# State of U.P v. Amin Uddin & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 3 ILRA 734
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2018-10-03
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 54830 of 2011
- **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Harsh Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-amin-uddin-ors-44389
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Urban Land (Ceiling &
Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sections 10(5),
10(6) - If possession had not been taken
either from the original tenure holder or
the answering respondents in accordance
with the provisions of the 1976 Act,
namely
after
complying
with
the
provisions of Section 10(5) & 10(6) of the
1976 Act, then the tenure holder and his
heirs the answering respondents are
entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act of
1999 (Para 5)

The entire proceedings including the issuance of
notice under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 against the
tenure holder were coram non judice as no
proceedings
could
have
been
undertaken
against a dead person. (Para 8)

It has been found that the possession memo
which was prepared on 22/23.3.1998, nowhere
indicates as to how possession was taken and
what is the name of witness in whose presence
such possession was taken. There is no name
indicated in the writ petition filed by the State or
even in the rejoinder affidavit. The name of the
Lekhpal
in
whose
presence
the
alleged
possession is said to have been taken has not
been mentioned and the printed proforma of the
possession memo is blank to that effect. (Para
12)

B. Under the provisions of Section 10(5) of
the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act,
1976 a period of 30 days is given to the
tenure
holder
to
handover
peaceful
possession, and then if the tenure holder
fails
to
deliver
possession
forcible
possession can be adhered to in terms of
Section 10(6) thereof. In the instant case
surprisingly enough even before the expiry of 30
days, the possession memo is said to have been
taken on 22/23.3.1998. This was clearly an
over-reach and a clear paper transaction which
establishes
that
the
petitioner-State
has
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Amin Uddin & Ors.
735
proceeded to assume possession only on paper
which is contrary to the provisions of Section
10(5) of the Act and is unlawful. (Para 13, 14)

The question of taking actual possession
also has not been established inasmuch as
the proceedings were against a tenure
holder who had already died without any
notice to the heirs or legal representatives
of the tenure holder. (Para 15)

C. The beneficiary gets rights only after
the proceedings attain finality after full
contest,
subject
to
any
judicial
proceedings including the higher judiciary.
Thus, unless finality is attached with regard to
the vesting of the land in the State, a
beneficiary would not get any better title than
the State and would succeed only if the land
vests in the State. If the land is held to be that
of the tenure holder and if the surplus
declaration is held to be invalid in judicial
proceedings, the vesting of the land in the State
would dissolve and would not be final and
complete so as to allow the beneficiary to claim
any right title or interest whatsoever.

The disputed land therefore will not vest in the
State as a result whereof the beneficiary,
namely the Saharanpur Development Authority
cannot step into the shoes of the State to claim
possession. (Para 16)

D. Jurisdiction of Collector - The actual
physical possession has been found to be in
favour of the answering respondents as per the
impugned order of the Collector itself which was
not an order under the 1976 Act but was a fact
finding order as per the direction of the High
Court dated 09.04.2009. In such circumstances
neither the impugned order can be described as
or without authority in law nor the State has
been able to establish that the finding recorded
by the Collector with regard to actual physical
possession is perverse. (Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed/rejected. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

## Text

734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. Accordingly, we are unable to
accept even the last argument raised by the
counsel for the petitioner. It would
otherwise frustrate the very object of the
Act of 2016 and would give rise to the
anarchy, existing earlier, in the hands of
Promoters.

23. So far as challenge to Rule 24 (a)
of U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority
(General) Regulation, 2019 is concerned,
the issue is kept open. It has not been
debated for the reason that an order of the
nature provided under Regulation 24 (a)
has not been passed in the case in hand.
Thus, there is no occasion for the petitioner
to challenge the vires of the said Regulation
in these proceedings However, as and when
the Authority invokes Regulation 24 (a) of
Regulation, 2019, the liberty is given to
challenge the validity. Thus, issue is kept
open for the aforesaid.

