# Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 6 ILRA 68
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-06-04
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 5169 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sumit-kumar-sumit-kumar-gupta-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52157
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860
- Sections 323, 504, 506 & 241 -
Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Sections
3(1)(Da)(Dha)
&
14-A
-
Maintainability - Alternative remedy -
While the constitutional and inherent
powers of this Court are not "ousted" by
Section 14A, they cannot be invoked in
cases and situations where an appeal
would lie u/s 14A. (Para 8)

Inherent powers of this Court u/s 482 Cr.
P.C. cannot be invoked in cases and situations
where an appeal would lie u/s 14A and
aggrieved person having remedy of appeal u/s
14A of the 1989 Act, cannot be allowed to
invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court
u/s 482 Cr. P.C. (Para 8)

B. A decision is not an authority for the
proposition which did not fall for its
consideration. A judicial decision is an
authority for what it actually decides and not for
what can be read into it by implication or by
assigning an assumed intention to the judges,
and inferring from it a proposition of law which
the judges have not specifically laid down in the
pronouncement. (Para 11, 12)
Application dismissed, leaving it open to the
applicant to avail the statutory remedy u/s 14-A
of the 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,

## Text

68 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2024) 6 ILRA 68
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.06.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 5169 of 2024

Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors.
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Alok Srivastava, Pranav Tivaree

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,1860
- Sections 323, 504, 506 & 241 -
Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Sections
3(1)(Da)(Dha)
&
14-A
-
Maintainability - Alternative remedy -
While the constitutional and inherent
powers of this Court are not "ousted" by
Section 14A, they cannot be invoked in
cases and situations where an appeal
would lie u/s 14A. (Para 8)

Inherent powers of this Court u/s 482 Cr.
P.C. cannot be invoked in cases and situations
where an appeal would lie u/s 14A and
aggrieved person having remedy of appeal u/s
14A of the 1989 Act, cannot be allowed to
invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court
u/s 482 Cr. P.C. (Para 8)

B. A decision is not an authority for the
proposition which did not fall for its
consideration. A judicial decision is an
authority for what it actually decides and not for
what can be read into it by implication or by
assigning an assumed intention to the judges,
and inferring from it a proposition of law which
the judges have not specifically laid down in the
pronouncement. (Para 11, 12)
Application dismissed, leaving it open to the
applicant to avail the statutory remedy u/s 14-A
of the 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Pawan Kumar @ Pawan Yadav Vs St. of U.P. &
ors., 2024 AHC LKO 13846 (Para 4)

2. Shivam Kashyap Vs St. of U.P., 2024 SCC
OnLine All 376 (Para 8)

3. Ghulam Rasool Khan Vs St. of U.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine All. 975 (Para 8, 9)

4. Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs Tej Bahadur
Prajapati, (2004) 10 SCC 65 (Para 11)

5. St. of Orissa Vs Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC
275 (Para 11)

6. P.S. Sathappan Vs Andhra Bank Ltd., (2004)
11 SCC 672 (Para 12)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Devendra Yadav & ors Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 11043 of 2023,
decided on 10.04.2023; 2023 SCC OnLine All.
164 (Para 5, 9)

2. Ramawatar Vs St. of M. P., 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 966 (Para 9, 10)

3.
B.
Venkateswaran
Vs
P.
Bakthavatchalamreported in 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 14 (Para 9, 10)

Present petition seeks quashing of the
charge-sheet
No.
01/2023
dated
16.03.2023 as well as the summoning
order dated 25.05.2023 and the order
dated 27.03.2024 passed by the learned
Special Judge SC/ST Act, Gonda.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Alok Srivastava-II, the
learned counsel for the applicant, Sri
6 All. Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
69
Anurag Verma, the learned AGA-I for the
State and perused the record.

2. By means of the instant application
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
applicant has sought quashing of the
charge-sheet No. 01/2023 dated 16.03.2023
as well as the summoning order dated
25.05.2023 and the order dated 27.03.2024
passed by the learned Special Judge SC/ST
Act, Gonda issuing a non-bailable warrant
against the applicant and the entire
proceedings of Sessions Case No. 806 of
2023; State versus Sumit Kumar Gupta &
Ors, relating to Case Crime No. 70 of 2023,
under Sections 323, 504, 506, 241 IPC &
Sections 3 (1)(Da)(Dha) of Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act, Police
Station Kaudia, District Gonda pending in
the Court of learned Special Judge SC/ST
Act, Gonda.

