# State of U.P v. Sandeep Vishwakarma

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 1027
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-07
- **Case number:** Government Appeal Defective No. 182 of 2024
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra, Dr. Gautam Chowdhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-sandeep-vishwakarma-54563
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 363, 366 & 376 - The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 - Section 3/4 - Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015
- Section 94 -Appeal against acquittal -
determination of the victim's age, with
conflicting evidence from school records
and a matriculation certificate-trial court's
preference for the school record indicating
the victim was a major, supported by the
Supreme Court's precedent that such
presumptions are rebuttable-no grounds
to interfere with the trial court's acquittalprosecution failed to prove its case
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt-
Appeal
dismissed. (Paras 12, 13, 16, 18, 19 and
21)
HELD:
. The submission of learned State Counsel
cannot be accepted. First and foremost it is to
be borne in mind that the presumption
stipulated under Section 94 of the Act 2015 is
not conclusive and is rebuttable. This position
has been clarified by the Supreme Court in
Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs State of Uttar Pradesh
and others 2022 (8) SCC 602. (Para 16)

On the basis of elaborate analysis of the
evidence placed on record before the trial Court,
the Court has returned the finding that the
prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond all reasonable doubt. We have been
taken through the Judgement of trial Court and
we find that neither any triable issue is raised
before us nor any perversity or contradiction is
shown in the judgement of acquittal, which may
persuade us to grant leave to assail the
Judgement of acquittal. Law is otherwise settled
that where the view taken by the trial judge to
acquit the accused is a permissible view, the
appeal Court would not interfere only because a
different view could be taken in the matter.
(Para 21)

Appeal dismissed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. State of U.P. Vs. Sandeep Vishwakarma
1027
Apparently, the value judgement of the
Law-giver is to give the provision, a
modicum
of
voluntariness
for
the
defendant, whereas, the plaintiff, who
approaches the Court, must, necessarily,
resort to it. Section 12A elevates the
settlement under the Act and the Rules to
an award within the meaning of Section
30(4) of the Arbitration Act, giving it
meaningful enforceability. The period spent
in mediation is excluded for the purpose of
limitation. The Act confers power to order
costs based on conduct of the parties."

Section 12A(1) provides that preinstitution mediation is mandatory, where
in the suit there is no urgent interim relief is
required, but in the present case, as the
defendant is interfering in operation of
petrol pump and there was an urgent need
of interim relief, the provisions of Section
12A are not attracted in the present case.

11. Since the interim injunction was
granted by the learned trial court is exparte, the defendant-appellant has a remedy
to file application for vacating / recalling of
ex-parte injunction order under Order 39
Rule 4 C.P.C. Statutory remedy is available
to the defendant-appellant to approach the
trial court by filing application for vacating
the ex-parte order. The provisions of Order
39 Rule 4 C.P.C. are reproduced herein
below :-

"4. Order for injunction may be
discharged, varied or set aside. - Any order
for an injunction may be discharged, or
varied, or set aside by the Court, on
application made thereto by any party
dissatisfied with such order:

[Provided that if in an application
for temporary injunction or in any affidavit
supporting such application, a party has
knowingly made a false or misleading
statement in relation to a material particular
and the injunction was granted without giving
notice to the opposite party, the Court shall
vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be
recorded, it considers that it is not necessary
so to do in the interest of justice:

Provided further that where an
order for injunction has been passed after
giving to a party an opportunity of being
hears, the order shall not be discharged,
varied, or set aside on the application of that
party except where such discharge, variation
or setting aside has been necessitated by a
change in the circumstances, or unless the
Court is satisfied that the order has been
caused undue hardship to that party.]"

12. From a bare perusal of Order 39
rule 4 C.P.C., it is apparent that the defendant
has a remedy to move application for setting
aside the ex-parte order. Since, the appellant
has a statutory remedy under Order 39 Rule 4
C.P.C. to file such application for setting
aside the ex-parte injunction order, the
present appeal on behalf of defendantappellant is not maintainable and is liable to
be dismissed.