24. Thus, for all the reasons, we are
unable to accept any of the arguments
raised by the counsel for the petitioner. The
writ petition is accordingly dismissed,
however, with the liberty to avail the
remedy of appeal if other than the issue
decided by us remains, which may include
the issue towards interest.
----------
(2021)03ILR A734
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.10.2018

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J.
THE HON'BLE HARSH KUMAR, J.

Writ-C No. 54830 of 2011

State of U.P. ...Petitioner
Versus
Amin Uddin & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sanjay Goswami (A.C.S.C.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ashfaq Ahmad Ansari, Sri Madhusudan
Dikshit

A. Civil Law - Urban Land (Ceiling &
Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sections 10(5),
10(6) - If possession had not been taken
either from the original tenure holder or
the answering respondents in accordance
with the provisions of the 1976 Act,
namely
after
complying
with
the
provisions of Section 10(5) & 10(6) of the
1976 Act, then the tenure holder and his
heirs the answering respondents are
entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act of
1999 (Para 5)

The entire proceedings including the issuance of
notice under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 against the
tenure holder were coram non judice as no
proceedings
could
have
been
undertaken
against a dead person. (Para 8)

It has been found that the possession memo
which was prepared on 22/23.3.1998, nowhere
indicates as to how possession was taken and
what is the name of witness in whose presence
such possession was taken. There is no name
indicated in the writ petition filed by the State or
even in the rejoinder affidavit. The name of the
Lekhpal
in
whose
presence
the
alleged
possession is said to have been taken has not
been mentioned and the printed proforma of the
possession memo is blank to that effect. (Para
12)

B. Under the provisions of Section 10(5) of
the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act,
1976 a period of 30 days is given to the
tenure
holder
to
handover
peaceful
possession, and then if the tenure holder
fails
to
deliver
possession
forcible
possession can be adhered to in terms of
Section 10(6) thereof. In the instant case
surprisingly enough even before the expiry of 30
days, the possession memo is said to have been
taken on 22/23.3.1998. This was clearly an
over-reach and a clear paper transaction which
establishes
that
the
petitioner-State
has
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Amin Uddin & Ors.
735
proceeded to assume possession only on paper
which is contrary to the provisions of Section
10(5) of the Act and is unlawful. (Para 13, 14)

The question of taking actual possession
also has not been established inasmuch as
the proceedings were against a tenure
holder who had already died without any
notice to the heirs or legal representatives
of the tenure holder. (Para 15)

C. The beneficiary gets rights only after
the proceedings attain finality after full
contest,
subject
to
any
judicial
proceedings including the higher judiciary.
Thus, unless finality is attached with regard to
the vesting of the land in the State, a
beneficiary would not get any better title than
the State and would succeed only if the land
vests in the State. If the land is held to be that
of the tenure holder and if the surplus
declaration is held to be invalid in judicial
proceedings, the vesting of the land in the State
would dissolve and would not be final and
complete so as to allow the beneficiary to claim
any right title or interest whatsoever.

The disputed land therefore will not vest in the
State as a result whereof the beneficiary,
namely the Saharanpur Development Authority
cannot step into the shoes of the State to claim
possession. (Para 16)

D. Jurisdiction of Collector - The actual
physical possession has been found to be in
favour of the answering respondents as per the
impugned order of the Collector itself which was
not an order under the 1976 Act but was a fact
finding order as per the direction of the High
Court dated 09.04.2009. In such circumstances
neither the impugned order can be described as
or without authority in law nor the State has
been able to establish that the finding recorded
by the Collector with regard to actual physical
possession is perverse. (Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed/rejected. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Mohd. Islam & 3 ors. Vs St. of U.P., Writ
Petition No. 15864 of 2015, decided on
04.12.2017 (Para 12)
2. Rati Ram Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2018 (4) ALJ
338 (Para 12)

3. St. of U.P. Vs Hari Ram, 2013 (4) SCC 280
(Para 14)

4. Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs St. of Har. & ors.,
2012 (1) SCC 792 (Para 14)

5. Yasin Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2014 (4) ADJ 305
(Para 14)

6. Lalji Vs St. of U.P. & 2 ors., 2018 (5) ADJ 541
(Para 14)

Precedent distinguished:

1. St. of Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma & ors.,
2015 (5) SCC 321 (Para 14)

2. Shiv Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2015
(5) AWC 4918 (Para 14)

Present petition challenges order dated
29.10.2010,
passed
by
Collector
Saharanpur.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J. & Hon'ble Harsh Kumar, J.)

