# Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari v. A.D.J. Bulandshahar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 9 ILRA 647
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-08-05
- **Case number:** WRIT - C No. 33434 of 2013
- **Bench:** Salil Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sudhir-kumar-maheshwari-v-a-d-j-bulandshahar-ors-46023
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act,1988 -
Section 166 & Central Motor Vehicle
Rules,1989-challenge to- recall of award
of Tribunal-the same refused by Tribunal
as Tribunal has no inherent power to
recall or review its award-registration
certificate filed by the petitioner was
sufficient evidence that the vehicle had a
fitness certificate valid for two years -
failure to file fitness certificate is not
material
and
sufficient
to
hold
the
petitioner-error apparent on the face of
record could be a ground for review if
Tribunal had the substantive power to
review its order on merits-the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal has no power to
review its order on merits.(Para 1 to 20)

B. It is settled legal proposition that
unless the statute/rules so permit, the
review application is not maintainable in
case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In
the absence of any provision in the Act
granting an express power of review, it is
manifest that a review could not be made
and the order in review, if passed, is ultra
vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Para
6) (E-6)
List of Cases cited: -

## Text

9 All. Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari Vs. A.D.J. Bulandshahar Ors.
647
by 33%". That being so, unless the fact that
meter was defective and running slow by
33% is ascertained in accordance with
procedure prescribed in Clause 5.6 of
Code, 2005, no further assessment could
have been made. Admittedly, procedure
laid down in Clause 5.6 was not observed.
There is no ascertainment or adjudication
by authorities concerned that meter was
actually running slow. Hence, authorities
had no power to make any assessment.
Moreso assessment could not have been
made for unauthorised use of electricity
since it was a case of alleged slow running
of meter.

25. We, therefore, find no merit in
writ petition. Dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2020)09ILR A647
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.08.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.

WRIT - C No. 33434 of 2013

Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari ...Petitioner
Versus
A.D.J. Bulandshahar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri H.M. Srivastava, Sri Neeraj Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Pankaj Rai

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act,1988 -
Section 166 & Central Motor Vehicle
Rules,1989-challenge to- recall of award
of Tribunal-the same refused by Tribunal
as Tribunal has no inherent power to
recall or review its award-registration
certificate filed by the petitioner was
sufficient evidence that the vehicle had a
fitness certificate valid for two years -
failure to file fitness certificate is not
material
and
sufficient
to
hold
the
petitioner-error apparent on the face of
record could be a ground for review if
Tribunal had the substantive power to
review its order on merits-the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal has no power to
review its order on merits.(Para 1 to 20)

B. It is settled legal proposition that
unless the statute/rules so permit, the
review application is not maintainable in
case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In
the absence of any provision in the Act
granting an express power of review, it is
manifest that a review could not be made
and the order in review, if passed, is ultra
vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Para
6) (E-6)
List of Cases cited: -

1. Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal & ors., (1980) (Sup) SCC 420
2. Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust & anr.
Vs U.O.I. & anr.(2008) 16 SCC 365

3. Sandhya Vaish & anr. Vs New India Insurance
Co. Ltd. & ors.,(2010) 81 ALR 360

4.
Shaurabh
Agarwal
Vs
Addl.Commr.(judicial),Agra
Mandal,
Agra
&
ors.,(2011) 114 RD 217

5. Naresh Kumar & ors. Vs Govt. (NCT of
Delhi),(2019) 9 SCC 416

6. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Rajendra
Singh & ors.,(2000) 3 SCC P. 581

7. Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union Vs Birla Cotton
Spinning And Weaving Mills Ltd. & anr.(2005)
13 SCC 777

8. Debi Prasad & ors. Vs Khelawan & ors.,
(1956) ALL. L.J. 13

9. Smt. Raj Kumari Vs Motor Accident Claim
Tribunal,Jaunpur,(2002) ALJ 833

(Delivered by Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai, J.)
648 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Heard Shri H.M. Srivastava and
Shri Neeraj Srivastava, counsel for the
petitioner.