13. The first appeal from order is
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 1027
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. GAUTAM CHOWDHARY, J.

Government Appeal Defective No. 182 of 2024

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Sandeep Vishwakarma ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sri Ashutosh Kumar Sand

Counsel for the Respondent:

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 363, 366 & 376 - The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 - Section 3/4 - Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015
- Section 94 -Appeal against acquittal -
determination of the victim's age, with
conflicting evidence from school records
and a matriculation certificate-trial court's
preference for the school record indicating
the victim was a major, supported by the
Supreme Court's precedent that such
presumptions are rebuttable-no grounds
to interfere with the trial court's acquittalprosecution failed to prove its case
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt-
Appeal
dismissed. (Paras 12, 13, 16, 18, 19 and
21)
HELD:
. The submission of learned State Counsel
cannot be accepted. First and foremost it is to
be borne in mind that the presumption
stipulated under Section 94 of the Act 2015 is
not conclusive and is rebuttable. This position
has been clarified by the Supreme Court in
Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs State of Uttar Pradesh
and others 2022 (8) SCC 602. (Para 16)

On the basis of elaborate analysis of the
evidence placed on record before the trial Court,
the Court has returned the finding that the
prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond all reasonable doubt. We have been
taken through the Judgement of trial Court and
we find that neither any triable issue is raised
before us nor any perversity or contradiction is
shown in the judgement of acquittal, which may
persuade us to grant leave to assail the
Judgement of acquittal. Law is otherwise settled
that where the view taken by the trial judge to
acquit the accused is a permissible view, the
appeal Court would not interfere only because a
different view could be taken in the matter.
(Para 21)

Appeal dismissed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:
1. Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs St. of U. P. & ors.
2022 (8) SCC 602

2. Narain Chetan Ram Chowdhary Vs St. of Mah.
reported in 2023 Live Law (SC) 244

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J. & Hon'ble Dr. Gautam
Chowdhary, J.)

ORDER
ON
DELAY
CONDONATION APPLICATION NO:
01 OF 2024

1. Delay in filing the appeal has been
explained to the satisfaction of the Court.

2. Delay in filing the leave to
appeal is condoned.

3.

The
delay
condonation
application is, accordingly allowed.

ORDER ON CRIMINAL MISC.
(LEAVE TO APPEAL) APPLICATION

4. This appeal is by State
alongwith an application for grant of leave
to challenge the judgment of acquittal dated
06.02.2024, passed by Special Judge
(Juvenile Court) Room No.1/Additional
Sessions Judge, Mau in Special Sessions
No. 26 of 2017 (State Vs. Sandeep
Vishwakarma) arising out of Case Crime
No. 159 of 2017 under Sections 363, 366,
376 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of POCSO Act,
2012 Police Station Ranipur, District Mau.

5. As per the prosecution case, on
23.04.2017 at about 07:30 P.M. when the
informant's daughter aged about 17 years
had gone to ease herself two youngsters
came on a bike and took her away. The
passerby
informed
about
it
to
the
informant. The victim was in touch with
the accused Sandeep Vishwakarma from
8 All. State of U.P. Vs. Sandeep Vishwakarma
1029
before and when the informant made
necessary inquiry from the accusedopposite party, he did not inform anything
to the father of the victim. On pressure
being exerted, he said that the victim is
with her friend and he would bring her
back. On such assurance, he left his house
on a motor cycle bearing registration no.
UP54U-0438
and
disappeared.
The
accused-opposite
party
had
extended
threats to the elder daughter of the
informant
and
therefore
doubt
was
expressed in the written report that the
accused-Sandeep Vishwakarma along with
his mother and brother has enticed the
minor victim. On the basis of such
written report, F.I.R. came to be lodged
against the accused-opposite party in
Case Crime No. 159 of 2017 under
Sections 363, 366 I.P.C. and Section 7/8
of
POCSO
Act.
The
investigation
proceeded in the matter and ultimately
the victim was recovered. On the basis of
her statement charge sheet was submitted
against the accused-opposite party under
Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. read with
Section 3/4 of POCSO Act. Cognizance
in the matter was taken and the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions.
Charges were framed against the accusedopposite party in the above sections. The
accused-opposite
party
denied
the
accusations
made
against
him
and
consequently the trial proceeded.

