# Surendra Singh Defendant v. Additional District Judge CourtNo.11,Muzaffarnagar And Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 967
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-11
- **Case number:** Writ A(Rent Control) No. 10232 of 2019
- **Bench:** Surya Prakash Kesarwani
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/surendra-singh-defendant-v-additional-district-judge-courtno-11-muzaffarnagar-44511
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
1972: Section 21(1)(a)
Landlord is the best judge of his
need - has a right to expand his
business - Court cannot interfere in
concurrent findings of fact regarding
bonafide
need
established
before
authorities

Appeal
against
order
of
eviction
was
dismissed by the impugned order dated
17.04.2019.
Dismissing
the
petitioner
tenant's present petition, the High Court.
Held:-
The
financial resources of
the
landlord-respondents
to
construct
the
commercial complex could not be disputed
by the tenant- petitioner.
(Para 10)

Precedent followed: -
1.Smt. Shanti Devi and another Vs. (Para 12)

## Text

1 All. Surendra Singh Vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 11, Muzaffarnagar And Ors. 967
Rs.1000/- per day for each day of default
in vacating and handing over of vacant
and peaceful possession to the landlordrespondent.

19. Considering the statement made by
learned counsels for the parties as noted above,
it is provided that in the event the tenantspetitioners submit an undertaking to the
aforesaid effect before the court below within
three weeks from today and also deposit the
entire decretal amount and an additional sum of
Rs.10000/- within the same period then in that
event the tenants-petitioners shall not be evicted
from the disputed property till 15.10.2019. In
the event the conditions are not satisfied then
the protection as given above to the tenantspetitioners shall not continue. In the event the
conditions of the aforesaid undertaking are
complied with but tenants-petitioners do not
vacate and hand over vacant and peaceful
possession of the disputed property to the
landlord-respondent on or before 15.10.2019
then without prejudice to other consequences
which may follow, the tenants-petitioners shall
also pay a sum of Rs.1000/- per day for each
day of default in not vacating and not handing
over the vacant and peaceful possession to the
landlord-respondent after 15.10.2019.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.

Writ A(Rent Control) No. 10232 of 2019

Surendra Singh ...Defendant-Petitioner.
Versus
Additional
District
Judge
CourtNo.11,Muzaffarnagar And Ors.
 ...Plaintiffs-Respondents.

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Nipun Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Sumit Daga

A. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
1972: Section 21(1)(a)
Landlord is the best judge of his
need - has a right to expand his
business - Court cannot interfere in
concurrent findings of fact regarding
bonafide
need
established
before
authorities

Appeal
against
order
of
eviction
was
dismissed by the impugned order dated
17.04.2019.
Dismissing
the
petitioner
tenant's present petition, the High Court.
Held:-
The
financial resources of
the
landlord-respondents
to
construct
the
commercial complex could not be disputed
by the tenant- petitioner.
(Para 10)

Precedent followed: -
1.Smt. Shanti Devi and another Vs. (Para 12)

2. S. Venugopal Vs. A Karruppusami and
another(Para 13)

3.
R.V.E.
Venkatachala
Gounder
Vs.
Venkatesha Gupta and Others, (Para 16)

4. Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, (Para 17)

5. Mohd. Ayub and another Vs. Mukesh
Chand, (Para 18)

6. Nidhi Vs. Ram Kripal Sharma (Dead)
through legal representatives, (Para 19)

7. Vijay Kumar Gupta and another Vs.(Para
20)

8. Smt. Shamim Begum and others (Para 21)

9. Praveen Kumar Jain Vs. Kamal Gupta (Para 22)

10. Manish Mehra Vs. Ram Lal Gupta and
another, (Para 23)
968 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Precedent distinguished: -

1.Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596,
(Para 24)

2. Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC
705
 (Para 25) (E-4)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash
Kesarwani, J.)

1- Heard Sri Nipun Singh,
learned
counsel
for
the
tenantpetitioner and Sri Sumit Daga, learned
counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents.

