# Suraj Singh v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2007) 2 ILRA 430
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-12-15
- **Bench:** Bharati Sapru
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/suraj-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40900
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Sri Shree Prakash Singh
Suman Sirohi
S.C.

U.P. Police Regulation-Regulation 493
(c)-Reinstatement-acquittal in criminal
appeal-denial on the ground-that on
benefit of doubt order of acquittal
passed-held-in absence of provisionregarding nature of acquittal-hence the
objection is nothing but sitting order
court-entitled for reinstatement.

Held: Para 18

Such being the case, the petitioner
having
been
tried
and
judicially
acquitted which was later on confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order
dated 23.9.2003, there could be no
doubt that the he has been ''judicially
acquitted' and therefore he is entitled for
the benefit of Regulation 493 (c) of the
U.P. Police Regulations. The order dated
30.10.2000, by which the distinction has
been sought to be made, is clearly
misconceived
and
deserves
to
be
quashed.

1989 (1) UPLBEC-624
AIR 1991 SC-1210

Constitution of India Art. 226-Back
wages-if the authorities kept away from
working-employee willing work-despite
of final judgement of acquittal-No order
passed-held-entitled for reinstatement
with full back wages.

Held: Para 18

Such being the case, the petitioner
having
been
tried
and
judicially
acquitted which was later on confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order
dated 23.9.2003, there could be no
doubt that the he has been ''judicially
acquitted' and therefore he is entitled for
the benefit of Regulation 493 (c) of the
U.P. Police Regulations. The order dated
30.10.2000, by which the distinction has
2 All] Suraj Singh V. State of U.P. and others
431
been sought to be made, is clearly
misconceived
and
deserves
to
be
quashed.

## Text

430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
16. Till the date of moving of
applications under Section 155(2) before
the competent Court, the arrest of the
petitioners shall remain stayed. The
practice of moving applications under
section 155(2) Cr.P.C by the police or
other competent authority before the
concerned
Court
for
investigating
offences under the Electricity Act shall
continue to be followed in all cases
henceforth until there is an amendment in
the Electricity Act treating the said
offences as cognizable offences or an
order is obtained from the apex Court
staying the operation of the earlier
Division Bench in criminal miscellaneous
Writ No. 10090 of 2005 declaring
offences under the Electricity Act to be
non-cognizable offences.

17. List this case on 19.3.2007 for
further orders.

Office is directed to communicate
this order to the various parties within one
week for necessary compliance.
----------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.12.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BHARATI SAPRU, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 17514 of 2004

Suraj Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sanjay Kumar
Sri W.H. Khan
Sri Akshaya Kumar
Sri J.H. Khan
Sri Gulrez Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Shree Prakash Singh
Suman Sirohi
S.C.

U.P. Police Regulation-Regulation 493
(c)-Reinstatement-acquittal in criminal
appeal-denial on the ground-that on
benefit of doubt order of acquittal
passed-held-in absence of provisionregarding nature of acquittal-hence the
objection is nothing but sitting order
court-entitled for reinstatement.

Held: Para 18

Such being the case, the petitioner
having
been
tried
and
judicially
acquitted which was later on confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order
dated 23.9.2003, there could be no
doubt that the he has been ''judicially
acquitted' and therefore he is entitled for
the benefit of Regulation 493 (c) of the
U.P. Police Regulations. The order dated
30.10.2000, by which the distinction has
been sought to be made, is clearly
misconceived
and
deserves
to
be
quashed.

1989 (1) UPLBEC-624
AIR 1991 SC-1210

Constitution of India Art. 226-Back
wages-if the authorities kept away from
working-employee willing work-despite
of final judgement of acquittal-No order
passed-held-entitled for reinstatement
with full back wages.

Held: Para 18

Such being the case, the petitioner
having
been
tried
and
judicially
acquitted which was later on confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order
dated 23.9.2003, there could be no
doubt that the he has been ''judicially
acquitted' and therefore he is entitled for
the benefit of Regulation 493 (c) of the
U.P. Police Regulations. The order dated
30.10.2000, by which the distinction has
2 All] Suraj Singh V. State of U.P. and others
431
been sought to be made, is clearly
misconceived
and
deserves
to
be
quashed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Bharati Sapru, J.)