1. Heard the learned Standing
Counsel for the State and Sri Madhusudan
Dikshit for the respondent nos. 1 to 5.

2. The State has filed this writ petition
assailing the order passed by the Collector
Saharanpur dated 29.10.2010 primarily on
two grounds, namely, that the Collector had
no jurisdiction in the matter to pass any
such order relating to the declaration of
possession or otherwise, which could have
been done only by the competent authority
under
the
Urban
Land
(Ceiling
&
Regulation)
Act,
1976.
The
other
submission raised by the learned Standing
counsel is that the possession of the
disputed land from the tenure holder had
been taken as per the provisions of Section
10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling &
736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Regulation) Act, 1976, and consequently,
once the possession had been taken over,
the finding of the Collector that actual
physical possession remained with the
respondents is of no consequence keeping
in view the various pronouncements of this
Court as well as the Apex Court. The
learned Standing Counsel therefore submits
that once the possession had been taken
over and it had been handed over to the
Saharanpur Development Authority, there
was no occasion for the Collector to have
commented upon the nature of the
proceedings.

3. Sri Madhusudan Dikshit on the
other hand for the respondents submits that
the Collector has done nothing but simply
on the administrative side complied with
the directions of the High Court dated
09.04.2009 on making an enquiry with
regard to the status of actual physical
possession of the respondents and nothing
beyond that. He submits that the order of
the Collector was not an adjudication of
any of the rights of the parties in terms of
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act,
1976 and was a compliance order in view
of the direction of the High Court dated
09.04.2009 in Writ Petition No. 50818 of
2000.

4. Sri Dikshit further submits that the
original tenure holder late Sri Ruknuddin
against whom the notice had been issued
and the proceedings had been initiated
admittedly had died on 22.01.1993. In the
circumstances, the notice of possession as
alleged
by
the
petitioner-State
and
appended as Annexure-8 to the writ
petition was clearly issued in the name of a
dead person. There was no occasion for its
service on a dead person, and even
otherwise, no such notice was served either
on the heirs or legal representatives namely
the answering respondents who are sons of
late Ruknuddin.

5. It has further been submitted that if
possession had not been taken either from
the original tenure holder or the answering
respondents
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of the 1976 Act, namely after
complying with the provisions of Section
10(5) & 10(6) of the 1976 Act, then the
tenure holder and his heirs the answering
respondents are entitled to the benefit of the
Repeal Act of 1999, and consequently, the
land would not vest in the petitioner-State.
The same will therefore be treated to have
been released, and accordingly, the order of
the
Collector
does
not
require
any
interference by this Court. The counter
affidavit has been filed categorically stating
the facts as pleaded before us on behalf of
the respondents to which a rejoinder has
been filed by the petitioner-State. The fact
of death of Ruknuddin has not been denied
and to the contrary in paragraph no. 11 of
the rejoinder affidavit it is admitted that a
notice had been issued on 10.04.1998 to the
tenure holder who is none else than late Sri
Ruknuddin. This is evident also from the
recital in the notice as also the possession
memo dated 22/23.04.1998 that has been
relied upon by the petitioner. It has been
stated in the rejoinder affidavit of the State
that the land had been declared surplus
under the proceedings of the Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 after the
tenure holder had been issued notices and
who failed to submit any return to the said
notice, and consequently, notices were
issued on 09.09.1993 under section 10(1)
of the Act followed by a notification on
28.01.1994 under Section 10(3) of the Act.

6.