2- Briefly stated facts of the present
case are that undisputedly, the petitioner was
a tenant of a shop situate in Bagh Keshodas,
Roorki Road, Muzaffarnagar. The total area
of the property was 2654 Sq. Mts. On the
front portion of the aforesaid property there
were some shops which were let out. The
respondent-landlord wanted to construct a
commercial complex over the disputed
property. For this purpose, he got prepared
the map and also obtained requisite
permission. The front portion of the aforesaid
property was occupied by seven shops. The
petitioner's shop is one of those seven shops.
The respondent-landlord/plaintiff has filed
P.A. Cases for eviction of the tenants. He
filed P.A. Case No.12 of 2009 against the
petitioner-tenant on 1.10.2009, under U.P.
Act 13 of 1972.

3-

In
paragraph-10
of
their
application,
the
plaintifflandlord/respondents specifically stated
that the construction of ground floor over
the aforesaid property has been completed
and the plaintiffs are ready and undertake
to provide one shop to the petitionertenant in place of the disputed shop within
6 to 12 months after the disputed shop is
vacated and in the shop so offered, the
petitioner-tenant
may
carry
on
his
business of electric goods. It was further
stated that in the event, the petitionertenant finds that the shop offered is not
appropriate then he may search for a
suitable shop within 3 to 6 months, which
he may get at Roorki and Ansari roads,
where several shops have been built. He
also named several markets where the
shops were available.

4- The Prescribed Authority allowed
the aforesaid P.A. case on two grounds -
firstly, the disputed shop is in dilapidated
condition and secondly, there is bonafide
need of the plaintiff-landlord/respondent.
The aforesaid P.A. case was allowed by
the
Civil
Judge
(Senior
Division),
Muzaffarnagar
by
judgment
dated
18.8.2017.

5- Aggrieved with this judgment, the
petitioner-tenant filed Rent Control Appeal
No.6 of 2017 (Surendra Singh v. Alok
Swaroop and others ), which was dismissed
by impugned judgment dated 17.4.2019
passed by the Additional District Judge (Court
No.11), Muzaffarnagar. The appellate court
set aside the order dated 18.8.2017 passed by
the Prescribed Authority and upheld the
findings of the Prescribed Authority on the
ground of bonafide need. In support the
appellate court relied upon the judgments of
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
R.V.E.
Venkatachala Gounder v. Venkatesha
Gupta and others, (2002)4 SCC 437 and S.
Venugopal v. A Karruppusami and
another, (2006) 4 SCC 507 (Paragraph 10
and 11).

6- Aggrieved with the aforesaid
two judgments the petitioner-tenant has
filed the present writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
1 All. Surendra Singh Vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 11, Muzaffarnagar And Ors. 969

7- Learned counsel for the
petitioner-tenant
submits
that
the
plaintiff-landlord/respondents were in
need of the disputed shop only for the
purposes of passage to the commercial
complex constructed by them and since
some of the shops situated on the front
portion has either been vacated by
Court's judgment or by compromise,
therefore, the need of the plaintiffappellant/respondents stands satisfied.

8- Learned counsel for the plaintifflandlord/respondents
supports
the
impugned judgments.

9- I have carefully considered the
submissions of the learned counsels for
the parties and perused the impugned
judgments.

10- Admittedly, there were seven
tenants occupying the front portion of the
property in question including the tenantpetitioner. These front portion (seven
shops) situate on Roorki Road (G.T.
Road) were single storied. According to
the tenant-petitioner he is a tenant of one
of the shops at a monthly rent of Rs.115/-.
In para-1 of the release application dated
1.10.2009 it was stated that these shops
were constructed about 70-75 year ago.
The total area of the property in question
is about 2,654 Sq. Mts. The landlordrespondents
wanted
to
construct
a
commercial complex over the aforesaid
land. For this purpose, they got the map
sanctioned
from
Muzaffar
Nagar
Development
Authority.
They
filed
release application for release of all the
shops. The release application dated
1.10.2009
filed
against
the
tenantpetitioner was registered as P.A. Case
No.12 of 2009. The release applications
filed against other tenants being P.A. Case
No.230 of 2009, P.A Case No.14 of 2009,
P.A. Case No.15 of 2009, P.A. Case
No.16 of 2009 and P.A. Case No.18 of
2009, were allowed and the shops were
vacated. The financial resources of the
landlord-respondents
to
construct
the
commercial complex could not be disputed
by the tenant-petitioner. The landlordrespondents offered a shop to the tenantpetitioner on the ground-floor of the
aforesaid
commercial
complex
as
an
alternative accommodation to the tenanted
shop. However, the tenant-petitioner has not
accepted that offer and did not vacate the
shop. The tenant-petitioner is the only tenant
occupying a shop in the front portion of the
aforesaid commercial complex facing to
Roorki-Meerut road. The tenant-petitioner
has neither accepted the offered shop at the
ground-floor nor arranged any alternative
accommodation,
although
the
release
application was filed in the year 2009.

