# Sukh Ram Singh v. State Of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 522
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-25
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 742 of 1994
- **Bench:** Sandeep Jain
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sukh-ram-singh-v-state-of-u-p-anr-53729
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Whether the reference filed under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act was time-barred.
Whether the Collector was justified in awarding
compensation based on the lowest exemplar.
Whether the appellant is entitled to enhanced
solatium, additional compensation, and interest
under the amended provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Sections 4(1), 6, 11, 12(2), 18, 28, 54 -
Landowner's Appeal u/section 54 - against
rejection of Reference case as time-barred and
for enhancement of compensation awarded -
Land acquisition proceedings - Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the
year 1979 - objections invited - Award -
declaration under Section 12(2) published in
1980 - possession of the land taken - appellant
held entitled to receive compensation at the rate
of Rs. 479.15 per acre along with 15% solatium
and Rs. 374.69 u/section 11 of the Act -
appellant filed an application in 1989 seeking
enhancement of compensation - matter referred
by the Collector u/section 18 of the Act -
appellant contended lack of prior knowledge
regarding the acquisition and non-receipt of
notice, copy of the award, or compensation -
District Judge rejected his reference as timebarred - instant appeal - court finds that the
reference was filed within six months from the
date of knowledge - Collector's assessment of
compensation found to be arbitrary and based
on an inappropriate exemplar - Court held that
the Reference Court erred in dismissing the
appellant's
claim
as
time-barred
and
in
upholding
the
inadequate
compensation
awarded by the Collector - since the Collector's
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
523
award was made prior to the enactment of
Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, but the dismissal
of the reference occurred after the Act came
into force, the appellant is entitled to enhanced
benefits under the amended provisions -
consequently,
the
appellant
is
awarded
compensation at the rate of Rs. 8,784.77 per
acre, along with 30% solatium, 12% additional
compensation per annum from the date of
notification u/section 4(1) till the date of award
or possession, whichever is earlier, and interest
at the rate of 15% per annum under Section 28
of the Act - Appeal is allowed - Office is
directed to prepare the decree accordingly.
(Para - 24, 29, 31, 38, 40, 41, 42)
Appeal Allowed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors.,
(2010) 3 SCC 545) - Mehrawal Khewaji Trust
(Regd.), Faridkot & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 432) - General Manager,
ONGC Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel &
Anr., (2008) 14 SCC 745) - Union of India v.
Harpat Singh & Ors., (2009) 14 SCC 375).

LIST OF ACTS
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Amending Act No.
68 of 1984

LIST OF KEYWORDS
First Appeal - Land Acquisition - Compensation -
Reference under Section 18 - Time-barred
reference - Solatium - Additional compensation
- Enhanced interest - Exemplar sale deed -
Circle rate - Constructive knowledge - Limitation
- Arbitrary assessment.

CASE ARISING FROM
Judgment and order dated 22.01.1993 passed
by Additional District Judge, Aligarh rejecting
the land acquisition reference case No. 11/1990
(Sukhram Singh Vs. State of UP) - Acquisition of
0.68 acres of agricultural land in district Aligarh
(U.P.), for the construction of the Canal.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Devendra Dahma,
Shiv Kumar Singh.
Counsel for Respondent(s): SC.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,973 of 53,191. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39973 for what follows._

522 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relating to specific performance of contract
rather the same will depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case as to
whether
the
decree
for
specific
performance
is
to
be
granted
or
compensation be paid to the defendant or
earnest money be paid along with interest
to the defendant.

16.
In
the
instant
matter,
the
agreement to sell was denied by the
defendant but both the courts have recorded
finding on the basis of evidence on record
that
there
was
valid
execution
of
agreement to sell between the plaintiff
and defendant. The suit was filed within
limitation in the year 2005 in view of the
expiry of period as mentioned in the
agreement to sell dated 5.9.2003. The
finding of continuous readiness and
willingness is also in favour of the
plaintiff and the provisions of Section 20
of the Specific Relief Act has also been
taken into consideration, as such, there
can be no interference against the
concurrent judgment and decree passed
by the trial court as well as the 1st
appellate court, decreeing the suit for
specific performance. The substantial
questions of law as framed in the
memorandum of second appeal are not
involved in this second appeal.

17. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances, no interference is required
in the matter. The second appeal is
dismissed at the admission stage.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 522
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.
First Appeal No. 742 of 1994

Sukh Ram Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Devnendra Dahma, Shiv Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the reference filed under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act was time-barred.
Whether the Collector was justified in awarding
compensation based on the lowest exemplar.
Whether the appellant is entitled to enhanced
solatium, additional compensation, and interest
under the amended provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Sections 4(1), 6, 11, 12(2), 18, 28, 54 -
Landowner's Appeal u/section 54 - against
rejection of Reference case as time-barred and
for enhancement of compensation awarded -
Land acquisition proceedings - Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the
year 1979 - objections invited - Award -
declaration under Section 12(2) published in
1980 - possession of the land taken - appellant
held entitled to receive compensation at the rate
of Rs. 479.15 per acre along with 15% solatium
and Rs. 374.69 u/section 11 of the Act -
appellant filed an application in 1989 seeking
enhancement of compensation - matter referred
by the Collector u/section 18 of the Act -
appellant contended lack of prior knowledge
regarding the acquisition and non-receipt of
notice, copy of the award, or compensation -
District Judge rejected his reference as timebarred - instant appeal - court finds that the
reference was filed within six months from the
date of knowledge - Collector's assessment of
compensation found to be arbitrary and based
on an inappropriate exemplar - Court held that
the Reference Court erred in dismissing the
appellant's
claim
as
time-barred
and
in
upholding
the
inadequate
compensation
awarded by the Collector - since the Collector's
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
523
award was made prior to the enactment of
Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, but the dismissal
of the reference occurred after the Act came
into force, the appellant is entitled to enhanced
benefits under the amended provisions -
consequently,
the
appellant
is
awarded
compensation at the rate of Rs. 8,784.77 per
acre, along with 30% solatium, 12% additional
compensation per annum from the date of
notification u/section 4(1) till the date of award
or possession, whichever is earlier, and interest
at the rate of 15% per annum under Section 28
of the Act - Appeal is allowed - Office is
directed to prepare the decree accordingly.
(Para - 24, 29, 31, 38, 40, 41, 42)
Appeal Allowed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors.,
(2010) 3 SCC 545) - Mehrawal Khewaji Trust
(Regd.), Faridkot & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 432) - General Manager,
ONGC Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel &
Anr., (2008) 14 SCC 745) - Union of India v.
Harpat Singh & Ors., (2009) 14 SCC 375).

LIST OF ACTS
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Amending Act No.
68 of 1984

LIST OF KEYWORDS
First Appeal - Land Acquisition - Compensation -
Reference under Section 18 - Time-barred
reference - Solatium - Additional compensation
- Enhanced interest - Exemplar sale deed -
Circle rate - Constructive knowledge - Limitation
- Arbitrary assessment.

CASE ARISING FROM
Judgment and order dated 22.01.1993 passed
by Additional District Judge, Aligarh rejecting
the land acquisition reference case No. 11/1990
(Sukhram Singh Vs. State of UP) - Acquisition of
0.68 acres of agricultural land in district Aligarh
(U.P.), for the construction of the Canal.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Devendra Dahma,
Shiv Kumar Singh.
Counsel for Respondent(s): SC.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sandeep Jain, J.)

1. The instant appeal under Section 54
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act)
has been preferred by the landowner
against impugned judgment and order dated
22.01.1993 passed by Third Additional
District Judge, Aligarh rejecting the Land
Acquisition Reference No. 11 of 1990,
Sukhram Singh versus State of UP, by
holding that the Collector/Special Land
Acquisition Officer (SLAO) has awarded
the correct amount of compensation and
also, that the reference is time barred.

2. Facts in brief are, that for
constructing, Amarpur canal(rajvaha) from
kilometre
26-009
to
35-706,
for
transmitting the waters of Central Ganges
canal, land acquisition proceedings were
initiated for acquiring 8.62 acre land,
situated in village Jirauli Dor,Tehsil and
Pargana Kol, District Aligarh, on behalf of
the Executive Engineer, Madhya Ganga
canal, Construction Division- Second,
District Aligarh. A notification under
section 4(1) of the Act was published on
22.10.1979, which was published in the
Gazette on 8.3.1980, and subsequently, a
declaration under section 6 of the Act was
made on 7.2.1980, which was published in
the Gazette on 22.3.1980. After inviting the
objections of the affected landowners, the
Collector passed the award No. 426/198081 on 11.12.1980. A declaration under
section 12(2) of the Act, was also made on
11.12.1980.
The
possession
of
the
appellants land was taken on 16.1.1981.

