# Sunil Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 848
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-11
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 928 of 2026
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sunil-kumar-shukla-v-state-of-u-p-54811
- **Pages:** 19

## Text

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848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
17. The question was also with regard to the parameters laid down in paragraph 12 and the
Court was considering as to whether a case detected beyond the period of 30 days from the election
duty as covid 19 positive would fall within that category, not covered under the scheme.

18. In our considered view, in the above case this issue of established or not established
cases of covid 19 did not arise. Paragraph 17 that has been relied upon refers to the cases where
there was established case of detected covid 19 infected person who died within 30 days and the
court held that two situations were to be placed at par where the death had occurred due to covid 19
within a period 30 days of participation in election duty in a symptomatic case and secondly where
the infection of covid 19 was detected within a period of 30 days of election duty.

19. Thus, the Court was considering the cases where the person who died was in fact found
to be detected as infected covid 19 patient. Therefore, on fact the case is distinguishable.

20. Insofar as the case of Sadhna Sahu (supra) is concerned, the issue was whether the
case of the patient would be covered where the death of covid 19 victim took place on account of
infection though not specifically posted in the covid ward. The Court relies upon the judgment of
Delhi High Court wherein it was held that guards, nurses and paramedical staffs who might or
might not have been posted in the covid ward but if got infected by virus and died of covid, would
also be entitled to compensation under the scheme. It was also a case proven covid death.

21. We are clear that in the case in hand the claim has been rejected on the ground that
there was no material available on record to establish that it was the death of covid 19. Therefore,
the cases that have been relied upon are of no help to the petitioner.

22. A claimant must establish a case of covid infection qua the victim by placing test
reports or must have a covid death certificate to rely upon.

23. Thus, we do not find any merit in the case.

24. The writ petition is dismissed and is consigned to records.
----------
(2026) 3 ILRA 848
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 928 of 2026

Sunil Kumar Shukla ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
849
Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether the applicant accused in a daylight double murder case was entitled to be enlarged
on bail on the ground of alleged violation of Article 22(1) of Constitution of India and non-compliance with the
statutory requirement relating to communication of grounds of arrest, despite the prosecution case indicating
that the applicant was aware of reasons for his arrest and no demonstrable prejudice had been caused to him.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302, 323, 34, 504 - Constitution of India , 1950 - Article 22(1) -
Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 - ss. 50 - Bail - Arrest - Non-supply of written grounds of arrest
- Scope and effect - The instant bail application was moved by the applicant seeking
enlargement on bail in connection with a daylight double murder case in which specific
allegations were leveled that the applicant had caused fatal injuries to two deceased persons
who died on the spot - During the course of hearing, the applicant principally assailed the
legality of his arrest and subsequent judicial remand by contending that the constitutional
mandate contained in Constitution of India and the statutory requirements u/s 50 Cr.P.C.
relating to communication of grounds of arrest had not been complied with - Reliance was
placed upon recent judicial pronouncements concerning mandatory furnishing of grounds of
arrest in writing and the consequences of non-compliance therewith - The State, however,
opposed the bail prayer by contending that the applicant was fully aware of reasons for his
arrest from the very inception, and had failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice arising from
the alleged procedural lapse - The matter, came before the High Court for adjudication upon the
applicant's entitlement to bail in the backdrop of serious allegations of double murder and the
alleged violation of constitutional safeguards governing arrest.

Held: Upon due consideration of the facts of the case and the specific role attributed to applicant, according
to which it was the applicant who caused fatal injuries to two persons died on the spot (day light double
murder case) and also the observations made in the judgments, including the expression 'henceforth' used by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (infra) and explained in the law of Ram Kishor Arora
(infra), the Court is not inclined to enlarge the applicant on bail on the ground of violation of Article 22(1) of
Constitution of India for the reason(s) that (i) the materials on record taken note of in paragraphs 7 and 8 of
the order indicate that the applicant was aware of the grounds of his arrest from the outset and (ii) no
material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural
lapse - Accordingly, bail application allowed, direction to conclude the trial expeditiously. [Paras 10 to 12] (E13)

Case Law Cited
Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another; (2025) 5 SCC 799; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan
Etc.; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702; SAAD v. State (NCT of Delhi); 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8751; Shivam
Chaurasiya Thru. His Brother Mr. Manas Chaurasiya v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Affairs
Lko. and Others; 2026 SCC OnLine All 325 - referred to

Ram Kishor Arora v. Enforcement Directorate; (2024) 7 SCC 599; Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra;
(2026) 1 SCC 500 - followed

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India, 1950; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Bail Application; Day light double murder; Fatal injuries; Died on the spot; Violation of Article 22(1) of
Constitution of India; Illegal arrest; s. 50 Cr.P.C.; Procedural lapse; Awareness of grounds of arrest;
Demonstrable prejudice; Arrest memo; Giriftari Suchna Praptra; Specific role attributed to applicant;
Henceforth; Expeditious trial; Bail application rejected.
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. - 928 of 2026

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2025, passed by District and Sessions Judge, Sitapur in Case
Crime No. 607 of 2022.