3. The learned AGA-I has raised a
preliminary objection that the applicant has
got a statutory remedy of filing an appeal
under Section 14-A of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities)
Act,
and,
therefore,
the
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
should not be entertained.

4. The learned AGA-I has relied upon
a decision of this Court in Pawan Kumar
Alias Pawan Yadav v. State of UP & Ors:
2024 AHC LKO 13846: Application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 730 of 2024
decided on 16.02.2024.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
applicant has relied upon a decision rendered
by the coordinate Bench of this Court in
Devendra Yadav & 7 Ors v. State of U.P &
Os: Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No.
11043 of 2023 decided on 10.04.2023.

6. Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (which will hereinafter be referred
to as 'the Act') provides as follows:-

"14-A.
Appeals.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of
1974), an appeal shall lie, from any
judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an
Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court
both on facts and on law.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of
1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court
against an order of the Special Court or the
Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing
bail.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time being
in force, every appeal under this section shall
be preferred within a period of ninety days
from the date of the judgment, sentence or
order appealed from:

Provided that the High Court may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said
period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal within the period of
ninety days:

Provided further that no appeal
shall be entertained after the expiry of the
period of one hundred and eighty days.

(4) Every appeal preferred under
sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be
disposed of within a period of three months
from the date of admission of the appeal.
70 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. A bare perusal of Section 14-A of
the Act shows that it starts with the words
"Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of
1974)".

8. The question of maintainability of
an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in
spite of availability of remedy of filing an
appeal under Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T.
Act has been considered by this Court in
Shivam Kashyap v. State of U.P.: 2024
SCC OnLine All 376, and the relevant part
of the aforesaid judgment are being
reproduced below: -

"7. In Re : Provision of Section
14 (a) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)
Amen
dment Act, 2018 SCC OnLine All
2087 : (2018) 6 ALJ 631, the five questions
considered by the Full Bench, and answers
given to those questions, were as follows:-

"A. Whether provisions of subsection (2) of Section 14-A and the second
proviso to subsection (3) of Section 14-A of
the Amending Act, are
violative
of
Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution,
being unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary?

While we reject the challenge to
section 14A(2), we declare that the second
proviso to Section 14A(3) is clearly
violative
of
both
Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution. It is not just manifestly
arbitrary, it has the direct and unhindered
effect of taking away the salutary right of a
first appeal which has been recognised to
be an integral facet of fair procedure
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
The absence of discretion in the Court to
consider condonation of delay even where
sufficient cause may exist renders the
measure wholly capricious, irrational and
excessive. It is consequently struck down.

B. Whether in view of the
provisions contained in Section 14-A of the
Amending Act, a petition under the
provisions
of
Article 226/227 of
the Constitution of India or a revision
under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure or
a
petition
under
Section 482 Cr. P.C., is maintainable. OR in
other words, whether by virtue of Section
14-A of the Amending Act, the powers of
the High Court under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution or its revisional powers or
the
powers
under
Section 482 Cr.
P.C. stand ousted?

We therefore answer Question (B)
by holding that while the constitutional
and inherent powers of this Court are not
"ousted" by Section 14A, they cannot be
invoked in cases and situations where an
appeal
would
lie
under
Section
14A. Insofar as the powers of the Court
with respect to the revisional jurisdiction is
concerned, we find that the provisions of
Section 397 Cr.
P.C. stand
impliedly
excluded by virtue of the special provisions
made in Section 14A. This, we hold also in
light of our finding that the word "order"
as occurring in sub-section(1) of Section
14A would also include intermediate
orders.

C.
Whether
the
amended
provisions of Section 14-A would apply to
offences
or
proceedings
initiated
or
pending prior to 26 January 2016?

We hold that the provisions of
Section 14A would be applicable to all
judgments, sentences or orders as well as
orders granting or refusing bail passed or
pronounced after 26 January, 2016. We
further clarify that the introduction of this
provision would not effect proceedings
instituted or pending before this Court
6 All. Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
71
provided they relate to a judgment,
sentence or order passed prior to 26
January 2016. The applicability of Section
14A does not depend upon the date of
commission
of
the
offence.
The
determinative factor would be the date of
the order of the Special Court or Exclusive
Court.