We
have
considered
the
submissions
raised
and
perused
the
pleadings on record.
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Amin Uddin & Ors.
737

7. The facts as borne out in the
affidavits exchanged between the parties
indicates that the original tenure holder
Ruknuddin had died during the pendency
of
the
proceedings
before
the
competent/prescribed authority with regard
to which an information had been tendered,
yet the proceedings were finalised against
him on 22.07.1993 after his death followed
by the notice under Section 10(1) of the
1976 Act on 09.09.1993 and under Section
10(3) on 28.01.1994.

8. The petitioner-State contends that it
had issued notices under Section 10(5) on
10.03.1998. We have examined the said
notice and we find it to have been issued in
the name of late Sri Ruknuddin who had
admittedly died in January 1993 and was
the recorded tenure holder. In the rejoinder
affidavit as well as in the writ petition there
is no averment denying the aforesaid fact
which
is
the
stand
taken
by
the
respondents. There is also no material filed
on behalf of the State to demonstrate that
such a notice under Section 10(5) of the
1976 Act was served on the heirs of late
Ruknuddin. In the aforesaid background
when the date of death of Ruknuddin is not
disputed and is admitted in paragraph 8 of
the writ petition then it is more evident that
the
entire
proceedings
including
the
issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of
the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation)
Act, 1976 against the tenure holder were
coram non judice as no proceedings could
have been undertaken against a dead
person.

9. Apart from this we further find that
the answering respondents being legal heirs
filed an appeal No. 1007 of 1998 against
the proceedings before the competent
authority that was exparte before the
District Judge which was dismissed as
having abated on 19.05.1999. This was on
account of the repeal Act having come into
force,
and
consequently,
another
application moved on their behalf before
the competent authority on 18.09.2000 was
dismissed on 22.09.2000.

10. It appears that the answering
respondents came up before this Court by
filing a Writ Petition No. 50818 of 2000
challenging the aforesaid action and
seeking protection from this Court in
relation to the aforesaid disputed land. A
Division Bench of this Court issued a
direction to the Collector on 09.04.2009 to
examine the claim of the petitioner
including the fact as to whether they are
entitled to seek any benefit under Section
3(2)(a) of the repeal Act 1999 or not.

11. The Collector therefore in
compliance of the said order called for a
report from the competent authority dated
22.06.2009
and
from
the
Tehsildar,
Saharanpur on 22.07.2009 and also heard
the answering respondents in response
thereto. After having examined the records,
the Collector Saharanpur came to the
conclusion that even though the transaction
proceedings of taking over possession is on
record and the entry has been made in the
revenue records under the column land
declared surplus under the Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, yet the
actual
physical
possession
of
the
answering respondents has remained intact
with them and they are in actual possession
of the land continuously.

12. We having gone through the
records and we find that the possession
memo
which
was
prepared
on
22/23.03.1998, no where indicates as to
how possession was taken and what is the
name of witness in whose presence such
738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
possession was taken. There is no name
indicated in the writ petition filed by the
State or even in the rejoinder affidavit. The
name of the Lekhpal in whose presence the
alleged possession is said to have been
taken has not been mentioned and the
printed proforma of the possession memo is
blank to that effect. The question as to how
the factum of taking actual physical
possession has been established by the
State was discussed by a Division Bench in
the case of Mohd. Islam & 3 Others Vs.
State of U.P. in Writ Petition No. 15864 of
2015 decided on 4th December, 2017. The
said decision was quoted with approval by
a Division Bench in the case of Rati Ram
Vs. State of U.P. & Others 2018 (4) ALJ
338 paragraph no. 8 as follows:-

"8. The 'Dakhalnama' a certified copy
whereof has been produced before us does
not even bear the signatures of any
attesting witness. We find this to be a lapse
and patent illegality the benefit whereof
has to be given to the land holder in view of
the Division Bench judgment in the case of
Mohd. Islam and 3 others v. State of U.P.
and 2 others, Writ Petition No. 15864 of
2015 decided on 4th December, 2017. It
was also a case of District-Saharanpur. We
extract paragraph Nos. 44 to 47 of the said
judgment which are as under:

"44. Since, in the present case, neither
factum of taking actual physical possession
by Competent Authority under Ceiling Act
has been fortified by placing any document
nor factum of possession of Development
Authority at any point of time has been
shown, therefore, argument advanced by
learned Standing Counsel on the basis of
State of Assam (supra) will not help.

