# State of U.P v. Ram Sajeevan @ Gunda

- **Citation:** (2012) 2 ILRA 545
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-05-09
- **Bench:** Dharnidhar Jha, Ramesh Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-ram-sajeevan-gunda-42299
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Government Appeal-against acquittaloffence under Section 436 IPC alongwith
Section 3 (2) (4) of S.T/S.C. Act-inspite
of 4 years opportunity prosecution fail to
produce any witness- while primary duty
of officer incharge of Police Station was
to obtain bond under Section 170 (2)
Cr.P.C. From the person acquainted with
incident-exercise
of
Trail
Judge
to
examine accused person under Section
313 wholly un-warranted-in absence of
prosecution
witness-major
difference
between FIR and evidence-appeal by
Government with Section 5 Applicationcompletely
unnecessary
exerciseamounts to wastage of Public timeAppeal dismissed.

Held: Para 5 and 6

We have already pointed out that no
witness was present. As such, there was
no evidence and there could not have
been any other result as was recorded by
the learned Trial Judge. We do not find
any merit in the application filed under
546 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
and in the present appeal. The two are
dismissed.

Before we part with the judgment, we
feel
that
it
was
completely
an
unnecessary exercise by the State of U.P.
to
process
the
appeal
for
being
presented before this Court as it has not
only wasted public time in the law
department or other sections of the
Government, it also wasted public time
of this court also. We desire such
frivolous appeals should not be filed by
the Government and for that purpose,
we direct that a copy of the present
judgement be sent to the Principal
Secretary (Law), Government of U.P.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 274

## Text

2 All] State of U.P. V. Ram Sajeevan @ Gunda
545
Caste, there could be no such restriction
on the Court for executing sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff pursuant to a decree
for specific performance. Thus, even if it
is assumed that the statutory bar applies to
a Court that executes a sale deed pursuant
to a decree for specific performance, that
bar did not apply to the Court that
executed sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff inasmuch as on 23.03.1974, that
is, when the sale deed was executed, there
was no restriction in the statute book on
transfer by a member of a Scheduled
Caste.

23. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, the substantial question of
law, as framed, for hearing of this appeal,
is purely academic in nature and is not
required to be decided for determining the
rights of the parties to the suit. The
judgment relied upon by the counsel for
the appellant does not go to show that the
provisions of Section 157-A of the
U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act would affect
transfers carried out before insertion of
the statutory bar.

24. In the instant appeal there is no
challenge to the finding recorded by both
the courts below that the plaintiff is in
possession of the land in suit and that her
name is recorded in the revenue records.
In this view of the matter, the plaintiffrespondent being owner in possession is
entitled to decree of her suit for
permanent
prohibitory
injunction
as
against the defendant-appellants. For the
reasons
noted
above,
I'm
of
the
considered view that the courts below
were legally justified in decreeing the suit
of the plaintiff and that the judgment and
decree passed by the courts below does
not suffer from any legal infirmity. The
appeal, therefore, lacks merit and is
hereby dismissed with costs.
---------

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.05.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DHARNIDHAR JHA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.

Government Appeal Defective No. - 122
of 2006

State of U.P.

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Ram Sajeevan @ Gunda ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner
Govt Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
.........................................

Government Appeal-against acquittaloffence under Section 436 IPC alongwith
Section 3 (2) (4) of S.T/S.C. Act-inspite
of 4 years opportunity prosecution fail to
produce any witness- while primary duty
of officer incharge of Police Station was
to obtain bond under Section 170 (2)
Cr.P.C. From the person acquainted with
incident-exercise
of
Trail
Judge
to
examine accused person under Section
313 wholly un-warranted-in absence of
prosecution
witness-major
difference
between FIR and evidence-appeal by
Government with Section 5 Applicationcompletely
unnecessary
exerciseamounts to wastage of Public timeAppeal dismissed.

Held: Para 5 and 6

We have already pointed out that no
witness was present. As such, there was
no evidence and there could not have
been any other result as was recorded by
the learned Trial Judge. We do not find
any merit in the application filed under
546 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
and in the present appeal. The two are
dismissed.

Before we part with the judgment, we
feel
that
it
was
completely
an
unnecessary exercise by the State of U.P.
to
process
the
appeal
for
being
presented before this Court as it has not
only wasted public time in the law
department or other sections of the
Government, it also wasted public time
of this court also. We desire such
frivolous appeals should not be filed by
the Government and for that purpose,
we direct that a copy of the present
judgement be sent to the Principal
Secretary (Law), Government of U.P.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 274

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dharnidhar Jha, J.)

