# Surendra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 881
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-24
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 5564 of 2023
- **Bench:** Attau Rahman Masoodi, Om Prakash Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/surendra-kumar-v-union-of-india-ors-50625
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985 - Section 22 (3) - Central
Administrative
Tribunal
(Procedure)
Rules, 1987 - R. 17 - Limitation Act, 1963
- Ss. 5 and 29 - Exercise of review power
- Belated Review Petition was filed along
with Delay Condonation Application -
Maintainability - Tribunal rejected the
application on the ground of lack of
provision relating to condonation of delay
- Validity challenged - Earlier, the High
Court has given liberty to petitioner to file
review application before Tribunal - Effect
- Held, having traced the review making
power of the Tribunal, it can be safely
deduced that neither section 22 of the Act,
which gives the power of review to an
Administrative
Tribunal,
nor
rule 17,
which provides for application of review,
expressly excludes the applicability of the
Limitation Act - Provisions of S. 5 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to a
review
Application
filed
before
the
Administrative Tribunal - An application
for condonation of delay in Review
Application is maintainable. (Para 9, 28,
35 and 46)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,677 of 61,954. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39677 for what follows._

8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
881
gratuity from the date of retirement till
actual payment/ realization @ 7% per
annum.

23. As regards the commutation of
pension, the respondents shall take a
decision
on
the
application
for
commutation of pension in respect of both
the petitioners within a period of three
months as per law.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 881
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Writ-A No. 5564 of 2023

Surendra Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ajay Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Kushagra Dikshit

A. Service Law - Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985 - Section 22 (3) - Central
Administrative
Tribunal
(Procedure)
Rules, 1987 - R. 17 - Limitation Act, 1963
- Ss. 5 and 29 - Exercise of review power
- Belated Review Petition was filed along
with Delay Condonation Application -
Maintainability - Tribunal rejected the
application on the ground of lack of
provision relating to condonation of delay
- Validity challenged - Earlier, the High
Court has given liberty to petitioner to file
review application before Tribunal - Effect
- Held, having traced the review making
power of the Tribunal, it can be safely
deduced that neither section 22 of the Act,
which gives the power of review to an
Administrative
Tribunal,
nor
rule 17,
which provides for application of review,
expressly excludes the applicability of the
Limitation Act - Provisions of S. 5 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to a
review
Application
filed
before
the
Administrative Tribunal - An application
for condonation of delay in Review
Application is maintainable. (Para 9, 28,
35 and 46)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:
1. Akshaya Kumar Parida Vs U.O.I. & ors.; AIR
2015 Orissa 49
2. Haris K.M. & ors. Vs Jahfar & ors.; 2020 SCC
OnLine Ker 4009
3. Ajit Kumar Rath Vs St. of Orissa; (1999) 9
SCC 596
4. Gopalbandhu Biswal Vs Krishna Chandra
Mohanty; (1998) 4 SCC 447
5. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy; (1998)
7 SCC 123
6. Mangu Ram Vs Municipal Corporation Delhi;
(1976) 1 SCC 392
7. Mukri Gopalan Vs C.P. Aboobacker; (1995) 5
SCC 5
8. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs Madan
Lal Dan & Sons. Bareilly; (1977 (1) SCR 683
9. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs Madan
Lal Dan & Sons. Bareilly; (1977 (1) SCR 683
10. B. Madhuri Goud Vs B. Damodar Reddy;
(2012) 12 SCC 693
11. C. Nara Simha Rao Vs Regional Joint
Director of School Education; 2003 SCC Online
AP 1068
12. K. Ajit Babu & ors. Vs U.O.I.; (1997) 6 SCC 473
13. W.P (c) 3034/2021; U.O.I. & ors. Vs
Chanchal Nag decided on 27-03-2023
14. S.S. Rathore Vs St. of M. P.; (1989) 4 SCC
582
15. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Central Administrative
Tribunal; (2002) SCC Online Cal 597
882 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
16. Civil Appeal No. 6213 of 2008; U.O.I. &
others Vs Chitra Lekha Chakraborty decided by
Supreme Court
(Delivered by Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla, J.)