11- Both the courts below have
recorded concurrent findings of fact based
on consideration of relevant evidences on
record that the landlord-respondents are in
bonafide need of the disputed shop and
comparative hardship is in their favour.

12- In Smt. Shanti Devi and
another v. Swami Ashanand and
another, (2003) 2 SCC 26 (Para-5),
Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted the
provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act
13 of 1972 and held that this provision is
very widely worded. Demolition and
reconstruction for occupation by landlord
himself either for residential purpose or
for purposes of any profession, trade or
calling
is
permissible.
The
words
'profession, trade or calling' are very wide
and include all activities wherein a person
may usefully and/ or gainfully engage
himself.
970 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13- In S. Venugopal v. A
Karruppusami and another, (2006) 4
SCC 507 (Paragraph 11, 12 and 13),
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
considered
bonafide need of the landlord on the facts
that the disputed property has acquired
commercial value and, therefore, the the
landlord wished to demolish the old single
storey structure and to construct a multistoreyed building which may fetch him
higher rent and has applied to the
competent authorities and got the plans
approved, and held that the landlord's
bonafide need is true.

14- The tenant-petitioner has not
disputed the fact even before this Court that
the landlord-respondents have offered him a
shop on the ground-floor for vacating the
disputed shop and that the commercial
complex as per sanctioned map has already
been constructed by the landlord-respondents
over the land in question and the only shop is
of the petitioner which obstructed the front
portion of the newly constructed commercial
complex. Under the circumstances, the
bonafide need of the landlord-respondents
stands proved under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P.
Act 13 of 1972 and also in view of the law
laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Smt. Shanti Devi and another
(supra). Under the circumstances, the conduct
of the tenant-petitioner in not vacating the
shop, cannot be appreciated, inasmuch as he is
the only tenant, who is obstructing better
beneficial use of the commercial complex by
the landlord-respondents.

15- In S. Venugopal v. A
Karruppusami and another, (2006) 4
SCC 507 (Paragraph 11), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as under :

"11. In the instant case, we find
that the property owned by the landlord,
whatever may have been its value in the
past, has acquired commercial value and,
therefore, the landlord wishes to demolish
the old single storey structure and to
construct a multi-storyed building which
may fetch him higher rent, apart from
serving his own needs. The landlord had
already
applied
to
the
competent
authorities and got the plans approved.
Taking into consideration
all these
reasons, we are convinced that the
landlord bona fide intends to demolish the
old building and to construct a new one.
Raising funds for erecting a structure in a
commercial center is not at all difficult
when a large number of builders,
financiers as well as banks are willing to
advance funds to erect new structures in
commercial areas. This is apart from the
fact that the landlord has himself
indicated that he was willing to invest a
sum of Rs. One and a half lakh of his
own, and he owns properties and
jewellery worth a few lakhs".

