# State of U.P. & Ors v. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 419
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-13
- **Case number:** Second Appeal Defective No. 87 of 2017
- **Bench:** Prashant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-ors-v-vinod-kumar-chopra-ors-54247
- **Pages:** 28

## Text

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2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
419

77. The petition has no substance and the same is, therefore, dismissed.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 419
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

Second Appeal Defective No. 87 of 2017

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellant
Versus
Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether the appellants/State have demonstrated "sufficient cause" within the meaning of s.
5 of Limitation Act, 1963, so as to justify the condonation of an inordinate and unexplained delay of 4957 days
(or substantially reduced delay even after exclusion of time u/s 14), in filing the instant second appeal against
the impugned judgment and decree, thereby warranting adjudication of the appeal on merits by the High
Court.

Headnotes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.96 - Limitation Act, 1963 - ss.5, 14 - Condonation of delay -
Sufficient cause - Maintainability - The instant matter arises out of a suit for recovery instituted
by the plaintiffs (respondent nos. 1 and 2), who were engaged in the business of manufacturing
and supplying bricks, against the State authorities - Pursuant to an order dated 07.03.1992, the
plaintiffs supplied 35,000 bricks at the agreed rate of Rs. 875 per thousand, and additionally
supplied 8,000 bricks on further directions, out of the total supply, 15,024 bricks were returned
as substandard, while 28,476 bricks were retained by the defendants, valued at Rs. 24,966.50,
payable within three months, i.e., by 27.06.1992 - Upon failure of defendants to make payment,
the plaintiffs instituted Regular Suit No. 108 of 1995, which was decreed on 15.05.2000 - The
defendants preferred a delayed first appeal, which was dismissed on 23.07.2003 on the ground
of limitation as well as on merits, thereafter, a civil revision filed before the High Court was also
dismissed on 18.09.2015 as not maintainable with liberty to approach the appropriate forum -
Subsequently, the State filed the instant second appeal on 16.02.2017, accompanied by an
application for condonation of an inordinate delay of 4957 days.
Held: While dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the vital test is whether "sufficient cause"
has been made out - However, in cases involving bureaucratic inefficiency, the Court must examine whether
there is a valid explanation for the delay or merely an excuse has been set up - Though the two concepts may
sometimes overlap, there is a fine distinction between a genuine explanation and a mere excuse, which the
appellant is required to establish satisfactorily - Since the rule of limitation are based on principle of sound
public policy, hence it cannot be contended in a mechanical manner - The appellant has been pursuing a
trivial issue of Rs.24,966/- upto this Court - All the proceedings initiated after the dismissal of the civil suit
have been filed with the delay - In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, since sufficient cause is
not made out for condonation of delay in filing second appeal, the application for condonation of delay is
rejected - Accordingly, the second appeal also dismissed with costs. [Paras 56, 59 to 61] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
420 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors., Reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132; N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy, Reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123; Sridevi Datla v. Union of India and Ors, Reported in (2021)
5 SCC 321; Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 INSC 382; G. Ramegowda,
Major & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142; Special Tehsildar,
Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 634; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, reported
in (2005) 3 SCC 752; Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, reported in
(2012) 3 SCC 563; State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, reported in [1972] 2
SCR 874; Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363; State of Madhya Pradesh &
Ors. v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654; Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd.,
reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460; State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda, reported in (2021) 11 SCC
560; State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Shivamma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Karnataka Housing Board
and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/1262/2025; Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India, reported in (1974) 3
SCC 554; Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 701; Urban Improvement
Trust, Bikaner v. Mohan Lal, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 512; Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khajani, reported in
(2012) 8 SCC 781; Punjab State Power Corporation Limited Patiala and others v. Atma Singh Grewal,
reported in (2014) 13 SCC 666; Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and another;
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.56230 of 2024 - referred to

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963

List of Keywords
Second appeal defective; Condonation of delay; Delay of 4957 days; Sufficient cause; ss. 5, 14 Limitation Act;
Prescribed period; Explanation of delay; Procedural delay; Bona fide; Negligence; Laches; Deliberate inaction;
Casual and lethargic; Burden of proof; Maintainability; Civil revision; Liberty to approach appropriate forum;
Recovery suit; Dismissal on merits and limitation; Ex parte (not applicable); Sanction/approval process;
Impersonal machinery; Public interest; Justice-oriented approach; Technicalities of limitation; Finality of
litigation; Conduct of party; Rejection of appeal on ground of limitation.