A. INTRODUCTION

(1) This writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioner, with the following
reliefs :-

i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature of certiorari quashing the impugned
order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the
Centra Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow
in review application No. 20/2016 in
Original
Application
No.
561/2005,
Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and
others.
ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus directing the Central
Administrative
Tribunal,
Lucknow
to
decide the review application No. 20/2016
in Original Application No. 561/2005,
Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and
others on merits."

B. FACTUAL MATRIX

(2) In the year 2001, the petitioner
was engaged as daily wage casual labour
under the Joint Commissioner, Income Tax,
Faizabad and continued to work as such till
his services was terminated orally w.e.f.
02.09.2005.

(3) The aforesaid oral order of
termination
w.e.f.
02.09.2005
was
challenged by the petitioner by preferring
Original Application No. 561 of 2005
before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Tribunal"). The Tribunal, vide judgment
and order dated 30.09.2011, dismissed the
aforesaid original application.

(4) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment
and order of the Tribunal dated 30.09.2011,
the petitioner preferred writ petition No.
1551 (S/B) of 2013 before this Court. A
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while
recording the submission of the petitioner
that in an identical matter, a review
application was filed before the Tribunal
and the Tribunal has proceeded to allow the
review application, disposed of the writ
petition with liberty to the petitioner to file
review application before the Tribunal, vide
judgment and order dated 21.01.2016.

(5) Apparently, pursuant to the
aforesaid
judgment
and
order
dated
21.01.2016, the petitioner preferred Review
Application No. 20 of 2016 before the
Tribunal, seeking review of the judgment
and order dated 30.09.2011 passed by the
Tribunal in Original Application No. 561 of
2005. The learned Tribunal, noting the
provision of Rule 17 of the Central
Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1987 and also the fact that though in writ
petition No. 1551 (S/B) of 2013, this Court
had passed the order regarding filing of
review application to the Tribunal on
21.01.2016,
however,
the
petitioner
preferred review application only on
17.05.2016 and thus arrived at a conclusion
that
there
being
no
provision
for
condonation of delay under Rule 17 of
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1987, the review
application would not be maintainable and
accordingly, vide judgment and order dated
13.03.2023, the learned Tribunal dismissed
the review application. It is this order dated
13.03.2023, which has been challenged in
the instant writ petition.
8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
883

C. SUBMISSIONS

(6) Heard Shri Ajay Pandey, learned
Counsel representing the petitioner and
Shri Kushagra Dikshit, learned Counsel
representing the respondents/Union of
India.
This
court
records
valuable
suggestion
by
Mr.
Apoorva
Tiwari,
Advocate, who was requested by this Court
to give his assistance, keeping in view the
significant question of law involved in this
petition.

(7) Learned Counsel representing the
petitioner, at the outset, has fairly submitted
that in the instant writ petition, he has not
challenged the order dated 30.09.2011
passed by the learned Tribunal in Original
Application No. 561 of 2005, but this writ
petition is limited to the extent of
challenging the order dated 13.03.2023, by
which the learned Tribunal has dismissed
the review application seeking review of
the aforesaid order dated 30.09.2011
(supra) only on the ground that the learned
Tribunal has no power to condone the delay
in filing the review application.