16- In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder
v. Venkatesha Gupta and others, (2002)4
SCC 437 and S. Venugopal v. A
Karruppusami and another, (2006) 4 SCC
507 (Paragraph 11 and 12), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as under:

"11.We may refer to two
decisions of Madras High Court. In S.
Raju and others Vs. K. Nathamani, 1998
(3) LW 214, the Constitution Bench
decision has been followed and it has
been held that when new buildings with
modern amenities have come up in that
locality, naturally the building in question
may
become
unsuitable
to
the
surroundings and a liability, in its present
condition, to the landlord. Keeping the
building in the same condition will
amount to asking the landlord to shoulder
1 All. Surendra Singh Vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 11, Muzaffarnagar And Ors. 971
the burden for ever. Tenants may be
satisfied with the present state of the
building since they have to pay only a
nominal rent but the Rent Control
Legislation, beneficial to the landlord and
the tenant both, should be interpreted in
that way. For the purpose of proving his
bonafides the landlord need only show
that he has got the capacity to raise the
necessary funds. In A.N. Srinivasa Thevar
Vs. Sundarambal alias Prema W/o.
Chandrakumar, 1995 (2) LW 14, even
before the decision by Constitution Bench
in Vijay Singh's case was available, it was
held in the light of the decision in P. Orr
& Sons that the availability of the
following factors was sufficient to make
out a case of bona fide requirement
under Section 14(1)(b): "(a) Capacity
of the landlord to demolish and to
reconstruct is undisputed and also
proved satisfactorily; (b) The size of the
existing building occupies only one
third of the site, leaving two third
behind vacant and unutilized; (c)
Demand for additional space: The
demised premises is situated in a busy
locality. Therefore, there is a great
demand for additional space in the
locality
which
could
be
met
by
demolishing the existing small building
and putting up a larger building providing
for future development vertically also, by
building pucca terraced building; (d) The
economic
advantage:
A
modern
construction of a larger building shall
certainly yield better revenue and also
appreciate in value, when compared to the
asbestos sheet roofed old building." In
that case, it was observed that the existing
building was an old, out-model asbestos
sheet building proposed to be replaced
with better and modern building which
would
provide
for
better
quality
accommodation to the needs of the
present days as the preservation of such
building in a busy locality of a town shall
not only be an eyesore but also against the
souring public demand for additional
space. Viewed from the angle of general
interest of the public which, according to
the decision in P. Orr & Sons is one of the
considerations, it was observed that a big
site should yield to a larger modern
building with an increased and enlarged
accommodation having better facilities to
solve the ever increasing demand for
more
space.
Stalling
growth
and
development for the sake of one tenant
who is in occupation of an old model
building constructed with mud and mortar
and asbestos sheets occupying only one
third of the site was held to be not
conducive to public interest. We approve
the statement of law and the approach
adopted by Madras High Court in both the
abovesaid decisions. The structural and
physical features and the nature of the
construction of the building cannot be
ignored. Even in P. Orr & Sons, this
Court was of opinion that various
circumstances, such as the capacity of
the landlord, size of the existing
building, the demand for additional
space, the condition of the place, the
economic advantage and other factors,
justifying investment of capital on
reconstruction may be taken into
account by the concerned authorities,
while considering the requirement for
reconstruction of the building as the
essential and overriding consideration
in the general interest of the public and
for the protection of the tenant from
unreasonable eviction".

"12. Reverting back to the case
at hand, we find that the six tenants are
not in full occupation of the entire space
available. The landlord proposes to
construct a new and modern building in
972 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
busy commercial locality of a rising city. The
landlord requires a part of the newly
constructed building for his own personal use
and such part of the newly constructed
building as would be in excess of his own
requirement he is willing to let out at current
rate of rent to his tenants which would
obviously augment his earnings. The newly
constructed double storeyed building, would
certainly
provide
much
more
total
accommodation than what is available. In
such circumstances the offer of the tenant
that they are prepared to pay the rent at the
current rate, the one which the landlord
expects
on
reconstruction,
becomes
irrelevant and should not have prevailed with
the High Court".