2. The respondent Nos. 3 to 8
instituted Motor Accident Claim Petition
No. 244 of 2008 under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicle Act 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as, 'Act, 1988') before Motor
Accident
Claims
Tribunal,
DistrictBulandshahar (hereinafter referred to as,
'Tribunal') against the petitioner and
respondent No. 2 claiming compensation
for the death of Shri Nanak Chandra in an
accident occurring on 16.6.2008 and caused
due to rash and negligent driving of Truck
No. U.P. 82 J 9175. The petitioner is the
owner of the vehicle, i.e., Truck No. U.P.
82 J 9175 and the vehicle was insured with
respondent No. 2, i.e., The National
Insurance
Company
Limited.
The
respondent Nos. 3 to 8 are the dependents
of (Late) Shri Nanak Chand. The Tribunal
through its award dated 1.3.2011 awarded,
to the claimants, a compensation of Rs.
3,69,500/- with a simple interest of 6% per
annum calculated from the date of the
institution of the claim petition. In its
judgment, the Tribunal recorded that the
petitioner
had
not
filed
the
fitness
certificate of the vehicle and, therefore, the
Tribunal held that the petitioner, i.e., the
owner of the vehicle and not the respondent
no. 2, i.e., the Insurance Company, was
liable to pay compensation. The petitioner
filed a review application for review of the
award dated 1.3.2011 alleging that the
vehicle was a new vehicle and was
registered for the first time on 25.1.2007
and, therefore, under Rule 62(1)(a) of the
Central
Motor
Vehicle
Rules,
1989
(hereinafter referred to as, 'Rules, 1989'),
the fitness certificate of the vehicle was
valid for two years from the date of
registration, i.e., from 25.1.2007. The
ground for review was that in cases of new
vehicles, i.e., vehicles registered for the
first time, fitness certificate of the vehicle
is issued along with the registration
certificate and the petitioner had filed the
registration certificate of the vehicle,
therefore,
it
was
evident
from
the
documents filed by the petitioner that the
vehicle had a fitness certificate. On the
aforesaid application of the petitioner,
Review Application Case No. 92/2011 was
registered before the Tribunal and the
Tribunal vide its order dated 18.5.2013
dismissed the said application on the
ground that it did not have the power to
review its award.

3. The present writ petition has been
filed by the petitioner praying for a writ of
certiorari to quash the award dated
1.3.2011 passed by the Tribunal as well as
the order dated 18.5.2013 of the Tribunal
dismissing the review application filed by
the petitioner.

4. Challenging the order dated
18.5.2013, the counsel for the petitioner
have argued that a vehicle which is
registered for the first time is issued a
certificate
of
fitness
alongwith
the
registration certificate itself and the fitness
certificate is valid for a period of two years
from the date of issue. It was argued that
the registration certificate of the vehicle
showing that the vehicle had, for the first
time, been registered on 25.1.2007 was on
record and the said document, by virtue of
Rule 62(1)(a) of the Rules was sufficient
evidence to prove that the vehicle had a
fitness certificate on the relevant date, i.e.,
the date of accident and the failure of the
petitioner to file the fitness certificate was
not sufficient to absolve the Insurance
Company from paying compensation. It
was argued, that for the aforesaid reason,
9 All. Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari Vs. A.D.J. Bulandshahar Ors.
649
the award of the Tribunal releasing the
Insurance Company and holding the
petitioner/owner
liable
to
pay
compensation to the claimants on the
ground that the petitioner had not filed the
fitness certificate of the vehicle was
contrary to law and thus liable to be
quashed. It was further argued by the
counsel for the petitioner that the failure of
the Tribunal to consider the aforesaid
aspect in its award dated 1.3.2011 was a
mistake on the part of the Tribunal causing
injustice to the petitioner and therefore the
Tribunal had the inherent power to recall its
award and the opinion of the Tribunal, as
recorded in its order dated 18.5.2013, that it
had no power to recall or review its
previous award is contrary to law and thus
the order dated 18.5.2013 is also liable to
be set aside. In support of his arguments,
the counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgements of the Supreme Court
reported in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs.
Central Government Industrial Tribunal
& Others, 1980 (Sup) SCC 420, Sunita
Devi
Singhania
Hospital
Trust
&
Another Vs. Union of India & Another,
(2008) 16 SCC 365 and the judgements of
Allahabad High Court reported in Sandhya
Vaish
& Another
Vs.
New
India
Insurance Company Limited & Others,
2010 (81) ALR 360; and Shaurabh
Agrawal Vs. Additional Commissioner
(Judicial), Agra Mandal, Agra & Others,
2011 (114) RD 217.

