# State of U.P v. Har Pal Singh

- **Citation:** (2014) 1 ILRA 426
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-04-02
- **Case number:** Service Bench No. 1527 of 2000
- **Bench:** Devi Prasad Singh, Ashok Pal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-har-pal-singh-42831
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A)Constitution of India, Art.-226-Practice &
Procedure-in garb of interim relief-final relief
can not be granted-state tribunal while
entertaining claim petition instead of staying
the operation of impugned charge sheetstayed disciplinary proceeding-which can be
granted only after hearing both parties-order
quashed direction for expeditious disposal of
claim petition itself given.

Held:Para-7 & 14

## Text

426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

In case, insurance company is not liable
under certain conditions then owner of the
vehicle
shall
be
responsible
to
pay
compensation. Keeping in view the mandate
as contained in Sub-section 1 of section 149
in case the insurance company is directed to
pay compensation with right of recovery it
shall fulfill the statutory obligation and intent
of legislation. Once vehicle is insured the
first charge shall be on the insurance
company to pay compensation and only in
the event of breach of permit condition the
owner may be held responsible to pay
compensation
or
satisfy
award.
Accordingly, the insurance company may
be directed to pay compensation in terms
of award to satisfy its statutory obligation
and then recover the same from owner in
the event of breach of policy conditions in
view of sub-section (2) of Section 149.

13. Keeping in view the statutory
mandate as contained in Section 149 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, coupled with the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are
of the view that the Tribunal has committed
no illegality in directing the appellant
Insurance Company to pay the compensation
and thereafter, recover the same from the
owner of the vehicle. Apart from the above,
Section 174 provides to recover the
compensation as arrears of land revenue. The
procedure prescribed under Section 174
Motor Vehicles Act, is not applicable to the
cases where compensation is sought to be
recovered from the owner of the vehicle. In
case the Insurance Company after satisfying
the award proceed to recover the outstanding
dues from the owner, then the provisions
contained in Section 174 of the Motor
Vehicles Act shall equally be applicable to
recover the outstanding dues as arrears of
land revenue from the owner of the vehicle.
It shall speed up the recovery process and
satisfy the award within reasonable period.

14. The claimant respondents while
preferring the cross appeal has made prayer
for enhancement of compensation. The
Tribunal awarded the compensation after
considering
the
relevant
acts
and
circumstances as well as the injuries caused
and expenses incurred thereon. The attention
of the Court has not been invited to any
perversity in the impugned award delivered
by
the
Tribunal
while
awarding
compensation. Well reasoned order has been
passed by the Tribunal.

15. In view of the above, the appeal
preferred by the Insurance Company as
well as the claimant respondents fails. Let
entire compensation be deposited before the
Tribunal within three months and shall be
released to the claimant respondents in terms
of award by Tribunal within two months.
Any application moved by the Insurance
Company for recovery, that shall be
processed by the Tribunal expeditiously
keeping in view the observations made in the
body of the judgments. The amount
deposited in this Court shall be remitted to
the Tribunal forthwith.

The appeals are dismissed. Costs
easy.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.04.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DEVI PRASAD SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE ASHOK PAL SINGH, J.

Service Bench No. 1527 of 2000

State of U.P............................ .Petitioner
Versus
Har Pal Singh. .......................Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
C.S.C.
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. Har Pal Singh

427
Counsel for the Respondent:
S.P. Singh

(A)Constitution of India, Art.-226-Practice &
Procedure-in garb of interim relief-final relief
can not be granted-state tribunal while
entertaining claim petition instead of staying
the operation of impugned charge sheetstayed disciplinary proceeding-which can be
granted only after hearing both parties-order
quashed direction for expeditious disposal of
claim petition itself given.

Held:Para-7 & 14
7. In view of law laid down in the case of
Ram Sukhi Devi (Supra), while deciding
the pending claim petition, it was not
open for the Tribunal to grant any relief
which may amount to a final relief.

14. In view of above, the argument
advanced
by
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing Counsel seems to be correct. The
Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it by passing the interim order
which amounts to grant of final relief. It is
bad also because it does not assign any
reason even precisely for staying the
disciplinary proceedings pending in the
government. The writ petition deserves to be
allowed. The writ petition is allowed
accordingly.

(B)Constitution
of
India,
Art.-226Recording Reasons- Every quasi judicial
officer-bound to record the reasons -
reason,like sole of the body of order-in
absence the order is like body without soleheld-order not sustainable-quashed.