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Applicant(s):
Hariom Divedi

Adv. for the Opposite Party(s)
G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Supplementary affidavit filed by the learned counsel for the applicant and short counter
affidavit filed by the State in the Court today are taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Prashant Tiwari, Advocate holding brief of Sri Hariom Divedi, the learned
counsel for the applicant and Dr. V.K. Singh, learned Government Advocate, who appeared
alongwith Sri Badrul Hasan, the learned AGA, Sri S.P. Tiwari, the learned AGA & Sri Amitabh
Chaturvedi, the learned AGA, as well as perused the record.

3. The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant seeking bail in Case
Crime/FIR No. 607 of 2022, under Sections- 302, 323, 34, 504 IPC, Police Station- Ramkote,
District- Sitapur.

4. The instant application has been filed by the applicant on the sole ground to the effect that
the reasons of arrest were not communicated in writing to the applicant, as required under Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India and also statutory provision i.e. Section 50 of Cr.P.C.

5. This Court considered the facts of the case, as brought to the notice of this Court by the
parties' counsel, which includes the following:-

(i) The FIR in issue i.e. FIR No. 0607 of 2022 was lodged by the informant/Smt. Munish
Kumari Shukla (wife of deceased/Manish Kumar Shukla and real sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of
deceased/Munendra Shukla) on 25.11.2022 at about 16.25 hours in regard to incident alleged to
have taken place on 25.11.2022 at about 12.00 hours making allegations against Sunil Kumar
Shukla s/o Ramsanehi (real brother-in-law (Jeth) of informant) and Manmohan @ Mohan Shukla,
Deepu Shukla & Gopal Shukla, all sons of Sunil Kumar Shukla, so as to attract the offences as
indicated under Section 302 IPC.

(ii) It is to be noted that as per the case setup in the FIR, the accused namely Sunil Kumar
Shukla s/o Ramsanehi (real brother-in-law (Jeth) of informant) and Manmohan @ Mohan Shukla,
Deepu Shukla & Gopal Shukla, all sons of Sunil Kumar Shukla, caused fatal injuries with 'Farsha'
and 'Kulhadi' to Manish Kumar Shukla (husband of informant) and Munendra Shukla (brother-inlaw (Devar) of informant).
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
851

(iii) As per the FIR, the aforesaid incident was seen by Jay Prakash Shukla (son of informant),
aged about 12 years at the time of alleged incident. As such, he is the eye-witness of the incident.

(iv) The statement of Jay Prakash Shukla was recorded on 25.11.2022 by the Investigating
Officer (in short "I.O.").

(v) A perusal of the copy of statement of Jay Prakash Shukla, on record, as Annexure No. SA1 to the supplementary affidavit dated 23.02.2026 indicates that fatal injuries with 'Farsha' to
Manish Kumar Shukla (father of Jay Prakash Shukla) and Munendra Shukla (uncle of Jay Prakash
Shukla) was caused by Sunil Kumar Shukla (applicant herein) and due to the injuries sustained
both of them died on the spot.

(vi) A perusal of copies of statement(s) of independent witnesses namely Sonu s/o Ram
Naresh, Rampal s/o Jagmohan, Ashok s/o Raghunath, Sudheer s/o Baburam, Umesh s/o Arjun,
Manoj s/o Ramautar and Amrish s/o Loknath, on record, as Annexure No. 3 to the instant bail
application would indicate that these witnesses have assigned specific role to the applicant of
causing fatal injuries with 'Farsha' to deceased(s) namely Manish Kumar Shukla and Munendra
Shukla.

(vii) The co-accused namely Manmohan Alias Mohan has already been released on bail by
this Court vide order dated 07.10.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 6833 of
2024. Another co-accused namely Deepu Shukla has also been released on bail by this Court vide
order dated 13.11.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 4805 of 2025.

6. Opposing the instant bail application preferred based upon the aforesaid main ground, the
learned Government Advocate stated that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the applicant
on the date of arrest i.e. on 26.11.2022 and therefore the instant application seeking bail on the
ground to the effect that grounds of arrest were not communicated to the applicant is liable to be
rejected.