5. I have considered the submissions
of the counsel for the petitioner.

6. It is settled law that power of
review is not an inherent power and a
judicial or a quasi judicial authority can
review its previous order on merit only if it
is vested with such a power by a statute
either
expressly
or
by
necessary
implication. It would serve no purpose to
burden this judgement by reference to the
numerous judicial precedents propounding
the aforesaid view and it would be
sufficient to refer to the observations made
by the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 13
of its judgement reported in Naresh
Kumar & Others Vs. Government (NCT
OF
DELHI),
(2019)
9
SCC
416.
Paragraph
No.
13
of
the
aforesaid
judgement is reproduced below :-

"13. It is settled law that the
power of Review can be exercised only
when the statute provides for the same.
In the absence of any such provision in the
statute concerned, such power of review
cannot be exercised by the authority
concerned. This Court in Kalabharati
Advertising
v.
Hemant
Vimalnath
Narichania, has held as under: (SCC pp.
445-46, paras 12-14)

"... 12. It is settled legal
proposition that unless the statute/rules
so permit, the review application is not
maintainable in case of judicial/quasi
judicial orders. In the absence of any
provision in the Act granting an express
power of review, it is manifest that a
review could not be made and the order
in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal
and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel
Chunibhai
Dajibha
v.
Narayanrao
Khanderao
Jambekar
and
Harbhajan
Singh v. Karam Singh.)

13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Chandra
Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, Kuntesh
Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya,
State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records
& Settlement and Sunita Jain v. Pawan
Kumar Jain this Court held that the power
to review is not an inherent power. It
must
be
conferred
by
law
either
expressly/specifically or by necessary
650 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
implication and in the absence of any
provision in the Act/Rules, review of an
earlier order is impermissible as review is a
creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review
can be derived only from the statute and
thus, any order of review in the absence of
any statutory provision for the same is a
nullity, being without jurisdiction.

14. Therefore, in view of the above,
the law on the point can be summarised to
the effect that in the absence of any
statutory provision providing for review,
entertaining an application for review or
under
the
garb
of
clarification
/modification/
correction
is
not
permissible."
(Emphasis supplied)

7. However, the courts have also
admitted certain exceptions to the above
rule.

8. In United India Insurance
Company Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh &
Others, (2000) 3 SCC P. 581, the Supreme
Court held that a court or tribunal can recall
or review its orders, if the judgement of the
court or tribunal is obtained by practicing
fraud or misrepresentation of such a
dimension as would affect the very basis of
the claim

9. Further, if the court or the tribunal,
while adjudicating on merits, commit a
procedural illegality which goes to the root
of
the
matter
and
invalidates
the
proceedings itself and consequently the
order passed therein, the court or the
tribunals have the power to recall their
order and rehear the case on merits after
ascertaining whether they had committed
the procedural illegality alleged by the
applicant. Such a review has been referred
by the courts as procedural review. In this
regard it would be relevant to refer to the
observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph nos. 19 and 20 of the judgement
reported in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union
Vs. Birla cotton Spinning And Weaving
Mills Ltd. & Another, (2005), 13 SCC
777. Paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of the
aforesaid judgement are reproduced below
:-

"19. Applying these principles it
is apparent that where a Court or quasijudicial authority having jurisdiction to
adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its
judgment or order can be reviewed on merit
only if the court or the quasi-judicial
authority is vested with power of review by
express
provision
or
by
necessary
implication.
The
procedural
review
belongs to a different category. In such a
review, the court or quasi-judicial
authority
having
jurisdiction
to
adjudicate proceeds to do so, but in
doing so commits (sic ascertains whether
it has committed) a procedural illegality
which goes to the root of the matter and
invalidates the proceeding itself, and
consequently the order passed therein.
Cases where a decision is rendered by the
court or quasi-judicial authority without
notice to the opposite party or under a
mistaken impression that the notice had
been served upon the opposite party, or
where a matter is taken up for hearing and
decision on a date other than the date fixed
for its hearing, are some illustrative cases
in which the power of procedural review
may be invoked. In such a case the party
seeking review or recall of the order does
not have to substantiate the ground that
the order passed suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record or any
other ground which may justify a review.
He has to establish that the procedure
followed by the court or the quasijudicial authority suffered from such
9 All. Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari Vs. A.D.J. Bulandshahar Ors.
651
illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and
invalidated
the
order
made
therein,
inasmuch the opposite party concerned was
not heard for no fault of his, or that the matter
was heard and decided on a date other than the
one fixed for hearing of the matter which he
could not attend for no fault of his. In such
cases, therefore, the matter has to be reheard in accordance with law without going
into the merit of the order passed. The
order passed is liable to be recalled and
reviewed not because it is found to be
erroneous, but because it was passed in a
proceeding which was itself vitiated by an
error of procedure or mistake which went
to the root of the matter and invalidated the
entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.
Central Government Industrial Tribunal, it
was held that once it is established that the
respondents were prevented from appearing at
the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed
that the matter must be re-heard and decided
again.

