# State of U.P. & Ors v. Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011

- **Citation:** (2021) 8 ILRA 708
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-08-05
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 147 of 2016
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-shyam-lal-425-s-s-2011-47296
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Law
-
Dismissal
-
Maintainability of the review petition on
the ground of dismissal of the Special
Leave
Petition
against
the
same
judgment. Mere rejection of a special leave
petition does not take away the jurisdiction of
the Court, Tribunal or Forum whose order
forms the subject-matter of petition for special
leave, to review its own order if grounds for
exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to
exist. The doctrine of merger would not apply
even when the order rejecting an SLP is a
speaking order (that is, where reasons have
been assigned for rejecting the petition for
special leave). But the law stated or declared
shall attract applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution. The reasons assigned in the order
expressing its adjudication (expressly or by
necessary implication) on point of fact or law
shall take away the jurisdiction of any other
Court, tribunal or authority to express any
opinion in conflict with or in departure from the
view taken by the Apex Court. (Para 9, 11)

In the present case, mere rejection of the
SLP vide order dated 29.7.2016 without
assigning any reasoning would not take
away the jurisdiction of this Court to review
its own judgment if grounds for exercise of
review jurisdiction exist. (Para 13)

B. Scope of Judicial Review - High Court,
as a Court of record, has a duty to itself
to keep all the records correctly and in
accordance with law. Hence, if any
apparent error is noticed by the High
Court in respect of any orders passed by
it, the High Court has not only power, but
a duty to correct it. (Para 19 to 21)

Review Petition allowed. Judgment dated
19.04.2016 is recalled and the Special Appeal
is restored to its original number for decision
afresh. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

## Text

708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2021)08ILR A708
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

Special Appeal No. 147 of 2016

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Ram Harakh

A.
Service
Law
-
Dismissal
-
Maintainability of the review petition on
the ground of dismissal of the Special
Leave
Petition
against
the
same
judgment. Mere rejection of a special leave
petition does not take away the jurisdiction of
the Court, Tribunal or Forum whose order
forms the subject-matter of petition for special
leave, to review its own order if grounds for
exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to
exist. The doctrine of merger would not apply
even when the order rejecting an SLP is a
speaking order (that is, where reasons have
been assigned for rejecting the petition for
special leave). But the law stated or declared
shall attract applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution. The reasons assigned in the order
expressing its adjudication (expressly or by
necessary implication) on point of fact or law
shall take away the jurisdiction of any other
Court, tribunal or authority to express any
opinion in conflict with or in departure from the
view taken by the Apex Court. (Para 9, 11)

In the present case, mere rejection of the
SLP vide order dated 29.7.2016 without
assigning any reasoning would not take
away the jurisdiction of this Court to review
its own judgment if grounds for exercise of
review jurisdiction exist. (Para 13)

B. Scope of Judicial Review - High Court,
as a Court of record, has a duty to itself
to keep all the records correctly and in
accordance with law. Hence, if any
apparent error is noticed by the High
Court in respect of any orders passed by
it, the High Court has not only power, but
a duty to correct it. (Para 19 to 21)

Review Petition allowed. Judgment dated
19.04.2016 is recalled and the Special Appeal
is restored to its original number for decision
afresh. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (Now known as
Khoday
India
Limited)
&
ors.
Vs
Sri
Mahadeshwara Sahakara, (2019) 4 SCC 376
(Para 5)

2. Kunhayammed & ors. Vs St. of Kerala & anr.,
(2000) 6 SCC 359 (Para 11)

3. Kamlesh Verma Vs Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC
320 (Para 15)

4. Perry Kansagra Vs Smriti Madan Kansagra,
(2019) 20 SCC 753 (Para 16)

5.F.C.I. & anr. Vs M/s Seil Ltd. & ors., (2008) 3
SCC 440 (Para 17)

6. S. Nagraj Vs St. of Kar., (1993) Supp. 4 SCC
595 (Para 21)

7. M.M. Thomas Vs St. of Kerala & anr., (2000)
1 SCC 666 (Para 21)

Present review petition seeks review of
the judgment and order dated 19.04.2016,
passed by coordinate Bench in Special
Appeal (D) no. 147 of 2016.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

(1) Heard Sri Dileep Kumar Gautam,
learned counsel for the petitioner/review
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011
709
petitioner and learned standing counsel for
the opposite parties.