Case Arising From
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Second Appeal Defective No. - 87 of 2017

From the Judgment and Decree dated 23.07.2003 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Court No.5,
Lakhimpur Kheri in Civil Appeal No.230 of 2001

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant:
Standing Counsel

Adv. for the Respondent:
Sushil Kumar Rastogi

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prashant Kumar, J.)

C.M. Application No.20593 of 2017

1. Heard Shri Anuj Kudesia, Additional Advocate General as well as Senior Advocate assisted
by Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the
appellant/State.
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
421

2. The second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 23.07.2003
passed by learned Additional District Judge, Court No.5, Lakhimpur Kheri in Civil Appeal No.230
of 2001 (Prabhagiya Van Adhikari and others v. Dev Kumar Chopra and others), whereby the
application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure
Code against the judgement and decree dated 15.05.2000 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge
(S.D.), Lakhimpur Kheri in Regular Suit No.108 of 1995 (Dev Kumar Chopra v. Prabhagiya Van
Adhikari and others) moved by the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been
rejected. This appeal was filed with the delay of 4957 days.

3. This is an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the
Limitation Act.

Factual matrix of the case are as follows:

4. The respondent nos.1 and 2 (plaintiffs) owned a brick-kiln and was in a business of
manufacturing bricks. The respondents supplied bricks to the Government and other government
agencies from time to time and whenever quotation was called for, they used to give quotation for
the same. In the year 1992, the defendant no.1/appellant no.2 sought for a quotation for 35,000 best
quality bricks. The same was given by the plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 and 2. On 07.03.1992 an
order was placed to provide 35,000 best quality bricks and to be delivered in the office of the
defendant no.1/appellant no.2. The agreed rate was Rs.875/- per thousand, which included
transportation, unloading and stacking. As per order the plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 and 2 supplied
35,000 bricks. The defendant no.1/appellant no.2 further directed him to provide additional 8,000
bricks, which were also supplied and transported, unloaded and stacked in the office of the
defendant no.2/appellant no.3. At that point of time, defendant no.1/appellant no.2 returned 15024
bricks, which were not upto the mark, however, the defendant no.1/appellant no.2 retained 28,476
bricks, which according to the agreement were valued Rs.24,966.50/-. All the bricks were supplied
on 27.03.1992. As per agreement the payment was to be made within three months. Accordingly,
the payment became due on 27.06.1992. After getting the bricks, the defendant no.1/appellant no.2
did not pay the amount. Hence, plaintiff preferred a suit for recovery of the amount. In this suit,
written statement was filed by the appellants. After hearing the parties, the civil court framed issues
and ultimately decreed the suit vide order dated 15.05.2000.

5. The appellants herein assailed this decree and judgement dated 15.05.2000 passed by the
civil court by preferring appeal bearing Civil Appeal No.230 of 2001 before the appellate court i.e.
Additional District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri. This appeal was filed after a delay of 1 year and 4
months and the same was rejected vide order dated 23.07.2003 on the ground of delay and on
merits.

6. Further after a delay of almost about 9 months, on an advice given by the counsel for the
appellants, a civil revision bearing Civil Revision No.61 of 2004 was filed before this Court on
21.04.2004, which got rejected vide order dated 18.09.2015, which is quoted below:
422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"Sri Adnan Ahmad, State Law Officer candidly states that this revision is not
maintainable in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Prem Wati and Anr. vs. Smt.
Munni Devi [2009(27)LCD 508].

Accordingly, revision is dismissed as not maintainable.

It will be open for the revisionist to approach appropriate forum in accordance with law,
if so advised."