20. The facts of the instant case
are quite different. The recall of the
award of the Tribunal was sought not on
the ground that in passing the award the
Tribunal had committed any procedural
illegality or mistake of the nature which
vitiated
the
proceeding
itself
and
consequently the award, but on the
ground that some mattes which ought to
have been considered by the Tribunal
were not duly considered. Apparently
the recall or review sought was not a
procedural review, but a review on
merits. Such a review was not permissible
in the absence of a provision in the Act
conferring the power of review on the
Tribunal either expressly or by necessary
implication." (Emphasis supplied)

10.

Apart
from
the
aforesaid
exceptions referred in United Insurance
Company Ltd. (Supra) and Kapra
Mazdoor Ekta Union (Supra), a Division
Bench of this Court in its judgement
reported in Debi Prasad & Others Vs.
Khelawan & Other, 1956 ALL. L.J. 13
has also listed certain exceptions to the
general rule that a judicial or quasi-judicial
authority can review its order only if it is
vested with the power by express provision
or necessary implication. Paragraph No. 16
of the aforesaid judgement is relevant for
the purpose and is reproduced below :-

"16. But the rule is subject to
certain qualifications.

1. Until a judgment or order
has been delivered and signed there is
inherent in every Court the power to
vary its own orders so as to carry out
what was intended and to render the
language free from doubt, or even to
withdraw the order so that the decision
may be recognised--Halsbury's Laws of
England (Hailsham Edition) Vol. 19, p.
261; 'Lawrie v. Lees', (1881) 7 AC 19 (35)
(G).

2. After the judgment or order has
been entered or drawn up or signed, there is
power both under Section 152, Civil P. C.,
and inherent in the Judge who gave or
made the judgment or order to correct any
clerical mistake or error arising from
any accidental slip or omission so as to do
substantial justice and give effect to his
meaning and intention (1881) 7 AC 19 (G).

3. If an order for judgment has
been made or judgment entered without
notice to a party when that party had the
right to be heard, the Court or Judge may
set it aside--The Bolivier 1916-2 AC 203
(H);
Halsbury's
Laws
of
England
(Hailsham Ed.) Vol. 19, p. 263.

4. If an order has been signed by
inadvertence or failure of memory when it
was intended that it should not be signed at
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that stage, the Court or Judge may recall
the order--Jai Karan v. Panchaiti Akhara
Chota Naya Udasi Nanak Shahi', AIR 1933
All 49 (I).

5. Where a decree has been
passed against a dead person, the order may
be vacated and the case reheard--Debi
Baksh Singh v. Habib Shah', ILR 35 All
331 (PC) (J). The same rule applies to an
order passed against a company which has
already been dissolved or which was nonexistent--Lazard Brothers & Co. v. Barque
Industrielle de Moscou 1932-1 KB 617
(624) (K), S. C. on appeal Lazard Brothers
& Co. v. Midland Bank Ltd., 1933 AC 289
(296) (L).

6. A Court has larger power of
modifying or getting aside interlocutory
orders than it has in respect of final orders.
Thus an order for sale of unsaleable
property
may
be
set
aside--Tafazzul
Hussain Khan v. Raghoonath Prasad', 14
Moo
Ind
App
40
(PC)
(M)."
(Emphasis supplied)

11. A reading of above case law
shows that the courts or tribunals do not
have the power to review, on merits, their
own orders unless the same is expressly or
by necessary implication provided in the
statute but can recall and review an order if
there has been some procedural illegality
which goes to the root of the matter and
invalidates the proceedings itself and
consequently the order passed therein or if
the order has been obtained by practicing
fraud on the court. Further, every court has
an inherent power to correct any clerical or
arithmetical errors in its order. Subject to
the aforesaid and also the exceptions listed
in Debi Prasad (Supra), any order
delivered and signed by a judicial or quasi
judicial authority attains finality subject to
appeal or revision as provided under the
relevant statute and the proceedings cannot
be reopened if the court or the quasi
judicial authority is not vested with the
power of review under the statute.

