# State of U.P v. Shivchand Yadav & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 3 ILRA 438
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-02-09
- **Case number:** Government Appeal No. 1 of 2021
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/state-of-u-p-v-shivchand-yadav-anr-48203
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - The prosecution has failed
to prove the guilt of the accused person by
leading sufficient evidence to form a chain to
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability the
crime was committed by the accused person.
(para 24)
Appeal Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

438 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proper to have a glance over the impugned
judgment as allegations, if proved, would
be considered to be against society. In
cross it was admitted by PW-1 and 2 that
death had taken place after seven years of
marriage. It is a case where only a
skelteon was found and it was not known
whether it was of a male or of a female
and even D.N.A. was not conducted to
ascertain whether it was of the deceased
Kaushlaya. It is virutally a case of no
evidence.

13. Keeping in view the aforesaid
facts and the legal position, we do not find
any good ground to condone such huge
delay.
In
these
circumstances,
the
application for condonation of delay in
filing the appeal is liable to be rejected.

14
.
The
delay
condonation
application is accordingly rejected.

Order on Application Seeking Leave
to File Appeal

Since
the
application
seeking
condonation of delay to file leave to
appeal
is dismissed,
the
application
seeking leave to file appeal is accordingly
rejected.

Order on the Appeal
Since the application seeking leave to file
an appeal is rejected, the appeal also
stands dismissed.
----------
(2022)03ILR A438
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.02.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Government Appeal No. 1 of 2021

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Shivchand Yadav & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
A.G.A.

Counsel for the Respondents:

A. Criminal Law - The prosecution has failed
to prove the guilt of the accused person by
leading sufficient evidence to form a chain to
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability the
crime was committed by the accused person.
(para 24)
Appeal Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Babu Vs St.of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189

2. Surrendra Kumar Vs St.of Punj. (1999) SCC
(Crl.) 33

3. Sampath kumar Vs. Inspector of Police
(2012) 4 SCC 124

4. Anwar Ali Vs St. of H.P. (2020) 10 SCC 166
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla,
learned AGA for the appellant on the
application under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C.
seeking leave to file appeal against the
judgment and order dated 02.09.2020
passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Session Trial No.
120 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav
and another) and Session Trial No.121 of
2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav).

2. Facts of the case, briefly stated, are
that on 03.05.2014 a first information
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Shivchand Yadav & Anr.
439
report was lodged at 00:30 hours against
unknown persons on the information given
by Ajay Kumar Maurya son of Late Ramji
Maurya stating that the informant's father
was employed as Muneeb in the oil depot
of Madan Lal Agrahari. On 02.05.2014 at
21:30 hours, he received an information
that his father was murdered at Toll Plaza
of Lala Nagar, near petrol pump of Natwa
Village by some unknown miscreants.

3. The accused persons Shivchand
Yadav (respondent no.1) and Kamlesh
Dubey (respondent no.2) were arrested on
08.05.2014 and one pistol along with three
cartridges were recovered from respondent
no.1. On the basis of the said recovery,
Case Crime No. 145 of 2014 under
Sections 3/25/27 of the Arms Act was
registered against him on that very day.
After investigation a charge sheet under
Section 302 IPC was submitted in Case
Crime No. 143 of 2014 against both the
respondents and a charge sheet under
Section 3/25/27 of the Arms Act was
submitted in Case Crime No. 145 of 2014
against the respondent no.1.

4. As many as 11 witnesses were
examined by the prosecution before the
learned Trial Court. After examination of
the statements of witnesses, the Trial Court
came to a conclusion that there was no
delay in lodging the FIR and the
prosecution has proved the time and place
of occurrence.

5. P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 were said to be
eye-witnesses of the incident and the
learned Trial Court has discussed and
analyzed their statements in great detail for
ascertaining their presence at the time and
place of the incident. It was emphasized by
the defence counsel before the Trial Court
that the presence of eye-witnesses at the
time and place of occurrence was highly
doubtful. They were neither accompanying
the deceased nor are they residents of any
locality near the place of occurrence. As
they are chance witnesses and residents of
places far away from the place of the
incident, it was incumbent upon them to
disclose the particular occasion for which
they were present on the time and place of
the incident.