3. Besides others, the appellant Sukh
Ram's land belonging to khata number 186,
Chuck No. 329, having area of one beegha,
three Biswa, 17 biswansi(0.68 acres)
situated in village Jirauli Dor,was acquired
for the above purpose. The appellant was
held entitled to receive compensation at the
rate of rupees 479.15 per acre ,for his 0.68
524 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
acre land, amounting to rupees 325.82,
besides this, he was also awarded solatium
at the rate of 15% amounting to ₹48.87, in
total,
the
appellant
was
awarded
compensation of ₹ 374.69, under section 11
of the Act.

4.
The
Collector
determined
compensation
on
the
basis
of
sale
deed(exemplar) dated 20.7.1979, pertaining
to an area of 2.413 acre. The Collector
considered five sale deeds pertaining to the
same village, but he rejected the other four
exemplars on the ground that they were of
lands, which were situated far away from
habitation and acquired land and also were
of the period, which was not proximate to
the notification under section 4(1) of the
Act. The compensation was determined on
the basis of exemplar dated 20.7.1979 by
concluding that the land pertaining in this
exemplar, is very close to habitation, which
is relatively distant to the acquired land. It
was further held that, this land is similar to
the acquired land, regarding facilities
available for irrigating the land and its
suitability for agriculture.

5. The appellant moved an application
on 3.3.1989 before the Collector to refer
the
matter
for
enhancement
of
compensation under section 18 of the Act,
to the reference court on the ground that he
had no information prior to February, 1989
about the acquisition, since he never
received any notice from the Collector,
never received the copy of the award, never
received the compensation, as such, he had
no
knowledge
about
the
acquisition
proceedings, as such, he could not make an
application earlier for getting the matter
referred for enhancement of compensation.

6. The Collector referred the matter
under section 18 of the Act on 25.4.1989,
to the District Judge, Aligarh who passed
an order dated 25.5.1990 , since primafacie it appeared that the reference was
time barred, that question of limitation will
be decided at the time of adjudication at the
time of trial, after framing an issue and
hearing the State, provided the State takes
such plea in its written statement.

7. The reference court framed the
following issues on 9.10.1991, which are
stated as under:-

(i) Whether the compensation
paid to the plaintiff is insufficient? If yes,
the entitled rate?

(ii) Whether the instant reference
is barred by limitation?

(iii) To what relief the plaintiff is
entitled ?

8. The reference court while deciding
issue no.1, came to the conclusion that the
exemplar on the basis of which the
Collector has awarded compensation, is
correct and accordingly, the reference court
came to the conclusion that the appellant is
not
entitled
to
receive
enhanced
compensation, than what has already been
awarded by the Collector. The reference
court while deciding issue no. 2, came to
the conclusion that the appellant moved an
application on 3.3.1989 for having the
matter referred, which was time barred,
because the appellant failed to examine the
person from whom he got the knowledge
belatedly.
The
reference
court
also
concluded that since two notifications have
already been issued and the possession of
the land has already been taken on
16.1.1981, as such, the reference has been
moved after about nine years, which is
hopelessly time barred. In view of the
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
525
above conclusions, the reference court
dismissed the reference by impugned
judgment and order dated 22.1.1993,
aggrieved against which, the landownerappellant has preferred the instant first
appeal under section 54 of the Act.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the appellant was not having
any knowledge of the award passed by the
Collector because no notice was ever
received
by
him
during
acquisition
proceedings, no notice after pronouncement
of award was sent to the appellant, no copy
of the award was sent to the appellant, as
such, the appellant being a poor illiterate
farmer never became aware of the award
and as such, he could not file reference
within the stipulated time prescribed under
section 18 of the Act.

10. Learned counsel further submitted
that the appellant for the first time became
aware of the award of the Collector in the
month of February, 1989 and thereafter, he
obtained the certified copy of the award
and then, he became aware that a paltry
compensation has been awarded to him, on
the basis of exemplar dated 20.7.1979,
which is not applicable, because the other
exemplars ,which were about two years
prior to the notification under section 4(1)
of the Act, show that the land was sold for
a price which was many times more than
reflected in the exemplar dated 20.7.1979.