7. On the aforesaid aspect of the case, reference has been made by the learned Government
Advocate to the copy of arrest memo prepared on 26.11.2022 at 16.15 hours (annexed as Annexure
No. S.C.A.-2 to short counter affidavit filed in the Court today). The relevant portion of the arrest
memo, referred, is extracted hereunder:-

"................यह पवश्वास होने पर कक पकड़े गये उपरोक्त तीनो व्यजक्त ही मुकदमा उपरोक्त में
नासमत असभयुक्तगण हैं, को उनके पवरुद्ध पंिीकृत मु0अ0सं0 607/22 धारा 302 भा०द०पव० से अवगत
कराते हुए ननयमानुसार समय करीब 15.30 बिे बबिौरा पुल के पास से दहरासत पुसलस में सलया गया।
चगरफ्तारी मेमो मौके पर तैयार कर सवथ सम्बजन्धत के हस्ताक्षर/अलामात बनवाये गये। आने िाने वाले
िनता के व्यजक्तयों से गवाही हेतु कहा गया तो कोटथ किहरी के िक्कर व भलाई बुराई के कारण सभी बबना
नाम पता बताये हट बढ़ गये। दौराने चगरफ्तारी मा० सवोच्ि न्यायालय व राटरीय मानवाचधकार आयोग के
आदेशो ननदेशों का अक्षरशः पालन ककया/कराया गया। असभयुक्तगण की िामा तलाशी से बरामद रुपयों को
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
असभयुक्तवार अलग अलग कागि मे रखकर चिटबन्दी ककया गया। असभयुक्तगण की चगरफ्तारी की सूिना
असभयुक्त सुनील कुमार शुक्ला की पत्नी सुनीता देवी को देने हेतु हे०का० डीलिन्द को दहदायत मुनाससब कर
ग्राम बीहटगौड़ रवाना ककया गया। असभयुक्तगण का ननयमानुसार मेडडकल परीक्षण कराने एवं न्यायालय
समय से भेिने कायाथलय में मौिूद आरक्षी को दहदायत ककया गया। पववरण पववेिना िररए सी०डी० प्रेपषत है
िािथ थाना बिुम्मे स्वयं ग्रहण ककया।"

8. Reference has also been made by the learned Government Advocate to the copy of 'Giriftari
Suchna Praptra (चगरफ्तारी सूिना प्रपत्र)' (form of information of arrest). The scanned copy of the
same is as under:-

9. This Court also considered the following judgments referred by the parties' counsel.
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
853

(i) The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishor Arora v.
Enforcement Directorate; (2024) 7 SCC 599, the relevant paragraphs of which, referred, are as
under:-

"23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of
India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] also noticing the inconsistent practice being followed by the officers
arresting the persons under Section 19 PMLA, directed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing
as a matter of course, "henceforth", meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement of the
judgment. The very use of the word "henceforth" implied that the said requirement of furnishing
grounds of arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not mandatory or
obligatory till the date of the said judgment. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr
Singhvi for the appellant that the said judgment was required to be given effect retrospectively
cannot be accepted when the judgment itself states that it would be necessary "henceforth" that a
copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and
without exception. Hence, non-furnishing of grounds of arrest in writing till the date of
pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC
576] could neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the officer concerned in not furnishing the
same in writing could be faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person arrested about
the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] .

24. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the
appellant was handed over the document containing grounds of arrest when he was arrested, and
he also put his signature below the said grounds of arrest, after making an endorsement that "I
have been informed and have also read the abovementioned grounds of arrest." The appellant in
the rejoinder filed by him has neither disputed the said endorsement nor his signature below the
said endorsement. The only contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi is that he
was not furnished a copy of the document containing the grounds of arrest at the time of arrest.
Since the appellant was indisputably informed about the grounds of arrest and he having also put
his signature and the endorsement on the said document of having been informed, we hold that
there was due compliance of the provisions contained in Section 19 PMLA and his arrest could
neither be said to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India."

(ii) The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State of
Haryana and another; (2025) 5 SCC 799, relevant paragraphs of which, referred, are as under:-

"Conclusions

26. Therefore, we conclude:

26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory
requirement of Article 22(1);

26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in
such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and
communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode
854 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is
achieved;

26.3. When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article
22(1), the burden will always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1);

26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of
the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a
criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation,
charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge-sheet will not validate a breach of
constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);

26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is
the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory
safeguards has been made; and

26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to
forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory
restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court
to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.

