# Sunil Kumar v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 569
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 7544 of 2019
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra, Sameer Jain
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sunil-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-49211
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
Section 106 - Burden of proving fact
especially within knowledge - When any
fact is especially within the knowledge of
any person, the burden of proving that
fact is upon him - Section 106 of the
Evidence
Act
does
not
absolve
the
prosecution of discharging its primary
burden of proving the prosecution case
beyond reasonable doubt - It is only when
the prosecution has led evidence which, if
believed, will sustain a conviction, or
which makes out a prima facie case, that
the question arises of considering facts of
which the burden of proof would lie upon
the accused - it is well-settled that Section
106 of the Evidence Act does not directly
operate against either a husband or wife
staying under the same roof and being the
last person seen with the deceased (Para
14)

B. Criminal Law - conviction on a criminal
charge - suspicion - in a criminal trial,
suspicion,
howsoever
grave,
cannot
substitute proof - prosecution has to
elevate its case from the realm of "may be
true" to the plane of "must be true" for
conviction on a criminal charge
-
fundamental
principle
of
criminal
jurisprudence is that the accused must be
guilty and not merely may be guilty before
a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be'
is long and divides vague conjectures from
sure conclusions (Para 18, 19)

C. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
Section 106 - Wife of the appellant was
married on 20.2.2015 - She died in her
matrimonial house on 24.3.2017 - It was
accused specific stand that at the time of
the incident he was at Etah Bazar, his
father and mother were in Delhi and his
brother was at his shop when some
miscreants looted the house and killed his
wife - He came to know about the incident
at 12:30 hours in the day but the report
was lodged at 4:30 PM not by him but by
the father of the deceased - Trial court
taking into account that the deceased died
a homicidal death and she died in her
matrimonial home where she resided with
her husband, by taking the aid of Section
106 of the Evidence Act , placed the
burden
on
the
accused-appellant
to
explain the circumstances in which the
deceased had suffered the injuries - As
there was no acceptable explanation, trial
court recorded conviction - Held - even if
the accused was guilty of not promptly
lodging the FIR, it cannot be taken as a
conclusive circumstance reflecting a guilty
mind - The initial burden was on the
570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prosecution to first establish that the
accused was present in the house at the
time the deceased was killed - Had the
prosecution established that fact, then the
burden would have shifted on to the
accused-appellant, by virtue of Section
106 of the Evidence Act, to explain the
circumstances in which the deceased had
suffered those injuries on account of
which she died - But as the prosecution
has completely failed to discharge its
initial burden with regard to the presence
of the appellant in the house when the
deceased died, conviction of the appellant,
only on the ground that he did not lodge
the FIR and had failed to explain the
circumstances in which the deceased died,
is not at all sustainable in law

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

2 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
569

64. The ASJ-IV, Pilibhit, to ensure
compliance.

65. Let a copy of this order alongwith
record of the trial court be sent back to the
ASJ-IV, Pilibhit, for taking necessary steps
and for the consignment of the records.

66. Sri Kuldeep Johri and Sri Ankur
Singh Kushwaha, learned amicus curiae
appearing for the appellants shall be paid
Rs.7,500/- each as fee.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 569
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SAMEER JAIN, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 7544 of 2019

Sunil Kumar ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Sanjeev Kumar Pandey, Sri Rohit
Nandan Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
Section 106 - Burden of proving fact
especially within knowledge - When any
fact is especially within the knowledge of
any person, the burden of proving that
fact is upon him - Section 106 of the
Evidence
Act
does
not
absolve
the
prosecution of discharging its primary
burden of proving the prosecution case
beyond reasonable doubt - It is only when
the prosecution has led evidence which, if
believed, will sustain a conviction, or
which makes out a prima facie case, that
the question arises of considering facts of
which the burden of proof would lie upon
the accused - it is well-settled that Section
106 of the Evidence Act does not directly
operate against either a husband or wife
staying under the same roof and being the
last person seen with the deceased (Para
14)

