# Sujan Singh Bundela & Anr v. Kripal Singh Yadav & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 1657
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-03-15
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order Defective No. 945 of 2004
- **Bench:** Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sujan-singh-bundela-anr-v-kripal-singh-yadav-ors-50236
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Civil Law- The Limitation Act,1963-Section
5- There is huge delay of 2 years and 93
days-The matter has remained pending
before this Court for 19 years without
steps being taken-the kind of explanation
rendered does not satisfy the observations
of Apex Court that if delay has occurred
for reasons which does not smack of mala
fide, the Court should be reluctant to
refuse condonation-On the contrary a
complete careless and reckless long delay
on the part of applicant which has remain
virtually unexplained at all-No reason to
exercise judicial discretion so as to justify
condonation of delay in the present case.
(Para 13) (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Sujan Singh Bundela & Anr. Vs. Kripal Singh Yadav & Ors.
1657
(2023) 5 ILRA 1657
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order Defective No. 945 of
2004

Sujan Singh Bundela & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Kripal Singh Yadav & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri V.C. Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Sharad Kumar Purwar, Sri Satya
Prakash Singh

Civil Law- The Limitation Act,1963-Section
5- There is huge delay of 2 years and 93
days-The matter has remained pending
before this Court for 19 years without
steps being taken-the kind of explanation
rendered does not satisfy the observations
of Apex Court that if delay has occurred
for reasons which does not smack of mala
fide, the Court should be reluctant to
refuse condonation-On the contrary a
complete careless and reckless long delay
on the part of applicant which has remain
virtually unexplained at all-No reason to
exercise judicial discretion so as to justify
condonation of delay in the present case.
(Para 13) (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

1. Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107

2. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St.of Kerala, AIR 1998
SC 2276

3. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari, AIR
1969 SC 575
4. Brij Indar Singh Vs Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94

5. St.of Nagaland Vs Lipok AO & ors., AIR 2005
SC 2191

6. Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT 2001(5) SC
608

7. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project &
anr.(2008) 17 SCC 448

8.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC
157

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. This is an application seeking
condonation of delay in filing the appeal
which was filed in the year 2004.

]

2. There is huge delay of 2 years and
93 days. The matter has remained pending
before this Court for 19 years without steps
being taken. Today also, none is present for
the appellants.

3. Reasons for the delay as explained
in the affidavit attached to this application
reads as under :

"2. That the impugned judgment
was passed on 8.11.2001 and decree was
passed on 24.11.2001, but the Certified
Copy of the Order was applied on
17.3.2004 and received on the same date,
and Certified Copy of the Decree was also
applied on 17.3.2004 and received on the
same day.

3. That the appellants were not a
party in the case. Pooran Singh Bundela
was a party and proceedings was in the in
the knowledge of the appellants.
1658 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. That when the Collection
Officials were directed to recover the
amount from the appellants, then the
appellants came to know about the
proceedings.

5. That after obtaining the
Certified Copy of the Judgment and
Decree, the appellants fell ill and they
could not direct the deponent to contact the
counsel for filing of the aforesaid case
before this Hon'ble Court. The date of
knowledge of the proceedings of the
appellants
is
17.3.2004,
when
they
obtained the copy of the judgment and
decree of the Courts below"

3. The above reasons will have to be
looked
into
the
with
the
principle
enunciated by the Courts from time to time
for condonation of delay. The expression
"sufficient cause" in Section 5 of Act, 1963
has been held to receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice and generally a delay in preferring
appeal may be condoned in interest of
justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is
imputable to parties, seeking condonation
of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition
Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court
said, that, when substantial justice and
technical considerations are taken against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred, for, the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non
deliberate delay. The Court further said that
judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.

4. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court
said:

"Law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribe and the Courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

5. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when
an action becomes barred by time, the
Court should be slow to ignore delay for
the reason that once limitation expires,
other party matures his rights on the
subject with attainment of finality. Though
it cannot be doubted that refusal to
condone delay would result in foreclosing
the person who initiate suit from putting
forth his cause but simultaneously the
party on the other hand is also entitled to
sit and feel carefree after a particular
length of time, getting relieved from
persistent and continued litigation.
5 All. Sujan Singh Bundela & Anr. Vs. Kripal Singh Yadav & Ors.
1659

6. There is no presumption that delay
in approaching the court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate
delaying a matter by not resorting to take
appropriate legal remedy within time but
then the words "sufficient cause" show that
delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual
approach of concerned litigant, but, it
should be bona fide, and, for the reasons
beyond his control, and, in any case should
not lack bona fide. If the explanation does
not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court
should show due consideration to the suiter,
but, when there is apparent casual approach
on the part of suiter, the approach of Court
is also bound to change. Lapse on the part
of litigant in approaching Court within time
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt on
the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.

7. We need not to burden this
judgment with a catena of decisions
explaining and laying down as to what
should be the approach of Court on
construing "sufficient cause" under Section
5 of Act, 1963 and it would be suffice to
refer a very few of them besides those
already referred.

8. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three
Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless
want of bona fide of such inaction or
negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

9. The Privy Council in Brij Indar
Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal
94 observed that true guide for a court to
exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This
principle still holds good inasmuch as the
aforesaid decision of Privy Council as
repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and
others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

10. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil
and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court
said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A
distinction must be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case
where the delay is of a few days. In the
former case consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so
the case calls for a more cautious approach
but in the latter case no such consideration
may arise and such a case deserves a liberal
approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down in this regard and the basic guiding
factor is advancement of substantial justice.

11. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court
said :

"...The
evidence
on
record
suggests neglect of its own right for long
time in preferring appeals. The court
cannot enquire into belated and state
claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The court helps those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights."
1660 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of
the judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasised is
that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be adopted
in the exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and other similar statutes,
the Courts can neither become oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has
acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is
consumed at various stages of litigation apart
from the cost. What colour the expression
'sufficient cause' would get in the factual
matrix of a given case would largely depend
on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the
Court finds that there has been no negligence
on the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona fides,
then it may condone the delay. If, on the other
hand, the explanation given by the applicant
is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay. In cases involving
the State and its agencies/instrumentalities,
the Court can take note of the fact that
sufficient time is taken in the decision making
process but no premium can be given for total
lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the
officers
of
the
State
and
/
or
its
agencies/instrumentalities
and
the
applications filed by them for condonation of
delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal of
the matter on the ground of bar of limitation
will cause injury to the public interest."

13.
In
our
view,
the
kind
of
explanation rendered herein does not
satisfy the observations of Apex Court that
if delay has occurred for reasons which
does not smack of mala fide, the Court
should be reluctant to refuse condonation.
On the contrary, we find that here is a case
which shows a complete careless and
reckless long delay on the part of applicant
which has remain virtually unexplained at
all. Therefore, we do not find any reason to
exercise our judicial discretion exercising
judiciously so as to justify condonation of
delay in the present case.

14. In view of the above, this
application requires to be rejected hence,
the same is rejected.

Order on Appeal

Since application seeking condonation
of delay in filing this appeal has been
dismissed vide order of date, the appeal
being barred by limitation, is accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1660
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Writ-C No. 1000408 of 2001

Mohd. Naim ...Petitioner
Versus
Additional Commissioner, Admin., Gonda
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shyam Krishna Srivastava, Najeem Zafar,
Rafar Farooqui, T.H. Khan, Z. Jilani

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., D.C. Mukherjee, Deepak Seth, Iqbal
Ahmad, Jitendra Saxena, Kumar Ayush,
Mohd. Aslam Khan, Mohd. Kumail Haider,