# Sunil Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 7 ILRA 426
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-07-15
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 9604 of 2025
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sunil-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54624
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

order of punishment without exhausting first the
remedy of statutory appeal?

Headnotes
A. U.P. Government Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1991: Rules 4, 7, 13,
20, 23 - The power vested with the State
Government u/s 13 of the Rules, 1991 are
power of revision and a delinquent employee
may directly approach the state government
against the order of punishment without
exhausting first the remedy of statutory appeal.
(Para 5)
Power of revision cannot be equated with
the power of statutory appellate authority
even in service jurisprudence. Both the
disciplinary authority as well as the appellate
authority are subordinate authorities to the
State Government being functionaries of police
department of the State Government. Such
authorities being subordinate to the state
Government, are subject to extraordinary power
vested
with
the
State
Government.
An
employee, therefore, can always apply to the
State Government directly against the final
order of disciplinary authority and/ or appellate
authority without exhausting the alternative
remedy. However, the powers of the state
government u/Rule 23 are only discretionary,
may be exercised suo motu or on an application
being filed and shall not be confused with vide
power vested with the appellate authority under
punishment and appeal rules. Thus, ordinarily
power of appeal be first exhausted and state
government
should
also
encourage
while
dealing with representations directly made
against punishment orders that aggrieved
employee should approach it only exceptionally.
(Para 7)

B. Supreme Court though has discussed
1999 Rules but Rule 13 of 1999 Rules and
rule 23 of 1991 rule are pari materia and
hence principles regulating the field would
dependent upon the same analogy. (Para
9)

Since power is there with the State Government
and representation has been made by the
petitioner, this petition is disposed of with the
direction to the respondent No. 1 to decide the
representation
of
the
petitioner
dated
16.05.2025
in
accordance
with
law,
as
expeditiously as possible within a period of two
months from the production of certified copy of
this order. (Para 10)

Writ petition disposed of with directions. (E-4)

Case Law Cited

## Text

426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of Rule 5, the same would be considered
appropriately and an order would be passed.

15. The petitioner, would therefore be at
liberty to invoke the remedy of making a
representation in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5
of the Rules, 1973, within a period of two
weeks from today, and in the event such
representation is moved, the specified authority
would accord consideration to the same and
pass a reasoned order within a period of four
weeks thereafter.

16. With the above observations, the
petition stands disposed of.
----------
(2025) 7 ILRA 426
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.07.2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 9604 of 2025

Sunil Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shyam Lal

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Issue for consideration
Whether a delinquent employee may directly
approach the state government against the
order of punishment without exhausting first the
remedy of statutory appeal?

Headnotes
A. U.P. Government Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1991: Rules 4, 7, 13,
20, 23 - The power vested with the State
Government u/s 13 of the Rules, 1991 are
power of revision and a delinquent employee
may directly approach the state government
against the order of punishment without
exhausting first the remedy of statutory appeal.
(Para 5)
Power of revision cannot be equated with
the power of statutory appellate authority
even in service jurisprudence. Both the
disciplinary authority as well as the appellate
authority are subordinate authorities to the
State Government being functionaries of police
department of the State Government. Such
authorities being subordinate to the state
Government, are subject to extraordinary power
vested
with
the
State
Government.
An
employee, therefore, can always apply to the
State Government directly against the final
order of disciplinary authority and/ or appellate
authority without exhausting the alternative
remedy. However, the powers of the state
government u/Rule 23 are only discretionary,
may be exercised suo motu or on an application
being filed and shall not be confused with vide
power vested with the appellate authority under
punishment and appeal rules. Thus, ordinarily
power of appeal be first exhausted and state
government
should
also
encourage
while
dealing with representations directly made
against punishment orders that aggrieved
employee should approach it only exceptionally.
(Para 7)

B. Supreme Court though has discussed
1999 Rules but Rule 13 of 1999 Rules and
rule 23 of 1991 rule are pari materia and
hence principles regulating the field would
dependent upon the same analogy. (Para
9)

Since power is there with the State Government
and representation has been made by the
petitioner, this petition is disposed of with the
direction to the respondent No. 1 to decide the
representation
of
the
petitioner
dated
16.05.2025
in
accordance
with
law,
as
expeditiously as possible within a period of two
months from the production of certified copy of
this order. (Para 10)

Writ petition disposed of with directions. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Munna Lal Vs. State of U.P. Through Principal
Secretary Home Department Lko and 2 others
Writ A No. 2359 of 2025 (Para 4)

2. Prachand Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and
others,
(2004)
4
SCC
113
(Para
8)
7 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
427
List of Acts
U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1991.