B. Criminal Law - conviction on a criminal
charge - suspicion - in a criminal trial,
suspicion,
howsoever
grave,
cannot
substitute proof - prosecution has to
elevate its case from the realm of "may be
true" to the plane of "must be true" for
conviction on a criminal charge
-
fundamental
principle
of
criminal
jurisprudence is that the accused must be
guilty and not merely may be guilty before
a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be'
is long and divides vague conjectures from
sure conclusions (Para 18, 19)

C. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
Section 106 - Wife of the appellant was
married on 20.2.2015 - She died in her
matrimonial house on 24.3.2017 - It was
accused specific stand that at the time of
the incident he was at Etah Bazar, his
father and mother were in Delhi and his
brother was at his shop when some
miscreants looted the house and killed his
wife - He came to know about the incident
at 12:30 hours in the day but the report
was lodged at 4:30 PM not by him but by
the father of the deceased - Trial court
taking into account that the deceased died
a homicidal death and she died in her
matrimonial home where she resided with
her husband, by taking the aid of Section
106 of the Evidence Act , placed the
burden
on
the
accused-appellant
to
explain the circumstances in which the
deceased had suffered the injuries - As
there was no acceptable explanation, trial
court recorded conviction - Held - even if
the accused was guilty of not promptly
lodging the FIR, it cannot be taken as a
conclusive circumstance reflecting a guilty
mind - The initial burden was on the
570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prosecution to first establish that the
accused was present in the house at the
time the deceased was killed - Had the
prosecution established that fact, then the
burden would have shifted on to the
accused-appellant, by virtue of Section
106 of the Evidence Act, to explain the
circumstances in which the deceased had
suffered those injuries on account of
which she died - But as the prosecution
has completely failed to discharge its
initial burden with regard to the presence
of the appellant in the house when the
deceased died, conviction of the appellant,
only on the ground that he did not lodge
the FIR and had failed to explain the
circumstances in which the deceased died,
is not at all sustainable in law

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shivaji Chintappa Patil Vs St. of Mah. 2021
(5) SCC 626

2. Vijay Shankar Vs St. of Har., (2015) 12 SCC
644

3. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs St. of Mah.,
(1984) 4 SCC 116

4. Bablu Vs St. of Raj., (2006) 13 SCC 116

5. Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & anr. Vs St. of
Mah., (1973) 2 SCC 793

6. Devi Lal Vs St. of Raj., (2019) 19 SCC 447

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J.
&
Hon'ble Sameer Jain, J.)

1. This appeal has been filed against
the judgement and order dated 2.11.1999
passed by Additional Sessions Judge/
Special Judge, Gangsters Act, Court No. 5,
Etah in S.T. No. 70 of 2018, whereby,
though the appellant Sunil Kumar, coaccused Gajraj Singh and Nirmala Devi
have been acquitted of the charge of
offences punishable under Sections 498A,
304B IPC and 3⁄4 Dowry Prohibition Act
but, the appellant - Sunil Kumar has been
convicted under Section 302 IPC and
sentenced to imprisonment for life whereas,
the co-accused Gajraj Singh and Nirmala
Devi have been acquitted of the charge of
offence punishable under Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC. While admitting this
appeal, vide order dated 7.12.2019, lower
court record was summoned and office was
directed to prepare the paper book of the
appeal. Paper book of the appeal is ready
therefore, with the consent of Sri Sanjeev
Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the
appellant, and Sri Amit Sinha, learned
AGA for the State, this appeal has been
heard and is being decided finally by this
order.