12. At this stage, it would be appropriate
to consider the judgements referred by the
counsel for the petitioner. The issue before the
courts in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (Supra),
Sandhya Vaish (Supra) and Shaurabh
Agrawal (Supra) did not relate to the powers
of the courts or tribunals to review their orders,
on merit, even though the relevant statute did
not confer any such power in them. The facts
in the aforesaid cases referred by the counsel
for the petitioner were covered by the
exceptions
admitted
in
United
India
Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra), Kapra
Mazdoor Ekta Union (Supra) and Debi
Prasad & Ors. (Supra).

13. The issue before the Supreme
Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (Supra)
was as to whether an order setting aside an
ex-parte award would amount to a review
and the Supreme Court answered in the
negative. The Supreme Court held that no
finality is attached to an ex-parte award
which is always subject to its being set
aside on sufficient cause being shown and
the Tribunal, i.e., the Industrial Tribunal in
the said case, had the power to deal with an
application for setting aside an ex parte
award. The issue in the Grindlays Bank
Ltd. (Supra) did not relate to review of the
order on merits. This aspect of the
Grindlays Bank Ltd. (Supra), was also
noted by the Supreme Court in Kapra
Mazdoor Ekta Union (Supra). The
observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph nos. 17 and 18 of Kapra
Mazdoor Ekta Union (Supra) are relevant
for the purpose and are reproduced below :-

"17. The question still remains
whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
9 All. Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari Vs. A.D.J. Bulandshahar Ors.
653
recall its earlier Award dated June 12,
1987. The High Court was of the view that
in the absence of an express provision in
the Act conferring upon the Tribunal the
power of review the Tribunal could not
review its earlier award. The High Court
has relied upon the judgments of this Court
in Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Management of
Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya and Patel
Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsingji wherein this Court has clearly
held that the power of review is not an
inherent power and must be conferred by
law either expressly or by necessary
implication. The appellant sought to get
over this legal hurdle by relying upon the
judgment of this Court in Grindlays
Bank
Ltd.
vs.
Central
Government
Industrial Tribunal. In that case the
Tribunal made an ex-parte award. The
respondents applied for setting aside the
ex-parte award on the ground that they
were prevented by sufficient cause from
appearing when the reference was called on
for hearing. The Tribunal set aside the exparte Award on being satisfied that there
was sufficient cause within the meaning of
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and accordingly set aside the exparte award. That order was upheld by the
High Court and thereafter in appeal by this
Court.

18. It was, therefore, submitted
before us relying upon Grindlays Bank
Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal that even in the absence of an
express power of review, the Tribunal
had the power to review its order if some
illegality
was
pointed
out.
The
submission
must
be
rejected
as
misconceived. The submission does not
take notice of the difference between a
procedural review and a review on
merits. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.
v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal
clearly highlighted this distinction when it
observed (SCC p. 425, para 13):-

"Furthermore,
different
considerations
arise
on
review.
The
expression 'review' is used in the two
distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural
review which is either inherent or implied
in a court or Tribunal to set aside a
palpably erroneous order passed under a
misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on
merits when the error sought to be
corrected is one of law and is apparent on
the face of the record. It is in the latter
sense that the court in Patel Narshi
Thakershi case held that no review lies on
merits unless a statute specifically provides
for it. Obviously when a review is sought
due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent
error committed by the Tribunal must be
corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the
abuse of its process, and such power
inheres in every court or Tribunal".
(Emphasis supplied)