6. At the stage of trial, the informant
has been produced as P.W.1. The victim
has appeared as P.W.2 and Dr. Mamta
Sharma,
who
conducted
medical
examination of the victim has been
produced as P.W.3 and other witnesses are
formal
police
personnels.
Various
documentary
evidence
including
the
medical examination report, supplementary
medical report were filed in the case.

7. The prosecution evidence was
confronted to the accused-opposite party
for recording his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. The accused denied the
evidence and has termed the evidence to be
false and has pleaded his innocence. The
accused-opposite party lastly submitted that
the victim had come to his house on her
own accord; she was major on the date of
incident and he has been falsely implicated.
He further stated that the victim has studied
in primary institution at Akbarpur from
Class-1 to 3 and he shall produce relevant
evidence to prove the majority of victim.

8. The trial Court has taken up the
issue of minority of the victim at the outset.
There are two sets of evidence placed on
record. From the side of the prosecution
High School certificate of the victim has
been produced wherein her date of birth is
recorded as 08.05.2000. The prosecution
case is that the victim was admitted in her
school for the first time in Class-4 and she
had not studied in any school from Class-1
to 3. On the strength of the High School
certificate it was urged by the prosecution
that such evidence being admissible and
relevant in terms of Section 94 (2) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act 2015 (hereinafter to be
referred to as "the Act of 2015) the victim
ought to be treated as a minor.

9. On the contrary, the other evidence
on record adduced by the defence witnesses
is in the form of original school record of
the Government Primary Institution where
the victim studied from Class 1 to Class-3.
The
officiating
Principal
of
the
Government Primary institution has been
produced in evidence where the victim had
studied from Class 1 to Clsss-3. Original
records were produced during trial to show
that the victim was admitted on 28.07.2005
1030 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the school and her name finds place at
serial no. 179 of the scholars' register.
She
was
promoted
to
Class-2
on
15.05.2006 and again to Class-3 on
30.05.2007. She was then admitted to
Class-4 on 20.05.2008 but as she absented
thereafter her name was struck off from the
school rolls on 30.07.2009. The officiating
Principal has produced the above records as
also the original record wherein the date of
birth of victim at the time of her admission
to class-1 was recorded as 05.06.1998. It
has further come in evidence that no
transfer certificate was issued by the said
institution where the victim studied up till
Class-3. The testimony of defence witness,
in this regard, has not been seriously
questioned.

10. The victim in her statement
before the Court however, disclosed her
date of birth as 08.05.2000. She further
claimed that her first admission in the
school was in Class-4 and she had not
studied in any previous school from Class 1
to Class-3.

11. The trial Court on the basis of
evidence on record has accepted the
defence version according to which, date of
birth of the victim is 05.06.1998. For
arriving at such conclusion, the Court has
taken into consideration Section 94 (2) of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act 2015 which provides for
presumption and determination of age
where there is doubt in that regard. Section
94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act 2015 provides
for presumption and determination of age is
reproduced hereinafter:-

"94(1)
Presumption
and
determination of age- (1) Where, it is
obvious to the Committee or the Board,
based on the appearance of the person
brought before it under any of the
provisions of this Act (other than for the
purpose of giving evidence) that the said
person is a child, the Committee or the
Board shall record such observation stating
the age of the child as nearly as may be and
proceed with the inquiry under section 14
or section 36, as the case may be, without
waiting for further confirmation of the age.
 (2) In case, the Committee or the
Board has reasonable grounds for doubt
regarding whether the person brought
before it is a child or not, the Committee or
the Board, as the case may be, shall
undertake the process of age determination,
by seeking evidence by obtaining?
 (i) the date of birth certificate
from the school, or the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; and in the
absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i)
and (ii) above, age shall be determined by
an ossification test or any other latest
medical age determination test conducted
on the orders of the Committee or the
Board:

Provided such age determination
test conducted on the order of the
Committee or the Board shall be completed
within fifteen days from the date of such
order.