Introductory facts

2. The wife of the appellant-Sunil
Kumar, namely, Sangeeta was married to
the appellant on 20.2.2015. She died in her
matrimonial house on 24.3.2017 of which a
first information report (vide written report-
Ex. Ka-1) was lodged by PW-1 (Jamuna
Prasad) father of the deceased. In the first
information report, it is alleged that the
accused, namely, Sunil Kumar (husband);
Gajraj Singh (father-in-law); Sudhir and
Yogendra (Devars) and Nirmala Devi
(mother in law) were not happy with the
dowry provided in the marriage and were
pressing for a three wheeler and Rs. Fifty
thousand in cash. It was alleged that in
connection with the said demand, the
deceased was being harassed and assaulted
by the accused. It is also alleged that in
connection
with
that,
several
times
panchayats were organised but the accused
did not relent and as the demand was not
met, the accused killed Sangeeta. This FIR
2 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
571
was registered at police station Mirhachi,
District - Etah on 24.3.2007 at 16.25 hrs. of
which a Chik FIR (Ex. Ka-3) and G.D.
Entry (Ex. Ka-4) was prepared/made by
PW-10. Inquest was conducted at 18.25 hrs
on 24.3.2017 at deceased's matrimonial
house in the presence of her family
members of which inquest report (Ex. Ka10) was prepared.

3. Autopsy of the body of the
deceased was conducted by PW-9 on
25.3.2017 at about 2:50 pm. The autopsy
report (Ex. Ka-2) revealed three ante
mortem injuries:

(i) Abrasion size 3 cm X 1 cm left
size of neck below left mandibular angle
placed obliquely.

(ii) Abrasion front of trachea size
2 cm X 1 cm front of neck above thyroid
cartilage placed horizontally.

(iii) Abrasion 5 cm X 1 cm back
of neck (right side) placed obliquely.

On dissection under injury No.1
clotted blood with rupture of muscles was
noted.

The
cause
of
death
was
ascertained to be due to asphyxia as a result
of ante mortem throttling.

The estimated time of death was
about a day before.

4. After investigation, a charge sheet
(Ext. Ka-5) was submitted against three
persons, namely, Sunil Kumar (appellant),
Gajraj Singh and Smt. Nirmala Devi.

5. After taking cognizance on the
charge sheet and committal to the court of
session, the trial court framed charges against
the said three accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC
and 3⁄4 Dowry Prohibition Act with an
alternative charge of an offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

Prosecution Evidence

6. During the course of trial, the
prosecution examined eleven witnesses, out
of which six, namely, PW-1 (father of the
deceased); PW-2 (scribe of the written
report); PW-3 (mother of the deceased); PW4 also a relative of the informant; PW-5
another relative of the informant; PW-6
(brother of the informant) were witnesses of
fact. All of them except PW-6 were declared
hostile. Notably, PW-6, though, he might not
have been declared hostile but he did not
support the prosecution case, in his cross
examination. What is important is that all the
witnesses of fact in unison have denied
harassment of the deceased in connection
with demand of dowry and have not
supported the prosecution case in respect of
alleged demand of dowry. Rather, they
disclosed that the goods of the house were
strewn all over as if there was robbery/ theft
in the house. They also admitted that the
father in law and mother in law of the
deceased were in Delhi at the time of the
incident. It be noticed that PW-6 though, in
his examination-in-chief, sought to support
the prosecution case in respect of demand of
dowry but in his cross-examination he did not
support the allegation in respect of demand of
dowry. What is most important is that none of
the prosecution witnesses of fact have
deposed with regard to the presence of the
appellant in the house on or about the
probable time of the incident.

7. PW-7 and PW-8 who are witnesses
of the inquest proceeding have stated that at
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the spot they noticed that the goods were
strewn all over the house and it appeared
that a robber or thief had killed the
deceased.

8. PW-9 (autopsy surgeon) proved the
autopsy report prepared by him and stated
that he conducted the autopsy between 2.20
and 2.50 pm on 25.3.2017 and according to
him the deceased might have died a day
before the autopsy.

9. PW-10, Head Moharrir posted at
the police station concerned proved the
registration of the FIR and G.D. entry
thereof.