Held:Para-13-
In view of above, the argument advanced
by
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel seems to be correct. The Tribunal
has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in
it by passing the interim order which
amounts to grant of final relief. It is bad
also because it does not assign any reason
even precisely for staying the disciplinary
proceedings pending in the government.
The writ petition deserves to be allowed.
The writ petition is allowed accordingly.
Case Law Discussed-
(2005) 9 SCC 733; (2011) 2 SCC 741; 2013
(11) ADJ 22; AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2260.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.)

1. Inspite of the fact that list has been
revised, none appeared for the opposite
parties. Heard learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the petitioners and
perused the record.

2. The instant writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has been preferred against the Judgment
and order dated 17-12-1999 passed by the
State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow
in Claim Petition No. 2155/1999 by
which the Tribunal has passed an interim
order restraining the petitioner-State to
proceed with the disciplinary proceeding
against the claimant-opposite party no. 1.
No interim order was passed by this court
at the time of admitting the present writ
petition.

3. While assailing the impugned order,
Sri
Shatrughan
Chaudhary,
learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits
that by the orders dated 01-11-1999 and 0811-1999, the State Government has initiated
the disciplinary proceedings and approved
the chargesheet of the claimant-opposite
party no. 1. The claimant-opposite party no.
1 approached the Tribunal for quashing of
the aforesaid orders passed the State
Government with regard to initiation of
disciplinary proceedings as well as service of
Chargesheet.

4. A perusal of the claim petition
filed by the claimant-opposite party no. 1
before the Tribunal, reveals that the
claimant-opposite party no. 1 has prayed
for the following reliefs in his claim
petition :-
428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"(8) RELIEF SOUGHT

On the basis of facts and grounds
mentioned in the present claim petition,
the petitioner prays for the following
reliefs:-

(a) That this Hon'ble Tribunal may
graciously be pleased to quash the
Annexure no. 1 and 2 to the compilation
no. 1 of claim petition and declare that no
enquiry
is
permissible
against
the
petitioner and he is entitled to all the
consequential service benefits arising out
of the same.

(b) That the cost of the claim petition
alongwith any other order, which this
Tribunal may deem, fit, just and proper
may also be passed in favour of the
petitioner.

(9) INTERIM RELIEF IF ANY
PRAYED FOR.

For
the
facts,
reasons,
and
circumstances stated in the present claim
petition, it is most respectfully prayed that
this Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be
pleased to stay the operation of the
Annexure no. 1 dated 1.11.1999 and
8.11.1999 or stay the further proceedings
on the basis of order dated 1.11.1999 and
8.11.1999 or pass any suitable order,
which
is
just
and
proper
in
the
circumstances of the case in favour of the
petitioner."

5. The perusal of the aforesaid
reliefs on the face of record, reveals that a
prayer was made for quashing of the
pending disciplinary proceedings against
the claimant-opposite party no. 1. While
passing the impugned order dated 17-121999, the Tribunal has restrained the State
Government to proceed further with the
disciplinary proceedings.

6. Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary,
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel appearing for the petitioners
submits that the Tribunal has granted the
interim relief having the nature of the
final
relief
which
is
not
legally
sustainable. He has relied upon a case
reported in (2005) 9 SCC 733, State of
U.P. and Others Versus Ram Sukhi Devi
in which Hon'ble Supreme Court after
considering various earlier Judgments,
held as under :

8.To say the least, approach of the
learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench is judicially unsustainable and
indefensible. The final relief sought for in
the writ petition has been granted as an
interim measure. There was no reason
indicated by learned Single Judge as to why
the Government Order dated 26.10.1998
was to be ignored. Whether the writ
petitioner was entitled to any relief in the
writ petition has to be adjudicated at the
time of final disposal of the writ petition.
This Court has on numerous occasions
observed that the final relief sought for
should not be granted at an interim stage.
The position is worsened if the interim
direction has been passed with stipulation
that the applicable Government Order has to
be ignored. Time and again this Court has
deprecated the practice of granting interim
orders which practically give the principal
relief sought in the petition for no better
reason than that of a prima facie case has
been made out, without being concerned
about the balance of convenience, the public
interest and a host of other considerations.
[See Assistant Collector of Central Excise,
West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985 (1)
SCC 260 at p. 265), State of Rajasthan v.
M/s Swaika Properties (1985 (3) SCC 217
at p.224), State of U.P. and Ors. v.
Visheshwar (1995 Supp (3) SCC 590),
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. Har Pal Singh

429
Bharatbhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar (Dr.) v.
Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa and Ors. (1995
Supp (2) SCC 593), Shiv Shankar and Ors.
v. Board of Directors, U.P.S.R.T.C. and
Anr. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 726) and
Commissioner/Secretary to Govt. Health
and Medical Education Department Civil
Sectt., Jammu v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli
(1995 Supp (4) SCC 214).] No basis has
been indicated as to why learned Single
Judge thought the course as directed was
necessary to be adopted. Even it was not
indicated that a prima facie case was made
out though as noted above that itself is not
sufficient. We, therefore, set aside the
order passed by learned Single Judge as
affirmed by the Division Bench without
expressing any opinion on the merits of
the case we have interfered primarily on
the ground that the final relief has been
granted at an interim stage without
justifiable reasons. Since the controversy
lies within a very narrow compass, we
request the High Court to dispose of the
matter as early as practicable preferably
within six months from the date of receipt
of this judgment."