17- In Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi
Prakash, (2004) 3 SCC 682 (Paragraph4), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the
scope of Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India in matters arising
from the application under Section 21
(1)(a) and (b) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972,
and held as under:

"4. Feeling aggrieved by the
judgment of the Appellate Court, the
respondent preferred a writ petition in the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
under Article 226 and alternatively under
Article 227 of the Constitution. It was
heard by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court. The High Court has set aside
the judgment of the Appellate Court and
restored that of the Trial Court. A perusal
of the judgment of the High Court shows
that the High Court has clearly exceeded
its jurisdiction in setting aside the
judgment of the Appellate Court. Though
not specifically stated, the phraseology
employed by the High Court in its
judgment, goes to show that the High
Court has exercised its certiorari
jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of
the Appellate Court. In Surya Dev Rai Vs.
Ram Chander Rai &Ors. - (2003) 6 SCC
675, this Court has ruled that to be
amenable to correction in certiorari
jurisdiction, the error committed by the
Court or Authority on whose judgment the
High Court was exercising jurisdiction,
should be an error which is self-evident. An
error which needs to be established by
lengthy and complicated arguments or by
indulging into a long- drawn process of
reasoning, cannot possibly be an error
available for correction by writ of
certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to
form two opinions on the same material,
the finding arrived at one way or the other,
cannot be called a patent error. As to the
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution also, it has been held in Surya
Dev Rai (Supra) that the jurisdiction was not
available to be exercised for indulging into
re- appreciation or evaluation of evidence
or correcting the errors in drawing
inferences like a court of appeal. The High
Court has itself recorded in its judgment that
"considering the evidence on the record
carefully" it was inclined not to sustain the
judgment of the Appellate Court. On its own
showing, the High Court has acted like an
Appellate Court which was not permissible
for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227
of the Constitution".

18- In Mohd. Ayub and another v.
Mukesh Chand, (2012)2 SCC 155
(Paragraph 15), Hon'ble Supreme Court
held as under:

"15. It is well settled the
landlord's requirement need not be a dire
necessity. The Court cannot direct the
landlord to do a particular business or
imagine that he could profitably do a
1 All. Surendra Singh Vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 11, Muzaffarnagar And Ors. 973
particular
business
rather
than
the
business he proposes to start. It was wrong
on the part of the District Court to hold that
the appellants' case that their sons want to start
the general merchant business is a pretence
because they are dealing in eggs and it is not
uncommon for a Muslim family to do the
business of non-vegetarian food. It is for the
landlord to decide which business he wants
to do. The Court cannot advise him.
Similarly, length of tenancy of the
respondent in the circumstances of the case
ought not to have weighed with the courts
below".

19- In the case of Nidhi v. Ram
Kripal Sharma (Dead) through legal
representatives,
(2017)5
SCC
640
(Paragraph
14
and
16),
Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as under:

"14. The legislations made for
dealing with such landlord-tenant disputes
were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend
towards the tenant in order to do justice
with the tenant; but in the process of
doing justice the Court cannot be over
zealous and forget its duty towards the
landlord also as ultimately, it is the
landlord who owns the property and is
entitled to possession of the same when
he proves his bonafide beyond reasonable
doubt as it is in the case before this
Court".

16. Ordinarily, rights of the
parties stand crystallised on the date of
institution of the suit. However, the court
has power to take note of the subsequent
events and mould the relief accordingly.
Power of the court to take note of
subsequent
events
came
up
for
consideration in a number of decisions. In
Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal
(2002) 2 SCC 256, this Court held as
under:-

"11. The ordinary rule of civil law
is that the rights of the parties stand
crystallised on the date of the institution of the
suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should
accord with the rights of the parties as they
stood at the commencement of the lis.
However, the Court has power to take note of
subsequent events and mould the relief
accordingly
subject
to
the
following
conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as
claimed originally has, by reason of
subsequent events, become inappropriate or
cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such
subsequent event or changed circumstances
would shorten litigation and enable complete
justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that
such subsequent event is brought to the notice
of the court promptly and in accordance with
the rules of procedural law so that the opposite
party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti
Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders
(1975) 1 SCC 770 this Court held that a fact
arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the
court and having a fundamental impact on the
right to relief or the manner of moulding it and
brought diligently to the notice of the court
cannot be blinked at. The court may in such
cases bend the rules of procedure if no
specific provision of law or rule of fair play is
violated for it would promote substantial
justice provided that there is absence of other
disentitling factors or just circumstances. The
Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J.
affirmed the proposition that the court can, so
long as the litigation pends, take note of
updated facts to promote substantial justice.
However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event
should be one as would stultify or render inept
the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure
may be bent if no specific provision or
fair play is violated and there is no other
special circumstance repelling resort to
that course in law or justice, (iii) such
cognizance of subsequent events and
developments should be cautious, and (iv)
974 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the rules of fairness to both sides should
be scrupulously obeyed".