7. After rejection of the civil revision, instant second appeal along with application for
condonation of delay has been filed on 16.02.2017 challenging the order dated 23.07.2003. The
Registry of this Court pointed out a delay of 13 years, 3 months and 26 days (4957 days). The
reasons for the delay mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation
application was that, the impugned order was passed on 23.07.2003, but due to some legal advice, a
civil revision was filed before this Court on 21.04.2004, which ultimately got dismissed on
18.09.2015 on the ground that the revision is not maintainable. However, this Court granted a
permission to the revisionist to approach any forum in accordance with law. This order was passed
on 18.09.2015 and after that the appellants sought permission from the Legal Department of the
State for filing the appeal. The permission was accorded on 04.11.2016. Thereafter the District
Forest Officer, Lakhimpur Kheri wrote a letter on 17.11.2016 and requested the Chief Standing
Counsel to file instant second appeal, who in turn advised the officer to bring documents along with
certified copy of the impugned decree and order. Certified copy was applied on 21.11.2016 and the
same was made available on 24.12.2016. Somehow the certified copy was not given to the counsel
and hence the certified copy of the decree was applied, which was made available on the same day.
Thereafter the instant second appeal was filed on 16.02.2017.

8. Since the reasons for condonation of delay were not properly explained, a supplementary
affidavit was filed, wherein it has been stated that against the impugned order dated 23.07.2003
passed by the civil court, the appellant had preferred a civil revision before this Court on
21.04.2004 and the same was dismissed on 18.09.2015. After passing the aforesaid order by the
High Court on 18.09.2015, the Regional Forest Officer, Sharda Nagar informed the same to the
Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri vide letter dated 30.09.2015. On 15.10.2015, the Divisional
Forest Officer, Kheri requested the Chief Standing Counsel for obtaining the certified copy of the
order dated 18.09.2015 and to furnish legal opinion regarding future course. The Regional Forest
Officer, Sharda Nagar vide his letter dated 12.01.2016 sent certified copy of the order dated
18.09.2015 to the Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri for his guidance, who sought for the legal
opinion and the same was submitted on 14.01.2016 by the State Law officer to the Divisional
Forest Officer on 18.01.2016. The Divisional Forest Officer on 26.01.2016 requested the District
Government Counsel (Civil), Lakhimpur Kheri to prepare short history of the case and submit his
legal opinion on the subject. The Regional Forest Officer, Sharda Nagar vide his letter dated
24.09.2016 submitted his synopsis of the case and his opinion to the District Government Counsel
(Civil) Lakhimpur Kheri. The Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri vide his letter dated
01.03.2016 requested the Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow for filing instant
second appeal. The Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow vide his letter dated
04.03.2016 sought further report on certain subject from the Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri,
who in turn submitted his report to the Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow on
15.03.2016. The Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow vide his letter dated
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
423
21.03.2016 requested the Principal Secretary, Forest and Forest Animal, U.P. to accord permission
to file second appeal, but the matter was kept pending before the Principal Secretary, Forest. The
Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow, he again on 28.07.2016 requested the
Principal Secretary, Forest to accord permission. Similar requests were also made on 12.09.2016
and 15.09.2016. The Divisional Forest Officer again asked the Regional Forest Officer to
personally contact the State Government for obtaining necessary approval for filing second appeal.
It is on 14.10.2016, the Chief Forest Conservator, Lucknow Division, Lucknow directed the
Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri to proceed for filing of the instant second appeal. The
Additional Legal Remembrancer accorded the approval for filing of the instant second appeal on
04.11.2016. Thereafter on 17.11.2016, the Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri requested the
Chief Standing Counsel for filing of instant second appeal and thereafter instant second appeal was
filed on 16.02.2017.

Submissions

9. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/State further submits that the delay so
occasioned in filing the appeal is a procedural delay and further the benefit of period for which the
civil revision was pending, may be granted to them as per the Limitation Act.

10. He further submits that in view of above, any delay so occasioned is not because of the
laches or laxity, but because of the procedure adopted by the State, wherein approval has to be
taken at various levels and accordingly, the delay may be condoned.

11. He also submits that the sufficient cause has been shown in the delay condonation
application and the delay, so occasioned, is purely a procedural. He further submits that while
condoning the delay, the Court should take liberal view looking into the facts that some delay do
happen as the file has to move at different levels before permission is granted and the appeal is
filed and hence a lenient view should be taken for the State and its instrumentalities as has been
laid down in various judgements passed by the Apex Court.