D. Whether upon the expiry of the
period of limitation for filing of an appeal
as specified in the second proviso to
Section 14-A(3), Section 439 Cr. P.C. and
the powers conferred on the High Court in
terms thereof would stand revived?

We
hold
that
the
powers
conferred on the High Court under
Section 439 Cr. P.C. do not stand revived.
We find ourselves unable to sustain the line
of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge
in
Rohit
that
the
provisions
of
Section 439 Cr.
P.C. would
remain
in
suspension during the period of 180 days
and thereafter revive on its expiry. The
conclusion so arrived at cannot be
sustained on any known principle of
statutory interpretation. We are therefore,
constrained to hold that both Janardan
Pandey as well as Rohit do not lay down
the correct law and must, as we do, stand
overruled.

E. Whether the power to directly
take cognizance of offences shall be
exercisable by the existing Special Courts
other than the Exclusive Special Courts or
Special Courts to be specified under the
amended Section 14?"

The existing Special Courts do
not have the jurisdiction to directly take
cognizance of offences under the 1989 Act.
This power stands conferred only upon the
Exclusive Special Courts to be established
or the Special Courts to be specified in
terms of the substituted section 14.
However it is clarified that the substitution
of Section 14 by the Amending Act does not
have the effect of denuding the existing
Special Courts of the authority to exercise
jurisdiction in respect of proceedings under
the 1989 Act. They would merely not have
the power to directly take cognizance of
offences and would be bound by the rigours
of Section 193 Cr. P.C. Even if cognizance
has been taken by the existing Special
Courts directly in light of the uncertainty
which prevailed, this would not ipso facto
render the proceedings void ab initio.
Ultimately it would be for the objector to
establish
serious
prejudice
or
a
miscarriage of justice as held in Rati
Ram."

8. In Ghulam
Rasool
Khan v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All
975, another Full Bench of this Court dealt
with the following questions:-

(i) Whether a Single Judge of this
Court while deciding Criminal Appeal
(Defective)
No.
523/2017
In
re :
Rohit v. State of U.P. vide judgment dated
29.08.2017
correctly
permitted
the
conversion of appeal under Section 14 A of
the Act, 1989 into a bail application by
exercising the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.?

(ii) Whether keeping in view the
judgment of Rohit (supra), an aggrieved
person will have two remedies available of
preferring an appeal under the provisions
of Section 14 A of the Act, 1989 as well as a
bail application under the provisions of
Section 439 of the Cr. P.C.?

(iii) Whether an aggrieved person
who has not availed of the remedy of an
72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal under the provisions of Section 14 A
of Act, 1989 can be allowed to approach
the
High
Court
by
preferring
an
application
under
the
provisions
of
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.?

(iv) What would be the remedy
available to an aggrieved person who
has failed to avail the remedy of appeal
under the provision of Act, 1989 and the
time period for availing the said remedy
has also lapsed?

9. The Full Bench answered
the aforesaid questions as follows:-

(i)
Question
No.
(I)
is
answered in negative as Rohit v. State
of U.P., (2017) 6 ALJ 754 has been
overruled by Full Bench of this Court in
In Re : Provision of section 14 (a)
of SC/ST
(Prevention
of
Atrocities)
Amendment Act, 2015, (2018) 6 ALJ
631.

(ii)
Question
No.
(II)
is
answered in negative holding that an
aggrieved person will not have two
remedies namely, i.e. filing an appeal
under Section 14A of the 1989 Act as
well as filing a bail application in terms
of Section 439 Cr. P.C.

(iii) Question No. (III) is
answered in negative holding that the
aggrieved person having remedy of
appeal under Section 14A of the 1989
Act, cannot be allowed to invoke
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 482 Cr. P.C.

(iv) Question No. (IV) - There
will be no limitation to file an appeal
against an order under the provisions of
1989 Act. Hence, the remedies can be
availed of as provided.

10. The learned A.G.A. has
informed the Court that the following
questions have been referred by the
order
dated
20.09.2023
passed
in Abhishek
Awasthi
@
Bholu
Awasthi v. State of U.P., Application
under Section 482 No. 8635 of 2023
and other connected matters:-

(i) Whether a Single Judge of this
Court while deciding Criminal Appeal
(Defective)
No.
523/2017
In
re :
Rohit v. State of U.P. vide judgment dated
29.08.2017
correctly
permitted
the
conversion of appeal under Section 14 A of
the Act, 1989 into a bail application by
exercising the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.?