10. PW-11 (the Investigating Officer)
proved the various stages of investigation.
Investigating Officer, however, did not
support the theory of there being theft or
robbery in the house as he did not notice
anything unusual at the spot, at the time of
inspection. He stated that he submitted
charge-sheet on the basis of material
collected by him during the course of
investigation and on the basis of statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

11. Incriminating circumstances
appearing in the prosecution evidence
were put to the accused. As this appeal is
filed by the appellant-Sunil Kumar, we
propose to notice, in brief, the statement
of Sunil Kumar recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. In his statement recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused
appellant denied the allegation in respect
of demand of three wheeler and Rs.
50,000/- in connection with dowry and
also denied the allegation of harassment
of the deceased in connection therewith.
Notably,
the
statement
of
accusedappellant Sunil Kumar, under Section 313
Cr.P.C., was recorded twice. One on
30.11.2018 and the other on 17.10.2019.
In both the statements, the specific stand
is that at the time of the incident he was
at Etah Bazar, his father and mother were
in Delhi and his brother was at his shop
when some miscreants looted the house
and killed his wife Sangeeta. In the
statement recorded on 30.11.2018, he
specifically stated that at the time of the
incident, nobody else other than the
deceased was in the house. The accused
also led evidence by examining two
defence witnesses. They also supported
the stand taken by the accused-appellant
in his statement under section 313 CrPC.

Trial Court Findings

12. The trial court upon noticing that
there was no evidence forthcoming in
respect
of
demand
of
dowry
and
harassment of the deceased by the accused,
acquitted the accused of the charge of
offences punishable under Sections 498A,
304B
IPC
and
Section
3⁄4
Dowry
Prohibition Act. The court, however, drew
adverse inference against the present
appellant on the basis of circumstance that
according to the accused i.e. statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. he came to know
about the incident at 12:30 hours in the day
but the report was lodged at 4:30 PM not
by him but by the father of the deceased,
which suggests that true facts were being
hidden. Secondly, the I.O. had not noticed
anything significant at the spot to suggest
possibility of a theft or robbery in the
house.
Consequently,
by
taking
into
account that the deceased died a homicidal
death and she died in her matrimonial home
where she resided with her husband by
taking the aid of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act and placing the burden on the
accused-appellant
to
explain
the
circumstances in which the deceased had
suffered the injuries, upon finding that
2 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
573
there was no acceptable explanation,
recorded conviction.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

13.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant has 'questioned' the judgment
and order of the trial court on the ground
that the prosecution evidence would
suggest that the incident occurred during
day
time.
There
is
no
evidence
whatsoever that the accused-appellant
was in the house at the time of the
incident whereas there is an explanation
of
accused-appellant
that
he
was
elsewhere, therefore, placing the burden
on the accused-appellant to explain the
circumstances in which the deceased had
suffered those injuries, as a result of
which she expired, the court committed
manifest error of law. Hence, the
conviction recorded is liable to be set
aside.

14.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant has placed reliance on a recent
three-judge
Bench
decision
of
the
Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji
Chintappa
Patil
Vs.
State
of
Maharashtra
2021
(5)
SCC
626,
wherein, in paragraph no. 23, the Apex
Court has observed as follows:-

"It could thus be seen, that it is
well-settled that Section 106 of the
Evidence Act does not directly operate
against either a husband or wife staying
under the same roof and being the last
person seen with the deceased. Section
106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve
the
prosecution
of
discharging
its
primary
burden
of
proving
the
prosecution
case
beyond
reasonable
doubt. It is only when the prosecution has
led evidence which, if believed, will
sustain a conviction, or which makes out
a prima facie case, that the question
arises of considering facts of which the
burden of proof would lie upon the
accused."

In paragraph no. 25 of that
decision (supra) it has also been observed
that "it is well-settled principle of law,
that false explanation or non-explanation
can only be used as an additional
circumstance, when the prosecution has
proved the chain of circumstances leaving
to no other conclusion than the guilt of
the accused. However, it cannot be used
as a link to complete the chain."