List of Keywords
Service Law; adverse entries; withholding
salary; penalty; disciplinary authority.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and
learned Standing Counsel.

2. By means of this petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution petitioner
though has prayed for quashing of various
orders passed by the authorities imposing
penalty in the nature of adverse entries of
censure, withholding of salary for certain
period, etc, however, now learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that petitioner is
confining his prayer for a writ of mandamus to
command the state Government to consider and
decide the representation made by the petitioner
on 17.05.2025.

3. Learned Standing Counsel has raised
preliminary objection as to the maintainability
of this petition on the ground that petitioner
should have first exhausted alternative statutory
remedy of appeal before preferring revision.

4. Meeting the preliminary objection
learned counsel for petitioner has placed
reliance upon Division Bench judgment of this
Court at Lucknow in the case of Munna Lal vs.
State of U.P. Through Principal Secretary
Home Department Lko and 2 others Writ A
No. 2359 of 2025 wherein meeting the similar
objection the Court vide paragraphs 13, 14,
15,16,17, 23, 25, 26 and 28 has held thus:

"13. Rule 25 of the Rules, 1991, operates in a
different field and for a definite purpose, both for the State
as well as for an aggrieved person. Two aspects of the rule
are evident. Firstly, the rule provides for a remedy
notwithstanding anything envisaged under any other rules
of the Rules, 1991. Secondly, this provision is invoked by
the State suo moto or otherwise where an appeal is not
instituted by an aggrieved person. The power under Rule 25
of the Rules, 1991, has been conferred for definite purposes
mentioned in the statutory rules itself, which are of wide
import.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in the
backdrop of the aforesaid facts, has argued that the
representation dated 25.04.2016, which was preferred under
Rule 25 of the Rules, 1991, has been decided by the
competent authority by passing a detailed and reasoned
order on merit. It is, thus, argued that once a statutory
representation was decided by the State by passing an order
on merit, the principle of merger would apply insofar as the
period of limitation against the cause of action, which had
initially accrued to him against the order dated 28.11.2013,
merged into the order dated 05.06.2017. The submission is
that once the competent authority proceeded to decide the
representation on merit, the matter was again looked into at
the higher level and the whole cause assumed a new frame
and form. That being so, the learned Tribunal, while
rejecting the claim petition on the ground of limitation
computed with effect from the date of the original order
dated 28.11.2013, fell in error, and therefore, the impugned
judgment passed by the Tribunal purely on the ground of
limitation suffers from an apparent error of law, calling for
interference in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in this
Court by virtue of Article 227/226 of the Constitution of
India.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner, to
buttress his argument, has placed reliance upon a judgment
rendered by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of S.S.
Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh : (1989) 4 SCC 582.

16. Per contra, learned counsel for the State,
placing reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this
Court rendered in the case of Amol Kumar Sharma v. Uttar
Pradesh Public Service Tribunal, 2021 SCC OnLine All
457, has argued that once the remedy under Rule 25 of the
Rules, 1991, was held to be a non-statutory remedy,
the principle of merger, as put forth by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, would not be applicable in
the facts and circumstances of the present case.

17. Learned counsel for the State, on the
basis of instructions, has further argued that a copy of
the order dated 18.11.2013 was served upon the wife
of the petitioner on 04.12.2013, and any averment to
the contrary made in the representation or claim
petition is wholly unfounded. It has also been argued
that the view taken by the learned Tribunal does not
suffer from any illegality and the judgment so
rendered deserves affirmation
428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

23. Though it has been acknowledged by
the Tribunal that no limitation is provided in Rule 25
of the Rules, 1991, but the claim petition preferred
by the petitioner stands rejected solely on the ground
that the representation was preferred by the petitioner
without availing the statutory remedy of appeal/ revision. The
representation was held to be non-statutory which on its
rejection would not enable the petitioner to claim the benefit of
limitation from a subsequent date, the tribunal has opined.

