# State of U.P v. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 11 ILRA 455
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-07-20
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 11012 of 2021
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-chief-controlling-revenue-auth-anr-46578
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 - Writ -
Highly belated writ petition filed by the St. -
Effect - Procedural delay, how far excusable -
Held, the action on part of the St. authority is
merely to obtain order of dismissal to save
their skin - Supreme Court's decision to
deprecate the practice of challenging order in
higher court with delay relied upon - High
Court refused to accept the explanation of
procedural delay and issued the direction to
take action against the persons responsible for
delay. (Para 7, 13 and 15)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

11 All. State of U.P. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
455
(2021)12ILR A455
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

Writ-C No. 11012 of 2021

State of U.P. ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajiv Kumar Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
--

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 - Writ -
Highly belated writ petition filed by the St. -
Effect - Procedural delay, how far excusable -
Held, the action on part of the St. authority is
merely to obtain order of dismissal to save
their skin - Supreme Court's decision to
deprecate the practice of challenging order in
higher court with delay relied upon - High
Court refused to accept the explanation of
procedural delay and issued the direction to
take action against the persons responsible for
delay. (Para 7, 13 and 15)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. St. of M.P. & ors. Vs Bherulal; 2020 (10) SCC 654
2. Government of Maharasthra (Water Resource
Department
Vs
Borse
Brothers
Engineers
&
Contractors Pvt. Ltd.; 2021 SCC online SC 233
3. St. of Odisha Vs Sunanda Mahakud, 2021 SCC
online SC 384
4. Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).
19846/2020; U.O.I. Vs Central Tibetan Schools Admin
decided on 04.02.2021
5. St. of U.P. Vs Khushnoor Khan; 2021 SCC Online All 164
6.
St.
of
M.P.
Vs
Ramprakash
Tyagi,
MANU/MP/0566/2021
7. JK Economic Reconstruction Agency Vs Kamal
Builders, MANU/JK/0252/2021
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. Heard learned Standing Counsel for the
petitioner.

2. This petition has been filed by the State
of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Stamps and
Registration
challenging
the
order
dated
5.7.2017 passed by respondent no. 1, Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad.

3. A perusal of the order indicates that
huge amount is involved in the present case.
Impugned order is being challenged on several
grounds.

4. Stamp reporter has reported the latches
of 1267 days in filing the present petition.

5. Such huge lacthes have been explained
in paragraph nos. 3 to 10 of the petition which
reads as under:

"3. That since the impugned order
under challenge has been passed by the
respondent no. 1 dated 5.7.2017 and it has not
been challenged by the petitioner well within
time as the Commissioner Stamps at U.P.
Allahabad after considering the impugned order
dated 5.7.2017 forwarded a letter dated
17.7.2017 to A.I.G. Stamps, Etawah regarding
filing the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court
and in the aforesaid letter it has been stated that
prima facie the learned Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority has ignored and overlooked
the confidential report, spot inspection, evidence
and submission advanced by the State counsel
thereafter
A.I.G.
Stamps
at
once
take
congnizance of the aforesaid matter and
directed to the Sub Registrar, Etawah dated
456 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
22.7.2017 to proceed for filing writ petition
before Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad. In this
regard the copy of the letter dated 17.7.2017
forwarded by Commissioner to A.I.G. Stamps,
Etawah is being filed herewith and marked as
Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition.

4. That thereafter the Sub Registrar,
Etawah send a requesting letter dated 4.9.2017
to A.D.G.C. District Etawah asking for his
opinion and the learned A.D.G.C. District
Etawah has given his opinion on 11.9.2017 to
Sub Registrar Etawah to file writ petition before
Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this regard
the copy of the letter dated 11.9.2017 is being
filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 2 to
this writ petition.

5. That after getting the opinion from
A.D.G.C. District Etawah for filing the writ
petition before Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad
the District Magistrate, Etawah send a letter
dated 26.9.2017 to the Commissioner Stamps,
Board of Revenue at Allahabad for seeking
permission
from
the
Government/
Administration. In this regard the copy of the
letter issued by the District Magistrate, Etawah
seeking permission from State Authorities dated
26.9.2017 is being filed herewith and marked as
Annexure No. 3 to this writ petition.

