
point that if any charge-sheet has been
issued without jurisdiction and the charges
are non est in the eyes of law as to how
such charge-sheet may be issued against the
petitioner. Thereafter the Writ Petition was
listed on 08.08.2024, when it was allowed,
without giving an opportunity to the
opposite parties to file a counter affidavit
and only after giving an opportunity to seek
instructions regarding a limited ground, as
aforesaid.

14. Relying upon the decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of
Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of
India & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 409 and
Abhay Jain v. High Court of Rajasthan:
(2022) 13 SCC 1, the Writ Court held that a
person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers may not be subjected to a
departmental trial if there is any error in
any order passed by the authority. If a
judicial or a quasi-judicial authority is
subjected to departmental trial for his
orders, he/she may be afraid of passing
orders. It is recorded in the judgment dated
08.08.2024 that as per instructions provided
to the learned Standing Counsel, the orders
in question passed by the respondent had
been recalled.

15. While assailing the aforesaid
order, Shri Anand Kumar Singh, the learned
Standing Counsel has submitted that the Writ
Court has not appreciated relevant legal
position in its correct perspective. Zunjarrao
Bhikaji Nagarkar (Supra) was decided by a
Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court by placing
reliance upon some earlier judgments. The
learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance
on a subsequent three Judge Bench in the
case of Union of India v. Duli Chand:
(2006) 5 SCC 680, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to an earlier three
Judge Bench in the case of Union of India v.
K. K. Dhawan: (1993) 2 SCC 56, wherein it
was noted that the view that no disciplinary
action could be initiated against an Officer in
respect of judicial or quasi-judicial functions,
was wrong.

16. The learned Standing Counsel
further submitted that the enquiry against the
respondent already stands concluded and
Enquiry Officer - Commissioner, Prayagraj
Division, Prayagraj has prepared his report on
03.08.2024, but as the same had not been
received by the State Government till the
instructions were sent to the learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel in
furtherance of the order dated 01.08.2024
passed by the Writ Court, the same could not
be placed before the writ Court.

17. A copy of the enquiry report
dated 03.08.2024 has been annexed with the
Special Appeal, which shows that the
respondent has participated in the enquiry
proceedings. The respondent has been found
to have decided cases in great haste - in some
cases, within 12 days, without following the
mandate of the substantive as well as the
procedural law, negligently and in bad faith,
thereby causing loss to the State. In one case,
she delivered her judgment after keeping the
same reserved for more than 4 months,
whereas normally reserved judgments are to
be delivered within 1 month. Charges no. 1 to
9 and supplementary charges no. 1 and 2
have been proved and it has been found that
the respondent was guilty.

18. Charge no. 11 has been
partially proved and although it has been
found that the respondent has decided as
many as 17 Regular Suits under Section
288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
144 of the U.P. Revenue Code within 12 to
43 days without following the procedure
laid down by law in a manifestly negligent
manner, it could not be proved that the
respondent had contacted the beneficiaries
and had obtained any illegal advantage
from them. Charge no. 10 has not been
proved. As the charge-sheet and the
supplementary charge-sheet have been
quashed, no action can be taken against the
respondent in spite of the fact that she has
been found guilty of numerous charges.

19. It was held in K. K. Dhawan
(Supra) that: -

"28. Certainly,
therefore,
the officer who exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial
powers
acts
negligently or recklessly or in order
to confer undue favour on a person
is not
acting
as
a
Judge.
Accordingly, the contention of the
respondent has to be rejected. It is
important to bear in mind that in
the present case, we are not
concerned with the correctness or
legality of the decision of the
respondent but the conduct of the
respondent in discharge of his
duties as an officer. The legality of
the orders with reference to the
nine
assessments
may
be
questioned in appeal or revision
under the Act. But we have no
doubt in our mind that the
Government is not precluded from
taking the disciplinary action for
violation of the Conduct Rules.
Thus,
we
conclude
that
the
disciplinary action can be taken in
the following cases:

29. Where the officer had
acted in a manner as would reflect
on his reputation for integrity or
good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) if there is prima facie
material to show recklessness or
misconduct in the discharge of his
duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a
manner which is unbecoming of a
Government servant;
(iv)
if
he
had
acted
negligently or that he omitted the
prescribed conditions which are
essential for the exercise of the
statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order
to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated
by corrupt motive, however small
the bribe may be because Lord
Coke said long ago "though the
bribe may be small, yet the fault is
great".
29. The instances above
catalogued are not exhaustive.
However, we may add that for a
mere technical violation or merely
because the order is wrong and the
action not falling under the above
enumerated instances, disciplinary
action is not warranted. Here, we
may utter a word of caution. Each
case will depend upon the facts
and no absolute rule can be
postulated.
(Emphasis added)

20. The decision in K. K. Dhawan
(Supra) was followed in Government of
Tamil Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurty: (1997)
7 SCC 101.