14. In Sandhya Vaish (Supra), the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had
awarded interest to the claimant on the
compensation amount at the rate of 9% per
annum, but had not specified the period for
which the interest was to be paid although
it did not award interest for the period the
claim petition stood dismissed in default.
The aforesaid fact is evident from the
contents of paragraph no. 5 of the reports.
The claimants filed an application for
review. The failure of the tribunal to
specify the period for which the interest
had to be paid made the award of the
tribunal, so far as it related to payment of
interest, unenforceable. The award of the
Tribunal regarding payment of interest on
the compensation amount could not have
been satisfied without specifying the period
654 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for which the interest was to be paid. The
error in the award in not specifying the
period for which interest was payable could
be corrected by the Tribunal in its inherent
power to make the award enforceable as
every court or tribunal has the inherent
power to vary its own orders so as to carry
out what was intended in the judgment or
to correct any clerical mistake or error
arising from any accidental slip or
omission. The said exceptions to the
general rule that no court or tribunal has the
inherent power to review its own order,
was recognized by the Division Bench of
this Court in Debi Prasad (Supra).

15. In Shaurabh Agrawal (Supra),
an ex-parte order was passed against the
petitioner without serving any notice on
him. Evidently, the case fell within the
exceptions enumerated before.

16. In Sunita Devi Singhania
Hospital Trust (Supra), the applicant had
filed an application under Section 129-B(2)
of the Customs Act for recall of the original
order on the ground that certain issues
raised by him and the facts involved in his
case had not been considered by the
Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate
Tribunal which passed the original order on
the basis of facts involved in the appeal
filed by another assessee whose case had
been clubbed with the case of the applicant.
The Tribunal dismissed the application on
the ground that the application was barred
by limitation. In this context, the Supreme
Court held that, in such situations, the
period of limitation prescribed in Section
129-B(2) of the Custom Act was not
attracted if the application was filed within
a reasonable time. In this regard, the
observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph nos. 20 and 25 of the judgement
reported
in
Sunita
Devi
Singhania
Hospital Trust (Supra) are relevant and
are reproduced below :-

"20. While the judges' records
are considered to be final, it is now a
trite law that when certain questions are
raised before the Court of law or
Tribunal but not considered by it, and
when it is brought to its notice, it is the
only appropriate authority to consider
the question as to whether the said
contentions are correct or not. For the
aforementioned purpose the provisions
of limitation specified in Sub-section (2)
of Section 129 B of the Customs Act
would not be attracted. We, however, do
not mean to lay down a law that such an
application can be filed at any time. If such
an application is filed within a reasonable
time and if the Court or Tribunal finds that
the contention raised before it by the
applicant is prima-facie correct, in order to
do justice, which is being above law,
nothing fetters the judges hands from
considering the matter on merit.

...

...

...

25. It may be true, as has been
contended by Mr. Abhichandani, learned senior
counsel that Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
1963 will have no application in view of the
fact that provisions governing limitation are
contained in the Customs Act. It is so for in a
matter of this nature the Tribunal was required
to consider the application filed by he appellant
which was filed within a reasonable time. It
should have also considered that the appellant
had been bonafide pursuing its remedies before
this Court."

(Emphasis supplied)

The observations of the Court in
paragraph No. 20 of the reports show that
the issue before the Supreme Court in the
9 All. Sudhir Kumar Maheshwari Vs. A.D.J. Bulandshahar Ors.
655
said case was regarding the power of the
Tribunal to entertain an application under
Section 129-B(2) of the Customs Act if the
said application was filed after the
prescribed
period
of
limitation
but
otherwise within a reasonable time. It
would also be relevant to note that the
judgement of the Supreme Court in Sunita
Devi Singhania Hospital Trust (Supra)
was passed under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India.

17. There is no provision in Act, 1988
conferring the power of review on the
Tribunal. It was in these circumstances that
a Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Raj
Kumari Vs. Motor Accident Claim
Tribunal, Jaunpur, 2002 ALJ 833 held
that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
did not have the power to review its own
order either under the old Act or under the
new Act.