12. To buttress his arguments, he placed reliance on the judgement passed by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors., Reported in
(1996) 3 SCC 132, wherein it has been held as under:

"In G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors, v. Spl, Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore; [(1988) 2
SCR 198], it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel
could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is
a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of decision of private individuals. The law of
limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government,
424 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case
where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of
its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was,
therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial
verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on
Governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the
very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making
process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned."

(emphasis supplied)

13. He further placed reliance upon a judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, wherein it has been held as
under:

10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for
approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause
would transform into a good cause.

***

12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting
forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate.
This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari; [1969] 1 SCR 1006 and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah
Municipality; [1972] 2 SCR 874.

13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part
of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door
against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a
dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is
reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time
then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. ..."

(emphasis supplied)
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
425

14. Further he placed reliance on a judgement passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter
of Sridevi Datla v. Union of India and Ors, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 321, wherein it has been
held as under:

"27. It is evident that the term sufficient cause is relative, fact dependant, and has many
hues, largely deriving colour from the facts of each case, and the behaviour of the litigant who
seeks condonation of delay (in approaching the court). However, what can broadly be said to be
universally accepted is that in principle, the applicant must display bona fides, should not have
been negligent, and the delay occasioned should not be such that condoning it would seriously
prejudice the other party.

28. Keeping these principles in mind, it is relevant to consider whether the NGT's refusal
to exercise discretion, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was erroneous. The court is
conscious of the fact that exercise of discretion, per se, is a fact dependent one, and considerable
latitude should be given to the court or tribunal of the first instance, in the performance of that
task. Nevertheless, as decided, cases and judgments have shown that the exercise of discretion does
at times, call for appellate scrutiny by this court. This is one such. The appellant pleaded that since
the documentation attendant to the clearance granted to the Project Applicant was voluminous,
and expert as well as professional legal advice of the kind necessary to approach the NGT was not
available in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the procuring of relevant documents, and
correspondence with counsel in Delhi and drafting of the appeal entailed some delay.

***

30. In view of the foregoing findings, this court is of the opinion that the impugned order
of NGT has to be and is, therefore set aside. The delay in filing the appeal before the NGT is
hereby condoned; the parties shall now appear and proceed to argue the appeal on its merit, which
shall then be disposed in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order on
costs.

(emphasis supplied)

15. He also placed reliance upon a judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 INSC 382, wherein it has been
held as under:

"14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be
condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a
particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of
limitation.

15. In the present case, the filing of the Review Petition before the First Appellate Court
was with a delay of two years and four months and the Second Appeal before the High Court was
delayed by about a year from the date of the dismissal of the Review Petition i.e., 30.09.2019.
Pausing for a moment, it is necessary to indicate that in the present case, the dispute over title of a
land is not between private parties, but rather between the private party and the State. Moreover,
when the land in question was taken possession of by the State and allotted for public purpose to
426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Youth Welfare Department and the Collectorate and has continued in the possession of the
State, the claim of the State that it is government land cannot be summarily discarded. We find,
upon a perusal of the record, that the appellant had, in fact, filed an execution case for taking over
possession of the land, which would demonstrate clearly the admitted position that he was not in
possession thereof. Thus, the matter would, in our considered view, require adjudication on its own
merits due to various reasons, inter alia, the fact that a new district has been formed after the
initial claim of the appellant of being allotted the land in the years 1975-1976/1977-1978.
Therefore, the delay of 1537 days reckoned from 01.10.2015 i.e. when the First Appellate Court
decreed the suit, includes two years and four months delay in filing a Review Petition (which was
itself dismissed on the ground of delay by the First Appellate Court) and of about a year thereafter
for filing the Second Appeal before the High Court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, which, at the cost of repetition relate to land claimed by the State as government land and in
its possession, persuade us to not interfere with the Impugned Order. Relevantly, initially the suit
was dismissed by the Trial Court, which decision was reversed by the First Appellate Court.