25. When the petitioner approached the Tribunal
second time against the rejection of his representation decided
on merit, the claim petition was rejected by computing the
period of limitation from the date of original order passed in
2013 rather looking into the consequence of merger, which
Rule - 25 of the Rules, 1991 is capable to bring about. Such a
provision operates as a residuary power with the state to nullify
the actions which do not stand in conformity with law by taking
suo motu notice and exceptionally the jurisdiction is available to
the aggrieved person as well in appropriate cases, as at hand.

26. The second claim petition could not be
thrown out simply because the petitioner had not availed
statutory remedies available under law, inasmuch as, the order
dated 28.11.2013 had not been supplied to the petitioner till
09.02.2016 when he approached the Nodal Officer, Firozabad
for its supply. Thereafter, the petitioner immediately
approached the Tribunal as noted here-in-above. The doctrine
of merger came into operation to subsume a lower authority?s
decision into that of the higher authority when a remedy was
pursued and dealt with on merit exhaustively.

28. It follows, therefore, that the period of
limitation ought to have been reckoned not from the date of the
original dismissal order but from the date when the statutory
representation was decided. The Tribunal erred in dismissing
the claim petition solely on the ground of limitation without
appreciating that the petitioner had diligently pursued his
remedies and the doctrine of merger had come into effect."

5. From the observations made above by the
Division Bench while dealing with issue of
limitation whether to run from the date of order of
punishment or from the date of order passed upon
representation of the petitioner. A conclusion can
be clearly drawn that power vested with the State
Government under Section 13 of the Rules, 1991
are power of revision and a delinquent employee
may directly approach the state government
against the order of punishment without
exhausting first the remedy of statutory appeal.
Rules 13 of the 1999 Rules is reproduced as
under:

"13. Revision.- Notwithstanding anything
contained in these rules, the Government may of its own
motion or on the representation of concerned Government
Servant call for the record of any case decided by an authority
subordinate to it in the exercise of any power conferred on such
authority by these rules; and

(a) confirm, modify or reverse the order passed
by such authority; or

(b) direct that a further inquiry be held in the case,
or

(c) reduce or enhance the penalty imposed by the
order; or

(d) make such other order in the case as it may
deem fit".

6. Upon a bare reading of the above
provisions, it becomes explicit that power vested
with the State Government is with a very wide
discretion to call for and examine the records of
any case decided by an authority subordinate to it.
The question may be as to whether authority
sitting in revision will examine order of another
immediate subordinate to it or even appellate and
disciplinary authority. The words and expression
"in exercise of power conferred on such authority
by these rules" the words "such authority" that
exercises power duly vested under the rules,
would include all the authorities that have been
entrusted with the power to decide a case. Rule 7
of 1991 Rules provides for an officer of
police department not below the rank of
Deputy Inspector General to be disciplinary
authority to accord punishments specified
under Rule 4 of the said rules. Similarly
Rule 20 of the 1991 rules prescribe for
statutory appeal against the order of the
disciplinary
authority
and
appellate
authority, a next superior authority to the
disciplinary authority in different rank of
officers who have been inflicted upon with
7 All. Sunil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
429
punishment. Rules 7 and 20 of the 1991
Rules are reproduced hereunder:

"7. Powers of punishment.- (1) The
Government or any officer of police department not
below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General may
award any of the punishments mentioned in Rule 4
on any Police Officer.

(2) The Superintendent of Police may
award any of the punishments mentioned in subclause (iii) of Clause (a) and Clause (b) of sub-rule
(1) of Rule 4 on Inspector and Sub-Inspectors.

(3) The Superintendent of Police may
award any of the punishments mentioned in Rule 4
on such Police Officers as are below the rank of SubInspectors.

(4) Subject to the provisions contained in
these rules all Assistant Superintendents of Police
and Deputy Superintendents of Police who have
completed two years of service as Assistant
Superintendents
of
Police
and
Deputy
Superintendents of Police as the case may be, may
exercise powers of Superintendent of Police except
the power to impose major punishments under Rule 4.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in
these rules Reserve Inspector, Inspector or Station
officer may award punishments of drill and fatigue duty
to any constable under his charge for a period not
exceeding three days but he shall inform the
Superintendent of Police concerned of his order
immediately and in any case within 24 hours of passing
the order."