20- In Vijay Kumar Gupta and
another v. Smt. Sumitra Devi and others,
2014(1) ARC 371 (Paragraph 20), a
Bench of this Court held that it is settled law
that the landlord is the best judge of his
need and this Court could not interfere in
concurrent findings of fact regarding
bonafide need establish before the
Prescribed Authority and the appellate
authority by the respondent-landlord. This
Court can interfere only when there is a
perversity in the findings recorded or
when the courts below have acted
without jurisdiction or far in excess of
jurisdiction.

21- In Smt. Shamim Begum and
others v. Dinesh Kumar and others,
2019(1) ADJ 160 (Paragraph Nos. 11
and 12), a Bench of this Court held that a
landlord has got a right to expand his
business and in case, he requires
additional space for it, the need cannot
be said to be malafide. The tenant
cannot dictate terms to the landlord as
to how he should specify his need. The
Court cannot act as a rationing authority
and force the landlord not to expand his
business or carry on in the same shop.

22- In Praveen Kumar Jain v.
Kamal Gupta, 2019(1) AWC 310
(Paragraph 13), a Bench of this Court
observed that the landlord was sole
person who could have taken a decision
as to which shop fulfils his need and the
needs of his family. The tenant or for
that matter even the Court could not
guide
the
landlord
as
to
which
accommodation he should view to fulfil
his need and which accommodation he
shall not use.

23- In Manish Mehra v. Ram Lal
Gupta and another, 2016 (1) ARC 135
(Paragraph No.6), a Bench of this Court
held that it is the choice of the landlord
to use a particular portion of the
building for particular purpose. The
tenant cannot be guide in this respect.

24- The judgment in the case of
Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596
(Para-12) heavily relied by the learned
counsel for the tenant-petitioner does not
support the case of the tenant-petitioner.

In the said case Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that-

"Mere assertion on the part of
the landlord that he requires nonresidential
accommodation
in
the
occupation of the tenant for the purpose
of starting or continuing his own business
is not decisive. It is for the Court to
determine the truth of the assertion and
also whether it is bonafide. The test
which has to be applied is an objective
test and not a subjective one and
merely because a landlord asserts that
he
wants
the
non-residential
accommodation for the purpose of
starting or continuing his own business,
that would not be enough to establish
that he requires it for that purpose and
that his requirement is bonafide. The
word 'required' signifies that mere desire
on the part of the landlord is not enough
but there should be an element of need
and the landlord must show the burden
being upon him that he genuinely requires
the non-residential accommodation for the
purpose of starting or continuing his own
business".

25- Similar view has been taken by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deena
1 All. Surendra Singh Vs. Additional District Judge Court No. 11, Muzaffarnagar And Ors. 975
Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 S.C.C.705
(Paragraph Nos. 15,16 and 17).

26- In the present case, I find that
both the courts below have objectively
examined the bonafide need of the
landlord-respondents and found that he is
in bonafide need of the disputed shop.
Therefore, these judgments are of no help
on the facts of the present case.

27-

Under
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, as briefly noted
above, the findings of both the courts
below with regard to bonafide need of the
plaintiff-landlord/respondents cannot be
said to suffer from any legal infirmity.
The findings recorded by the courts below
are findings of fact, which are based on
relevant evidences on record.

28- The legal position and
conclusions as stated above are briefly
summarized as under:

(i) Section 21(1)(a) of U.P.
Act 13 of 1972 is very widely worded.
Demolition
and
reconstruction
for
occupation by landlord himself either for
residential purpose or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling is permissible.
The words 'profession, trade or calling'
are very wide and include all activities
wherein a person may usefully and/ or
gainfully engage himself.

(ii) If the disputed property has
acquired commercial value and, therefore,
the the landlord wished to demolish the
old single storey structure and to construct
a multi-storeyed building which may
fetch him higher rent and has applied to
the competent authorities and got the
plans approved, then the landlord's
bonafide need is true.