42. The purpose of inserting Section 50-ACrPC, making it obligatory on the person
making arrest to inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons nominated by the
arrested person, is to ensure that they would be able to take immediate and prompt actions to
secure the release of the arrested person as permissible under the law. The arrested person,
because of his detention, may not have immediate and easy access to the legal process for securing
his release, which would otherwise be available to the friends, relatives and such nominated
persons by way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of the detained person on bail
at the earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue, and
in addition to his relatives as mentioned above is not merely a formality but to enable the detained
person to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity to him
through his relatives, friends or nominated persons to secure his release at the earliest possible
opportunity for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. Hence, the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is
not only to the arrested person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be
disclosed or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal.

(iii) The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs.
Sri Darshan Etc.; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, the relevant paragraphs of which, referred, are as
under:-

"20. In the present case, the High Court, by the impugned order, enlarged the
respondents on bail, primarily relying on a set of factual and legal findings. However, a closer
examination of these findings reveals serious infirmities that warranting interference. We shall
discuss the same in detail.
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
855

20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid
ground for grant of bail.

20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents - accused contended that the arrest was
illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article
22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr. P.C. (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is devoid of merit.

20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that "no person who is arrested shall
be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest,
nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his
choice". Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr. P.C. requires that "every police officer or other person
arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the
offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.

20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested
person must be informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form
or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that
substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is
shown.

20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana22, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is
satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in
writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh23, it was observed that
when arrest is made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance.
Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an
inflexible requirement in all circumstances.

20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr. P.C. is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been
to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of
written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable
prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.

20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a
determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the
existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders
about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly templatebased and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at
the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of
India24 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50)
that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of
arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.

20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the
respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the
outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any
prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable
prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on
bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the
gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on
Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially
856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled
principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.

20.2. Courts are not expected to render findings on the merits of the case at the bail
stage.

20.2.1. It is a settled principle that at the bail stage, courts are precluded from
undertaking a detailed examination of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the merits of
the case. Only a prima facie assessment of the material is warranted. The court cannot conduct a
mini-trial or record conclusions that could influence the outcome of the trial.

20.2.2. In Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote25, this Court held as under:

"Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits should
be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is
needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself"

20.2.3. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav26, the Court
reiterated that while detailed evaluation is not required, some reasoning must support the grant of
bail, especially when the offence is grave. However, even in such cases, the reasoning must be
confined to prima facie satisfaction, not merit-based findings.

20.2.4. By the impugned order, the High Court proceeded to grant bail to the accused by
delving into the merits of the case and recording findings that fall within the exclusive domain of
the trial Court. For instances, in para 24, the High Court observed that the nature of weapons used
did not suggest premeditation to assault and murder the deceased, and concluded that the intention
to commit murder would have to be determined during trial. In the same paragraph, it further held
that since the deceased had voluntarily accompanied certain accused to Bengaluru and had even
stopped at a bar en route, the question whether he was abducted or kidnapped also required fullfledged trial consideration. In para 29, the High Court noted that there was no prima facie
material revealing conspiracy as no witness statements supported the prosecution's theory of a preplanned murder. In para 32, the High Court discounted the evidentiary value of the recovery of
weapons merely because they were seized from an open place. With regard to medical evidence, in
para 31 the Court found that a further opinion of the doctor issued later (stating that 13 of 39
injuries were blood-oozing) was contrary to the post-mortem report, and held that this discrepancy
ought to be evaluated at trial. These are indicative of a premature judicial evaluation of guilt or
innocence, which is impermissible at the bail stage.

20.2.5. Further, such an approach of the High Court is contrary to the judicial
precedents of this court, including Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh27, Kanwar Singh Meena v.
State of Rajasthan28, wherein, it was held that courts, while considering bail, should not assess the
credibility of witnesses, as this function squarely lies within the domain of the trial Court. Thus, the
impugned order of the High Court violates this principle by commenting on the delay in the witness
statements and imputing lack of credibility at this stage.

20.2.6. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar29, the Court cautioned that there cannot be
elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in a
conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of
bail. The following paragraphs are pertinent:

"25. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable
right, at the same time while considering an application for bail Courts cannot lose sight of the
serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
857
particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must
be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-a-vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.

26. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned orders above. At the outset,
we observe that the extracted portions are the only portions forming part of the "reasoning" of the
High court while granting bail. As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a
Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage
and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystalised as such. There
cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in
a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of
bail. At the same time, a balance would have to be struck between the nature of the allegations
made against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond
reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the prosecution;
criminal antecedents of the accused; and a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the
charge against the accused.

20.2.7.In the present case, the reading of the High Court's order gives an unmistakable
impression that it has pre-judged the outcome of the trial, thereby setting the stage for discharge or
acquittal, which, according to this court, is contrary to law.