7. In view of law laid down in the
case of Ram Sukhi Devi (Supra), while
deciding the pending claim petition, it
was not open for the Tribunal to grant any
relief which may amount to a final relief.

8.

Learned
Additional
Chief
Standing Counsel has relied upon one
another case reported in (2011) 2 SCC
741, Raja Khan Versus Uttar Pradesh
Sunni Central Waqf Board and Another.

In the case of Raja Khan (Supra),
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while
granting any interim relief, the court should
not rely upon the material which may be
extraneous for the controversy involved
therein. It has further been held by their
Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court that
final relief should not be granted at an
interim stage. For convenience, the relevant
paragraphs from the case of Raja Khan
(Supra) are reproduced as under :-

11. It is well settled that by an
interim order the final relief should not be
granted, vide U.P. Junior Doctors' Action
Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani
(SCC para 8), State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi
Devi (SCC para 6), etc.

16. We are sorry to say but a lot of
complaints are coming against certain
Judges of the Allahabad High Court
relating to their integrity. Some Judges
have their kith and kin practising in the
same Court, and within a few years of
starting practice the sons or relations of
the Judge become multi-millionaires,
have huge bank balances, luxurious cars,
huge houses and are enjoying a luxurious
life. This is a far cry from the days when
the sons and other relatives of Judges
could derive no benefit from their
relationship and had to struggle at the bar
like any other lawyer.

17. We do not mean to say that all
lawyers who have close relations as Judges
of the High Court are misusing that
relationship. Some are scrupulously taking
care that no one should lift a finger on this
account. However, others are shamelessly
taking advantage of this relationship."

9. The perusal of impugned
Judgment and order dated 17-12-1999
reveals that the Tribunal has passed the
impugned order at the initial stage while
issuing notice to the respondents of the
claim petition. There is no whisper in the
impugned order as to why and under what
430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

ground, the Tribunal has stayed the
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
claimant-opposite party no. 1.

10. Now, it is well settled
proposition of law that every order
including an administrative, judicial or
quasi judicial order, must be reasoned
one. While passing the impugned order,
the Tribunal has not assigned any reason
or enumerated the ground on which it has
formed an opinion to stay the further
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
claimant-opposite
party
no.
1.
For
convenience, the order dated 17-12-1999
passed by the State Public Services
Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No.
2155/1999 is reproduced as under :-

vkns'k fnukad 17-12-99 dh izfrfyfi

17-12-99

;kph ds ;ksX; vf/koDrk ,oa izR;FkhZx.k dh
vksj ls fo}ku izLrqrdRrkZ vf/kdkjh mifLFkrA

vkns'k

lqukA xzghr ,oa iathd`r gksA fyf[kr foospuA
izfr'kiFki= ,oa vUrfje vuqrks"k ij vkifRr ds fy,
fnukad 11 Qjojh] 2000 fu;r djrs gq, izR;FkhZx.k
dks uksfVl tkjh gksA bl chp izR;FkhZx.k dks vkns'k
fn;k tkrk gS fd os izeq[k lfpo] mRrj izns'k 'kklu
ds i= fnukad 01 uoEcj] 1999 1⁄4,&11⁄2 vksSj vij
egkfujh{kd fucU/kuA iz'kkluA ds i= fnukad 8
uoEcj 1⁄4,&21⁄2 ds vuqlj.k esa dksbZ foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh
vkxs lEikfnr u djsA

g0@ ,-ch- gtsyk]

mik/;{k

11. Learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel invited attention to a
Full Bench Judgment of this court in a
case reported in 2013 (11) ADJ 22, Ms.
Ranjana Agnihotri Versus Union of India,
of which we were the Members, held as
under:-

196. The Supreme Court in a case
reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 Seimens
Engineering and Manufacturing Company
of India Limited versus Union of India
and another, held as under :

''"6..............If courts of law are to be
replaced by administrative authorities and
tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of
cases,
with
the
proliferation
of
Administrative law, they may have to be
so
replaced,
it
is
essential
that
administrative authorities and tribunals
should accord fair and proper hearing to
the persons sought to be affected by their
orders and give sufficiently clear and
explicit reasons in support of the orders
made by them. Then alone administrative
authorities and tribunals exercising quasijudicial function will be able to justify
their existence and carry credibility with
the people by inspiring confidence in the
ad judicatory process. The rule requiring
reasons to be given in support of an order
is, like the principle of audi alteram
partem, a basic principle of natural justice
which must inform every quasi-judicial
process and this rule must be observed in
its proper spirit and mere pretence of
compliance with it would not satisfy the
requirement of law."