1. The State of U.P. has filed the
present appeal against the judgment of
acquittal dated 07.09.2005 passed by Sri
Sudhir Kumar-I, the learned Sessions
Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Session
Trial No. 34 of 2001.

2. The charges were framed on 30th
of June, 2004 in a case under Section 436
etc. I.P.C. and Section 3 (2) (4) S.C./
S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act but in
spite of having availed of as many as
four years the State of U.P. did not
produce its witnesses as such the learned
trial judge was forced to shut out the
prosecution evidence to acquit the
accused. Before acquitting the accused
persons, the learned trial judge had
recorded the statements of accused
persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

3. We want, firstly, to point out by
referring to Section 170 (2) Cr.P.C. that
it is the duty of the officer in charge of
the police station by which the case has
been investigated into to obtain bonds
from persons who are acquainted with
the facts and circumstances of the case of
an undertaking that they shall appear
before the court to support the charges.
Thus, the primary duty of production of a
witness lies with the police. It is
invariably being seen that the above
statutory function of the police is being
flaunted with impunity. This section
might not have been referred to by the
Supreme Court in Shailendra Kumar Vs.
State of Bihar reported in AIR 2000 SC
274., when their Lordships was pointing
out the above proposition of law that it
was the duty of the officer-in-charge of
the police station by which the case had
been investigated into, to remain present
before the Court of Sessions with
witnesses on day to day basis during
hearing of such cases of serious charges
which ordinary go to the court of
Sessions and the prosecution evidence
must not to be shut out in want of
production of witnesses. We are of the
opinion that here in the present case it
could not be said that the learned trial
judge was acting in haste. The learned
judge was giving sufficient opportunity
to the State of U.P. for producing the
witnesses, but finding that no witness
was produced, he was finally shutting out
the prosecution case.

4. What we further find is that the
learned trial judge has not examined any
witness.
As
such,
there
was
no
requirement under law to examine the
accused persons under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. The provision of Section 313
Cr.P.C. requires the explanation of the
accused persons to be obtained through
their
examination
only
when
the
evidence indicates certain circumstances
appearing against them towards their
2 All] Ramji Singh V. Anuj Kumar Singh
547
culpability. If there was no evidence
then
there
could
not
be
any
circumstance appearing from evidence
against any of the accused and as such
there could not be any legal requirement
for any court to examine an accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. We are
saddened to find that the highest court
of the District was acting mechanically
to observe the formality of law as it was
never required to be observed in
absence of any evidence. The F.I.R. is
not the evidence. It might be a
document value thereof has repeatedly
been pointed out of as being a mere
statement which could be used for
corroborating or contradicting of the
maker of document. The contents of
such a document could not be utilised to
infer
the
circumstances
appearing
against the accused from evidence,
because a mere statement and evidence
are two different things as per the
simple definition of the terms. Evidence
is defined by section 3 of the Indian
Evidence Act. We, as such, find that
that particular exercise of the learned
Sessions Judge was not required to be
made by law.

5. We have already pointed out
that no witness was present. As such,
there was no evidence and there could
not have been any other result as was
recorded by the learned Trial Judge. We
do not find any merit in the application
filed under Section 5 of the Indian
Limitation Act and in the present
appeal. The two are dismissed.

6. Before we part with the
judgment, we feel that it was completely
an unnecessary exercise by the State of
U.P. to process the appeal for being
presented before this Court as it has not
only wasted public time in the law
department or other sections of the
Government, it also wasted public time
of this court also. We desire such
frivolous appeals should not be filed by
the Government and for that purpose,
we direct that a copy of the present
judgement be sent to the Principal
Secretary (Law), Government of U.P.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.05.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJES KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR SHARMA, J.

First Appeal From Order Defective No. - 673
of 2012

Ramji Singh

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Anuj Kumar Singh
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sankatha Rai
Dr. Vinod Kumar Rai
Sri Vijay Kumar Rai

Counsel for the Respondent
........................................

C.P.C.-order XXXIII, Rule I-first appeal
from order-against order passed under
order 39 rule 3A-on ground Trail Court
failed to finally pass order within 30
days-from order sheet within 30 days
objection filed and on subsequent date
with
consent
of
both
parties
adjournment granted-as such there is no
fault on part of presiding Judge-no doubt
the provision of order 39-Rule-3-A are
mandatory-but in present case neither
any omission on part of Trail Judge
found-not appeal maintainable-Registrar
General to conscious to all Judicial Office
regarding grant of ex-parte interim order
and mandatory provisions.