6. The learned Trial Court has
recorded that in his examination in chief,
P.W.-1 Ajay has deposed that while
returning from the police station, he was
informed by some people that the incident
was witnessed by Guddu Dubey and Pappu
Maurya. Pappu Maurya is uncle (Mausa) of
P.W.-1 Ajay. When P.W.-1 reached on the
spot, Pappu was not present there. Even at
the hospital, he had not met Pappu. He has
stated that he met Pappu in the morning of
the next day, i.e. on 03.05.2014. However,
P.W.-2 Pappu stated that in the night of the
occurrence, he went to the house of the
deceased at 10:30 P.M. and he stayed there
overnight. He further stated that he met
with P.W.-1 Ajay when he left the spot to
visit the deceased's house. He also talked
with Ajay for a few minutes. He was
present at the time of inquest and
postmortem. At one place P.W.-2, Pappu
has said that when he reached the spot of
occurrence, it was crowded and about 50 to
100 persons were present there. The
assailants were not present at the spot and
they had fled away. The deceased's son
Ajay (P.W.-1), deceased's brother Prakash
and his brother-in-law Manoj Kumar were
present at the spot. The learned Trial Court
has further noted that there is no
explanation as to why the names of the
accused persons were not mentioned in the
FIR when both P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 were in
contact and there was no reason for
440 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
concealment of the names of the assailants
from the informant, who is a close relative
of P.W. 2.

7. Similarly, if the testimony of P.W.-
1, Ajay is to be believed then naturally
questions will arise about the conduct of
P.W.-2 Pappu who, being an eye witness of
the incident and a relative (co-brother) of
the deceased, could not inform the family
members immediately about the incident
and waited till morning to visit the house of
the deceased. Such conduct of P.W.-2,
Pappu is unnatural and it cannot be
believed by any stretch of imagination that
a person who is witnessing the murder of
his close relative or acquaintance will keep
mum and not disclose the name of the
assailants, whom he claims to identify,
even to the family members of the
deceased, with whom he had met just after
the incident.

8. After extensively referring to the
statements of P.W.-1-the informant and son
of the deceased and P.W.-2 the eye witness
of the incident and nephew of the deceased,
the learned Trial Court came to a
conclusion that a close scrutiny of their
statements depicts that there are material
inconsistencies in the statements of P.W.-1
and P.W.-2 and the contradictions between
the testimonies of the two witnesses are
such as cannot be reconciled. Upon a
careful examination of the testimonies of
P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, it is apparent that
neither P.W.-2 was present on the spot at
the time of occurrence nor any disclosure
was ever made by him to P.W.1 regarding
the names of the assailants.

9. Regarding the alleged second eye
witness-P.W.-4 Arvind Maurya, the learned
Trial Court has recorded that this witness
came to light after the statement of P.W.-3,
Janki Devi wife of the deceased was
recorded by the Investigation Officer on
15.05.2015 i.e. after a fortnight. P.W.-3 has
stated that she knew the names of the
assailants from the very beginning, but she
had not disclosed the same to her son-P.W.-
1.

10. As per the prosecution version,
there are four witnesses of the incident out
of whom only two (P.W.-2 and P.W.-4)
have been examined. Both of them claimed
that they witnessed the incident when they
were present at the petrol pump. They
stayed at the spot for some time after the
incident. P.W.-1 Ajay stated that he met
P.W.-2, Pappu on the next day, which is a
very awkward circumstance that none of
the witnesses, who were close to the
deceased, could remain at the spot at least
till arrival of the family members of the
deceased. The witnesses have not uttered
anything about the steps taken by them
after the occurrence. It is very strange that
these
witnesses
did
not
send
any
information of the incident to the family
members
of
the
deceased
and
the
information was sent by some unknown
persons. The Trial Court has held that after
a close scrutiny of all the witnesses, it is
very much clear that all the witnesses of
fact examined by the prosecution have less
to disclose and more to hide about the
occurrence and the presence of the eye
witnesses at the spot. Stark contradictions
and inconsistencies appearing in the
testimonies of witnesses establish that
neither P.W.-2 nor P.W.-4 had witnessed
the incident.

11. The Trial Court has also recorded
that the incident occurred in the night at the
southern track of the G.T. Road and it was
allegedly seen by the witnesses from the
northern track of the road which is
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Shivchand Yadav & Anr.
441
partitioned by a divider and the divider is
embedded with oleander (Kanail shrubs)
and the vehicles were passing from both
sides of the road and there was no source of
light on the southern track of the road
where the incident occurred. The site plan
does not show any electric polls in it. P.W.-
4 claims to have witnessed the occurrence
from the distance about 25 meters. These
circumstances can only lead to one
conclusion that it is impossible for anybody
to witness the incident from the distance of
25 meters while there is no source of light
at the scene and the witnesses were present
on one side of the road while see the
incident occurred on the other side of the
road and the road is divided, shrubs are
planted on the divider and traffic was
moving on both sides of the road.