197. In one another case reported in
(2004)5 SCC 568 State of Orissa versus
Dhaniram Lunar, their Lordships of
Supreme Court held as under :

"8......... Right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound judicial system;
reasons at least sufficient to indicate an
application of mind to the matter before
Court. Another rationale is that the affected
party can know why the decision has gone
against him. One of the salutary requirements
of natural justice is spelling out reasons for
the order made..........".
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. Har Pal Singh

431

198. In Mc Dermott International
Inco. Versus Buru Standard Co. Limited
and others (2006) SLT 345, their
Lordships observed as under :

"...Reason' is a ground or motive for
a belief or a course of action, a statement
in justification or explanation of belief or
action. It is in this sense that the award
must state reasons for the amount
awarded. The rationale of the requirement
of reasons is that reasons assure that the
arbitrator has not acted capriciously.
Reasons reveal the grounds on which the
arbitrator reached the conclusion which
adversely affects the interests of a party.
The contractual stipulation of reasons
means, as held in Poyser and Mills'
Arbitration In Re, "proper, adequate
reasons". Such reasons shall not only be
intelligible
but
shall
be
a
reason
connected with the case which the court
can see is proper. Contradictory reasons
are equal to lack of reasons................"

199. A Division Bench of this Court
in a case reported in 2007 LCD 1266
Vijai Shanker Tripathi versus Hon'ble
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has
considered the concept of exercise of
discretionary power by the State or its
authorities including the High Court held
that every administrative order passed by
authorities must fulfil the requirement of
Art. 14 of the constitution.

200. Supreme Court in a case
reported in JT 2010(9) SC 590 M/s.
Kranti Associates Private Limited and
another versus Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan
and others held that a cryptic order shall
deem to suffer from vice of arbitrariness.
An order passed by quasi judicial
authority or even administrative authority
must speak on its face.

In a case reported in 2010(4) SCC 785
CCT versus Shukla and Brothers, their
Lordships held that the reason is the very life
of law. When the reason of a law once
ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such
is the significance of reasoning in any rule of
law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of
justice as well as avoids uncertainty. To
quote relevant portion from the judgment
(supra), to quote :

"Reasons are the soul of orders. Nonrecording of reasons could lead to dual
infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice
to the affected party and secondly, more
particularly,
hamper
the
proper
administration of justice. These principle
are not only applicable to administrative
or executive actions, but they apply with
equal force and, in fact, with a greater
degree
of
precision
to
judicial
pronouncements."

201. The aforesaid view with regard
to reasoned order by authorities which
include
judicial
and
quasi
judicial
authorities has been consistently reiterated
by the Supreme Court in earlier judgments.
Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the authorities have to record
reasons, otherwise it may become a tool for
harassment vide K.R. Deb versus The
Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR
1971 SC 1447; State of Assam and another
versus J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC
2277; State of Punjab versus Kashmir
Singh, 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; Union of India
and others versus P. Thayagarajan, AIR
1999 SC 449; and Union of India versus
K.D. Pandey and another, (2002)10 SCC
471.

In a recent judgment reported in AIR
2013 SCW 2752 Union of India versus
Ibrahimuddin(para 33), their Lordships of
432 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that
every order passed by the administrative
authority, judicial or quasi judicial must
be a reasoned order.

202. From the foregoing discussion
with regard to passing of a reasoned order
by administrative, quasi judicial or
judicial authorities, it appears that the law
on the question has travelled a long way."

12. The impugned Judgment and
order passed by learned Tribunal being a
non speaking one, seems to be hit by
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
While passing an interim order, the
authority, judicial or quasi judicial or
Tribunal, must assign justifiable reason
while forming an opinion for granting the
interim
relief
or
adjudicating
a
controversy.

13. It has been rightly argued by
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary that speaking
and reasoned order is necessary not only to
protect the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, but, also it is necessary for the
maintenance of Rule of law. In a democratic
polity, order or a decision where the
citizen's civil right is affected or functioning
of the government is interfered, must be
speaking so that the citizen or government
may
know
the
ground
which
has
necessitated to form an opinion. In the event
of disagreement, the citizen or the
government may approach the appropriate
form for judicial review of the order passed
by the court, authority or Tribunal.