11. Learned counsel further submitted
that the reference court committed illegality
in concluding that the reference is time
barred because the limitation is to be
considered from the date of knowledge i.e.
when the appellant became aware of the
award passed by the Collector. Learned
counsel further submitted that it has to be
seen when the appellant had constructive
knowledge of the award and from that date,
the limitation for filing reference under
section 18 of the Act is to be calculated. He
further submitted that the reference court
has simply calculated the limitation from
the date of taking possession of the land
ignoring
that,
the
appellant
had
constructive knowledge of the acquisition
only in February 1989. He submitted that
the reference has been filed on 3.3.1989,
which is within the limitation period, if
calculated from the date of knowledge of
the award.

12. Learned counsel further submitted
that the appellant is entitled to get
compensation on the basis of exemplar
which has been executed for the highest
consideration, as such, the Collector has
committed illegality in awarding the
compensation on the basis of exemplar
,which
denotes
the
lowest
sale
consideration.

13. Learned counsel further submitted
that the Collector only awarded solatium at
the rate of 15%, whereas, since the
reference was decided in the year 1993, the
appellant is entitled to get solatium at the
rate of 30%, additional compensation at the
rate of 12% per annum and enhanced
interest at the rate of 15% per annum, under
section 28 of the Act.

14. With these submissions, it was
prayed that the impugned judgment and
order of the reference court be set aside and
this appeal be allowed and consequently,
the
appellant
be
awarded
enhanced
compensation,
solatium,
additional
compensation and enhanced interest, in
accordance with law. Learned counsel in
support of enhancing compensation on the
basis of highest exemplar, relied upon the
case
of
Mehrawal
Khewaji
Trust
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Registered), Faridkot and others vs. State
of Punjab and others (2012) 5 SCC 432.

15. Per contra, learned additional
standing
Counsel
submitted
that
the
appellant was aware of the acquisition
proceedings and deliberately, did not
appear before the Collector. The possession
of the land was taken in the year 1981, but
the reference was made in 1989, which is
hopelessly time barred, as such, the
reference court has rightly concluded that
the reference was time barred. He further
submitted that the compensation has been
awarded on the basis of exemplar dated
20.7.1979, which is proximate in time to
the date of notification under section 4(1)
of the Act, as such, the Collector has not
committed any illegality in determining the
compensation on the basis of this exemplar.
He further submitted that since the award
by the Collector was made on 11.12.1980,
which is, prior to April 30, 1982 as such,
the appellant is not entitled to get additional
compensation at the rate of 12% per annum
and enhanced solatium at the rate of 30%
and also enhanced interest under section 28
of the Act. With these submissions, it was
prayed that this appeal be rejected.

16. I have heard the learned counsel of
both the sides and perused the record.

17 This appeal raises the following
factual and legal issues, which needs to be
determined by this Court:-

(1) Whether the reference made
by the appellant is time barred?

(2) Whether the Collector was
justified in determining the compensation
on the basis of lowest exemplar dated
20.7.1979, according to which the land
transaction took place at the rate of rupees
1435.97 per acre, and ignoring the other
exemplars, which were executed about a
year or two prior, from the date of
notification under section 4(1) of the Act?

(3) Whether the appellant is
entitled to get enhanced solatium at the rate
of 30%, additional compensation at the rate
of 12% per annum and enhanced interest at
the rate of 15% per annum on the
additional
amount
of
compensation
awarded to him by this Court.

Issue number:1

18. The Apex Court in the case of
Bhagwan Das and others vs. State of UP
and others (2010) 3 SCC 545, held as
under:-

"Re: Question (c)

18. Clause (b) of the proviso to
Section 18 requires a person interested
who has not accepted the award, to make
an application to the Collector requiring
him to refer the matter for determination of
the court, within six weeks of the receipt of
the notice from the Collector under Section
12(2) or within six months from the date of
the Collector's award whichever period
first expires, if he or his representative was
not present before the Collector at the time
of making of the award.

19. The reason for providing six
months from the date of the award for
making an application seeking reference,
where the applicant did not receive a notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act, while
providing only six weeks from the date of
receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the
Act for making an application for reference
where the applicant has received a notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious.
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
527
When a notice under Section 12(2) of the
Act is received, the landowner or person
interested is made aware of all relevant
particulars of the award which enables him
to decide whether he should seek reference
or not. On the other hand, if he only comes
to know that an award has been made, he
would require further time to make
enquiries or secure copies so that he can
ascertain the relevant particulars of the
award.

20. The term "date of the
Collector's award" occurring in clause (b)
of the proviso, has been interpreted by this
Court in several cases. We may refer to a
few of them.

21. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh
v. Land Acquisition Officer [AIR 1961 SC
1500] this Court held: (AIR pp. 1503-04,
paras 5-6)

"5. ... Therefore, if the award
made by the Collector is in law no more
than an offer made on behalf of the
Government to the owner of the property
then the making of the award as properly
understood
must
involve
the
communication of the offer to the party
concerned. That is the normal requirement
under the contract law and its applicability
to cases of award made under the Act
cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus
considered the date of the award cannot be
determined solely by reference to the time
when the award is signed by the Collector
or delivered by him in his office; it must
involve the consideration of the question as
to when it was known to the party
concerned either actually or constructively.
If that be the true position then the literal
and mechanical construction of the words
'the date of the award' occurring in the
relevant section would not be appropriate.

6. There is yet another point
which leads to the same conclusion. If the
award is treated as an administrative
decision taken by the Collector in the
matter of the valuation of the property
sought to be acquired it is clear that the
said decision ultimately affects the rights of
the owner of the property and in that sense,
like all decisions which affect persons, it is
essentially fair and just that the said
decision should be communicated to the
said party. The knowledge of the party
affected by such a decision, either actual or
constructive, is an essential element which
must be satisfied before the decision can be
brought into force. Thus considered the
making of the award cannot consist
merely in the physical act of writing the
award or signing it or even filing it in the
Office of the Collector; it must involve the
communication of the said award to the
party
concerned
either
actually
or
constructively. If the award is pronounced
in the presence of the party whose rights
are affected by it, it can be said to be made
when pronounced. If the date for the
pronouncement
of
the
award
is
communicated to the party and it is
accordingly pronounced on the date
previously announced the award is said to
be communicated to the said party even if
the said party is not actually present on the
date of its pronouncement. Similarly if
without
notice
of
the
date
of
its
pronouncement an award is pronounced
and a party is not present the award can be
said to be made when it is communicated to
the party later. The knowledge of the party
affected by the award, either actual or
constructive,
being
an
essential
requirement of fair play and natural
justice the expression 'the date of the
award' used in the proviso must mean the
date
when
the
award
is
either
communicated to the party or is known by
528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
him either actually or constructively. In
our opinion, therefore, it would be
unreasonable to construe the words 'from
the date of the Collector's award' used in
the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or
mechanical way."

22. In State of Punjab v. Qaisar
Jehan Begum [AIR 1963 SC 1604] this
Court reiterated the principles stated in
Harish Chandra Raj Singh [AIR 1961 SC
1500] and further held as follows: (Qaisar
Jehan Begum case [AIR 1963 SC 1604] ,
AIR p. 1607, para 5)

"5. ... It seems clear to us that
the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra
case [AIR 1961 SC 1500] is that the party
affected by the award must know it,
actually or constructively, and the period of
six months will run from the date of that
knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award
does not mean a mere knowledge of the
fact that an award has been made. The
knowledge must relate to the essential
contents of the award. These contents may
be known either actually or constructively.
If the award is communicated to a party
under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party
must be obviously fixed with knowledge of
the contents of the award whether he reads
it or not. Similarly when a party is present
in court either personally or through his
representative when the award is made by
the Collector, it must be presumed that he
knows the contents of the award. Having
regard to the scheme of the Act we think
that knowledge of the award must mean
knowledge of the essential contents of the
award."

24. When land is acquired and an
award is made under Section 11 of the Act,
the Collector becomes entitled to take
possession of the acquired land. The award
being only an offer on behalf of the
Government, there is always a tendency on
the part of the Collector to be conservative
in making the award, which results in less
than the market value being offered.

25. Invariably, the land-loser is
required to make an application under
Section 18 of the Act to get the market
value as compensation. The land-loser does
not get a right to seek reference to the civil
court unless the award is made. This means
that he can make an application seeking
reference only when he knows that an
award has been made.

26. If the words six months from
the "date of the Collector's award" should
be literally interpreted as referring to the
date of the award and not the date of
knowledge of the award, it will lead to
unjust and absurd results. For example, the
Collector may choose to make an award
but not to issue any notice under Section
12(2) of the Act, either due to negligence or
oversight or due to any ulterior reasons. Or
he may send a notice but may not bother to
ensure that it is served on the landowner as
required under Section 45 of the Act. If the
words "date of the Collector's award" are
literally interpreted, the effect would be
that on the expiry of six months from the
date of award, even though the claimant
had no notice of the award, he would lose
the right to seek a reference. That will lead
to
arbitrary
and
unreasonable
discrimination between those who are
notified of the award and those who are not
notified of the award.