(8) It has been contended by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner that the order
sought to be reviewed was passed by the
learned Tribunal on 30.09.2011 and the
same was initially challenged by the
petitioner before this Court in Writ Petition
No. 1551 of 2013 (S/B). During pendency
of the said writ petition, the learned
Tribunal itself entertained a bunch of
review
application
involving
identical
issue,
the
leading
being
Review
Application No. 332/00028/2014 and vide
common
judgment
and
order
dated
24.12.2014, the learned Tribunal was
pleased to allow the bunch of review
applications by reviewing/modifying the
order sought to be reviewed in the said
bunch of review application and resultantly,
the
learned
Tribunal
directed
the
respondents to consider the case of the
applicants for regularization in accordance
with law within six months. According to
him, on coming to know the aforesaid order
dated 24.12.2014 (supra), the petitioner has
drawn the attention of the same to a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ
Petition No. 1551 (S/B) of 2013, which had
ceased of the said matter.

(9) Apparently, the said Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, appreciating the
submission of the petitioner in this regard,
disposed of the said writ petition by
granting liberty to the petitioner to file a
review application before the Tribunal by
means of an order dated 21.01.2016.
Thereafter, the petitioner has sought legal
opinion and prepared review application
No. 20 of 2016 and filed the same before
the learned Tribunal. The petitioner claimed
that the delay in filing the review
application was bona fide as the petitioner
is a Class-IV employee and he has no legal
knowledge in this regard. According to
him, there is no deliberate or intentional
delay on the part of the petitioner, however,
without considering the bona fide reasons
for filing the review application belatedly,
the learned Tribunal has dismissed the
review application by means of the
impugned order only on the ground that the
Tribunal has no power to condone the
delay.

(10) The learned Counsel for the
petitioner, placing reliance on the judgment
of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court
in
Akshaya
Kumar
Parida
(dead)
through L.Rs. Vs. Union of India and
others : AIR 2015 Orissa 49, has submitted
that in Akshsha Kumar Parida (supra), a
Full Bench of Orissa High Court has held
884 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is
a Special Act and Rule 17 of the Central
Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1987 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules,
1987") provides a period of limitation for
filing a review different from the schedule of
the Limitation Act, 1963. According to the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Orissa
High Court has held in that judgment that
Rule 17 of the Rules, 1987 does not contain
any express rider prohibiting filing of a
review application after 30 days and neither
does it specifically exclude the application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963, hence
the learned Tribunal has jurisdiction to
entertain an application for condonation of
delay in filing a review application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to
him, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court
in the case of Haris K.M. and others Vs.
Jahfar and others : 2020 SCC OnLine Ker
4009 has also held that delay in filing a
review
application
before
the
Central
Administrative Tribunal can be condoned by
application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 by operation of Section 29 (2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963.

(11) Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
thus,
has
submitted
that
the
review
application filed by the petitioner
is
maintainable and the learned Tribunal has
ample power to condone the delay, if he
satisfies the Tribunal that the delay in filing
the review application has been satisfactorily
explained. Thus, it has been submitted that
the impugned order passed by the learned
Tribunal, dismissing the review application
on the ground that the Tribunal has no power
to condone the delay, is liable to be set-aside
and the matter be remitted to the learned
Tribunal for its adjudication on merits.

(12) Per contra, learned Counsel
representing the Union of India has
opposed the aforesaid submissions of the
learned counsel for the petitioner and has
argued that Rule 17 (1) of the Rules, 1987
indicated of the intent to make it mandatory
that no application for review can be
entertained unless it is filed within thirty
days from the date of receipt of a copy of
the order sought to be reviewed.

(13) According to the learned Counsel for
the respondents, no other explanation or
advantages can be made to the aforesaid Rules,
1987 as Rule 17 (1) of Rules, 1987 prohibited
entertainment of any application for review
beyond thirty days. He submits that admittedly,
the petitioner has filed the Review Application
No. 20 of 2016 after thirty days as provided
under Rule 17 (1) of the Rules, 1987, hence the
learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the review
application as not maintainable by means of the
impugned order. Thus, the instant writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.

D. ANALYSIS

(14) Having regard to the submissions
advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties
and going through the record available before
this Court in the instant writ petition, we find that
a very interesting question emerges for
consideration, which can be framed as herein
below:-

"Whether the Central Administrative
Tribunal has power to condone the delay in
filing a review application against its
judgment exercising power under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 in view of
section 21 & 22 of the Administrative
Tribunal Act 1985 and Rule 17 (1) of the
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1987 ?"