6. That the District Magistrate,
Etawah again dispatched a letter dated
16.7.2020 to A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah as
well as a reminder dated 20.7.2020 for filing the
writ petition before Hon'ble High Court at
Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter
dated 16.7.2020 as well as reminder dated
20.7.2020 are being filed herewith and marked
as Annexure No. 4 to this writ petition.

7. That the Special Secretary and
Additional Law Advisor U.P. Government
forwarded a letter to the Chief Standing counsel
High Court Allahabad for filing writ petition
before Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this
regard the copy of the letter dated 26.10.2020 is
being filed herewith and marked as Annexure
No. 5 to this writ petition.

8. That thereafter a letter dated
2.11.2020 has been sent to Commissioner
Stamps U.P. Prayagraj by Special Secretary
U.P. Admin in regard with sanction of U.P.
Administration for filing writ petition before
Hon'ble High Court Allahabad vide letter dated
1.12.2020 directing A.I.G. Stamps District
Etawah to proceed for filing writ petition before
Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this regard
the copy of the letter dated 2.11.2020 and
1.12.2020 are being filed herewith and marked
as Annexure No. 6 to this writ petition.

9. That thereafter A.I.G. Stamps
District Etawah send a letter dated 17.2.2021 to
Chief Standing Counsel High Court Allahabad
for filing writ petition in the aforesaid matter. In
this regard the copy of the letter dated 17.2.2021
forwarded by A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah to
Chief Standing Counsel of this Hon'ble Court for
filing writ petition is being filed herewith and
marked as Annexure No. 7 to this writ petition.

10. That in view of the aforesaid facts,
the delay in filing the writ petition is not
deliberate and intentional but is procedural and
as such is deserves to be condoned by this
Hon'ble Court and the writ petition is also
deserves to be heard on merits so that justice
may be done otherwise the petitioner shall suffer
irreparable loss and injury."
 (emphasis supplied)

6. It is, thus, submitted that there was no
deliberate delay on part of the authority
concerned and that the delay was purely
procedural in nature.

7. This practice of challenging order in
higher court with delay has been deprecated by
Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya
Pradesh and other vs. Bherulal, 2020 (10)
SCC 654 wherein the Apex Court refused to
condone the delay of 663 days and held that
such action on part of the State authority is
merely to obtain order of dismissal to save their
skin. The Apex Court has further held as under :
11 All. State of U.P. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
457

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the
Government inefficiencies but the sad part is
that the authorities keep on relying on judicial
pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater
leeway was given to the Government (Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr vs. Mst.
Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107). This position
is more than elucidated by the judgment of this
Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General
& Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012)
3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:

"12) It is not in dispute that the
person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the
matter by way of filing a special leave petition in
this Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate
period
of
limitation
when
the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence
of
plausible
and
acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact
that in a matter of condonation of delay when
there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the
facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time
to inform all the government bodies, their
agencies and instrumentalities that unless
they
have
reasonable
and
acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was
bonafide effort, there is no need to accept
the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red- tape
in the process. The government departments
are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated
benefit
for
government
departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering
the
fact
that
there
was
no
proper
explanation offered by the Department for
the delay except mentioning of various
dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and
cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a
huge delay." Eight years hence the judgment
is still unheeded!

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid
approach is being adopted in what we have
categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The
object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing
could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who may
be at default that such a process is followed. We
have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There
seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certificates and if the Government suffers losses,
it is time when the concerned officer responsible
for the same bears the consequences. The irony
is that in none of the cases any action is taken
against the officers, who sit on the files and do
nothing. It is presumed that this Court will
condone the delay and even in making
submissions, straight away counsels appear to
address on merits without referring even to the
aspect of limitation as happened in this case till
458 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
we pointed out to the counsel that he must first
address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal
and we propose to do in all matters today, where
there are such inordinate delays that the
Government or State authorities coming before
us must pay for wastage of judicial time which
has its own value. Such costs can be recovered
from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the
casual manner in which the application has been
worded, we consider appropriate to impose
costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/-
(Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited
with the Mediation and Conciliation Project
Committee. The amount be deposited in four
weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officers responsible for the delay in filing the
special leave petition and a certificate of
recovery of the said amount be also filed in this
Court within the said period of time.