(2) This review petition has been filed
by the petitioner-respondent in special appeal,
seeking a review of the judgment and order
dated 19.04.2016 passed by a co-ordinate
Bench in Special Appeal (D) no. 147 of 2016.

(3) The petitioner with respect to his
grievance that he was being treated as
Seasonal Collection Amin filed W.P. No. 425
(SS) of 2011 (Shyam Lal vs. State of U.P. and
Ors.) for direction to the opposite parties to
treat him as regular Collection Amin w.e.f.
03.07.1986, claiming the benefit of the
judgment dated 19.08.2006 passed in W.P.
No. 4031 (SS) of 2001 (Pratap Narain
Pandey vs. State of U.P. and Ors.). In Pratap
Narain Pandey, this court had quashed the
order dated 19.09.2000 impugned therein and
had directed the authorities to allow the
petitioner of that writ petition to work as
Regular Collection Amin since 05th June,
1986 for the purposes of seniority etc, except
the salary for the period during which he did
not work. The review petitioner was extended
the same benefit vide order dated 09.09.2011
but in the Special Appeal, the judgment dated
09.09.2011 was set aside and the Writ
Petition No. 425 (SS) of 2011 was dismissed
after condoning the delay. The Special Leave
Petition filed by the review petitioner was
dismissed
on
29.07.2016
by
Hon'ble
Supreme Court.

(4) A preliminary objection has been
raised by the learned Standing Counsel that
after dismissal of the S.L.P. against the
judgment under review, the review petition
is not maintainable.

(5) Sri Dilip Kumar Gautam has
submitted that the review petition is
maintainable, as the order of dismissal of
S.L.P. was without assigning any reason,
placing reliance on Khoday Distilleries
Ltd. (NOW KNOWN AS KHODAY
INDIA LIMITED) and Others vs. Sri
Mahadeshwara Sahakara [(2019) 4 SCC
376].

(6) Learned counsel for the review
petitioner has submitted that in compliance
of the judgment dated 09.09.2011, the
petitioner was given appointment on
13.09.2012
and
his
services
were
confirmed after completion of two years'
probation period on 16.01.2015, and he was
given benefit of seniority w.e.f. the year
1986 vide order dated 17.07.2015. The
special appeal was filed in the year 2016
after all these events had taken place but
without disclosing the facts correctly and
by concealing the material facts of the
confirmation of petitioner's services and
giving of seniority etc benefits. He has
submitted that the writ petition was decided
after giving opportunity for filling counter
affidavit to the State-opposite parties vide
order dated 27.01.2011, however, no
counter affidavit was filed, but in the
Special Appeal plea was taken that the
learned Single Judge without calling for
any counter affidavit and opportunity to
contest, allowed the writ petition, and
resultantly in the judgment under review, it
has been observed that the writ petition was
decided on the first day, which is factually
not correct. He has further submitted that
counsel for the respondent-petitioner could
not appear before this Court in appeal
therefore these facts could not be brought
to the notice of Hon'ble Court for its
consideration. However the primary duty in
this regard to disclose correct and complete
facts was on the appellant, who did not
discharge it. Non-consideration of these
facts has resulted in grave miscarriage of
justice as petitioner has been ousted from
710 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
service consequent to the judgment under
review.

(7) Learned Standing Counsel has
submitted that the judgment under review
does not suffer from any apparent error of
law and the review petition deserves to be
dismissed. However, he could not dispute
that the writ petition was not decided on the
same day but was decided after providing
opportunity of filing counter affidavit,
which was not filed. He also could not
dispute that the orders dated 13.09.2012,
16.01.2015 and 17.07.2015 passed by the
authorities, much prior to filing of the
Special Appeal, were not placed before the
Court in the special appeal.

(8)

We
have
considered
the
submissions advanced and have also
perused the material brought on record.