(3) The age recorded by the
Committee or the Board to be the age of
person so brought before it shall, for the
purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the
true age of that person.

12. Section 94 (2) of Act 2015
provides where the committee or the board
has reasonable ground to doubt whether a
8 All. State of U.P. Vs. Sandeep Vishwakarma
1031
person brought before it is child or not, it
shall
undertake
the
process
of
age
determination
by
seeking
evidence
specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii). Clause
(i) provides date of birth certificate from
the
school,
or
the
matriculation
or
equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; in the
absence thereof, birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority and in
the absence thereof, medical evidence is to
be relied upon for determination of age.

13. The provision, therefore
clearly lets out a scheme priortising the
evidence to be relied upon in a given case.
At the top of the ladder is the date of birth
certificate from the school or matriculation
certificate or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination board. In the facts
of the present case, we find that date of
birth issued from the school where the
victim was first admitted to Class-1 has
been duly produced and exhibited during
trial as per which, her date of birth is
05.06.1998. The other evidence is in the
form of matriculation certificate. The
matriculation certificate records the date of
birth of victim as 08.05.2000. The basis for
recording the date of birth in matriculation
certificate is the date of birth of the victim
recorded for the first time in Class-4. No
explanation is furnished or any evidence
adduced for recording the date of birth of
victim in Class-4. The victim herself has
stated that she has not studied in any school
from Class-1 to Class-3 and that she was
admitted in the school only in Class-4.

14. The trial Court has given
preference to the date of birth of the victim
recorded in Class-1 over her date of birth
recorded in the matriculation certificate.
The Court has found no reasons to
disbelieve the defence evidence of victim's
admission in Class-1 in the Government
Primary Institution where her year of birth
is 1998. The victim's explanation that she
studied in no school from Class-1 to Class3 has not been found reliable by the Court.
The Court has doubted the victim's version
that she did not attend any school uptill
Class-3.

15. Learned A.G.A. submits that once
the matriculation certificate is produced in
evidence it was not open for the Court to
have ignored it or to have admitted in
evidence
any
other
material
for
determination of age of victim in view of
Section 94 of the Act 2015.

16. The submission of learned State
Counsel cannot be accepted. First and
foremost it is to be borne in mind that the
presumption stipulated under Section 94 of
the Act 2015 is not conclusive and is
rebuttable. This position has been clarified
by the Supreme Court in Rishipal Singh
Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others 2022 (8) SCC 602. In para 33.3 and
33.4 of the report, the Court has held as
under:-

33.3 That when a claim for
juvenility is raised, the burden is on the
person raising the claim to satisfy the court
to discharge the initial burden. However,
the documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)
(a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the JJ Rules, 2007
made under the JJ Act 2000 or sub-section
(2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 shall
be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of
the court. On the basis of the aforesaid
documents a presumption of juvenility may
be raised.