20.2.8. In Dinesh M.N. (SP) v. State of Gujarat30, the court clarified:

"Even though the re-appreciation of the evidence as done by the court granting bail is to
be avoided, the court dealing with an application for cancellation of bail under section 439(2) can
consider whether irrelevant materials were taken into consideration. That is so because it is not
known as to what extent the irrelevant materials weighed with the court for accepting the prayer
for bail."

20.2.9. Thus, this Court has made it clear that the findings of the High Court, while
deciding bail, are to be treated as expressions of opinion only for that purpose and should not, in
any manner, prejudice the trial or other proceedings. In the present case, however, the High Court
has relied upon irrelevant and premature assessments, and entered into questions best left for the
trial, thereby committing a grave jurisdictional error."

(iv) The judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi in the case of SAAD v. State (NCT of
Delhi); 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8751, the relevant paragraphs of which, referred, read as under:-

"11. Moreover, no objection was raised by the petitioner at the time of remand regarding
any alleged failure to inform him of the grounds of his arrest. The remand order has never been
challenged. The petitioner had also preferred multiple bail applications, including one before this
Court (Bail Application No. 2537/2025), which was ultimately withdrawn by the learned counsel
for the petitioner with the liberty to file a fresh application upon filing of the supplementary
chargesheet along with the CDRs. Significantly, even in the said bail application, no contention
regarding non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest was raised on behalf of the petitioner. It is
858 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
also evident that the petitioner continued to file bail applications thereafter and remained duly
represented by counsel throughout.

12. At this stage, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of Karnataka v. Sri. Darshan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, wherein the Supreme Court, while
dealing with a case concerning an offence under Section 302 of IPC- akin to the present case -
clarified, after considering earlier decisions including Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 456 and Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri)
450, that mere absence of written grounds of arrest does not, by itself, render the arrest illegal
unless the accused demonstrates actual prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend himself.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that the requirement under Article 22(1) of the
Constitution stands satisfied where the accused is made aware of the grounds of arrest in
substance, even if the same are not furnished in writing. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that
where the arrest memos and remand proceedings reflect that the accused was aware of the reasons
for arrest, and where the accused had access to legal representation and availed legal remedies
such as bail, the absence of written grounds constitutes, at best, a curable defect and does not
vitiate the arrest or entitle the accused to bail. The relevant observations are set out below:

"20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested
person must be informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form
or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that
substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is
shown.

20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is
satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in
writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that
when arrest is made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance.
Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an
inflexible requirement in all circumstances.

20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr. P.C. is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been
to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of
written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable
prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.

20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a
determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the
existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders
about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly templatebased and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at
the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India
and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from
03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest
immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.

20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the
respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the
outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any
3 All. Sunil Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P.
859
prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable
prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on
bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the
gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on
Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially
different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled
principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail."

(emphasis added)

(v) The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah v.
State of Maharashtra; (2026) 1 SCC 500. It is to be noted that in this case, the judgment passed
in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan Etc.; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 was not
taken note of. Relevant paragraphs of the report, referred, are as under:-

8. Then, while granting leave on 22-4-2025 [Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2531] , this Court formulated the following questions of law for
consideration:

8.1. (a) Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an offence under the Penal
Code, 1860 ("IPC, 1860") now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS 2023) would it be necessary
to furnish grounds of arrest to an accused either before arrest or forthwith after arrest, and

8.2.(b) Whether, even in exceptional cases, where on account of certain exigencies it will
not be possible to furnish the grounds of arrest either before arrest or immediately after arrest, the
arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50CrPC
(now Section 47 of BNSS 2023).

12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that the mode
of communication of grounds of arrest is not specified in the provision of Section 47 of BNSS 2023.
The reliance on the decisions in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC
576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir Purkayastha [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573] , is misplaced as both the cases pertain to
special statutes and the facts therein are not similar to the present case. It is argued that the
mandate of Article 22(1) is to inform the grounds of arrest to the arrestee and there is no specific
statutory mandate to provide such grounds in writing. The respondent while supporting the
judgment of the High Court of Bombay contends that while informing grounds of arrest to the
arrestee is mandatory, the mode thereof is not specified, and hence, the appellant has been arrested
in consonance with law and by following all procedural safeguards.

48. As mentioned above, it has been held while dealing with the mode of communicating
the grounds of arrest so as to serve the intended purpose of the constitutional mandate that the
language used in Articles 22(1) and 22(5) regarding communication of the grounds is identical and
therefore the interpretation of Article 22(5) shall ipso facto apply to Article 22(1). The grounds of
arrest must be furnished in writing, in order to attend the true intended purpose of Article 22(1).
Reference at this stage may be made to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Harikisan
[Harikisan v.