(15) Before analyzing the aforesaid
question, we deem it apt to go through the
8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
885
relevant statutory provision touching the
issue involved in the instant writ petition.

(16) Presumably, part-XIV-A was
inserted in the constitution of India by the
forty-second amendment in the year 1976.
The said part consists of two articles.
Article 323A of the Constitution of India
provides
for
establishment
of
Administrative Tribunals by law made by
Parliament for the adjudication of disputes
and complaints related to recruitment and
conditions of service of Government
servants under the Central Government and
the State Government. It includes the
employees of any local or other authority
within the territory of India or under the
control of the Government of India or of a
corporation owned or controlled by the
Government. On the other hand, Article
323B
of
the
Constitution
of
India
empowers the legislatures of states to
provide for the adjudication of certain
disputes as enumerated in clause 2 of the
said Article, for adjudication by the said
Tribunals.

(17) In pursuance of the provisions in
Article 323A of the Constitution of India,
Parliament
passed
the
Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985, providing for all the
matters falling within Clause (1) of Article
323-A of the Constitution of India.
According to the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985, there must be a Central
Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at the
Centre and a State Administrative Tribunal
(SAT) at the State Level for every State.

(18) Without burdening this Judgment
with
the
various
provisions
of
the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, it is
stated that Section 19 of the Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to
as "Act, 1985") provided that subject to the
other provisions of the Act, a person
aggrieved by any order pertaining to any
matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal
may make an application to the Tribunal for
the redressal of his grievance. Section 21 of
the Act, 1985 deals with limitation in filing
the original application. It would be
profitable to extract section 21 of the Act,
which inter-alia states as under:

"21. Limitation.-(1) A Tribunal shall
not admit an application,-

(a) in a case where a final order such
as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of section 20 has been made in
connection with the grievance unless the
application is made, within one year from
the date on which such final order has been
made;

(b) in a case where an appeal or
representation such as is mentioned in
clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20
has been made and a period of six months
had expired thereafter without such final
order having been made, within one year
from the date of expiry of the said period of
six months.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), where-

(a) the grievance in respect of which
an application is made had arisen by reason
of any order made at any time during the
period
of
three
years
immediately
preceding
the
date
on
which
the
jurisdiction, powers and authority of the
Tribunal becomes exercisable under this
Act in respect of the matter to which such
order relates; and

(b) no proceedings for the redressal of
such grievance had been commenced
before the said date before any High Court,
the application shall be entertained by the
Tribunal if it is made within the period
referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may
be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a
886 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
period of six months from the said date,
whichever period expires later.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2), an application may be admitted after
the period of one year specified in clause
(a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the
case may be, the period of six months
specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant
satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient
cause for not making the application within
such period."

(19) It is apparent from a reading of
the
aforesaid
provisions,
specifically
section 21(3) that the Act itself bestows
power on the Tribunal to condone delay in
filing of the original application, of course
the applicant has to satisfy the Tribunal
relating to "sufficient cause" for not
making the said application within the
period of limitation as provided under the
Act.

(20) Since, the present issue is
relating to condonation of delay in filing
the review before the Tribunal, this Court
finds
that
section
22(3)(f)
of
the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 relates
to the power of a Central Administrative
Tribunal to review its own decision.
Therefore, as far as the power of the
Administrative Tribunal to review its own
decision is concerned, sufficient power has
been vested as per the statute itself.
Apparently, the extent of power to be
exercised by the Tribunal can be well
understood from the provision that the said
power of review is to be found under the
larger umbrella of section 22 (3) of the Act,
1985, which inter-alia states:

"22 (3) A tribunal shall have, for the
purpose of discharging its function under
this Act, the same powers as are vested in a
civil court, under the Code of Civil
procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in
respect of the following matters, namely;-

(a) Xxx

(b) Xxx

(c) Xxxx

(d) Xxxx

(e) Xxxx

(f) Reviewing its decisions;

(g) Xxx

(h) Xxxx

(i) Any other matter which may be
prescribed by the Central Government.