1. Heard Sri Gulrez Khan learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shree
Prakash Singh learned standing counsel
for the respondents.

2. This writ petition has been filed
seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the
order dated 30.10.2000 passed by the
respondent no. 3 by which he has rejected
the representation of the petitioner to be
reinstated in the police force and the
consequential order which the petitioner
seeks quashing of the order of dismissal
dated 28.5.1990 passed by the respondent
no. 3. This is the original order by which
the impugned order of dismissal was
passed against the petitioner removing
him from the service of the State. The
next prayer, which the petitioner made, is
for a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to reinstate him in service
with full back wages and all other
consequential benefits.

3. The facts of the case are that the
petitioner was working as a constable in
the Provincial Armed Constabulary and
was posted at Gurgaon and an F.I.R. was
lodged under sections 363, 366 and 376
I.P.C. in case crime no. 740 of 1989,
which
was
registered
against
the
petitioner on 18.10.1989.

4. The investigation was conducted
against the petitioner and a charge sheet
was issued against him. The trail had
proceeded before the Sessions Court in
S.T. no. 10 of 1990. The trial Court
passed an order on 30.3.1990 and the
petitioner was held guilty of having
committed offences under sections 366,
376 I.P.C. and was sentenced 8 years R.I.
together with a fine of Rs.2000/- each in
respect of both the offences.

5. As soon as the order of conviction
was passed by the trial Court, the
petitioner was dismissed from service on
28.5.1990
by
the
Commandant
28
Battalion P.A.C. Etawah. The order of
dismissal dated 28.5.1990 is appended as
Annexure 1 to the writ petition and it
records in para 3 that pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 55 and 55-A of the
U.P.
Civil
Services
(Classification,
control and Appeal) Rules and Regulation
493 of U.P. Police Regulations read with
Article 311 (2 (a) of the Constitution and
in view of the Government Order dated
12.10.1979, it is reasonably appropriate to
dismiss the services of the petitioner.

6. The extract of relevant provision
of 493 (c) of the U.P. Police Regulations
is quoted below:

"493.(c). If the accused has been
judicially acquitted or discharged, and
the period for filing an appeal has
elapsed and/or no appeal has been filed,
the Superintendent of Police must at once
reinstate him if he has been suspended;
but should the findings of the court not be
inconsistent with the view that the
accused has been guilty of negligence in,
or unfitness for, the discharge, of his duty
within the meaning of section 7 of the
Police Act, the Superintendent of Police
may refer the matter to the Deputy
Inspector General and ask for permission
to try the accused departmentally for such
negligence or unfitness."
432 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
7.

Admittedly,
thereafter
no
disciplinary
proceedings
took
place
against the petitioner. This is evident from
the counter affidavit, which has been filed
and is on record.

8. The petitioner filed an appeal
against the order of conviction passed by
the trial Court being criminal appeal no.
124(SB) of 1990 which the Punjab &
Haryana High Court allowed acquitting
the petitioner vide its judgment dated
24.2.1994.

9. After the passing of the judgment
dated 24.2.1994 by which the petitioner
was acquitted, the petitioner applied to the
authority concerned for being reinstated
in service with all consequential benefits.
It has also been stated in the writ petition
that against the judgment of Punjab &
Haryana High Court dated 24.2.1994,
Government had preferred a criminal
appeal being Criminal Appeal no. 2060 of
1996 and by its order dated 23.9.2003, the
Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the said
Criminal Appeal. As such the judgment
dated 24.2.1994 of Punjab & Haryaya
High Court acquitting the petitioner has
been confirmed.

10. During the pendency of Criminal
Appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court
arises out of judgment of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court acquitting the
petitioner, the services of the petitioner
had been removed. Aggrieved, he had
made a representation on 7.12.1995 for
his reinstatement, which was rejected by
the impugned order dated 30.10.2000,
which is also impugned in the present writ
petition.