21. In Duli Chand (Supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that these
earlier decisions were considered by the
two Judge Bench in Zunjarrao Bhikaji
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
289
Nagarkar (Supra) but the Court appears to
have reverted back to the earlier view of
the matter where disciplinary action could
be taken against an Officer discharging
judicial functions only when there was an
element of culpability involved. The three
Judge Bench held that Nagarkar case
(Supra) was contrary to the view expressed
in K. K. Dhawan case (Supra). The
decision in K. K. Dhawan (Supra) being
that of a Larger Bench would prevail. The
decision in Nagarkar (Supra) case therefore
does not correctly represent the law.

22. Therefore, the law laid down
by the three Judge Bench in Union of
India v. K. K. Dhawan (Supra), as
affirmed in Union of India v. Duli Chand
(Supra), would govern the field.

23. Learned counsel for the
respondent has relied upon a subsequent
decision of a three Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of
Allahabad and Anr.: (2007) 4 SCC 247,
wherein
the
Supreme
Court
was
considering an Appeal filed by a Judicial
Officer against a major punishment order of
withholding of two annual increments with
cumulative effect, which, after dismissal of
a writ petition filed by the Officer, was
enhanced to reduction in rank. The only
charge against the Officer was that he had
granted a bail on insufficient grounds. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that granting
bail to accused pending trial is one of the
significant functions to be performed by a
Judicial Officer. The bail order passed by
the Officer had not been challenged. The
reasons assigned in the bail order could not
be said to be totally unwarranted or
superfluous.
In
the
aforesaid
factual
background, the Hon'ble supreme Court
held that: -
"We fail to understand as
to how the High Court arrived at a
decision to initiate disciplinary
proceedings solely based on the
complaint, the contents of which
were not believed to be true by the
High Court. If the High Court were
to initiate disciplinary proceedings
based on a judicial order, there
should have been strong grounds to
suspect officer's bona fides and the
order itself should have been
actuated
by
malice,
bias
or
illegality..."
(Emphasis added)

24. Even in Ramesh Chander
Singh (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
followed and affirmed the law laid down in
Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (Supra) by
stating that: -

"17. In Zunjarrao
Bhikaji
Nagarkar v. Union
of
India his
Court held that wrong exercise of
jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial
authority or mistake of law or
wrong interpretation of law cannot
be
the
basis
for
initiating
disciplinary proceeding. Of course,
if the judicial officer conducted in a
manner as would reflect on his
reputation or integrity or good faith
or there is a prima facie material to
show recklessness or misconduct in
discharge of his duties or he had
acted in a manner to unduly favour
a party or had passed an order
actuated by corrupt motive, the
High Court by virtue of its power
under
Article
235
of
the
Constitution
may
exercise
its
supervisory
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless,
under
such
circumstances it should be kept in
290 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
mind that the Judges at all levels
have to administer justice without
fear or favour. Fearlessness and
maintenance
of
judicial
independence are very essential for
an efficacious judicial system.
Making adverse comments against
subordinate judicial officers and
subjecting
them
to
severe
disciplinary
proceedings
would
ultimately harm the judicial system
at the grassroot level."

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
also took into consideration the following
peculiar facts of the case in Ramesh
Chander Singh (Supra): -

"18. Apart from the merits
of the case before us, we have also
gone into the confidential reports of
the appellant officer. His integrity
and honesty
had
never
been
doubted at any point of time. In
some of the confidential reports
except stating that the appellant
officer was not having smooth
relationship with the advocates, no
other adverse remarks had been
entered. Two senior Judges of the
High Court have entered in his
confidential
register
that
the
appellant is an officer of honesty
and integrity. The fact that it was a
case of daylight murder wherein
two persons died, is not adequate
to hold that the accused were not
entitled to bail at all. Passing
order on a bail application is a
matter of discretion which is
exercised by a judicial officer with
utmost responsibility. When a coaccused had been granted bail by
the High Court, the appellant
cannot be said to have passed an
unjustified order granting bail,
that too, to an accused who was a
student and had been in jail for
more than one year. If at all, the
inspecting
Judge
had
found
anything wrong with the order, he
should have sent for the officer and
advised him to be careful in future.
The punishment of reverting the
appellant to the post of Civil Judge
(Senior Division), in the facts and
circumstances of this case could
only be termed as draconian and
unjust. The appellant had been in
the cadre of District Judge for eight
years at the time this grave
punishment of reversion to a lower
rank was imposed on him. In our
opinion,
the
punishment
was
clearly disproportionate to the
lapse
alleged
to
have
been
committed by him. The imposition
of the punishment of withholding
two increments with cumulative
effect
also
appears
to
be
disproportionate to the alleged
lapse."
(Emphasis added)

26. The observations made in an
order passed while scrutinizing the merits
of the punishment order after completion of
a full-fledged disciplinary enquiry cannot
form the basis of quashing a charge sheet
without a challenge having been made to
the final outcome of the disciplinary
proceedings.