45. Viewed from the above exposition
of law we find in the present case that no
such exercise of issuing notice under
Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 and
thereafter execution of memo on the spot
had taken place which is mandatory for
ceiling
authorities
as
admittedly
the
original
tenure-holder
and
then
his
successors
had
never
voluntarily
surrendered the possession of land. In the
absence
of
voluntary
surrender
of
possession of surplus land, the authorities
were required to proceed with forcible
possession. The document of possession
memo would not by itself evidence the
actual taking of possession unless it is
witnessed by two independent persons
acknowledging
the
act
of
forcible
possession. As discussed above in the
earlier part of this. judgment we are not
able to accept the alleged possession memo
worth calling a document as such in the
absence of certain requisites, nor does it
bear the details of witnesses who signed the
document. It bears mainly signatures of
Chackbandi Lekhpal, a person taking
possession and then the document has been
directed to be kept on file. This is no way of
taking forcible possession nor, a document
worth calling possession memo. A mere
issuance of notification under Section 10(3)
and notice under Section 10(5) regarding
delivery of possession does not amount to
actual delivery of possession of land more
especially in the face of the fact that the
tenureholder had in fact not voluntarily
made surrender of possession of surplus
land and no proceeding under Section
10(6) had taken place.

46.
Since,
we
have
held
that
possession memo dated 20.06.1993 is not a
possession memo and is a void document
for want of necessary compliance under
Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976, the
petitioners are entitled to the benefit under
Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 that came
into force w.e.f. 20.03.1999.

47. We may also place on record that
respondents claim that possession of land
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Amin Uddin & Ors.
739
in question was handed over to Saharanpur
Development
Authority
pursuant
to
Government Order dated 29.12.1984 but
here also we find that no material has been
placed on record to show that any such
actual physical possession was handed
over to Saharanpur Development Authority
and the said authority is in de facto
possession of land in dispute. Except bare
averment made in the counter-affidavit
respondent have not chosen to place
anything on record to support the stand
that de facto possession over land in
dispute is that of Saharanpur Development
Authority. Therefore even this stand has no
legs to stand and is rejected."

13. There is yet another aspect of the
matter namely under the provisions of
Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling &
Regulation) Act, 1976 a period of 30 days
is given to the tenure holder to handover
peaceful possession, and then if the tenure
holder fails to deliver possession forcible
possession can be adhered to in terms of
Section 10(6) thereof.

14. In the instant case surprisingly
enough even before the expiry of 30 days,
the possession memo is said to have been
taken on 22/23.03.1998. This was clearly
an over-reach and a clear paper transaction
which establishes that the petitioner-State
has proceeded to assume possession only
on paper which is contrary to the provisions
of Section 10(5) of the Act and is unlawful.
In all such matters the State relies on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
State of Assam Vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma
& Others 2015 (5) SCC 321 that has been
followed by a Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Shiv Ram Singh Vs. State of
U.P. & Others 2015 (5) AWC 4918. In the
instant case the aforesaid judgments would
not apply in view of the peculiar facts of
this case as discussed herein. To the
contrary since taking over of possession by
the State has not been established in the
present case, the issue stands covered by
the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram 2013 (4)
SCC 280 and the decision in the case of
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of
Haryana & Others 2012 (1) SCC 792 as
well as the Division Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Yasin Vs. State of U.P.
& Others 2014 (4) ADJ 305. The latest
Division Bench of this Court with which
we find ourselves in complete agreement
with is in the case of Lalji Vs. State of U.P.
& 2 Others 2018 (5) ADJ 541 that has been
delivered after taking into account the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Bhasker Jyoti Sharma (supra).