27. Unless the procedure under
the Act is fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, it will run the risk of being
branded as being violative of Article 14 as
also Article 300-A of the Constitution of
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
529
India. To avoid such consequences, the
words "date of the Collector's award"
occurring in proviso (b) to Section 18
requires to be read as referring to the date
of knowledge of the essential contents of
the award, and not the actual date of the
Collector's award.

28.
The
following
position
therefore emerges from the interpretation
of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act:

(i) If the award is made in the
presence of the person interested (or his
authorised representative), he has to make the
application within six weeks from the date of
the Collector's award itself.

(ii) If the award is not made in the
presence of the person interested (or his
authorised representative), he has to make the
application seeking reference within six weeks
of the receipt of the notice from the Collector
under Section 12(2).

(iii) If the person interested (or his
representative) was not present when the award
is made, and if he does not receive the notice
under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has
to make the application within six months of the
date on which he actually or constructively
came to know about the contents of the award.

(iv) If a person interested receives a
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, after the
expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of
such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the
provision for six months for making the
application on the ground that the date of
receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act
was the date of knowledge of the contents of the
award.

29. A person who fails to make an
application for reference within the time
prescribed is not without remedy. It is open
to him to make an application under
Section 28-A of the Act, on the basis of an
award of the court in respect of the other
lands covered by the same acquisition
notification, if there is an increase. Be that
as it may.

30. When a person interested
makes
an application
for
reference
seeking the benefit of six months' period
from the date of knowledge, the initial
onus is on him to prove that he (or his
representative) was not present when the
award was made, that he did not receive
any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act,
and that he did not have the knowledge of
the contents of the award during a period
of six months prior to the filing the
application for reference. This onus is
discharged by asserting these facts on
oath. He is not expected to prove the
negative.
Once
the
initial
onus
is
discharged
by
the
claimant/person
interested, it is for the Land Acquisition
Collector to establish that the person
interested was present either in person or
through his representative when the
award was made, or that he had received a
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or
that he had knowledge of the contents of
the award.

31.
Actual
or
constructive
knowledge of the contents of the award
can be established by the Collector by
proving that the person interested had
received or drawn the compensation
amount for the acquired land, or had
attested the mahazar / panchnama /
proceedings delivering possession of the
acquired land in pursuance of the
acquisition,
or
had
filed
a
case
challenging
the
award
or
had
acknowledged the making of the award in
530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
any document or in statement on oath or
evidence. The person interested, not being
in possession of the acquired land and the
name of the State or its transferee being
entered in the revenue municipal records
coupled with delay, can also lead to an
inference of constructive knowledge. In
the absence of any such evidence by the
Collector, the claim of the person
interested that he did not have knowledge
earlier will be accepted, unless there are
compelling circumstances not to do so."

(emphasis supplied)

19. It is evident from the law laid
down by the Apex Court in the case of
Bhagwan Das (supra) that when a person
interested
makes
an
application
for
reference seeking the benefit of six months,
from the date of knowledge, the initial onus
is on him to prove that he(or his
representative) was not present when the
award was made, that he did not receive
any notice under section 12(2) of the Act,
and that he did not have the knowledge of
the contents of the award during the period
of six months prior to the filing of the
application for reference. This onus is
discharged by asserting these facts on oath.
He is not expected to prove the negative.
Once the initial onus is discharged by the
claimant/person interested, it is for the land
acquisition Collector to establish that the
person interested was present either in
person or through his representative when
the award was made, or that he had
received a notice under section 12(2) of the
Act, or that he had knowledge of the
contents
of
the
award.
Actual
or
constructive knowledge of the contents of
the award can be established by the
Collector by proving that the person
interested had received or withdrawn the
compensation amount for the acquired
land,
or
had
attested
the
mahazar/Panchnama/proceedings
delivering possession of the acquired land
in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed
a case challenging the award or had
acknowledged the making of the award in
any document or any statement on oath or
evidence. The person interested, not being
in possession of the acquired land and the
name of the State or its transferee being
entered in the revenue/ municipal records
coupled with delay, can also lead to an
inference of constructive knowledge. In the
absence of any such evidence by the
Collector, the claim of the person interested
that he did not have knowledge earlier will
be accepted, unless there are compelling
circumstances not to do so.