"20. Appeals.- (1) Every Police Officer,
against whom an order of punishment mentioned in subclauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (a) and sub-clauses (i) to (iv)
of Clause (b) of rule 4 shall be entitled to prefer an
appeal against the order of such punishment to the
authority mentioned below:

(a) to the Police Officer, who is the
immediate jurisdictional superior authority to the Police
Officer who passed the order of punishment.

(b) to the Director General of Police who
may either decide the appeal himself or nominate any
Additional Director General for deciding it;

(c) to the State Government against the
order passed under Clause (b).

(2) No appeal shall lie against the order
inflicting any of the petty punishments enumerated in
sub-rules 92) and (3) of Rule 4.

(3) Every officer desiring to prefer an
appeal shall do so separately.

(4) Every appeal preferred under these rules
shall contain all materials, statements, arguments relief
on by the Police Officers preferring the appeal, and shall
be complete in itself, but shall not contain disrespectual
or improper language. Every appeal shall be
accompanied by a copy of final order which is the
subject of appeal.

(5) Every appeal, whether the appellant is
still in service of Government or not, shall be submitted
throguh the Superintendent of Police of the district or in
the case of Police Officers not employed in district work
through the head of the office to which the appellant
belongs or belonged.

(6) An appeal will not be entertained unless
it is preferred within three months from the date on
which the Police Officer concerned was informed of the
order of punishment.

Provided that appellate authority may at his
discretion, for good cause shown extend the said period
up to six months.

(7) If the appeal preferred does not comply
with the provisions of sub-rule (4) the appellate
authority may require the appellant to comply with the
provisions of the said sub-rule within one month of the
notice of such order to him and if the appellant fails to
make the above compliance the appellate authority may
dispose of the appeal in the manner as it deems fit.

(8) The Director- General or an Inspector
General may for reasons to be recorded in writing, either
on his own motion or on request from an appellate
authority before whom the appeal is pending transfer the
same to any other officer of corresponding rank "

7. Thus both the disciplinary authority
as well as the appellate authority are
subordinate
authorities
to
the
State
Government being functionaries of police
department of the State Government.
However State Government may also be an
appellate authority for the purposes of Rule
23 of the 1991 Rules the discretion to
430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
impose
punishment
by
disciplinary
authority and discretion to affirm or reverse
such decision by appellate authority, such
authorities being subordinate to the state
Government, are subject to extraordinary
power vested with the State Government.
An employee, therefore, can always apply
to the State Government directly against
the final order of disciplinary authority and/
or appellate authority without exhausting
the alternative remedy. However, I may
hasten to add, the powers of the state
government under Rule 23 are only
discretionary, may be exercised suo motu
or on an application being filed and shall
not be confused with vide power vested
with
the
appellate
authority
under
punishment and appeal rules. Thus,
ordinarily power of appeal be first
exhausted and state government should
also
encourage
while
dealing
with
representations directly made against
punishment
orders
that
aggrieved
employee
should
approach
it
only
exceptionally. Power of revision cannot
be equated with the power of statutory
appellate
authority
even
in
service
jurisprudence.

8. In the case of Prachand Sharma
v. State of U.P. and others (2004) 4
SCC 113 Supreme Court has held that
government
authorities
under
U.P.
Government Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rule 1999 if pass orders would
be an authority subordinate to the state
government within the meaning of Rule
13 of the 1999 rules but the authority
even if on deputation to any corporation
where 1999 rules are applicable by
adoption, while exercising power of
disciplinary
authority/
appellate
authority-
revisional
authority,
such
authority would not be an authority
subordinate to government under Rule 13
of the 1999 rules for mere adoption of
1999 rules. Vide paragraph 8 the Court
has held thus:

"8. The learned counsel for the
appellant also draws our attention to Rule 13 to
indicate that if the rule is to be applicable, as it is,
then the Government will have power to revise the
order only in case it has been passed by an
authority subordinate to it. The Managing Director
or
the
Chairman
are
the
authorities
and
functionaries of the corporation. Incumbent of
such officers may even though sometimes be
government servants on deputation but while
working as Chairman or the Managing Director or
any
authority
in
the
organization
or
the
corporation, the would not be subordinate to the
Government. It is again to be noticed that then
perhaps the right to invoke the revisional powers
may be available only to the "government servant
concerned" as provided under Rule 13 and may
not be available to the employee of the
corporation. Therefore, it is submitted and in our
view, rightly, the adoption of rules is implemented
in a manner as they fit in the structure of the
adopting organization and not as a straitjacket
application to the adopting organization. It has
also been pointed out that according to the
provisions of Rule 13, as it is, an order can be
subjected to the revisional power of the State only
if the order has been passed in exercise of any
power conferred under the Rules of 1999. It is
submitted that the order passed by the Managing
Director or the Chairman cannot be said to be
orders passed under the U.P. Rules of 1999 and
not under the Rules as adopted by the Corporation
"

9.
Supreme
Court
though
has
discussed 1999 Rules but Rule 13 of 1999
Rules and rule 23 of 1991 rule are pari
materia and hence principles regulating
the field would dependent upon the same
analogy.

10. In view of the above discussions,
since power is there with the State
Government and representation has been
made by the petitioner, I dispose of this
petition with the direction to the direction
to the respondent No. 1 to decide the
7 All. Dharvendra Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
431
representation of the petitioner dated
16.05.2025 in accordance with law, as
expeditiously as possible within a period of
two months from the production of
certified copy of this order
----------
(2025) 7 ILRA 431
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.07.2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Writ A No. 9632 of 2025

Dharvendra Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Prabhakar Awasthi, Rohit Upadhyay

Counsel for the Respondents:
Bhanu Pratap Singh kachhawah, C.S.C.

Issue for Consideration
The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant
Teacher in 2007 and later transferred to
Upper Primary School ,Kangarpur,BlockMarhera, District-Etah. On August 27,2024,
during an inspection, he was found absent
without
authorization.
this
led
to
his
suspension and a departmental enquiry
proceeded ex-parte.

Headnotes
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1999The petitioner challenged an order
dated May 28,2025, by District Basic
Education Officer Etah which stopped
one of his increments and transferred
him Upper Primary School-The court
found no significant procedural lapses
causing prejudice, relying on Supreme
Court Judgments-The transfer based
on the August 20,2022 circular and
linked to the January 17,2023 order
was valid posting to a vacancy after
suspension revocation, not requiring
interference-Petition dismissed.
Held:
A charge sheet was issued, petitioner
submitted a reply but inquiry proceeded ex
parte-A second show cause notice followed
in January 2025, and despite requests for
the inquiry report, the process continuedThe District Basic Education Officer revoked
suspension but imposed a minor penalty:
stoppage of one annual increment and
transfer to Composite Institution-Petitioner
claimed violations of natural justice and
procedural defects i.e. charge sheet and
inquiry report not served properly and
inquiry not conducted fairly under Rules
4,7, 8, 9, 10 of the 1999 Rules-Petitioner
sought quashing of order dated 28 May
2025 and referenced a similar case(Special
Appeal No. 208 of 2025) for interim reliefThe State and BSA argued the process
followed the 1999 Rules, and the Transfer
was administrative, justified by judicial
precedents and government orders dated
17
January
2023-the
court
found
no
significant
procedural
lapses
causing
prejudice
relying
on
Supreme
Court
judgments-No interference was warrantedThe writ petition was dismissed.(Para 21 to
33) (E-6)

Case Law Cited
St. of U.P. & Anr. Vs Johri Mal (2004) AIR
SC 3800; Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn.
Vs St. of U.P. & Anr.(2003) 4 SCC 104;
Param Singh & 4 Ors Vs St. of UP & 5
Ors.(2018)
SCC
Online
All
5677;Kul
Bhushan Mishra & Anr Vs St. of UP & Ors
(2023) SCC OnLine ALL 286; St. of UP Vs.
Saroj Kumar Sinha(2010) 2 SCC 772; UOI
Vs
Tulsiram
Patal(1985)
3
SCC
398;
Chairman,LIC Vs A.Masilamani(2023) 6 SCC
530;
St.
of
Ori.
VS
Bidyabhushan
Mohapatra(1963)AIR SC 779;M.D. ECIL Vs
B. Karunakar(1993) 4 SCC 727-reffered to.

List of Acts/Rules
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servant(Discipline and Appeal) Rules of
1973 read with Rules 1999.

List of Keywords