12. P.W.-4, Arvind Maurya has stated
that when he heard the gun shot, he was
driving his motorcycle. The learned Trial
Court has recorded that generally when a
person is himself driving a motorcycle on
highway in night hours, his focus will be
concentrated on his front side and it is not
possible that while driving the motorcycle
they would have observed the incident
from the other side of the road. In such
circumstances, it was not possible for P.W.-
2
and
P.W.-4
have
witnessed
the
occurrence on the other side of the road
which was not illuminated.

13. The learned Trial Court has
recorded that in their examination in chief,
both the aforesaid witnesses stated that
initially they saw that the accused persons
and the deceased were talking and in the
meantime the accused persons started
abusing the deceased and afterwards they
fired at him. However, in his cross
examination, P.W.-4 stated that he saw the
accused persons and the deceased only
after he heard the gun shot.

14. After a very detail and thorough
scrutiny of the statements of all the
witnesses, the learned Trial Court came to
the conclusion that if all the facts are
combined together, the only conclusion is
that the witnesses have not witnessed the
incident. The learned Trial Court has come
to a conclusion that the prosecution
witnesses could not prove the guilt of the
accused
persons.
Consequently,
it
concluded the accused persons by means of
the judgment and order dated 02.09.2020.
We do not find any infirmity in the
aforesaid finding of the learned Trial Court.

15. In Babu v. State of Kerala,
(2010) 9 SCC 189, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court
was
pleased
to
reiterate
the
guidelines for the High Court to interfere
with the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial Court, in the following
words: -

"12. This Court time and again
has laid down the guidelines for the High
Court to interfere with the judgment and
order of acquittal passed by the trial court.
The appellate court should not ordinarily
set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case
where two views are possible, though the
view of the appellate court may be the more
probable one. While dealing with a
judgment of acquittal, the appellate court
has to consider the entire evidence on
record, so as to arrive at a finding as to
whether the views of the trial court were
perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The
appellate court is entitled to consider
whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial court had failed to take into
consideration admissible evidence and/or
had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law.
Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof
may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by
442 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v.
State of U.P., Shambhoo Missir v. State of
Bihar, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.,
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., Budh
Singh v. State of U.P., State of U.P. v. Ram
Veer Singh, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami
Reddy,
Arulvelu
v.
State,
Perla
Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. and
Ram Singh v. State of H.P.)

13. In Sheo Swarup v. King
Emperor, the Privy Council observed as
under: (SCC Online PC: IA p. 404)

''... the High Court should and
will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the
views of the trial Judge as to the credibility
of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the
fact that he has been acquitted at his trial;
(3) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of
fact arrived at by a Judge who had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses.'

14. The aforesaid principle of law
has consistently been followed by this
Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State, Balbir
Singh v. State of Punjab, M.G. Agarwal v.
State of Maharashtra, Khedu Mohton v.
State of Bihar, Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.
and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran.)

15. In Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka, this Court reiterated the legal
position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

''(1) An appellate court has full
power
to
review,
reappreciate
and
reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.

(2)
The
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973
puts
no
limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of
law.

(3) Various expressions, such as,
"substantial and compelling reasons",
"good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
"flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to
come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however,
must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the
accused.
Firstly,
the
presumption
of
innocence is available to him under the
fundamental
principle
of
criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court.'

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of
U.P., this Court reiterated the said view,
observing that the appellate court in
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Shivchand Yadav & Anr.
443
dealing with the cases in which the trial
courts have acquitted the accused, should
bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal
bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent. The appellate court must give due
weight and consideration to the decision of
the trial court as the trial court had the
distinct
advantage
of
watching
the
demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a
better position to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v.
Naresh, the Court again examined the
earlier judgments of this Court and laid
down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)

''20. ... An order of acquittal
should not be lightly interfered with even if
the court believes that there is some
evidence pointing out the finger towards
the accused.'