20.
In
the
application
seeking
reference,
the
appellant
specifically
mentioned that he had no knowledge of the
acquisition proceedings because he never
received any notice from the Collector and
for the first time he became aware of the
award in February ,1989 and thereafter, he
obtained the certified copy of the award
and only then he became aware of the
contents of the award and then he became
aware that only a paltry amount has been
awarded to him and as such he moved an
application for seeking reference.

21. The landowner - appellant Sukhlal
appeared in the witness box in the reference
court and examined himself as PW-1 and
deposed that before passing of the award,
no notice was ever received by him. He
also remained unaware that an award had
been
passed.
He
deposed
in
his
examination-in-chief that for the first time
he became aware of the award in February,
1989 and then after obtaining the copy of
the award, he had filed reference. He
further deposed that the compensation
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
531
awarded has not been obtained by him
because it is meagre.

22.
Sukhlal
deposed
in
crossexamination that he was informed about the
award by his neighbour Lal Singh, who
resides in village Moosepur, whose land is
nearby to his acquired land, whose land
was also acquired by the government. He
also admitted that their lands were acquired
for the same canal(rajvaha). He admitted
that Lal Singh had enquired from him
whether he received any compensation or
not and then he was told about the
acquisition. He also admitted that prior to
that, a canal was dug in his land. He further
deposed that he never received any notice
from the Collector.

23. The respondents pleaded in their
written statement before the reference
court, that the appellant was well aware of
the acquisition proceedings because notices
were sent to him, which were received by
him, but he neither appeared nor adduced
any evidence, as such, the appellant
deliberately preferred reference belatedly
,which is barred by limitation.

24. It is evident that in support of the
above pleadings, the respondents have not
filed any documentary or oral evidence, to
prove, that the appellant was sent notices
during acquisition proceedings, which were
received by him, the appellant was aware
of the award of the Collector and he
deliberately did not prefer reference, within
the stipulated period of limitation. The
respondents could have very well filed
documentary evidence of the receipt of
notices by the appellant, but no such
documentary evidence was ever filed
before the reference court. Even no witness
was examined by the respondents in
support of their above contentions. In view
of this, the statement of Sukhlal PW-1
remains uncontroverted, that he had no
knowledge of the acquisition proceedings
and for the first time he became aware of it
in February, 1989. There is no evidence to
presume that the appellant was having
knowledge of the award prior to February,
1989. In view of this, the application dated
3.3.1989 seeking reference under section
18 of the Act, cannot be held to be barred
by limitation, because it was made within
six months from the date of actual
knowledge of the award. In view of this
conclusion,
the
reference
court
has
recorded a perverse finding that the
reference was time barred. Accordingly,
this issue is decided in the negative and it is
held that, the reference was preferred
within time.

Issue No.2

25. The Apex Court in the case of
Mehrawal
Khewaji
Trust(Registered),
Faridkot and Others vs. State of Punjab
and others (2012) 5 SCC 432, while
considering the applicability of exemplars
in
awarding
compensation
in
land
acquisition cases, held as under:-

14. As pointed out above, the
Reference Court failed to take note of the
highest
exemplar,
namely,
the
sale
transaction under Ext. A-61 dated 22-71977. In this regard, it is useful to refer the
decision
of
this
Court
in
M.
Vijayalakshmamma
Rao
Bahadur
v.
Collector of Madras [(1969) 1 MLJ 45
(SC)] . In this case, this Court has held thus
: (MLJ pp. 46-47)

"... where sale deeds pertaining
to different transactions are relied on
behalf of the Government, that representing
the highest value should be preferred to the
532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
rest unless there are strong circumstances
justifying a different course. In any case we
see no reason why an average of two sale
deeds should have been taken in this case."

15. In State of Punjab v. Hans
Raj [(1994) 5 SCC 734] this Court has held
that method of working out the "average
price"
paid
under
different
sale
transactions is not proper and that one
should not have, ordinarily recourse to
such method. This Court further held that
the bona fide sale transactions proximate
to the point of acquisition of the lands
situated in the neighbourhood of the
acquired lands are the real basis to
determine the market value.

16. This Court in Anjani Molu
Dessai v. State of Goa [(2010) 13 SCC 710
: (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 788] , after relying
upon the earlier decisions of this Court in
M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur and
Hans Raj held in para 20 as under :( SCC
p. 715)

"20. The legal position is that
even where there are several exemplars
with reference to similar lands, usually the
highest of the exemplars, which is a bona
fide transaction, will be considered."