 (emphasis supplied)

8. The same view has been taken in a very
recent judgment of Apex Court in the case of
Government
of
Maharasthra
(Water
Resource Department vs. Borse Brothers
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC
online SC 233, where in paragraph nos. 57, 58,
59, 60 and 61, the Apex Court has held as under:

57. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy
resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient
cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays
beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient
cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in
Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14
SCC 81, has held:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for
which the defendant could not be blamed for his
absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude, which when
the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose
intended in the facts and circumstances existing in
a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context, "sufficient cause" means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently"
or "remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land
and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee
[AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan
[(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal
v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ)
1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah
v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5
SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC
1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar
[AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the
difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa.
However, if any difference exists it can only be that
the requirement of good cause is complied with on
a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient
cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause"
should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure
11 All. State of U.P. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
459
that substantial justice is done, but only so long
as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1
SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party
but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim
dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard
but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in
the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from
lapse of time become stale. According to
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The
courts have expressed at least three differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation
would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh
v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973
SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5
SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation
amounts to legislating and would fly in the face
of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC
1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case has
been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want
of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent
a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
460 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

58.
Likewise,
merely
because
the
government is involved, a different yardstick for
condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This
was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v.
Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563
["Postmaster General"], as follows:

"27. It is not in dispute that the
person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when
the Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable explanation,
we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the
fact that in a matter of condonation of delay
when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the
facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to
inform all the government bodies, their agencies
and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform
their
duties with
diligence
and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated
benefit
for
the
government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few."

59. The decision in Postmaster General
(supra) has been followed in the following
subsequent judgments of this Court:

i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan
Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592 at paragraphs 8-8.2;

ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav,
(2014) 2 SCC 422 at paragraphs 2-3;

iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan,
(2014) 11 SCC 709 at paragraphs 11-13; and

iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020)
10 SCC 654 at paragraphs 3-4.

60. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667,
this Court referred to Postmaster General
(supra), and held as follows:

"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh
continues to do the same thing again and again
and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The
special leave petition has been filed after a delay
of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with
such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by
the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v.
Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-102020.

2. We have penned down a detailed
order in that case and we see no purpose in
repeating the same reasoning again except to
record what are stated to be the facts on which
the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-12019, it is stated that the Government Advocate
was approached in respect of the judgment
delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v.
State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and
the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP
against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus,
the Law Department took almost about 17
11 All. State of U.P. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
461
months' time to decide whether the SLP had to
be filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal
Department!

3. We consider it appropriate to direct
the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya
Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the
Legal Department as it appears that the
Department is unable to file appeals within any
reasonable period of time much less within
limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already
recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more
admissible in view of the judgment in
Postmaster General v. Living Medi
a (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v.

Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3
SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]

4. We have also expressed our concern
that these kinds of the cases are only "certificate
cases" to obtain a certificate of dismissal from
the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue.
The object is to save the skin of officers who
may be in default. We have also recorded the
irony of the situation where no action is taken
against the officers who sit on these files and do
nothing.

5. Looking to the period of delay and
the casual manner in which the application has
been worded, the wastage of judicial time
involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State
of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation
and Conciliation Project Committee. The
amount be deposited within four weeks. The
amount be recovered from the officer(s)
responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on
the files and certificate of recovery of the said
amount be also filed in this Court within the said
period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate
General to caution that for any successive
matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up."

61. Also, it must be remembered that
merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of a given case, there is no right
in the appellant to have delay condoned. This
was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows:

"It
is,
however,
necessary
to
emphasise that even after sufficient cause has
been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of
right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
s. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for
condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then
the Court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at
this stage that diligence of the party or its bona
fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of
the enquiry while exercising the discretionary
power after sufficient cause is shown would
naturally be limited only to such facts as the
Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify
an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle
during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations
of bona fides or due diligence are always
material and relevant when the Court is dealing
with applications made under s. 14 of the
Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications
the Court is called upon to consider the effect of
the combined provisions of ss. 5 and 14.
Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which
have been expressly made material and relevant
by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same
extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under s. 5 without reference to s.
14."
 (emphasis supplied)

9. A reference may also be made to
judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case
of State of Odisha vs. Sunanda Mahakud,
462 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2021 SCC online SC 384, wherein the Apex
Court has held has under:

3. "There is no doubt that these are
cases including the present one where the
Government machinery has acted in a inefficient
manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either
of the two situations, this court ought not to
come to the rescue of the petitioner. No doubt,
some
leeway
is
given
for
Government
inefficiency
but
with
the
technological
advancement now the judicial view prevalent
earlier when such facilities were not available
has been over taken by the elucidation of the
legal principles in the judgment of this Court in
the Office of the Chief Post Master General &
Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. - (2012)
3 SCC 563. We have discussed these aspects in
SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020, State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Bheru Lal decided on 15.10.2020
and thus, see no reason to repeat the same
again.

4. In the present case, the State
Government has not even taken the trouble of
citing any reason or excuse nor any dates given
in respect of the period for which condonation is
sought. The objective of such an exercise has
also been elucidated by us in the aforesaid
judgment where we have categorized such cases
as "certificate cases".

5. The object of such cases appears to be to
obtain a certificate of dismissal from the
Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and
thus, say nothing could done because the highest
Court has dismissed the appeal. It is mere
completion of formality to give a quietus to the
litigation and save the skin of the officers who
may be at fault by not taking action in prescribed
time. If the state government feels that they have
suffered losses, then it must fix responsibility on
concerned officers for their inaction but that
ironically never happens. These matters are
preferred on a presumption as if this Court will
condone the delay in every case, if the State
Government is able to say something on merits.
Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been
worded, we consider appropriate impose costs of
Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with the Supreme
Court Advocates On Record Welfare Fund. The
amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount
be recovered from the officers responsible for
the delay in filing both the Writ Appeal and the
Special Leave Petition and a certificate of
recovery be also filed in this Court within the
same period of time.

6. The Special Leave Petition(s) is/are
dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid"

(emphasis supplied)

10. Regard may also be made to a recent
judgment of the Apex Court dated 04.02.2021,
whereby the Apex Court has dismissed the
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).
19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan
Schools Admin, which was preferred with the
delay of 532 days from the date of rejection of
restoration application and 6616 days from the
date of original order.

11. Reference may be made to a division
bench judgment of this Court rendered in the
case of State of U.P. v. Khushnoor Khan, 2021
SCC Online All 164, wherein this Court in
paragraph nos. 12, 13, 14, 17 and 20 held has
under :

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court time and
again has not only expressed words of caution in
respect of casual manner in which the State
Authorities approach the Courts without any
plausible ground for condonation of delay but
has even counselled the State Authorities in this
regard. Regard may be had at this juncture to
the latest pronouncement made by Hon'ble
Supreme Court on 04.02.2021 while dismissing
the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).
19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan
Schools Admin. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
11 All. State of U.P. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Auth. & Anr.
463
dismissed the Special Leave Petition, which was
preferred with the delay of 532 days from the
date of rejection of restoration application and
6616 days from the date of original order and
made certain observations are quoted below:

"We have heard learned Additional
Solicitor General for some time and must note
that the only error which seems to have occurred
in the impugned order is of noticing that it is not
an illiterate litigant because the manner in which
the Government is prosecuting its appeal reflects
nothing better! The mighty Government of India
is manned with large legal department having
numerous officers and Advocates. The excuse
given for the delay is, to say the least,
preposterous.
We
have
repeatedly
being
counselling
through
our
orders
various
Government departments, State Governments
and other public authorities that they must learn
to file appeals in time and set their house in
order so far as the legal department is concerned,
more so as technology assists them. This appears
to be falling on deaf ears despite costs having
been imposed in number of matters with the
direction to recover it from the officers
responsible for the delay as we are of the view
that these officers must be made accountable. It
has not had any salutary effect and that the
present matter should have been brought up,
really takes the cake!"