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, this
Court
gave
certain
illustrative
circumstances in which the Court would be
justified in interfering with a judgment of
acquittal
by
the
High
Court.
The
circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para
28)

''(i) The High Court's decision is
based on totally erroneous view of law by
ignoring the settled legal position;

(ii) The High Court's conclusions
are contrary to evidence and documents on
record;

(iii) The entire approach of the
High Court in dealing with the evidence
was patently illegal leading to grave
miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court's judgment is
manifestly unjust and unreasonable based
on erroneous law and facts on the record of
the case;

(v) This Court must always give
proper weight and consideration to the
findings of the High Court;

(vi)
This
Court
would
be
extremely reluctant in interfering with a
case when both the Sessions Court and the
High Court have recorded an order of
acquittal.'

A
similar
view
has
been
reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v.
State.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can
be summarised to the effect that in
exceptional
cases
where
there
are
compelling
circumstances,
and
the
judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere
with the order of acquittal. The appellate
court should bear in mind the presumption
of innocence of the accused and further
that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption of his innocence. Interference
in a routine manner where the other view is
possible should be avoided, unless there
are good reasons for interference."

 (emphasis supplied)"

16. Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, learned
AGA has submitted that the appellant was
seeking leave to file an appeal against the
aforesaid judgment mainly on the ground
that although it is a case of circumstantial
evidence, the accused persons had a strong
motive to kill the deceased.
444 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. Regarding motive, P.W.-1 Ajay
Kumar Maurya has stated that while he was
returning from the police station, some
people informed him that the incident was
witnessed by Guddu Dubey and Pappu
Maurya and they also told him that a few
days ago, Kamlesh Dubey alias Karia
(respondent no.2) and Shivchand Yadav
(respondent no.1) had forcibly tried to take
kerosene oil from his father and when
refused, they had abused his father.

18. P.W.-3 Janki Devi wife of
deceased has stated in her examination in
chief that her husband had informed her
that Shiv Chand Yadav and Kamlesh
Dubey were pressurising him to deliver
kerosene oil and upon his refusal, they had
threatened to kill him. She had advised her
husband to report the matter to police.
Apart from this statement of P.W.3, there is
no material on record in this regard.

19. A mere vague allegation of
demand of delivery of kerosene oil without
a specific mention of the date of the alleged
demand and the quantity demanded, is not
sufficient to establish a motive for
committing a heinous offence of murder.
We are not convinced that the nonfulfilment of a demand to deliver an
undisclosed quantity of kerosene can be a
sufficient motive to commit murder of the
deceased.

20. Although, motive is a relevant
consideration while deciding the case, it
cannot be the sole ground for convicting an
accused when there is no other sufficient
evidence available on record to establish
his
guilt
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
Therefore, assuming that the alleged
demand of delivery of kerosene oil could
form a motive for committing an offence,
the learned court below has committed no
error in acquitting the accused when their
guilt could not be established beyond
reasonable doubt by evidence adduced by
the prosecution.

21. In Surendra Kumar vs. State of
Punjab, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 33, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court pleased to hold that in the
absence of proof of any other circumstance
pointing to the guilt of the appellant, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution in
support of the motive is not of any
significance.

22. In Sampath Kumar v. Inspector
of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to and relied upon
its previous decisions and proceeded to
hold that motive alone can hardly be a
ground
for
conviction.
The
relevant
passage of the aforesaid judgment is as
follows: -

"29. In N.J. Suraj v. State the
prosecution case was based entirely upon
circumstantial evidence and a motive.
Having discussed the circumstances relied
upon by the prosecution, this Court rejected
the motive which was the only remaining
circumstance
relied
upon
by
the
prosecution stating that the presence of a
motive was not enough for supporting a
conviction, for it is well settled that the
chain of circumstances should be such as to
lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is
incompatible with the innocence of the
accused.

30. To the same effect is the
decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar
Singh v. State and Rukia Begum v. State of
Karnataka where this Court held that
motive alone in the absence of any other
circumstantial evidence would not be
sufficient
to
convict
the
appellant.
Reference may also be made to the decision
3 All. State of U.P. Vs. Shivchand Yadav & Anr.
445
of this Court in Sunil Rai v. UT,
Chandigarh. This Court explained the legal
position as follows: (Sunil Rai case, SCC p.
266, paras 31-32)

"31. ... In any event, motive
alone can hardly be a ground for
conviction.

32. On the materials on record,
there may be some suspicion against the
accused, but as is often said, suspicion,
howsoever strong, cannot take the place of
proof."