Again, in para 23, it was held
that "the averaging of the prices under the
two sale deeds was not justified."

17. It is clear that when there are
several exemplars with reference to
similar lands, it is the general rule that the
highest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied
that it is a bona fide transaction, has to be
considered and accepted. When the land is
being compulsorily taken away from a
person, he is entitled to the highest value
which similar land in the locality is shown
to have fetched in a bona fide transaction
entered into between a willing purchaser
and a willing seller near about the time of
the acquisition. In our view, it seems to be
only fair that where sale deeds pertaining
to different transactions are relied on
behalf of the Government, the transaction
representing the highest value should be
preferred to the rest unless there are
strong circumstances justifying a different
course. It is not desirable to take an
average of various sale deeds placed
before the authority/court for fixing fair
compensation.

18.
Based
on
the
above
principles, the market value as per Ext. A61 dated 22-7-1977 was Rs 1,39,130.43 per
acre (approx. Rs 1.40 lakhs per acre). The
said sale deed was two-and-a-half years
prior in time than Section 4(1) Notification
dated 22-12-1979. There is no reason to
eschew the above sale transaction. It is
also pointed out that the lands covered
under Ext. A-61 are nearer to the lands of
the appellants under acquisition."

(emphasis supplied)

26. It is evident that the Apex Court in
the
case
of
Mehrawal
Khewaji
Trust(supra) has held that when there are
several exemplars with reference to similar
lands, it is the general rule that the highest
of the exemplars, if the Court is satisfied
that it is a bonafide transaction, has to be
considered and accepted. It was further
held
that
when
the
land
is
being
compulsorily taken away from a person, he
is entitled to the highest value which
similar land in the locality is shown to have
fetched in a bona fide transaction entered
into between a willing purchaser and a
willing seller near about the time of the
acquisition. It was further held that where
8 All. Sukh Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
533
sale
deeds
pertaining
to
different
transactions are relied on, on behalf of the
State, the transaction representing the
highest value should be preferred to the
rest, unless there are strong circumstances
justifying a different course. It was further
held that it is not desirable to take an
average of various sale deeds placed before
the
authority/court
for
fixing
fair
compensation.

27. This principle of law has been
reiterated recently by the Apex Court in the
case of Manohar and others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1519, in which it was held as
under:-

"46.
It
was
sought
to
be
contended by the learned counsel for the
Respondent No. 3 (MIDC) that the
Reference Court has rightly used the
principle of averaging of sale price of sale
exemplars at Sr. No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 for
determination of market value of acquired
land. However, it is clear from a reading of
paragraph 20 of the judgment of this Court in
the case of Anjani Molu Dessai vs. State of
Goa & Another (2010) 13 SCC 710 that the
legal position is that even where there are
several exemplars with reference to similar
lands, usually the highest of the exemplars,
which is a bonafide transaction will be
considered. Further, only where there are
several sales of similar lands whose prices
range in a narrow bandwidth, the average
thereof can be taken, as representing the
market price. The said position of law was
reiterated in the judgment of this Court in the
cases of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (supra)
and Mohammad Yusuf & Others vs. State of
Haryana & Others (2018) 16 SCC 105.

47. Even in the case of Major
General Kapil Mehra & Others vs. UOI &
Another (2015) 2 SCC 262, relied upon by
the learned counsel for Respondent No. 3
(MIDC), it has been held that where there
are several sales of similar lands, more or
less, at the same time, whose prices have
marginal variation, averaging thereof is
permissible.

48. The position of law being thus
and further on account of the fact that the
lands acquired in the present case are in a
prime location, we are of the considered
opinion that no occasion arose for the
Reference Court to deviate from the wellsettled position of law and that the
claimants/ Appellants deserve the benefit of
the highest sale exemplar dated 31st March
1990. Not only that but in the event, the
values of the sale instances taken into
consideration by the Reference Court had a
"marginal variation", averaging thereof
would have been permissible. But the sale
exemplars taken into consideration by the
Reference Court, in the present case, were
the ones from Sr. Nos. 1 to 6 and they
ranged from Rs. 25,000/- per Acre to Rs.
72,900/- per Acre. In such a case, the
averaging
thereof
was
clearly
not
permissible."

28. The S.L.A.O.