(ii) Whether keeping in view the
judgment of Rohit (supra), an aggrieved
person will have two remedies available of
preferring an appeal under the provisions
of Section 14 A of the Act, 1989 as well as a
bail application under the provisions of
Section 439 of the Cr. P.C.?

(iii) Whether
an
aggrieved
person who has not availed of the remedy
of an appeal under the provisions of
Section 14 A of Act, 1989 can be allowed
to approach the High Court by preferring
an application under the provisions of
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.?

(iv) What would be the remedy
available to an aggrieved person who has
failed to avail the remedy of appeal under
the provision of Act, 1989 and the time
period for availing the said remedy has
also lapsed?""
6 All. Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
73

11. Although the questions have
been referred to a larger Bench by means
of an order dated 20.09.2023 passed by a
coordinate
Bench
of
this
Court
at
Allahabad in Application under Section
482 No. 8635 of 2023 and other connected
matters, the decision in Ghulam Rasool
Khan (Supra) will hold good till a decision
is taken by a larger Bench. In this regard, a
reference to the following passage from
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu &
Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1140 will be appropriate:-

"35. We are seeing before us
judgments and orders by High Courts not
deciding cases on the ground that the
leading judgment of this Court on this
subject is either referred to a larger Bench
or a review petition relating thereto is
pending. We have also come across
examples of High Courts refusing deference
to judgments of this Court on the score that
a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its
correctness. In this regard, we lay down the
position in law. We make it absolutely clear
that the High Courts will proceed to decide
matters on the basis of the law as it stands.
It is not open, unless specifically directed
by this Court, to await an outcome of a
reference or a review petition, as the case
may be. It is also not open to a High Court
to refuse to follow a judgment by stating
that it has been doubted by a later
Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced
with conflicting judgments by Benches of
equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier
one which is to be followed by the High
Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench
in National
Insurance
Company
Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC
680. The High Courts, of course, will do so
with careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it."

12. In Union of India v. State of
Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 relied
upon by the learned Counsel for the
applicant, the question involved was
regarding the bar created under Section 18
of the Act against grant of anticipatory bail
in offences under the Act and the question
of maintainability of an Application under
Section 482 Cr. P.C. was not involved in
that case. Therefore, that judgment is no
relevant for the decision of the point
involved in the present case.

13. Therefore, the mere reference
of the aforesaid questions would not affect
the binding nature of the law laid down
in Ghulam Rasool Khan (Supra).

14. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, the law on the point stands
clarified by two Full Benches, that inherent
powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. cannot be invoked in cases and
situations where an appeal would lie under
Section 14A and aggrieved person having
remedy of appeal under Section 14A of the
1989 Act, cannot be allowed to invoke
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 482 Cr. P.C."

9. In Devendra Yadav v. State of
U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 164, which has
been relied upon by the learned Counsel for
the applicant, a coordinate Bench of this
Court
distinguished
Ghulam
Rasool
(Supra) for the followins reasons: -

"11. Sri. Mohit Singh, learned
counsel for the applicant has cited a
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Ramawatar v. State
of
Madhya
Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC
966 decided on 25.10.2021 in Crl. Appeal
No. 1393 of 2011, whereby the full Bench of
Hon'ble Apex Court decided the issue in
74 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
most lucid terms. The relevant paragraph
nos. 9 and 16, which are quoted herein
below:-

"9. Having heard learned
Counsel for the parties at some length,
we are of the opinion that two
questions fall for our consideration in
the present appeal. First, whether the
jurisdiction
of
this
Court
under
Article 142 of the Constitution can be
invoked for quashing of criminal
proceedings
arising
out
of
a
'noncompoundable offence? If yes,
then whether the power to quash
proceedings
can
be
extended
to
offences arising out of special statutes
such as the SC/ST Act?

16. On the other hand, where it
appears to the Court that the offence in
question, although covered under the
SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in
nature, or where the alleged offence has
not been committed on account of the
caste of the victim, or where the
continuation of the legal proceedings
would be an abuse of the process of law,
the Court can exercise its powers to
quash the proceedings. On similar lines,
when considering a prayer for quashing
on the basis of a compromise/settlement,
if the Court is satisfied that the
underlying objective of the Act would
not be contravened or diminished even if
the felony in question goes unpunished,
the mere fact that the offence is covered
under a 'special statute' would not
refrain this Court or the High Court,
from exercising their respective powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution or
Section 482 Cr. P.C."