23. In the present case, there is no
direct evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused persons and it is a case of
circumstantial evidence. In Anwar Ali
versus State of H. P. (2020) 10 SCC 166,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to
reiterate that "in a case of circumstantial
evidence,
the
circumstances
taken
cumulatively, should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion
that
within
all
human
probability the crime was committed by the
accused
and
none
else
and
the
circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable
of explanation of any other hypothesis that
that of the guilt of the accused and such
evidence would not only be consistent with
the guilt of the accused but should also be
inconsistent with his innocent.

24. Analyzing the facts of the present
case in light of the aforesaid law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find that in the
present case, the prosecution has failed to
prove the guilt of the accused persons by
leading sufficient evidence to form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability
the crime was committed by the accused
persons and therefore, even if we assume that
the accused had a motive to commit murder of
the deceased, it will not be sufficient to hold
the accused persons guilty of the offence.

25. On examination of the aforesaid
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial
Court it is clear that the judgment has been
passed after a very detailed and thorough
examination of the entire material available on
record. The learned AGA has not assailed the
validity of the judgment terming it as perverse.
Her submission is that the learned Trial Court
has not weighed and assessed the prosecution
case in its proper perspective and has
erroneously
acquitted
the
accusedrespondents. However, in view of the
foregoing discussion, we find that the learned
Trial Court has acquitted the accused
respondents on the basis of the finding
recorded after a thorough analysis of the entire
evidence that it is a case of doubtful evidence
against the accused persons. The aforesaid
finding appears to be well founded, which
needs no interference by this Court in exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 378
Cr.P.C.

26. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
this Court is of the view that no case is made
out for grant of leave to file an appeal under
Section 378(3) of the Criminal Procedure
Code against the judgment and order dated
02.09.2020 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Session Trial
No. 120 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav
and another) and Session Trial No.121 of 2014
(State vs. Shivchand Yadav).

27. The application seeking leave to
file an appeal is rejected.

28. Since the application granting for
leave to appeal is rejected, consequently the
appeal also stands dismissed.
446 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2022)03ILR A446
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.02.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Government Appeal No. 306 of 2021

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Brijesh & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
A.G.A.

Counsel for the Respondents:

A. Criminal Law - The Court neither find any
clear motive for the accused to administer
poison to the deceased nor has it been proved
that the accused has the poison in his
possession and therefore, there is no sufficient
evidence to prove that the accused persons
committed
murder
of
the
deceased
by
administering poison to him. (Para 25)
Appeal Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs St. of Mah.
(1984) 4 SCC 116

2. Jaipal Vs St. of Har. (2003) 1 SCC 169

3. Jayamma Vs St. of Karn. (2021) 3 SCC 213
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Ratan Singh, learned
Additional Government Advocate for the
Appellant - State of U.P., on the application
under Section 378 (3) of the Criminal
Procedure Code (herein after referred to as
"Cr.P.C.") seeking leave to file appeal
against the judgment and order dated
18.03.2021
passed
by
the
learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 8,
Bulandshahar in Sessions Trial No. 352 of
2016, acquitting the accused-respondents of
the
charges
of
committing
offences
punishable under Sections 302/34, 328/34
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
referred to as "IPC") in Case Crime No.
265 of 2014, Police Station Chhataari,
District Bulandshahr.

2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case
is that on 16.08.2014 Ashok Kumar gave
information (Exhibit A-1) to the police that
his son (Sanna) had committed suicide at
his home on the same day. No one is guilty
for it, yet to ascertain the cause of his
death, a post-mortem examination be
conducted. On 25.08.2014, the informant
filed an application under Section 156
(3) Cr.P.C. (Exhibit A-2) stating that his
son Sanna used to work in Gujarat
alongwith Brijesh (the respondent no. 1) of
the same village and they used to do
painting jobs in factories. About one month
prior to the date of the incident i.e.
16.08.2014, Sanna had told the informant
on phone that Brijesh has made illicit
relations with a girl at Surat and upon being
forbidden, Brijesh threatened him of dire
consequences. The informant had told him
that he will talk to Brijesh when he would
come to the village.

3. The informant's son Sanna and
Brijesh were visiting the village on the
occasion of 'Rakshabandhan'. On 16.08.2014
at 10:00 a.m. Brijesh and his relative Praveen
had come to the informant's home. At that
time the informant, his wife and other son
Tota Ram were present there. In their
presence, Brijesh called and took away the
informant's son Sanna saying that they will