***

18. Considering the above pronouncements and on an overall circumspection, we are of the
opinion that the Second Appeal deserves to be heard, contested and decided on merits. However, a
note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude in like matters henceforth and
in futuro, failing which the Court may not be as liberal.

(emphasis supplied)

16. Hence, in view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, a lenient view should be
taken against the State and its intrumentalities, and owing to the genuine problem, which they face,
the Court should take a lenient view while dealing with the condonation the delay. He further
submits that in this matter sincere efforts were made by the revenue authorities to avoid the delay
but in spite of that, the delay could not be avoided and the same is bona fide and that there is no
deliberate lapse on the part of the authorities.

17. Learned counsel, Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, further submitted that, though sincere
efforts were made by the revenue authorities to avoid delay but in spite of that, the delay could not
be avoided and the same is bonafide. There is no deliberate lapse on the part of authorities but due
to procedures involved, the delay was caused. He further submits that the State is a multifunctioning body and it has to follow the rules of obtaining sanction etc. for filing an appeal,
therefore, it took some time for the State to obtain sanction etc. from the highest authorities of the
State for preferring this appeal. The delay caused in filing the instant appeal may kindly be
condoned on the basis of ratio as laid down in various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

18. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that if the delay is not condoned, as the delay
was because of reasons beyond the control of the appellant, then it would be very harsh upon the
appellant and it will have far-reaching consequences. He further submits that the delay, which has
so occasioned in preferring the instant appeal was procedural and unintentional, hence the same
may be condoned and the instant appeal may be heard on merit.
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
427

Analysis

19. Looking into the facts of this case, it is apparent that the plaintiffs (respondents) were in a
business of manufacturing bricks and used to supply to the defendants. An order was placed by the
defendants to supply 35,000 best quality bricks at the rate of Rs.875/- per thousand. As per order
the plaintiff supplied 35,000 bricks, however, the defendant no.4 further directed him to provide
additional 8,000 bricks and all the bricks were provided and transported, unloaded and stacked in
the office of the defendant no.2 on 07.03.1992. At that point of time, defendant no.1 returned
15,024 bricks, which were not upto the mark, however, the defendant retained 28,476 bricks, which
according to the agreement were valued Rs.24,966.50/-and as per agreement entire payment has to
be made within three months. Accordingly the last date of payment is 27.06.1992, but the
defendants chose not to pay the same. Since the payment was not made, the plaintiff preferred a
suit for recovery against defendants being Civil Suit No.108 of 1995, which was decreed vide order
dated 15.05.2000.

20. This order was assailed by the appellants by filing civil appeal before the Additional
District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri and the appeal was filed with the delay of more than about 16
months and the appellate court vide order dated 23.07.2003 was pleased to dismissed the appeal on
the ground of delay as well as on merits.

21. This appellate order was challenged after a delay of about 11 months by preferring a civil
revision before this Court being Civil Revision No.61 of 2004, which was dismissed on the ground
of maintainability, however, a liberty was granted to the appellants to approach any other forum.
Thereafter the appellants have assailed the order passed by the appellate authority by means of the
instant second appeal.

22. The Registry of this Court has pointed out a delay of 13 years, 3 months and 26 days
(4957 days) in filing this appeal.

23. It was contended, because of wrong advice, a civil revision was filed on 21.04.2004 and
the same was kept pending and was dismissed on 18.09.2015. Hence the benefit of this period may
be given to the appellants and the delay, because of the pendency of the civil revision, may not be
included in the delay as the delay so occasioned was purely technical. The details of the delay in
filing the respective cases is as follows :

Case Number

Filed on

Decided on

Gap
in
filing
case

Gap
in
filing
second
appeal
from decision of
first appeal

Days lapse during
the
period
of
revision

Regular Suit No.108 of
1995

15.05.2000

N.A.

4957 days

4167 days

Civil Appeal No.230 of
2001
19.12.2001

23.07.2003

583 days

Civil Revision No.61 of
2004
21.04.2004

18.09.2015

273 days

Second Appeal Defective
No.87 of 2017
16.02.2017

N.A.