(iii) It is well settled the
landlord's requirement need not be a dire
necessity. The Court cannot direct the
landlord to do a particular business or
imagine that he could profitably do a
particular
business
rather
than
the
business he proposes to start. It is for the
landlord to decide which business he
wants to do. The Court cannot advise him.

(iv) Landlord is the best judge of
his need and this Court can not interfere in
concurrent
findings
of
fact
regarding
bonafide need establish before the Prescribed
Authority and the appellate authority. This
Court can interfere only when there is
perversity in the findings recorded or when
the courts below have acted without
jurisdiction or far in excess of jurisdiction. A
landlord has got a right to expand his
business and in case, he requires additional
space for it, the need cannot be said to be
malafide. The tenant cannot dictate terms to
the landlord as to how he should satisfy his
need. Landlord is sole person who can take a
decision as to which shop fulfils his need and
the needs of his family. The tenant or for that
matter even the Court can not guide the
landlord as to which accommodation he
should view to fulfil his need and which
accommodation he shall not use.

(v)
To
be
amenable
to
correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the
error committed by the Court or Authority
on
whose
judgment
this
Court
is
exercising jurisdiction, should be an error
which is self-evident. An error which
needs to be established by lengthy and
complicated arguments or by indulging
into a long- drawn process of reasoning,
cannot possibly be an error available for
correction by writ of certiorari. If it is
reasonably possible to form two opinions
on the same material, the finding arrived
at one way or the other, cannot be called a
patent error. As to the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution also,
976 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (Supra)
that the jurisdiction was not available to
be exercised for indulging into re-
appreciation or evaluation of evidence or
correcting
the
errors
in
drawing
inferences like a court of appeal.

(vi) The tenant-petitioner has not
disputed the fact even before this Court
that the landlord-respondents have offered
him a shop on the ground-floor for
vacating the disputed shop and that the
commercial complex as per sanctioned
map has already been constructed by the
landlord-respondents over the land in
question and the only shop is of the
petitioner which obstructed the front
portion
of
the
newly
constructed
commercial
complex.
Under
the
circumstances, the bonafide need of the
landlord-respondents stands proved under
Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972.
Under the circumstances, the conduct of
the tenant-petitioner in not vacating the
shop, cannot be appreciated, inasmuch as
he is the only tenant, who is obstructing
better beneficial use of the commercial
complex by the landlord-respondents.

(viii)
Under
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, the findings of
both the courts below with regard to bonafide
need of the plaintiff-landlord/respondents
cannot be said to suffer from any legal
infirmity. The findings recorded by the
courts below are findings of fact, which are
based on relevant evidences on record.

29- For all the reasons aforestated,
this writ petition is dismissed with cost of
Rs.5,000/-.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR.YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ A(Rent Control) 5646 of 2019

Sanjay Bhardwaj @ Bablu And Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Dinesh Chandra Gupta And Others
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rahul Sahai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Kshitij Shailendra

A. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
Interpretation - A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted. "Original
tenant" u/s 24(2) would be "evicted tenant",
evicted u/s 21(1)(b)-rule of heritability
extends to statutory tenancy of commercial
premises as much as residential premises.

During the pendency of application u/s 24(2),
the original tenant died. Substitution of legal
heirs allowed. Recall application was dismissed
and review was rejected. Dismissing the
petitioner-landlord's present petition, the High
Court. The words used in an enactment should
be construed in a way which best gives effect
to the purpose of the enactment. The
provisions of S.24(2) and S.21 (1) (b) are
required to be read conjointly. Proceedings u/s
24(2) are a continuation of the proceedings
u/s 21(1)(b). As a logical corollary S.34(4)
would be applicable to proceedings u/s 24(2).
(Para 53, 54, 55, 56, 57)

B. The right of re-entry u/s 24(2) is to be
seen as a statutory right flowing from
the legislative mandate. (Para 59)

Precedent followed: -

1.Ashish Kumar Vs. Additional District Judge,
Ayodhya Prakaran, Lucknow, 2010 (3) ARC
238 (Para 12, 31)