33.4 The said presumption is
however not conclusive proof of the age of
juvenility and the same may be rebutted by
contra evidence let in by the opposite party.
1032 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. The view in Rishipal Singh
(supra) has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Narain Chetan Ram Chowdhary
Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
2023 Live Law (SC) 244. In para 37 the
Court has observed as under:-

37. In the cases of Ramdeo
Chauhan (supra), Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [(2019)
12 SCC 370], Parag Bhati (supra), Manoj
(supra), Babloo Pasi vs State of Jharkhand
and Another [(2008) 13 SCC 133] and
Birad Mal Singhvi (supra), different
Benches of this Court came to findings as
regards reliability of the documents upon
applying mind and none of these authorities
lay down that the certificate of date of birth
by
the
school
authorities
based
on
admission register of the school will not be
acceptable for an inquiry under Section
9(2) of the 2015 Act. On the other hand, in
the order of priority in the aforesaid
provision, the date of birth certificate by
the school authority has been given the preeminence. Though the heading of the said
section
reads
"presumption
and
determination of age", the section itself
does not specify that the date of birth
certificate by the school would only lead to
presumption. The way the provision thereof
has been framed, the documents referred to
in the first two sub-clauses of sub-section
(2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act, if
established in the order of priority, then the
dates reflected therein has to be accepted to
determine the age of the accused or convict
claiming to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence. In the event the
document referred to in Section 94 (2) (i) is
there, the inquiring body need not go to the
documents referred to in sub-clause (ii)
thereof. The only caveat, implicit thereto,
which has been sounded by several
decisions of this Court, is that the
document must inspire confidence. But
lack of inspiration of the age determining
authority must come for some cogent
reason and ought not to be sourced from
such body's own perception of age of the
juvenile-claimant.

18. If the argument of learned
State Counsel is accepted then the moment
matriculation
certificate
of
victim
is
produced by the prosecution there would be
no scope for the accused to show that the
basis of age in the matriculation certificate
is not reliable. This approach will restrict
the right of the accused to prove his
innocence by producing legally admissible
evidence. It will also impede the right of
accused to a fair trial. The approach
suggested by the State Counsel, for such
reasons, cannot be accepted.

18. Section 94 (2) (i) of the Act 2015
places the date of birth certificate from the
school or the matriculation or equivalent
certificate from the concerned examination
Board in the same category. It would
therefore be open for the Court to admit
defence evidence with regard to reliability
of the date of birth entry in the
matriculation certificate as has been done
herein.

19. The statute accords recognition to
the date of birth certificate from the school
at par with the matriculation certificate.
Where the date of birth in the above two
records are distinct it would be permissible
for the Court to evaluate the evidence on
record and accept one at the cost of other.
In this case, we find that original records of
the first school where the victim was
admitted in Class-1 has been produced and
is found reliable. The basis of date of birth
in the matriculation certificate is not
disclosed and the victim's version that she
attended no school from Class-1 to Class-
8 All. State of U.P. Vs. Sandeep Vishwakarma
1033
3 has not been found convincing and
reliable. In our opinion, the view taken by
the trial judge to accept the date of birth
certificate from the school by overlooking
the matriculation certificate is clearly a
permissible view on the basis of evidence
on record. The approach of the trial judge is
otherwise in keeping with the well settled
principle that the accused is to be presumed
innocent till he is proven guilty. The
approach of the trial judge is consistent
with the principles of a fair trial since the
accused is given the opportunity to produce
evidence and rebut the presumption which
otherwise
arises
on
a
matriculation
certificate by virtue of Section 94 (2) (i) of
the Act 2015.The finding of the trial judge
that victim on the date of incident was
major is thus sustained.

20. So far as the allegation with
regard to victim having been enticed or
subjected to sexual assault is concerned, the
evidence on record clearly shows that the
victim in her statement recorded under
Section
161
and
164
Cr.P.C.
has
categorically stated that she had gone with
the accused-opposite party on her own
volition. The victim at the relevant point of
time was studying in Intermediate in
V.D.P. Intermediate College and she was in
touch with the accused-opposite party for
the last more than a year. She has admitted
that she left with the accused-opposite
party on his motor cycle and thereafter
travelled to various places, including by
train to Mumbai for more than six days.
The victim remained with the accusedopposite party at Mumbai and physical
relations were voluntarily formed by the
victim with the accused-opposite party. It is
only after return to Mau and coming in
contact with her parents that the victim
took a contrary stand by asserting that she
was forcibly taken by the accused-opposite
party and was subjected to sexual assault.
The trial Court has examined the evidence
on record and the subsequent change in her
version has been found inconsistent with
the evidence placed on record. In the
medical examination also, the victim was
found major. No injury either external or
internal was found on the victim. The
victim had clearly stated before the
Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that
physical relations were established with her
consent by the accused-opposite party
therefore, the fact that victim's hymen was
found ruptured could not have been
construed as an evidence supporting the
prosecution case.