517 days
428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Days left after reduction of revision period:

Gap in filing Second Appeal after first appeal is: 4957 days

minus delay during pendency of civil revision: - 4167 days

Total gap left in filing second appeal is: = 790 days

minus statutory period of 90 days for filing second appeal:= 700 days

24. Even after granting the benefit the actual delay to condone will be 700 days. Even if this
Court do not consider the entire period lapse before final decision of civil revision still there is a
delay of 517 days, which requires sufficient explanation for condonation of delay.

25. The aforesaid chart showing the date of filing of various proceedings in the matter shows
that throughout the appellant had been casual, lethargic in safeguarding his interest. The application
for condonation of delay filed along with this appeal does not show any sufficient cause. However,
even an affidavit so filed by the appellant is nothing, but an eye wash. An attempt has been made to
explain the delay. The contents of the affidavit cannot be relied on as it is apparent that the same is
tailor made just to overcome the delay. In the affidavit, it has been pointed out that Divisional
Forest Officer had issued a letter on 26.01.2016.

The date had been filled without applying the mind and realizing that 26.01.2016 happened to
be Republic day and all the offices are mandatorily closed on that date. No offices are open or can
be opened on the Republic Day.

It is apparent that the reasons given in the affidavit are all fabricated.

Even keeping this issue aside, the original suit was decreed on 15.05.2000 on the basis of
some compromise. If the appellants were adversely affect by the order, they ought to have
challenged the same within time, but this order was challenged after a gap/lapse of about 583 days
and the appeal was also dismissed on the ground of delay. Still the appellant did not get up from
slumber and, challenged the same by filing a civil revision against after a further gap/lapse of about
273 days. The matter kept pending in the High Court for about 4167 days and thereafter it was
dismissed. Even after dismissal of the revision, which was well within the knowledge of the
lawyers of the appellants, instant second appeal has been filed with the gap/lapse of about 517
days. It is not a case that any of the order was passed ex parte. The counsel for the appellants were
present before the courts below on each and every proceedings.

The reasons given in the delay condonation application and along with supplementary
affidavit are not sufficient. The reasons are engineered. There has been inordinate delay in
challenging the civil court's order, challenging the appellate court's order and further rejection of
the civil revision assailing the civil court's order in this second appeal, which had not been
sufficiently explained in the delay condonation application.
2 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Chopra & Ors.
429

26. Before delving into the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court on limitation, this Court
would like to look into Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:

"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.- Any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.

Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.

(emphasis added)

27. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that an appeal may be
admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause
for not preferring the appeal within such time.

28. The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant, who is seeking condonation of
delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real
and bonafide and free of negligence. No doubt this expression has been constituted with justiceoriented approach so as to not punish an innocent litigant for circumstances beyond the control.
However, the Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference,
for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the
certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

29. The length of delay normally is not a deciding factor while condoning the delay rather the
conduct of the party seeking condonation of delay should be seen while doing so it should be seen
and the court should see whether the party had any reasonable deliberations during the prescribed
period. A long delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent, credible,
and convincing explanations. The proof required becomes stricter in proportion to the delay. The
longer time elapsed, the stronger the justification must be put forth.

30. Earlier the view of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Ramegowda, Major &
Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142 was that a
certain degree of latitude must be extended to the State and its instrumentalities in matters
concerning the condonation of delay, lest the rigidity of limitation operate to the detriment of
public interest. A certain degree of leeway ought to be accorded to the Government and Public
Authorities owing to the innate complexities in the way the State apparatus functions. Since the
way inherent bureaucracy moves certain laxity should be provided to them.

31. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chandra Mani (supra) reiterated that some
latitude must be shown to the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. It
observed that 'the State represents the collective cause of the community' and so a pragmatic view
430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ought to be adopted while dealing with applications for condonation of delay filed by public
authorities. It further emphasised that technicalities of limitation should not result in grave injustice
to the public interest, especially where the delay was not tainted by mala fides. The relevant
observations read as under: -

"11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the
cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this
Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause
to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State
are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the
State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making,
file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to
understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the
community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace
and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for
considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of
procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such
default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public
interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in
justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining
every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in
justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is
hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis
private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at
appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles
are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision
to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal
and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put
on the same footing as an individual.