12. Since the case of Gulam
Rasool Khan was decided in the year
2022*28.07.2022) whereas Ramawtar
case was decided in 2021, thus, it has
been contended by the counsel that 482
Cr. P.C. application is maintainable
even it relates to SC/ST Act.

13. Sri. Singh, learned counsel
for the applicant submitted that while
deciding the case of Gulam Rasool
Khan (supra), learned Division Bench
of this Court has never relied upon or
even considered the ratio laid down in
the judgment of Ramawatar v. State of
M.P. and thus could be safely be termed
as per incuriam.

14.
There
is
yet
another
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court cited
by learned counsel for the applicants in
the case of B. Venkateswaran v. P.
Bakthavatchalam reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 14 decided on 05.01.2023 in
Criminal Appeal No. 1555 of 2022. In
so many words the, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has opined that:-

"From the aforesaid, it seems
that the private civil dispute between
the parties is converted into criminal
proceedings. Initiation of the criminal
proceedings
for
the
offences
under Sections
3(1)(v) and
(va)
of
the Scheduled
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, therefore, is
nothing but an abuse of process of law
and Court. From the material on
record, we are satisfied that no case
for the offences under Sections 3(1)(v)
and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 is made out, even
prima facie. None of the ingredients of
Sections 3(1)(v)
and
(va) of
the Scheduled
Castes
and
the
6 All. Sumit Kumar @ Sumit Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
75
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 are made out
and/or satisfied. Therefore, we are of
the firm opinion and view that in the
facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court ought to have quashed
the criminal proceedings in exercise of
powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The impugned
judgment and order passed by the High
Court, therefore, is unsustainable and
the same deserves to be quashed and
set aside and the criminal proceedings
initiated
against
the
appellants
deserves to be quashed and set aside."

15. Thus from the aforesaid
discussions, it is clear that Hon'ble
Apex Court has clearly and time and
again have opined that elaborating the
aforesaid provision of full bench of this
Court as well as Hon'ble Apex Court
and taking the help of the aforesaid
judgments,
the
Court
is
of
the
considered
opinion
that 482 Cr.
P.C. application could be filed assailing
the summoning order."

10. The Hon'ble Single Judge
deciding
Devendra
Yadav
(Supra)
somehow omitted to notice that Section
14-A of the S.C./S.T. Act was not taken
into consideration either in Ramawatar
or
in
B.
Venkateswaran
v.
P.
Bakthavatchalam.

11. In Amrendra Pratap Singh v.
Tej Bahadur Prajapati: (2004) 10
SCC 65, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that:

"A judicial decision is an
authority for what it actually decides
and not for what can be read into it by
implication
or
by
assigning
an
assumed intention to the judges, and
inferring from it a proposition of law
which the judges have not specifically
laid down in the pronouncement.

In State of Orissa v. Mohd.
Illiyas: (2006) 1 SCC 275 it was
reiterated that: -

"12....
A
decision
is
a
precedent on its own facts. Each case
presents its own features. It is not
everything said by a Judge while
giving judgment that constitutes a
precedent. The only thing in a Judge's
decision
binding a
party
is
the
principle upon which the case is
decided and for this reason it is
important to analyse a decision and
isolate from it the ratio decidendi.
According to the well-settled theory of
precedents, every decision contains
three basic postulates : (i) findings of
material facts, direct and inferential.
An inferential finding of facts is the
inference which the Judge draws from
the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii)
statements of the principles of law
applicable
to
the
legal
problems
disclosed by the facts; and (iii)
judgment based on the combined effect
of the above. A decision is an
authority for what it actually decides.
What is of the essence in a decision is
its ratio and not every observation
found therein nor what logically flows
from the various observations made in
the judgment. The enunciation of the
reason or principle on which a
question before a court has been
decided
is
alone
binding
as
a
precedent. (See State of Orissa v.
Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (1968) 2 SCR
154 and Union of India v. Dhanwanti
Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44.) A case is a
precedent and binding for what it
76 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
explicitly decides and no more. The
words
used
by
Judges
in
their
judgments are not to be read as if they
are words in an Act of Parliament. In
Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495 the
Earl of Halsbury, L.C. observed that
every judgment must be read as
applicable to the particular facts
proved or assumed to be proved, since
the generality of the expressions
which are found there are not intended
to be the exposition of the whole law
but governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which
such expressions are found and a case
is only an authority for what it
actually decides."