27. The learned Counsel for the
respondent has also placed reliance on a
judgment in the case of Anjali Chaurasiya
v. State of U.P.: 2023 SCC OnLine All
3185, wherein a disciplinary proceeding
under U.P. Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999 was initiated
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
291
against
an
Assistant
Commissioner,
Commercial Tax on the ground that she had
violated provisions of the Goods and
Service Tax Act as she, by arranging wrong
facts, evidences and fabricated documents
at her own convenience as well as with the
collusion of traders, declared less valuable
and less taxable plastic scraps in place of
more valuable and more taxable metal/nonmetal items and deposited very less amount
in the State treasury instead of required
tax/penalty, which caused revenue loss to
the Government. The appellant was placed
under suspension. The suspension order
was stayed by the Writ Court but the
authorities were granted liberty to proceed
with the disciplinary proceedings. In appeal
against the order passed by the Writ Court,
a coordinate Bench of this Court noted that
the order passed by the appellant, which
formed the basis for her suspension and
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings
against her, had not been revised or
cancelled by the respondents. Rather, a
conscious decision was taken not to take
any action against the order passed by the
appellant. The Division Bench held that
when the respondents themselves had
allowed the order passed by the appellant to
attain finality and they had taken a
conscious decision not to challenge the
order, the disciplinary proceedings initiated
on the basis of a mere suspicion raised on
the basis that the assessee has deposited the
penalty within a very short span of time
after passing of the order, appears to be no
good ground for initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant. The
Bench held that: -

"The
disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant
have been initiated merely because
the assessee has deposited the
penalty within a very short span of
time which raised a suspicion with
regard to the penalty order passed
by the appellant. In Zunjarrao
Bhikaji
Nagarkar (Supra),
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
has
categorically
held
that
the
disciplinary proceedings against
an officer cannot take place on
information, which is vague and
indefinite and suspicion has no
role to play in such matters when
the
department
has
taken
a
conscious
decision
not
to
challenge the order passed by the
appellant and has allowed the
same
to
attain
finality. Prima
facie, it appears at this stage that
the disciplinary proceedings cannot
be drawn against the appellant to
punish her for having passed the
aforesaid order."

(Emphasis added)

28. In Anjali Chaurasiya (Supra),
the interim order passed by the Writ Court
whereby the authorities were granted
liberty to proceed with the disciplinary
proceedings, was stayed and the Writ
Petition was left open to be decided on its
merits. In Anjali Chaurasiya (Supra), the
solitary order passed by the appellant,
which formed the basis for her suspension
and initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against her, had not been revised or
cancelled by the respondents. Rather, a
conscious decision was taken not to take
any action against the order passed by the
appellant. In the present case, numerous
orders passed by the respondent were
challenged and all of those have been set
aside. The facts of the present case are in
no manner similar to the core fact which
had formed the basis of the order passed in
Anjali Chaurasiya (Supra) and, therefore,
292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the aforesaid judgment would be of no
avail to the respondent in view of the law
laid down in K. K. Dhawan (Supra) that
"Each case will depend upon the facts and
no absolute rule can be postulated".