(9) We first proceed to consider and
decide the preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the review petition on
the ground of dismissal of the Special
Leave Petition against the same judgment.

(10) Order dated 29.07.2016 by which
SLP of the petitioner against the judgment
under review reads as follows:-

"The Special Leave Petition is
dismissed.

As a sequel to the above, pending
interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed of."

(11) The law on the above point is no
longer res-integra. In the case of Khoday
Distilleries
Limited
(supra),
Hon'ble
Supreme Court reiterated and followed the
law laid down in Kunhayammed and Ors.
vs. State of Kerala and Anr. [(2000) 6
SCC 359] in which it was held that mere
rejection of a special leave petition does not
take away the jurisdiction of the court,
Tribunal or Forum whose order forms the
subject matter of petition for special leave,
to review its own order if grounds for
exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to
exist. Where the order rejecting an SLP is a
speaking order, that is, where reasons have
been assigned for rejecting the petition for
special leave and are stated in the order still
the order remains one rejecting the prayer
for grant of leave to appeal. Here also the
doctrine of merger would not apply. But the
law
stated
or declared
shall
attract
applicability
of
Article
141
of
the
Constitution. The reasons assigned in the
order expressing its adjudication (expressly
or by necessary implication) on point of
fact or law shall take away the jurisdiction
of any other court, tribunal or authority to
express any opinion in conflict with or in
departure from the view taken by the Apex
Court. Paragraph 38 of the Kunhayammed
and Ors. (supra) reads as under:-

38. The review can be filed even
after SLP is dismissed is clear from the
language of Order 47 Rule 1(a). Thus the
words "no appeal" has been preferred in
Order 47 Rule 1(a) would also mean a
situation where special leave is not
granted. Till then there is no appeal in the
eye of law before the superior court.
Therefore, the review can be preferred in
the High Court before special leave is
granted, but not after it is granted. The
reason is obvious. Once special leave is
granted the jurisdiction to consider the
validity of the High Court's order vests in
the Supreme Court and the High Court
cannot entertain a review thereafter, unless
such a review application was preferred in
the High Court before special leave was
granted.
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011
711

(12) It is apt to refer paragraph 26 of
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Khoday Distilleries Limited
(supra).
Paragraph
26
is
quoted
hereinbelow:-

26. From a cumulative reading of
the various judgments, we sum up the legal
position as under:

26.1. The conclusions rendered
by the three Judge Bench of this Court in
Kunhayammed
and
summed
up
in
paragraph 44 are affirmed and reiterated.

26.2. We reiterate the conclusions
relevant for these cases as under:

"(iv) An order refusing special
leave to appeal may be a non-speaking
order or a speaking one. In either case it
does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does
not stand substituted in place of the order
under challenge. All that it means is that
the Court was not inclined to exercise its
discretion so as to allow the appeal being
filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to
appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives
reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then
the order has two implications. Firstly, the
statement of law contained in the order is a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court
within the meaning of Article 141 of the
Constitution. Secondly, other than the
declaration of law, whatever is stated in the
order are the findings recorded by the
Supreme Court which would bind the
parties thereto and also the court, tribunal
or authority in any proceedings subsequent
thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the
country. But, this does not amount to saying
that the order of the court, tribunal or
authority below has stood merged in the
order of the Supreme Court rejecting the
special leave petition or that the order of
the Supreme Court is the only order
binding as res judicata in subsequent
proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has
been granted and appellate jurisdiction of
Supreme Court has been invoked the order
passed in appeal would attract the doctrine
of merger; the order may be of reversal,
modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been
preferred or a petition seeking leave to
appeal having been converted into an
appeal before the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a
review petition is lost thereafter as
provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order
47 CPC."

26.3. Once we hold that law laid
down in Kunhayammed is to be followed, it
will not make any difference whether the
review petition was filed before the filing of
special leave petition or was filed after the
dismissal of special leave petition. Such a
situation is covered in para 37 of
Kunhayammed case."

(13) In view of the above, we find the
review petition to be maintainable and
mere rejection of the SLP vide order dated
29.07.2016
without
assigning
any
reasoning would not take away the
jurisdiction of this Court to review its own
judgment if grounds for exercise of review
jurisdiction exist.