12. In P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra
Bank Ltd.: (2004) 11 SCC 672, a
Constitution Bench consisting of five
Hon'ble Judges held that: -

"144. While
analysing
different decisions rendered by this
Court, an attempt has been made to
read the judgments as should be read
under the rule of precedents. A
decision, it is trite, should not be read
as a statute.

145. A
decision
is
an
authority for the questions of law
determined by it. While applying the
ratio, the court may not pick out a
word or a sentence from the judgment
divorced from the context in which the
said question arose for consideration.
A judgment, as is well known, must be
read
in
its
entirety
and
the
observations
made
therein
should
receive consideration in the light of
the
questions
raised
before
it.
[See Haryana
Financial
Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002)
3
SCC
496, Union
of
India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC
44, Nalini Mahajan (Dr.) v. Director
of Income Tax (Investigation) (2002)
257
ITR
123
(Del), State
of
U.P. v. Synthetics
and
Chemicals
Ltd. (1991)
4
SCC
139, A-One
Granites v. State of U.P. (2001) 3 SCC
537
and Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)
Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111.

146. Although decisions are
galore on this point, we may refer to a
recent one in State of Gujarat v. Akhil
Gujarat
Pravasi
V.S.
Mahamandal (2004)
5
SCC
155
wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 172,
para 19)

"It is trite that any observation
made during the course of reasoning in
a judgment should not be read divorced
from the context in which it was used."

147. It is further well settled
that a decision is not an authority for
the proposition which did not fall for its
consideration."

13. The Hon'ble Single Judge
deciding
Devendra
Yadav
(Supra)
somehow omitted to notice that Section
14-A of the S.C./S.T. Act was not taken
into consideration either in Ramawatar
or
in
B.
Venkateswaran v. P.
Bakthavatchalam.

14. The question of effect of
Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T. Act on
entertainability of a petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. was neither raised
not decided in Ramawatar or in B.
Venkateswaran
v.
P.
Bakthavatchalam
and,
therefore,
6 All. Gayatri Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
77
those decisions are not relevant for
deciding
this
question.
Therefore,
those decisions would not affect the
binding values of the Full Bench
decisions in In Re : Provision of
Section 14 (a) of SC/ST (Prevention
of Atrocities) Amendment Act and
Ghulam
Rasool
Khan v. State
of
U.P..

15. In view of the aforesaid
discussion,
the
application
under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the
applicant seeking quashing of the
charge-sheet, the summoning order
and the entire proceedings of Case
under Sections 323, 504, 506, 241 IPC
& Sections 3 (1)(Da)(Dha) of 14-A of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 is not entertainable and the same
is dismissed, leaving it open to the
applicant to avail the statutory remedy
under Section 14-A of the 14-A of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989.
---------
(2024) 6 ILRA 77
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.06.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ C No. 5493 of 2024

Gayatri Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Punit Kumar Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Civil Law - Cancellation of fair price
shop
license
-
Maintainability
-
Alternative remedy - Petitioner has an
alternative and equally efficacious remedy
of filing of appeal u/s 13(3) of U.P.
Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale
and Distribution Control) Order, 2016.

Writ petition disposed of granting
liberty
to
petitioner
to
approach
appellate authority. (E-4)

Present
petition
challenges
the
orders
dated
24.01.2024
and
12.04.2024.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish
Mathur, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for
petitioner and learned State Counsel
for opposite parties.

2.

Petition
has
been
filed
challenging orders dated 24th January,
2024 and 12th April, 2024 pertaining
to cancellation of petitioner's fair
price shop license.

3. Learned State Counsel at the very
outset has taken a preliminary objection
regarding maintainability of this petition
since petitioner has an alternative and equally
efficacious remedy of filing of appeal under
Section
13(3)
of
the
U.P.
Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Sale and
Distribution Control) Order 2016.

4. In view of aforesaid, petition is
disposed of granting liberty to petitioner to
approach the appellate authority against
aforesaid orders, which if entertained shall be
decided expeditiously without granting any
undue adjournment.
---------