29. The learned Counsel for the
respondent has lastly relied upon a
judgment of a coordinate Bench in Hari
Om Rastogi v. State of U.P.: 2022 SCC
OnLine All 2305. The appellant in that case
was a Consolidation Officer, who was
issued a charge sheet containing two
charges stating that in two cases, he had
passed mutation orders in respect of land
recorded in the name of Gram Sabha, in
favour of certain private individuals,
causing loss to Gram Sabha. The appellant
claimed
he
was
not
provided
any
documents and no oral evidence was
recorded on behalf of the establishment.
The appellant too was not examined and an
ex parte inquiry report was submitted by
the Inquiry Officer. The disciplinary
authority issued a show cause notice to the
appellant against the proposed major
punishment, to which he submitted a
detailed reply asserting that both the
charges were not proved. Meanwhile, the
appellant
retired
from
service
on
30.04.2008. On 09.07.2008, he was served
with another show cause notice based on
the existing inquiry report, requiring him to
answer why the penalty of 50% reduction
of pension and 50% deduction of gratuity
be not awarded. The appellant submitted a
reply disputing the truth of the charges as
well as the fact that these were proved. The
respondents passed a punishment order
dated
03.08.2012,
imposing
10%
of
permanent reduction in pension payable
and 50% deduction, each from the pension
and the gratuity. The Writ Court held
that"The inquiry officer has dealt in the
inquiry as to how due procedure was not
followed by the petitioner and that required
precautions were not adhered to. I found
merit in the argument of learned counsel
for petitioner that Inquiry Officer has
scrutinized the orders like an Appellate
Authority and not like an Inquiry Officer.
The finding of loss are not supported by
any evidence or valuation of land. No
witness was examined from Gram Sabha. It
was also not noticed by Inquiry Officer that
one order was passed only in compliance of
an earlier order. The record was not
verified in absence of original record which
remained untraceable. The Inquiry Officer
has proceeded with inquiry like an
Appellate Authority and failed to decide
whether
any
grave
misconduct
was
committed or any pecuniary loss was
caused to Gaon Sabha." However, the Writ
Court merely held that the punishment was
very harsh and shockingly disproportionate
and it was set aside and the matter was
remanded. In Appeal, the coordinate Bench
held that: -

"17...Once
the
learned
Single Judge has held, and in our
opinion rightly so, that it was not
the business of the Inquiry Officer
or the Disciplinary Authority to
scrutinize the appellant's order
passed in a judicial capacity, like
an Appellate Authority, the findings
on the charges by the Inquiry
Officer and its acceptance by the
Disciplinary Authority, are bad in
law.
* * *
21. There is no cavil here
that
the
respondents
did
not
examine witnesses or led oral
evidence to prove the charges
against the appellant. The charges
were held proved, on the basis of
the Inquiry Officer going through
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shivani Singh
293
the records, that may constitute
material, but not evidence in the
absence of proof by oral evidence.
The learned Single Judge has also
held that no witness was examined
from the Gaon Sabha. Thus, the
inquiry
that
has
led
to
the
impugned order of punishment is
beset by a fundamental procedural
flaw, that goes to the root of the
matter,
on
account
of
nonproduction
of
evidence,
particularly oral evidence before
the
Inquiry
Officer
by
the
establishment.
* * *
24. In the present case, the
charge against the appellant is
about passing orders directing
mutation on the basis of earlier
orders, where original record had
remained untraceable. He has
passed an order of mutation i.e.
subject of the first charge, acting
on a copy of the order passed 10-12
years ago, where the records are
said to have been destroyed by fire.
The order, subject matter of the
other charge, was also passed in
haste, without taking precautions.
But, none of the orders, as the
learned Single Judge has held on
perusal of records, were evidently
passed to extend any undue benefit
to anyone nor the appellant's
integrity was proved doubtful.
25. In our opinion, the
learned Single Judge has fallen
into an error in upholding the
charges in the first limb of the
order and then recording findings
in reference to the quantum of
punishment, that go to vitiate the
findings of the Inquiry Officer and
the impugned order made by the
Disciplinary Authority. The kind of
flaws that the learned Single Judge
has discerned in the process of the
inquiry and the approach of the
Inquiry
Officer,
including
the
orders
of
the
Disciplinary
Authority, the findings of the
Inquiry Officer and the impugned
order
adjudging
the appellant
guilty, had to be quashed."

The aforesaid order was passed in
view
of
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of the case where there was
no allegation of violation of any statutory
provision and not even of negligence in
performance of duty and these observations
were made while examining the validity of
the final order of punishment. It will not
apply to the present case where the chargesheets have been challenged without
conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings
and the respondent has been found to be
guilty of violation of settled principles of
law and also of negligence and lack of
good faith.

30. The law regarding scope of
interference with a charge-sheet issued
during
departmental
disciplinary
proceedings was explained by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Ministry of Defence v.
Prabhash Chandra Mirdha: (2012) 11
SCC 565 in the following words: -

"12. Thus, the law on the
issue can be summarised to the
effect that the charge-sheet cannot
generally be a subject-matter of
challenge as it does not adversely
affect the rights of the delinquent
unless it is established that the
same has been issued by an
authority not competent to initiate
the
disciplinary
proceedings.
294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Neither
the
disciplinary
proceedings nor the charge-sheet
be quashed at an initial stage as it
would be a premature stage to deal
with the issues. Proceedings are not
liable to be quashed on the grounds
that proceedings had been initiated
at a belated stage or could not be
concluded in a reasonable period
unless the delay creates prejudice
to the delinquent employee. Gravity
of alleged misconduct is a relevant
factor
to
be
taken
into
consideration while quashing the
proceedings."