(14) We now proceed to consider the
scope of review jurisdiction.

(15) The basic principles in which
review application can be entertained and
cannot be entertained have been eloquently
laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the
case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati
[(2013) 8 SCC 320]. Paragraph 20 under
712 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the heading "summary of principles" is
being reproduced hereunder:-

20. Thus, in view of the above, the
following grounds of review are maintainable
as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be
maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence, was not within knowledge of
the petitioner or could not be produced by
him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient
reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju
Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16
LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by
this
Court
in
Moran
Mar
Basselios
Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR
520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds
at least analogous to those specified in the
rule". The same principles have been
reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur
Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC
337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275]

20.2. When the review will not be
maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled
argument is not enough to reopen concluded
adjudications.

(ii)
Minor
mistakes
of
inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot
be equated with the original hearing of the
case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable
unless the material error, manifest on the
face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an
appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is reheard and corrected but lies
only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two
views on the subject cannot be a ground for
review.

(vii) The error apparent on the
face of the record should not be an error
which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii)
The
appreciation
of
evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court, it cannot be
permitted to be advanced in the review
petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable
when the same relief sought at the time of
arguing
the
main matter
had
been
negatived.

(16) In the case of Perry Kansagra v.
Smriti Madan Kansagra [(2019) 20 SCC
753], the Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope
and power of review has reiterated the
same principles. It is apt to reproduce
paragraph nos. 14 to 16, which are as
under:-

14. The issues that arise for our
consideration can broadly be put under two
heads:

14.1. (a) Whether the High Court
was
justified
in
exercising
review
jurisdiction and setting aside the earlier
judgment?

14.2. (b) Whether the High Court
was correct in holding that the reports of
the Mediator and the Counsellor in this
case were part of confidential proceedings
and no party could be permitted to use the
same in any court proceedings or could
place any reliance on such reports?

15. As regards the first issue,
relying on the decisions of this Court in
Inderchand Jain v. Motilal [Inderchand
Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663 : (2009)
5 SCC (Civ) 461] , Ajit Kumar Rath v. State
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011
713
of Orissa [Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of
Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596 : 2000 SCC
(L&S) 192] and Parsion Devi v. Sumitri
Devi [Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997)
8 SCC 715], it was submitted by the
appellant that the exercise of review
jurisdiction was not warranted at all.

15.1.
In
Inderchand
Jain
[Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC
663 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 461] it was
observed in paras 10, 11 and 33 as under:
(SCC pp. 669 & 675)

"10. It is beyond any doubt or
dispute that the review court does not sit in
appeal over its own order. A rehearing of
the matter is impermissible in law. It
constitutes an exception to the general rule
that once a judgment is signed or
pronounced, it should not be altered. It is
also
trite
that
exercise
of
inherent
jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing
any order.

11. Review is not appeal in
disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India
[Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6
SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] this
Court held: (SCC p. 251, para 56)

''56. It follows, therefore, that the
power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake but not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised
within the limits of the statute dealing with
the exercise of power. The review cannot be
treated like an appeal in disguise.'

33. The High Court had rightly
noticed the review jurisdiction of the court,
which is as under:

''The law on the subject--exercise
of power of review, as propounded by the
Apex Court and various other High Courts
may be summarised as hereunder:

(i) Review proceedings are not by
way of appeal and have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) Power of review may be
exercised when some mistake or error
apparent on the fact of record is found. But
error on the face of record must be such an
error which must strike one on mere
looking at the record and would not require
any long-drawn process of reasoning on the
points where there may conceivably be two
opinions.

(iii) Power of review may not be
exercised on the ground that the decision
was erroneous on merits.

(iv) Power of review can also be
exercised for any sufficient reason which is
wide enough to include a misconception of
fact or law by a court or even an advocate.

(v) An application for review may
be necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.'

In our opinion, the principles of
law enumerated by it, in the facts of this
case, have wrongly been applied."