15. By relying upon the aforesaid
exposition of law, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that even if the
appellant was guilty of not promptly
lodging the FIR on getting information
with regard to the death of his wife, it
cannot
be
taken
as
a
conclusive
circumstance reflecting a guilty mind.
The burden was on the prosecution to
first establish that the appellant was
present in the house at the time the
deceased was killed. Had the prosecution
established that fact, then the burden
would have shifted on to the accusedappellant, by virtue of Section 106 of the
Evidence
Act,
to
explain
the
circumstances in which the deceased had
suffered those injuries on account of
which she died. But as the prosecution
has completely failed to discharge its
initial burden with regard to the presence
of the appellant in the house when the
deceased
died,
conviction
of
the
appellant, only on the ground that he did
not lodge the FIR and had failed to
explain the circumstances in which the
deceased died, is not at all sustainable in
law.
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Submissions on behalf of the State

16. Per contra, Sri Amit Sinha,
learned AGA submitted that the appellant
being the husband of the deceased would in
ordinary course be presumed to be residing
with the deceased and as no cogent
evidence has been led by the appellant as to
where else he was present at the time when
the incident occurred, the trial court rightly
placed the burden on the appellant to record
conviction with the aid of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act. Moreso, when the
factum of robbery/theft was not confirmed
by the testimony of the investigating
officer.

Analysis

17. Having considered the rival
submissions
and
having
noticed
the
prosecution evidence, it is not in dispute that
the motive set out for the crime, which is
demand of dowry and harassment in
connection therewith, has not been proved
and the trial court has specifically recorded its
finding in that regard and all the accused
including accused-appellant who were put to
trial on that charge, have been acquitted.
Once that is the position the benefit of legal
presumption, which the prosecution could get
under section 113-B of the Evidence Act, is
not available. Hence, the burden would
squarely fall on the prosecution to prove the
charge of murder either by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence. Admittedly, there is
no direct evidence. The law for conviction on
the basis of circumstantial evidence has been
well settled. In one of the recent decisions of
the Apex Court, in Vijay Shankar V. State
of Haryana, (2015) 12 SCC 644, following
its earlier decisions in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda V. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4
SCC 116 and Bablu V. State of Rajasthan,
(2006) 13 SCC 116, in respect of a case
based on circumstantial evidence, it was held
that "the normal principle is that in a case
based
on
circumstantial
evidence
the
circumstances from which an inference of
guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently
and
firmly
established;
that
these
circumstances should be of a definite
tendency unerringly pointing towards the
guilt of the accused; that the circumstances
taken cumulatively should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability
the crime was committed by the accused and
they should be incapable of explanation of
any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of
the accused and inconsistent with their
innocence". Further (vide paragraph 153 in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda's case), it is
settled, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established meaning thereby they 'must
or should' and not 'may be' established.

18. In addition to above, we must bear
in mind that the most fundamental principle
of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before
a court can convict and the mental distance
between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and
divides
vague
conjectures
from
sure
conclusions (vide Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
& Another v. State of Maharashtra, (1973)
2 SCC 793).

19. These settled legal principles have
again been reiterated in a three-judge Bench
decision of the Supreme Court in Devi Lal v.
State of Rajasthan, (2019) 19 SCC 447
wherein, in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the
judgment, it was held as follows:-

"18. On an analysis of the overall
fact situation in the instant case, and
considering the chain of circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the prosecution
and noticed by the High Court in the
2 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
575
impugned judgment, to prove the charge is
visibly incomplete and incoherent to permit
conviction of the appellants on the basis
thereof without any trace of doubt. Though
the
materials
on
record
hold
some
suspicion
towards
them,
but
the
prosecution has failed to elevate its case
from the realm of "may be true" to the
plane of "must be true" as is indispensably
required in law for conviction on a criminal
charge. It is trite to state that in a criminal
trial, suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot
substitute proof.

19. That apart, in the case of
circumstantial evidence, two views are
possible on the case of record, one pointing
to the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. The accused is indeed entitled
to have the benefit of one which is
favourable to him. All the judicially laid
parameters, defining the quality and
content of the circumstantial evidence,
bring home the guilt of the accused on a
criminal charge, we find no difficulty to
hold that the prosecution, in the case in
hand, has failed to meet the same."