18. It is in the light of the aforesaid
that I proceed to decide the merits of the
present writ petition.

19. A reading of the review
application filed by the petitioner (annexed
as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition)
shows that the grievance of the petitioner
was that the vehicle was a new vehicle
registered for the first time on 25.1.2007
and under Rules 62(1)(a) of the Rules,
1989, the fitness certificate issued to the
vehicle was valid for two years. The fitness
certificate of a vehicle registered for the
first
time
is
issued
alongwith
the
registration certificate itself. A reading of
the grounds narrated in the review
application show that the argument of the
petitioner
was
that
the
registration
certificate had been filed by the petitioner
and the same was sufficient evidence that
the vehicle had a fitness certificate valid for
a period of two years. It was not stated in
the review application that the fitness
certificate had been filed alongwith the
registration certificate. A reading of the award
dated 1.3.2011 also shows that a photocopy of
the registration certificate had been filed but
the fitness certificate had not been filed by the
petitioner before the Tribunal. The recital in
the award that the petitioner, i.e., the owner of
the vehicle had not filed the fitness certificate
has not been controverted by the petitioner in
the review application. Even if the argument of
the petitioner based on Rule 62(1)(a) of the
Rules, 1989 and that the registration certificate
filed by the petitioner was sufficient evidence
that the vehicle had a fitness certificate valid
for two years and failure of the petitioner to
file the fitness certificate was not material and
sufficient to hold the petitioner, and not the
Insurance
Company,
liable
to
pay
compensation, is accepted, the same can be a
ground for a review of the award on merits.
The failure of the Tribunal to consider the
aforesaid aspect is not a mistake or illegality
committed by the Tribunal in the procedure
followed by it while hearing the claim petition.
The said ground does not fall in any of the
exceptions narrated previously in the present
judgement. The error, if any, by the Tribunal
relates to misinterpretation of an evidence filed
by the petitioner before the Tribunal or
ignoring a relevant and material document and
therefore could be an error apparent on the
face of record, a ground for review on merits if
the Tribunal had the substantive power to
review its order on merits. The Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal has no power to
review its order on merits. Thus, the tribunal
rightly refused to review its award and rightly
dismissed the application filed by the
petitioner.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, there is
no illegality in the orders dated 1.3.2011
and 18.5.2013 passed by the Tribunal.
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. The writ petition lacks merit and
is accordingly dismissed.

22. Interim order, if any, stands
vacated.
----------
(2020)09ILR A656
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.01.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BALA KRISHNA NARAYANA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

WRIT - C No. 36606 of 2019

Aditya Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
In Person

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Krishna Raj Singh Jadaun, Sri
R.P.S. Chauhan

A. Petitioner claimed for scholarship-the
claim was rejected on the fact that
petitioner was ineligible as per schemespetitioner's claim was allowed by the
court in earlier round of litigation and
remitted the matter to secretary, Ministry
of Tribal Affairs,GOI for reconsideration
the claim of petitioner in the light of
document filed by the petitioner in review
application-respondents
failed
to
reconsider the matter despite providing
complete documents again via mail by the
petitioner-consequently student has to
rush
again
to
the
court-petitioner
awarded cost of Rs. 50,000/- due to
forced litigation. (Para 1 to 30)

Awarding of costs must be treated generally as
mandatory inasmuch as the liberal attitude of
the courts in directing the parties to bear their
own costs had led the parties to file a number of
frivolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous
and unnecessary issues. costs must be awarded
to person who has been forced to enter into
litigation. In the instant case, the petitioner was
compelled to approach the court for the second
time. (Para 31 to 35) (E-6)
List of Cases cited: -

1. St. Of U.P. Vs Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad
Singh (1989) 2 SCC 505

2. Bachan Singh Vs U.O.I. (2008) 9 SCC 161

3. Bhubaneshwar Development Authority Vs
Adolamde Boswa (2012) 11 SCC 731

4.
Basavi
Engineering
College
Parents
Associaltion Vs St. Of Talengana (2019) 7 SCC
pg 172

5. Ramrameshwari Devi & ors. Vs Nirmala Devi
& ors. (2011) 8 SCC 249

6. A Shanmugam Vs Ariya Kshetirya Rajakula
Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai
Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430

7. Jagdev Singh Vs St. Of U.P. & ors. (2014) 32
LCD 2216

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Aditya Sharma, in
person, learned Assistant Solicitor General
appearing for respondent-1 to 3 and the
learned counsel for respondent-4.

2. The petition was filed for quashing
of order dated 15.10.2019 passed by
respondent-2 Director Scholarship Section,
Ministry of Tribal Affairs, New Delhi, by
which the petitioner's claim for grant of
scholarship under "National Fellowship &
Scholarship for Higher Education for
Scheduled Tribe Students" (in short called
"the Scholarship Scheme") for the session
2018-19, has not been acceded to. The
petitioner has further prayed that a