15.2. In Ajit Kumar Rath [Ajit
Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, (1999) 9
SCC 596 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 192] , it was
observed: (SCC p. 608, para 29)

"29. In review proceedings, the
Tribunal deviated from the principles laid
down above which, we must say, is wholly
unjustified and exhibits a tendency to
rewrite
a
judgment
by
which
the
controversy had been finally decided. This,
we are constrained to say, is not the scope
of review under Section 22(3)(f) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985...."

15.3. Similarly, in Parsion Devi
[Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8
SCC 715] the principles were summarised
as under: (SCC p. 719, para 9)

"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a
judgment may be open to review inter alia
if there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error which is not
self-evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
714 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. it is not permissible
for an erroneous decision to be "reheard
and corrected". A review petition, it must
be remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in
disguise".

16. On the other hand, reliance
was placed by the respondent on the
decision in BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club
[BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4
SCC 741] to submit that exercise in review
would be justified if there be misconception
of fact or law. Para 90 of the said decision
was to the following effect: (SCC p. 765)

"90. Thus, a mistake on the part
of the court which would include a mistake
in the nature of the undertaking may also
call for a review of the order. An
application for review would also be
maintainable if there exists sufficient
reason therefor. What would constitute
sufficient reason would depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case. The words
"sufficient reason" in Order 47 Rule 1 of
the Code are wide enough to include a
misconception of fact or law by a court or
even an advocate. An application for
review may be necessitated by way of
invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem
gravabit."

(17) It has thus been settled in law
that;

(i) the power of review may be
necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine ''actus curiae neminem gravabit'
which means that no act of the court in the
course of whole of the proceedings does an
injury to the suitors in the court. It has been
held in Food Corporation of India and
Another vs. M/s Seil Ltd. & Ors. [(2008)
3 SCC 440] that a writ court exercises its
power of review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India itself and while
exercising the jurisdiction it not only acts
as a court of law but also as a court of
equity. A clear error or omission on the part
of the court to consider a justifiable claim
would be subject to review, amongst others,
on the ''actus curiae neminem gravabit'.

(ii) The mistake or error must be
apparent on the face of record i.e. that it
must strike one on more looking at the
record and would not require any long
drawn process of reasoning. It should not
be an error which has to be fished out and
searched. Such an error must also be
material which undermines the soundness
of the judgment or results in miscarriage of
justice. An error which may be apparent but
is of inconsequential import, that would not
furnish a ground for review.

(iii) An application for review
would also be maintainable for ''any other
sufficient reason', which expression has
been interpreted to mean a reason sufficient
on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C., which
are
wide
enough
to
include
a
misconception of fact or law by a court or
even an Advocate and what other grounds
would constitute sufficient reason depends
on the facts and circumstances of each
case.

(iv) There are limitations on the
exercise of review jurisdiction. Review
proceedings are not by way of appeal. It
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.
A rehearing of the matter is not permissible
in law. If there are two views possible, the
power of review cannot be exercised to
substitute the view already taken in the
judgment under review. It is not for an
erroneous decision to be ''reheard and
corrected' in review jurisdiction.
8 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Lal 425(S/S)2011
715

(18) Keeping in mind the above
principles, we now proceed to consider as
to whether the grounds on which review
has been filed exist, and if yes, whether on
such grounds review would be permissible.

(19) A perusal of the judgment dated
19.04.2016 shows that an error occurred
therein as this Court proceeded on the
premise that the writ petition was disposed
of on the ''first date' whereas it was not
disposed of on the first date but later on
after giving opportunity to the opposite
parties to file counter affidavit vide order
dated 27.01.2011. The error is apparent.
The Special Appeal has been allowed only
on the ground of laches in filing the writ
petition but this Court did not notice that
the State did not file any counter affidavit
before the writ court raising the plea of
laches. If the correct fact had been noted,
the State-appellant might not have been
permitted to raise a plea in special appeal
which was not raised before the learned
Single Judge, inspite of opportunity having
been granted. We are saying so, not for
substituting
the
view
taken
but
to
emphasize that the mistake which is
apparent is not minor or of inconsequential
import but is a material error.