13. In the case of Central Tibetan Schools
Admin (supra)
while
observing
that
the
appellant therein had approached the Court in
casual manner without any cogent ground for
condonation of delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court
has referred to the cases of Office of the Chief
Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd.,
reported in [(2012) 3 SCC 563] and also the
case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh,
reported in [(2010) 8 SCC 685 : AIR 2010 SC
3043]. Relevant extract of the said judgment in
the
case
of Central
Tibetan
Schools
Admin (supra) runs as under:

"In this behalf, suffice to refer to our
judgment
in
the State
of
Madhya
Pradesh v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No.
9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The
State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C]
Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021].
The
leeway
which
was
given
to
the
Government/public authorities on account of
innate inefficiencies was the result of certain
orders of this Court which came at a time when
technology had not advanced and thus, greater
indulgence was shown. This position is no more
prevalent and the current legal position has been
elucidated by the judgment of this Court in
Office
of
the Chief
Post
Master
General v. Living Media India Ltd. - (2012) 3
SCC 563. Despite this, there seems to be a little
change in the approach of the Government and
public authorities.

14. In the case of Living Media India
Ltd. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the
advancement
in
modern
technology
and
observed that the claim of seeking condonation
of delay on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view
of the modern technologies being used and
available. In the said case, it was further
observed by Hon'ble Apex Court that all the
government
bodies,
their
agencies
and
instrumentalities need to be informed that unless
they
have
reasonable
and
acceptable
explanation for delay, there is no need to accept
usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red tape in the process.

17. When we examine the explanation of
delay of 1730 days in filing the review petition
from the date of judgment dated 19.04.2016
which has been sought to be reviewed and delay
of 1335 days from the date of dismissal of
Special Leave Petition on 05.07.2017, what we
find is that the State has once again sought
shelter in usual slow pace of State machinery in
preparation of office notes, movement of files,
non-availability
of
certain
necessary
information,
non-availability
of
concerned
464 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
officials/officers etc. The said explanation
cannot be said to be sufficient in view of the law
laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Living Media India Ltd. (supra). The State
while seeking condonation of delay in this case
has gone even to the extent of taking ground of
certain
"unavoidable"
and
"unspoken"
circumstances. In our considered opinion such
"unavoidable" and "unspoken" circumstances
cannot be taken shelter of to claim condonation
of delay in approaching the Courts. In fact the
course adopted by the State in preferring the
review petition reflects gross negligence and
inaction which in our considered opinion cannot
be said to be bona fide. We are aware that a
liberal view needs to be adopted by the Courts to
advance substantial justice. However, in the
facts and circumstances of this case, what we
find is that the approach of the State all along
has been casual and that of manifest negligence.
As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Living Media India Ltd. (supra), law of
limitation binds every one including the
Government.

20. In the light of the discussions made
above, the review petition fails and is hereby
dismissed on the ground of delay."

 (emphasis supplied)

12. It may further be mentioned that High
Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of State of
M.P.
v.
Ramprakash
Tyagi,
MANU/MP/0566/2021 while relying upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in Bheru Lal
(supra) refused to condone the delay of 967
days. Same view was taken by High Court of
Jammu & Kashmir in the case of JK Economic
Reconstruction Agency v. Kamal Builders,
MANU/JK/0252/2021.

13. Coming back to the explanation
submitted for such huge latches, a perusal of the
quoted paragraphs of the petition clearly indicate
that apart from whatever has been stated,
annexure no. 3 to the petition is a letter dated
26.9.2017 written by the District Magistrate
Etawah to the State authority. Next letters are
dated 16.7.2020 reminder written by District
Magistrate, Etawah to Assistant Commissioner,
Stamps, Etawah and letter dated 20.7.2020
written by Assistant Commissioner, Stamp to
Commissioner, Stamp, U.P. (annexure no. 4 to
the petition). It is, therefore, clear that for almost
two years and ten months the matter was not at
all pursued, even if, for the sake of arguments,
the other explanation regarding so called
'procedural delay' is accepted, the explanation so
submitted before this Court to explain such huge
lathces, is not acceptable.

14. In view of the discussion made herein
above, I find that the latches have not been
sufficiently
explained.
The
writ
petition
accordingly stands dismissed on the ground of
latches.

15. Registrar General of this Court as well
as learned Standing Counsel are directed to send
a copy of the order to the Chief Secretary,
Government of Uttar Pradesh for necessary
action against the persons responsible for such
delay and for issuing a word of caution to the
authority concerned to remain cautious in future.
----------
(2021)12ILR A464
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.11.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-C No. 16753 of 2010

M/s Magma Leasing Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Badri Vishal & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri C.K. Parekh, Sri Kumar Ankit Srivastava