15. The question of taking actual
possession also has not been established
inasmuch as the proceedings were against a
tenure holder who had already died without
any
notice
to
the
heirs
or
legal
representatives of the tenure holder. Apart
from this actual physical possession has
been found to be in favour of the answering
respondents as per the impugned order of
the Collector itself which was not an order
under the 1976 Act but was a fact finding
order as per the direction of the High Court
dated 09.04.2009. In such circumstances
neither the impugned order can be
described as or without authority in law nor
the State has been able to establish that the
finding recorded by the Collector with
regard to actual physical possession is
perverse.

16. On the other hand possession has
neither been taken lawfully nor actually
from the respondents. The contention that
possession had been handed over to the
Saharanpur Development Authority is
740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
therefor also unsubstantiated and falls
through. The disputed land therefore will
not vest in the State as a result whereof the
beneficiary,
namely
the
Saharanpur
Development Authority cannot step into the
shoes of the State to claim possession. In
all matters pertaining to Ceiling laws, there
is a compulsory exaction and practically
confiscation of land through legislation, by
virtue whereof the land vests in the State
for further settlement to a beneficiary. In
our opinion, the beneficiary gets rights only
after the proceedings attain finality after
full
contest
subject
to
any
judicial
proceedings including the higher judiciary.
Thus, unless finality is attached with regard
to the vesting of the land in the State, a
beneficiary would not get any better title
than the State and would succeed only if
the land vests in the State. If the land is
held to be that of the tenure holder and if
the surplus declaration is held to be invalid
in judicial proceedings, the vesting of the
land in the State would dissolve and would
not be final and complete so as to allow the
beneficiary to claim any right title or
interest whatsoever.

17. The Development Authority has
not chosen to content the matter either by
filing
it's
petition
or
by
seeking
impleadment in this case. The petitionerstate has also not impleaded the Authority
as a co-petitioner or even a performa
respondent.

18. Consequently, writ petition has no
merits and is accordingly rejected. The
petitioner-State through the Collector and
the competent authority Urban Ceiling are
directed to correct the entries and restore
them
in
favour
of
the
answering
respondents accordingly.
----------
(2021)03ILR A740
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MUNISHWAR NATH
BHANDARI, J.
THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Special Appeal No. 326 of 2020
Connected with

Special Appeal Nos. 167 of 2020, 315 of
2020, 316 of 2020, 317 of 2020, 318 of
2020, 319 of 2020, 320 of 2020, 321 of
2020, 322 of 2020, 323 of 2020, 324 of
2020, 325 of 2020, 327 of 2020, 328 of
2020, 329 of 2020, 330 of 2020, 331 of
2020, 332 of 2020, 333 of 2020, 334 of
2020, 335 of 2020, 336 of 2020, 337 of
2020, 338 of 2020, 339 of 2020, 340 of
2020, 341 of 2020, 342 of 2020, 343 of
2020, 344 of 2020, 345 of 2020, 346 of
2020, 347 of 2020, 355 of 2020, 356 of
2020, 357 of 2020, 358 of 2020, 359 of
2020, 360 of 2020, 361 of 2020, 362 of
2020, 363 of 2020, 364 of 2020, 365 of
2020, 366 of 2020, 367 of 2020, 368 of
2020, 369 of 2020, 370 of 2020, 379 of
2020, 380 of 2020, 381 of 2020, 382 of
2020, 383 of 2020, 384 of 2020, 388 of
2020, 389 of 2020, 390 of 2020, 391 of
2020, 392 of 2020, 393 of 2020, 394 of
2020, 395 of 2020, 396 of 2020, 397 of
2020, 398 of 2020, 399 of 2020, 400 of
2020, 401 of 2020, 402 of 2020, 403 of
2020, 404 of 2020, 405 of 2020, 409 of
2020, 410 of 2020, 411 of 2020, 412 of
2020, 413 of 2020, 414 of 2020, 415 of
2020, 416 of 2020, 417 of 2020, 418 of
2020, 423 of 2020, 424 of 2020, 425 of
2020, 426 of 2020, 427 of 2020, 428 of
2020, 429 of 2020, 430 of 2020, 431 of
2020, 433 of 2020, 434 of 2020, 435 of