11. The impugned order of rejection
of the representation dated 30.10.2000 has
been passed adopting reasoning that
because the petitioner was acquitted on
the basis of "benefit of doubt" and
because it was not a clear order of
acquittal, he is not entitled to be reinstated
in service.

12. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has drawn attention of this
Court to a judgment of this Court
rendered in the case of Dhani Ram versus
Superintendent
of
Police,
Hardoi,
reported in (1989) 1 UPLBEC 624
(Lucknow Bench). In this case, it has
been held that the Regulation 493 (c)
simply provides for ''a judicial acquittal'.

13. Having heard learned counsel
for the petitioner and the learned standing
counsel and having perused the relevant
provisions of Regulation 493 (c) of the
U.P. Police Regulations, it is abundantly
clear that there is no stipulation in the
Regulation 493 (c) with regard to the
nature of acquittal and no distinction has
been made between a ''clear acquittal' and
''acquittal', which is made basis of
"benefit of doubt" in the impugned order.

14. Denial of the benefit of words
"judicially acquitted" as provided in of
Regulation 493 (c), after the affirmation
of judgment of acquittal by the Hon'ble
Apex Court, on the pretext that the
judgment of acquittal is based on "benefit
of doubt" is nothing else but sitting over
an appeal or revision of the judgment of
acquittal.
''Judicial
acquittal'
means
''acquittal' by the court of law. As such
judicial
acquittal
is
an
''acquittal'
simplicitor.

15. Notably once the judgment of
acquittal has become final by the order of
Hon'ble Apex Court, under Article 141 of
2 All] Rishi Kumar Katiyar V. Labour Court, Kanpur and another
433
the Constitution of India, it is incumbent
upon every State, Tribunal, Courts and
functionary of the State to comply with it
in letters and spirit.

16. It is also contended on behalf of
the State that the petitioner is not entitled
to any back wages on the principle of "no
work no pay" and the petitioner is also not
entitled
to
any
other
consequential
benefits for the duties that he has not
discharged from the date of acquittal. The
petitioner was acquitted with effect from
24.2.1994 and he made a representation to
be
reinstated
on
7.12.1995.
The
authorities concerned has frustrated the
attempt of the petitioner to get reinstated.
Despite the fact that the Regulation 493
(c) clearly provides that once a person is
acquitted on criminal charges, he is liable
to get reinstated.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Union of India versus K.V.
Jankiraman, reported in AIR 1991 SC
2010, held that normal rule of "no work
no pay" cannot be applied to cases such as
the present one where the employee
although he is willing to work is kept
away from work by the authorities for no
fault of his. This is not a case where the
employee remained away from work for
his own reasons. Other than the criminal
proceedings, which were initiated against
the petitioner from which he was
judicially acquitted, there is not even
censor note against him. In the present
case the authority concerned failed to
exercise the jurisdiction vested in him
under Regulation 493 (c) by not passing
an appropriate order of reinstatement.
Therefore
in
view
of
the
above
discussion, I am of the opinion, the
petitioner deserves to be reinstated with
full consequential benefits.
18. Such being the case, the
petitioner having been tried and judicially
acquitted which was later on confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court by its order
dated 23.9.2003, there could be no doubt
that the he has been ''judicially acquitted'
and therefore he is entitled for the benefit
of Regulation 493 (c) of the U.P. Police
Regulations. The order dated 30.10.2000,
by which the distinction has been sought
to be made, is clearly misconceived and
deserves to be quashed.

19. I therefore command the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner
with all consequential benefits from the
date of acquittal which is dated 24.2.1994.
The impugned order dated 30.10.2000 as
well as the order of dismissal dated
28.5.1990 is hereby set aside.

The writ petition is allowed as above.
There will be no costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.05.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.U. KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.43617 of 1999

Rishi Kumar Katiyar

...Petitioner
Versus
Labour Court, Vth, U.P., Kanpur and
another

...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.K. Barman

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Prakash Padia
S.C.

Constitution of India Art. 226-Practice
and Procedure-burden of proof-240 days