 (Emphasis Supplied)

20. In the instant case, we do not find
any evidence on record to demonstrate that at
the time of the incident, the accused-appellant
was seen in the house with the deceased. The
incident, as per prosecution case including
the autopsy surgeon, was of day time. During
day time, it cannot be presumed that all
members of the house, particularly, male
member, would be at home because they
might be away to attend to their daily chores.
Specific case has been taken by the appellant
that he was at Etah Bazar when the
information came to him, at about 12:30
hours, with regard to the incident. There is no
evidence that on or about the probable time
of incident, the appellant was noticed in the
house or around or was seen exiting the
house.
In
these
circumstances,
the
prosecution has miserably failed to discharge
the initial burden placed upon it to prove that
the appellant was in the house or in all
probability would have been in the house, at
the time when the incident occurred. The
circumstance that the accused-appellant did
not immediately inform the police of the
occurrence in our view is not so clinching or
conclusive in its tendency as to hold the
appellant guilty. No doubt, conduct of the
accused does assume importance in a given
facts of the case. But, here, the delay in
lodging the FIR is barely of 4 hours. Notably,
the information was received by the
appellant, as is his case, at 12.30 hours, while
he was in the Bazaar. The in-laws of the
appellant lodged report at 16.25 hours on that
very day, therefore, there was hardly time
enough for the appellant to respond to enable
an adverse inference from his conduct. Once
this is the position, keeping in mind the
decision of the Apex Court in Shivaji
Chintappa Patil (supra), in our considered
view, the trial court misled itself by recording
conviction with the aid of Section 106 of
Evidence Act.

21. That apart, there is another important
feature of the prosecution case, which is, that all
prosecution
witnesses
of
fact
including
witnesses of inquest have consistently deposed
with regard to the goods strewn all over the
house suggestive of a robbery or theft in the
house. As this circumstance is noticeable in the
prosecution evidence there was all the more
reason to accept the explanation offered by the
appellant. In our view, therefore, the judgment
and the order of conviction recorded by the trial
court cannot be sustained.

22. The appeal is allowed. The
judgment and order dated 2.11.2019 passed
by
Additional
Sessions
Judge/Special
576 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Judge, Gangsters Act, Court No. 5, Etah is
set aside to the extent it convicts and
sentences the appellant. The appellant is
acquitted of the charge of the offence of
murder for which he has been convicted.
The appellant is reported to be in jail, he
shall be released forthwith subject to
compliance of provisions of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the trial court.

23. Let a copy of this order/judgment
and the original record of the lower court
be transmitted to the trial court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and
compliance. The office is further directed
to enter the judgment in compliance
register maintained for the purpose of the
Court.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 576
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.12.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 817 of 1993

State of U.P. & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Gauri Shanker Singh
 ...Plaintiff/Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri A.K. Saxena

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940Sections 30,33 & 20-Arbitration awardsetting aside- legality of- respondent
instituted a suit u/s 20 of Act-Arbitrator
by
award
directed
the
Contractor/
respondent to pay Rs. 4,47,875 to PWD
and Rs. 97,650 to respondent-Challenge
against-Aforesaid well-reasoned arbitral
award was interfered by the Court on the
ground that finding is bad-Reversal of
arbitral
award
found
erroneousInterference
with
impugned
order
declined. (Para 1 to 24)

The appeal is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. K. Marappan (Dead) Vs Superintending Engr.
T.B.P.H.L.C Circle Anantapur (2019) JX SC 391

2. Raveechee & Co. Vs U.O.I. (2018) AIR SC
3109

3. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs U.O.I. (1989)
AIR SC 777

4. St. of Ori. Vs B.N Agrawal (1997) 2 SCC 469

5. FCI Vs JoginderpalMohinderpal (1989) 2 SCC
347

6. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs J.M. Cons. Co. FAFO No.
714 of 2005

7. K.P. Paulose Vs St. of Ker. & anr.. (1975) 2
SCC 236

8. Hind Builders Vs U.O.I. (1990) 3 SCC 338

9. DandasiSahu Vs St. of Orissa (1990) 1 SCC
214

10. Thawer Das Vs U.O.I. (1955) AIR SC 468

11. Raipur Dev. Authority & ors. Vs Chokhamal
& ors. (1989) SCC 721

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. Heard Sri Rathor for the appellantstate.

2. The State is aggrieved by the order
dated 1.5.1993 passed by VIth Additional
District Judge, Gorakhpur, whereby the