Attention of the court has been
invited to a case reported in AIR 1975
Supreme Court 2260: Smt. Indira Nehru
Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain. Relevant portion
(para
205)
of the
said
case,
for
convenience, is reproduced as under :-

"205. Rule of Law postulates that the
decisions
should
be
made
by
the
application of known principles and rules
and in general such decisions should be
predictable and the citizen should know
where he is. If a decision is taken without
any principle or without any rule, it is not
predictable and such decision is the
antithesis
of
a
decision
taken
in
accordance with the rule of law."

14. In view of above, the argument
advanced by learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel seems to be correct.
The Tribunal has failed to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it by passing the
interim order which amounts to grant of
final relief. It is bad also because it does
not assign any reason even precisely for
staying
the
disciplinary
proceedings
pending in the government. The writ
petition deserves to be allowed. The writ
petition is allowed accordingly.

15. A writ in the nature of certiorari
is
issued
quashing
the
impugned
Judgment and order dated 17-12-1999
passed by the State Public Services
Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No.
2155/1999, Har Pal Singh Versus State of
U.P. & Another with consequential
benefits.

A writ in the nature of mandamus is
also issued directing the State Public
Services Tribunal, Lucknow to decide the
pending Claim Petition 2155/1999, in
case already not decided, expeditiously
say preferably within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of the present order. No
order as to costs.
--------
1 All] Anil Kumar Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

433
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 28.03.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ZAKI ULLAH KHAN, J.

U/S 482/378/407 No. 1773 of 2011

Anil Kumar Tripathi...................Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P & Anr.... .. .....Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
A.K. Tripathi (In Person)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate

Cr. P.C.-Section 482-Application to set-a-side
charge sheet offence under section 332, 353,
504, 506 IPC-applicant practicing Advocate
tried to pass his car-some how informant a
police constable-escaped-after parking the
car applicant came back caused heart by
slopping complainant-duty of complainant
was to control the traffic and not to check
inside the car-merely by passing car-can not
be termed intention to cause harm-no
occasion
for
applicant
to
stoppling
complainant after parking the car-did not
deter the complainant from discharging
public duty-ingredients for offence under
section 332, 353 not-attracted-Magistrate
without
scrutinizing
the
matter
under
section 190(1) Cr.P.C.-passed impugned
charge-sheet-if
proceeding
allowed
to
continue-amount to abused the process of
Court-charge sheet quashed.

Held:Para-8
The court has mechanically passed the order
and took cognizance without scrutinizing the
contents of the charge-sheet. The court
should have scrutinized the matter in view of
Section 190(1) Cr.P.C., it was the duty of the
court to ascertain as to what are the offences
and whether the offences are made out or
not. If the facts do not constitute the offence,
it would not be proper for the court to just
take cognizance. The cognizance means the
constitution
of
the
offence.
In
the
aforementioned
circumstances,
there
is
nothing like voluntarily causing hurt. The
allegations appear to be plain that the
applicant-Advocate
passed
the
vehicle
besides the complainant, who escaped unhurt
but there is nothing like voluntarily causing
hurt. Therefore, the application under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is liable to be allowed.

Case Law Discussed:
(2008) 1 SCC 474; (2006) 7 SCC 296

(Delivered by Hon'ble Zaki Ullah Khan, J.)

1. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by Shri
Anil Kumar Tripathi, a practicing Advocate
of the High Court, in person, challenging
the summoning order dated 02.03.2009
passed by A.C.J.M., C.B.I, Lucknow. By
the impugned application, the applicant has
prayed that the Court may set aside the
charge-sheet dated 27.12.2008 (Annexure
No.2) relating to Case Crime No.567 of
2008, under Sections 332, 353, 504 and 506
I.P.C., Police Station Wazirganj, District
Lucknow.

2.

Shri Anil Kumar Tripathi,
Advocate, arguing in person, challenged the
F.I.R. lodged by Raj Kumar Yadav
(H.C.No.0558). The applicant alleged that
the complainant in his F.I.R. stated that on
28.11.2008 at about 10:00 a.m. an advocate
whose name is Anil Kumar Tripathi came in
his vehicle at the gate where the complainant
was guarding and the applicant tried to pass
the vehicle besides the complainant and he
escaped unhurt as he saw the incoming
vehicle from opposite direction; that the
applicant immediately after parking the
vehicle came to Gate No.5 of the High Court
and he cautioned that this time the
complainant escaped unhurt but in future he
will be run over by his car; that when the
complainant questioned that how he could