21. On the basis of elaborate analysis
of the evidence placed on record before the
trial Court, the Court has returned the
finding that the prosecution has failed to
establish its case beyond all reasonable
doubt. We have been taken through the
Judgement of trial Court and we find that
neither any triable issue is raised before us
nor any perversity or contradiction is
shown in the judgement of acquittal, which
may persuade us to grant leave to assail the
Judgement of acquittal. Law is otherwise
settled that where the view taken by the
trial judge to acquit the accused is a
permissible view, the appeal Court would
not interfere only because a different view
could be taken in the matter.

22. In that view of the matter, we find
no good ground to interfere in the matter so
as to grant leave to appeal to the State in
order to assail the Judgement of acquittal.

23. Application for grant of leave to
appeal is, accordingly, refused and the
appeal
consequently
fails
and
is
dismissed.
----------
1034 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2024) 8 ILRA 1034
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ - C No. 1213 of 2023

Mithilesh Kumar Chaudhary ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Krishna Lal Yadav, Aparna Sinha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Atul Kumar Dwivedi

A.
Education
Law
-
Cancellation
of
admission in Ph.D. - Students cannot be
made to suffer for the fault of the
management of the university. (Para 13)

While granting the admission if the
academic body has acted inattentively and
mechanically, then they cannot be allowed
to take the plea that the admission was
never valid and that the petitioners were
ineligible from the very inception and
knowing the ineligibility they applied for
admission. The respondents cannot be allowed
to
cancel
the
admission
at
their
own
convenience at any time of the year without
considering the fact that if they cancel the
admission after the session has started then the
entire year of the petitioners will be spoiled.
(Para 14)

The respondents cannot be allowed to
take advantage of their own wrong and
cannot be permitted to take the plea that
under the prospectus they had the power
to cancel the admission of ineligible
student and the principle of estoppel will
operate against them. (Para 14)

B. The petitioners cannot be penalised for
the
negligence
of
authorities.
It
is
important
to
appreciate
that
the
petitioners in the facts and circumstances
cannot be accused of making any false
statement or suppressing any relevant
fact before anybody. (Para 14)

In the present case, once the University has
granted admission and permitted petitioner to
continue for five long years and his Ph.D. course
is on the verge of completion, it is now not open
for the University to restrain petitioner from
completing his course. Even presuming some
irregularity did occur at the time of admission in
Ph.D. course, the same cannot now be made
the basis for denying petitioner from completing
his course. Learned counsel for respondent
University could not show from record that
petitioner has in any manner misrepresented or
played fraud or otherwise was maliciously
involved in the said admission process and the
decision was taken by the authorities of
University in exercise of its powers. Thus, the
respondent University cannot restrain petitioner
from completing his Ph.D. course and is bound
to consider his application for extension of
period by one year as per rules. (Para 15)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Rajendra Prasad Mathur Vs Karnataka
University, 1986 Supp SCC 740 (Para 12)

2. Ashok Chand Singhvi (Para 13)

3. Abha George (Para 14)

Present petition challenges the order
dated
06.10.2022
passed
by
the
Departmental Research Committee of the
Dr.
Shakuntala
Misra
National
Rehabilitation
University,
Lucknow
by
which the admission of the petitioner in
the Ph.D. course of Sociology has been
cancelled. He has also challenged the
orders dated 13.12.2022 and 23.01.2023
passed by Research Degree Committee
and
by
the
Registrar,
respectively,
communicating the aforesaid order.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)