31. When we examine the
facts of the present case in light of the
law laid down in the above referred
cases, it appears that the respondent
was charged and has been found guilty
of deciding not one or two, but
numerous cases in violation of the
provisions of procedural as well as
substantive law. All those orders have
been
recalled
by
the
subsequent
Presiding
Officer
of
the
Court
concerned. The respondent has been
found guilty of acting in a manner
which establishes lack of good faith or
devotion to duty. He has been found to
have acted negligently and he has
violated
the
prescribed
conditions
which are essential for the exercise of
the statutory powers.

32. Although it is recorded in
the order dated 01.08.2024 passed by
the
Writ
Court
that
"on
being
confronted on the point that if any
charge-sheet has been issued without
jurisdiction and the charges are non
est in the eyes of law as to how such
charge-sheet may be issued against
the petitioner, the learned Counsel
had sought time to seek specific
instructions on that point", in the
impugned judgment dated 08.08.2024
no finding has been recorded that the
charge-sheet has been issued by an
authority not competent to initiate the
disciplinary proceedings and no such
contention has been raised by the
learned Counsel for the respondent
even during submissions advanced in
opposition of the Appeal.

33. There is no allegation of
delay in initiation of the disciplinary
proceedings, rather the Writ Petition
challenging the charge sheets was
filed with a delay of two years.

34. In these circumstances, the
disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent cannot be quashed as per
the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
above
mentioned cases.

35. In view of the foregoing
discussion, we find ourselves unable
to concur with the view taken by the
Writ Court. Accordingly, the Special
Appeal is allowed. The judgment and
order dated 08.08.2024 passed in Writ
A No.6001 of 2024 is set aside and the
Writ Petition is dismissed.

36. The appellants are directed
to
conclude
the
disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent in
furtherance of the charge-sheet dated
08.09.2022 and the supplementary
charge-sheet dated 29.11.2022 issued
against the respondent and the enquiry
report dated 03.08.2024 expeditiously,
in accordance with the law. The
parties shall bear their own costs of
litigation.
11 All. Manoj Kumar Yadav & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
295
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 295
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 34275 of 2024

Manoj Kumar Yadav & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Applicants:
Ekansh Varma, Vishnu Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 420, 452, 504 & 506 - Against
summoning
order
-
Maintainability
-
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227 -
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
Sections 156(3), 200, 397(3) - St. raised
objection regarding
maintainability
of
instant application, and submitted that in
view
of
fact
summoning
order
and
revisional order was under challenge,
application was not maintainable since
applicants have alternative remedy of
filing petition u/a 227 - Further taken
recourse to Section 397(3) and bar
contained therein to submit that in cases
where
second
revision
was
not
maintainable,
applicants
cannot
take
recourse proceeding u/s 482 to bye pass
the bar. (Para 5)

Held, neither Article 227 nor Section 482
indicate any aspect ousting jurisdiction of
other - In such circumstances, provisions
of Article 227 and Section 482 operate on
concurrent
basis
providing
option
to
applicant to approach Court under either
provision. (Para 11)

Regarding complaint, complainant admitted
he had taken loan pertaining to moveable
property from Bank, did not repay -
Applicants, official of Finance Company,
initiated proceedings for recovery of loan
amount by arbitration proceedings, award
passed and due to this, complaint lodged
against applicants not to recover loan. (Para
14)

Serious contradiction in averments made in
complaint
regarding
injury
upon
complainant and his family members by
applicants - Till next date of listing,
proceedings shall remain stayed. (Para 15)

Application pending. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Madhu Limaye Vs The St. of Mah.; (1977)4
SCC 551, (Para 10)

2. Krishnan & anr. Vs Krishnaveni & anr.; AIR
1997 SC 987, (Para 14)

3. Prabhu Chawla Vs St. of Raj. & anr.; AIR 2016
SC 4245, (Para 6)

4. G. Sagar Suri & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
reported in (2000)2 SCC 636, (Para 7)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1.

Heard
learned
counsel
for
applicants
and
learned
Additional
Government
Advocate
appearing
for
opposite party no.1 State.

2. Issue notice to opposite party
no.2, returnable at an early date.

3. Application under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
has
been
filed
challenging
summoning order dated 16.11.2023 as well
as proceedings of Complaint Case No.326
of 2019; Amjad Khan versus Manoj Yadav
& Ors., under Sections 420, 452, 504 &
506 I.P.C., Police Station Babina, District
Jhansi as well as order dated 29.08.2024
passed in Criminal Revision Case No.42 of