( Emphasis Supplied)

(21) In view of the above provisions,
the power of review vested with an
Administrative Tribunal is equated to a
Civil Court and, thus, while considering
and disposing of any review application,
the Administrative Tribunal is to follow the
Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, by
necessary implications the provisions of
review as found under the Civil procedure
Code i.e Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule
1 of the Civil Procedure Code came to be
incorporated along with the power of
review of an Administrative Tribunal.
Moreover, the power of the Tribunal to
review
its
judgment
has
been
well
explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case ofAjit Kumar Rath v. State of
Orissa : (1999) 9 SCC 596 and
Gopalbandhu
Biswal
Vs
Krishna
Chandra Mohanty : (1998) 4 SCC 447,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
held review power of a Tribunal to be
similar as has been granted to a Civil Court
underSection 114or under Order XLVII
Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In any
case, the power of review is not absolute
and is hedged in by the restrictions
indicated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the
Civil Procedure Code and the same can be
exercised on the application of a person on
8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
887
restricted grounds of discovery of new and
important matter; or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence, was not
within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the order
was made. The power can also be exercised
on account of some mistake of fact or error
apparent on the face of record or for any
other sufficient reason. It may be pointed
out that the expression "any other sufficient
reason" used in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the
Civil Procedure Code means a reason
sufficiently analogous to those specified in
the rule and is squarely applicable to the
Tribunal.

(22) Further, it is significant to note
that section 22(1) of the Act, 1985 clearly
and in somewhat mandatory manner
mentions that the Tribunal shall not be
bound by the procedure laid down in the
Code of Civil procedure, but shall be
guided by the principles of natural justice
and subject to the other provisions of this
Act and of any rules made by the Central
Government. The very said provisions also
says that the Tribunal shall have power to
regulate its own procedure including the
fixing of places and times of its inquiry and
deciding whether to sit in public or in
private.

(23) This Court finds that the Tribunal
in the first instance should be guided by the
principles of natural justice, which shall be
subject to rules and secondly the Tribunal
has been given a certain amount of power
to regulate its own procedure and to fix the
time of its inquiry. Rule 21(3) of the Act,
1985 is in consonance to the said regulation
for fixing of time of its inquiry as it gives
certain amount of discretion on the
Administrative Tribunal to fix the time of
inquiry and in that regard also condone the
delay, provided sufficient cause is shown
by the applicant. In any case, Section 21(3)
of the Act, 1985 says that an application
may be admitted even after the period of
limitation, if the applicant satisfies the
Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not
making the application within the period
prescribed. Section 21(3) of the Act, 1985
is similarly worded as Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Thus, section 21 of the Act,
1985 has to be read along with section 29
of the Limitation Act, which says that
where any special or local law prescribes
for any suit, appeal or application a period
of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions
of Section 3 shall apply as if such period
were the period prescribed by the Schedule
and for the purpose of determining any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by any special or
local law, the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only
in so far as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law.

(24) However, the procedure for filing
and consideration of an application for
condonation of delay of review application
is conspicuously absent from the provisions
of the Act, although Section 21 relating to
the limitation for filing and consideration
of an original application is specifically
mentioned in the said Act itself and Section
21 (3) provides for condonation of delay,
but similar provision for review is not
mentioned in the Administrative Act.