(20) Most importantly, the petitioner
had been given appointment on 13.09.2012,
and his services were confirmed on
16.01.2015 and he was also given seniority
in his cadre vide order dated 17.07.2015
with some other benefits in compliance of
the order passed by the writ court and the
Special Appeal was filed thereafter, in April
2016, after about four and half years. These
facts had a bearing on the result of the
appeal but were not placed before the Court
in Special Appeal. Consequently, pursuant
to the judgment passed in Special Appeal, a
confirmed employee has been ousted from
service on 12/13.05.2016 on account of
appeal of the State being allowed. It was
the primary duty of the State-appellant to
have disclosed all the relevant facts
correctly. Non-disclosure or suppression of
material facts in our considered view would
be covered by ''any other sufficient cause'
which furnishes a ground for review and is
wide enough to include such a cause.

(21) At this stage, it would be apt to
refer the judgment in the case of S. Nagraj
vs. State of Karnataka [(1993) Supp. 4
SCC 595], wherein Hon'ble Apex Court
has observed that it is the duty of the Court
to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and
when it is brought to its notice that certain
of its orders were passed on a wrong or
mistaken assumption of facts and that
implementation of those orders would have
serious consequences. Again in the case of
M.M. Thomas vs. State of Kerala &
Another [(2000) 1 SCC 666] the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that the High Court, as
a Court of record, has a duty to itself to
keep all the records correctly and in
accordance with law. Hence, if any
apparent error is noticed by the High Court
in respect of any orders passed by it, the
High Court has not only power, but a duty
to correct it.

(22) For the aforesaid reasons, we are
of the considered view that the judgment
dated 19.04.2016 is liable to be reviewed
and recalled. The Special Appeal deserves
to be restored for hearing afresh.

(23) Accordingly, review petition is
allowed. Judgment dated 19.04.2016 is
recalled and the Special Appeal is restored
to its original number for decision afresh.

(24) List the Special Appeal before
appropriate Bench.
716 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2021)08ILR A716
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RITU RAJ AWASTHI, J.
THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 271 of 2021

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Sunder Singh Solanki & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Shailendra
Singh
Rajawat,
Shubham
Tripathi

A. Service Law - Reimbursement of
medical
bills
-
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servants
(Medical
and
Attendance) Rules, 2011 - The amount
of the medical bills shall be paid in terms
of 'Uttar Pradesh Government Servants
(Medical and Attendance) Rules, 2011',
particularly when the earlier Government
orders operating the field were not adequate
to grant the reimbursement of medical bills
and
expenses
incurred
by
Government
Servants and the Government itself had
framed these Rules for that purpose. (Para
11)

The Government Servant cannot be denied
the benefit of said Rules simply because at
the time of accident the said Rules were
not applicable. The Rules shall be made
available to all such cases where the
reimbursement of the medical bills and
expenses have not been settled by the
Government and the decision is pending in
this regard. (Para 12)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-3)
Present appeal assails the judgment and
order
dated
25.01.2021,
passed
by
learned Single Judge.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ritu Raj Awasthi, J.
&
Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh, J.)

1. Mr. Shailendra Singh Rajawat,
Advocate has accepted notice on behalf of
respondent no.1 and Mr. Shubham Tripathi,
Advocate has accepted notice on behalf of
respondent no.2, as such, no steps are
required to be taken for service of notices
on respondents.

2. Heard learned Standing Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr.
Sushil Kumar Singh, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 as
well as Mr. Shubham Tripathi, learned
counsel for respondent no.2.

3. This intra court appeal has been
filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of
Allahabad
High
Court
Rules,
1952,
challenging the judgment and order dated
25.01.2021, passed by learned Single Judge
in Writ Petition No.6063 (SS) of 2017;
Sunder Singh Solanki Vs. State of U.P. and
others.whereby the writ petition preferred
by respondent no.1 has been allowed and
the impugned order dated 29.09.2016 has
been set aside.

4. The special appeal has been filed
with a reported delay of 166 days as on the
date of filing of special appeal on
9.8.2021.The
special
appeal
is
accompanied with an application for
condonation of delay supported with an
affidavit.

5. The cause shown in the affidavit
filed
in
support
of
application
for