(25) Since, the issue engaging the
attention
of
this
Court
relates
to
condonation of delay in filing of a review
Application and the necessary process and
since the limitation thereof are not
specifically
mentioned
in
the
Administrative Act, 1985, one has to see
888 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and refer to section 35 of the Act, which
provides for power of central Government
to make rules in the following terms :-

"35.
Power
of
the
Central
Government to make rules.-(1) The
Central Government may, subject to the
provisions of section 36, by notification,
make rules to carry out the provisions of
this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing power, such rules may
provide for all or any of the following
matters, namely:-

(a) the case or cases which shall be
decided by a Bench composed of more than
3 [two members] under clause (d) of subsection (4) of section 5;

(b) the procedure under sub-section (3) of
section 9 for the investigation of misbehaviour
or incapacity of 4 [Chairman or other Member];

(c) the salaries and allowances payable to,
and the other terms and conditions of, the 5
[Chairman and other Members];

(d) the form in which an application may
be made under section 19, the documents and
other evidence by which such application shall
be accompanied 6 [and the fees payable in
respect of the filing of such application or for
the service or execution of processes;]

(e) the rules subject to which a Tribunal
shall have power to regulate its own procedure
under sub-section (1) of section 22 and the
additional matters in respect of which a
Tribunal may exercise the powers of a civil
court under clause (i) of sub-section (3) of that
section; and

(f) any other matter which may be
prescribed or in respect of which rules are
required to be made by the Central
Government."

(26) Apparently, section 35 (2) (e) of the
Act, 1985 provides for rule making power
of the Central Government as far as it tends
to regulate its own procedure by the
Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 22
and also in respect of all those powers for
which the Tribunal may exercise the power of
Civil Court under clause (i) of sub-section (3)
of that section. Even this section does not
specifically provides for making of rules as far
as the provision of review is concerned and
merely authorizes the Central Government to
frame rules as to how the principles of natural
justice has to be followed while regulating its
own procedure by the Tribunal and as to how
and in what manner the Tribunal is to exercise
the powers vested with it as a Civil Court
under the provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure. This Court finds that a residual
power to frame rules has been given to the
appropriate Government in terms of section
36(3) of the Act, for those matters, which are
not mentioned in section 35 of the Act. Since,
the issue relating to competency relating to
framing of rules is not before this court in the
present matter, this court does not wish to
express its view on the same and restricts itself
to the issue raised in the present petition.

(27) Nevertheless, the Administrative
Rules came to be framed in 1987 and Rule
17 contains the provisions for application
of review in the following words:

"17. Application for review- (1) No
application for review shall be entertained
unless it is filled within thirty days from the
date of receipt of copy of the order sought
to be reviewed.

(2)
A
review
application
shall
ordinarily be heard by the same Bench
which has passed the order, unless the
chairman may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, direct it to be heard by any other
bench.

(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the
Bench concerned, a review application
shall be disposed of by circulation and the
8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
889
Bench may either dismiss the application or
direct notice to the opposite party.

(4) Where an application for review of
any judgment or order has been made and
disposed of, no further application for
review shall be entertained in the same
manner.

(5) No application for review shall be
entertained unless it is supported by a duly
sworn affidavit indicating therein the
source
of
knowledge,
personal
or
otherwise, and also those which are sworn
on the basis of the legal advice. The
counter-affidavit in review application will
also be a duly sworn affidavit wherever any
averment if fact is disputed."

(28) Although, the aforesaid rule
provides that any review filed before an
Administrative
Tribunal
cannot
be
entertained unless it is filled within thirty
days from the receipt of the copy of the
order. However, having traced the review
making power of the Tribunal, it can be
safely deduced that neither section 22 of
the Act, which gives the power of review to
an Administrative Tribunal, nor rule 17,
which provides for application of review,
expressly excludes the applicability of the
Limitation Act. Further, the word; "no
application for review shall be entertained",
intended to mean that no review application
would be entertained until and unless the
same is filed within 30 days. It does not say
and perhaps it cannot say to curtail the
scope of statute that no application for
condonation of delay in filing the same,
could be made when an application for
review was not filed within the time framed
in Rule 17. Apparently, Rule 17 prescribes
for making of the application for review to
save the purpose of statute and cannot be
extended to mean that an application for
condodnation of delay is specifically
barred. In fact, the Tribunal bound by the
principle of natural justice and some
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure were
created to ensure an expeditious process
unlike the time taking process by the Civil
Courts in the matter of civil disputes. The
bar of remedy was never an intention of
law. The meaning and import of the
negative couching of the said rule 17
relating to maintainability of review within
30 days can be well explained as held by a
full bench of the Kerala High Court in the
case of Haris K.M Vs. Jahfar : 2020 SCC
Online Kerala 4009 in the following
words:

"18....................The
reason
according to us is apparent, since the
power granted is the power to review under
the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions
relating to Review in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 are contained in Section
114 and Order XLVII. Article 124 of the
Limitation Act prescribes the period of
limitation for a petition for review under
the Civil Procedure Code as 30 days.
However, since the provisions of Limitation
Act are applicable, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is also applicable and a
Review Petition can be filed beyond the
period of 30 days, if the petitioner is able to
show sufficient cause for the delay.
19. In exercise of power conferred under
Section 35(2)(d), (e) and (f) and Section
36(c),
the
Central
Government
has
promulgated the Kerala Administrative
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010. Rule 21
of the Rules says that no application for
review shall be entertained unless it is filed
within thirty days from the date of the order
of which the review is sought. As already
observed, the rule making power does not
take in power to make rules for fixing a
period of limitation for filing a review
application. Such a prescription of 30 days,
which is the same as the one prescribed
890 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
under the Limitation Act, for filing a review
petition under the Code of Civil Procedure,
was totally unnecessary and uncalled for.
Even
without
Rule
21,
the
review
application ought to be filed within 30
days. Since the period of limitation
prescribed in Rule 21 is the same as that
applicable for a review petition under the
Code of Civil Procedure, we do not think it
is necessary to strike down Rule 21. All the
same, Rule 21 has to be necessarily subject
to the provisions of Section 29 of the
Limitation Act which specifically says that
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of
the Limitation Act will apply to a
prescription of limitation under any special
or local law. That is to say, an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for
condoning the delay in preferring a Review
Petition is maintainable".

(Emphasis Supplied)

(29) Having said so, this Court cannot
be oblivious of the fact that in case
sufficient
reasons
are
pleaded
for
maintainability of review, the Tribunal
should not shut its doors on the ground of
limitation. Observing that the rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123, held
as under:-

"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are meant
to see that parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair
the damage caused by reason of legal injury.
The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such
legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and
wasted time would never revisit. During the
efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. The law of limitation
is thus founded on public policy. It is
enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae
up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare
that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights
of the parties. They are meant to see that
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that
every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time." As pointed
out earlier, an appeal under Section 96 CPC
is a statutory right. Generally, delays in
preferring appeals are required to be
condoned, in the interest of justice, where
there is no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bonafide is imputable to
the party seeking condonation of delay."

(30) Essentially, the law of limitation is
founded on the anvil of public policy.
However, while examining rule 17, we are
countered with the disability which is present
in the peremptory form for preference of a
review application, in case they are filed after
30 days. At this juncture, it would be apt to
mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Mangu Ram V/s Municipal
Corporation Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 has
held that prescription by a special Act of a
mere provisions of a period of limitation
however peremptory or imperative language
is not sufficient to displace the applicability
of section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the
following words:

"7. There is an important departure
made by theLimitation Act, 1963 in so far
as the provision contained ins. 29, sub-s.
(2) is concerned, whereas under the
8 All. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
891
IndianLimitation Act, 1908s. 29, sub-s.
(2),cl. (b) provided that for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation
prescribed
for
any
suit,
appeal
or
application by any special or local law the
provisions of theIndian Limitation Act,
1908, other than these contained inss.
4,9to18and22,
shall
not
apply
and,
therefore, the applicability ofs. 5was in
clear and specific terms excluded,s. 29,
sub-s. (2) of theLimitation Act, 1963
enacts in so many terms that for the
purpose of determining the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal
or application by any special or local law
the provisions contained inss. 4to24,
which would includes. 5, shall apply in so
far as and to the extent to which they are
not expressly excluded by such special or
local law.Section 29, sub-s. (2), cl. (b) of
theIndian Limitation Act. 1908 specifically
excluded the applicability ofs. 5, whiles.
s.29, sub-s. (2) of theLimitation Act, 1963
in clear and unambiguous terms provides
for the applicability ofs. 5and the ratio of
the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case(1)
can, therefore, have no application in cases
governed by the Limitation' Act, 1963,
since that decision proceeded on the
hypothesis that the applicability ofs. 5was
excluded by reason ofs. 29(2)(b) of
theIndian Limitation Act, 1908. Since
under theLimitation Act, 1963 s. 5 is
specifically made applicable bys. 29. sub-s.
(2), it can be availed of for the purpose of
extending
the
period
of
limitation
prescribed by a special or local law if the
applicant can show that he had sufficient
cause for not presenting the application
within the period of limitation. It is only if
the special or local law expressly excludes
the applicability ofs. 5, that it would stand
displaced. There, as pointed out by this
Court in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) the
time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-s.
(4) ofs. 417is a special law of limitation
and we do not find anything in this special
law
which
expressly
excludes
the
applicability ofs. 5. It is true that the
language of sub- s. (4) ofs. 417is
mandatory and compulsive, in that it
provides in no uncertain terms that no
application for grant of special leave to
appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
entertained by the High Court after the
expiry of sixty days from the date of that
order of acquittal. But that would be the
language of every provision prescribing a
period of limitation. It is because a bar
against entertainment of an application
beyond the period of limitation is created
by a special or local law that it becomes
necessary to invoke the aid ofs. 5in
orderthat
the
application
may
be
entertained
despite
such
bar.
Mere
provision of period of limitation in
howsoever
peremptory
or
imperative
language is not sufficient to displace the
applicability of s. 5. The conclusion is,
therefore, irresistible that in a case where
an application for special leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal is filed after the
coming into force of theLimitation Act,
1963,s. 5would be available to the
applicant and if he can show that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the
application within the time limit of sixty
days prescribed in sub-s. (4) ofs. 417, the
application would not be barred and
despite the expiration of the time limit of
sixty days, the High Court would have the
power to entertain it. The High Court, in
the present case, did not, therefore, act
without jurisdiction in holding that the
application preferred by the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the
time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-s.
(4) of s. 417 since the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause
for not preferring the application within
892 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
such time limit. The order granting special
leave was in the circumstances not an order
outside the power of the High Court."

(31) This brings us immediately to
section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, which
rises to the occasion and says in the
following words:

"29(2) Where any special or local law
prescribes
for
any
suit,
appeal
or
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule,
the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by
the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation
prescribed
for
any
suit,
appeal
or
application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and
to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local
law."

(32) Now, therefore the question
arises as to when the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to
court/Tribunals functioning under Special
Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1953. This court finds that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Mukri Gopalan V/s C.P. Aboobacker,
(1995) 5 SCC 5, in an elaborate manner
while dealing with the provisions of Kerala
Rent Act, 1965, under which rent tribunals
have been founded, noted an earlier decision
passed by the Apex court in Commissioner of
Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan & Sons.
Bareilly(1977 (1) SCR 683) by a bench of
three learned Judges, to conclude that the
period
of
limitation
prescribed
therein
underSection 18of the Kerala Act governing
appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed
keeping in view the provisions ofSections
4to24of the Limitation Act, 1963 as such
proceedings will attractSection 29(2)of the
Limitation Act and consequentlySection 5of
the Limitation Act would also be applicable to
such proceedings.