# Suresh Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 11 ILRA 129
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-11-14
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 19871 of 2021
- **Bench:** Prakash Padia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/suresh-singh-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47793
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Arms Act, 1959 - Section
17(3) - Cancellation of arm licence -
Pendency of criminal cases and enmity
with other persons, how far permissible as
the ground - No finding was recorded by
DM that it was necessary for the security
of the public peace or for public safety to
revoke the licence - Effect - Duty of the
cancelling
authority,
how
can
be
discharged - Held, the mere existence of
enmity between a licensee & anr. person
would
not
establish
the
'necessary'
connection with security of the public
peace or public safety - There should be
some
evidence
of
the
provocative
utterances of the licensee or of his
suspicious movements or of his criminal
designs and conspiracy in reinforcement
of
the
evidence
of
enmity
-
The
cancellation of a licence destroys a
130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
valuable privilege of a free citizen of a free
country - The District Magistrate and the
Commissioner ought to fairly consider the
facts and circumstances of each case and
should also bear in mind the provisions of
Section 17 - The law does not give them a
free hand. (Para 12 and 13)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:-

## Text

11 All. Suresh Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
129
offered even for this delay assuming that
the same ought to be counted only from the
year 1991. Judged from any angle the
notice seeking to reverse the entries made
half a century ago, was clearly beyond
reasonable time and was rightly quashed."

 (emphasis added)

15. Thus principle has been discussed
that the law of limitation has been provided in
the Statute also gives accrual to the rights of
other side. Metaphorically, it is true that a
deep-rooted tree should ordinarily not be
uprooted because the roots are so embedded
inside the earth that it may have a very
devastating impact on the nature's ecosystem
whereas the new plants can be replanted
anywhere. Similarly here also, if today the
controversy regarding allotment which is
already settled is reopened after lapse of more
than 4 decades it will cause more damage to
public interest than to serve it. So even on
this count also, this Court will be reluctant in
reopening an issue of allotment of the year
1973.

16. Besides above, the petitioner being
a complainant must have a right on the date
of allotment in question. In the year 1973, the
complainant was not born and, therefore, he
could not have maintained any right to get
allotment of land as residential lease.
Canvassing for right of father, who himself
was not vigilant as he never set up any claim
of his own, cannot be permitted and no such
complaint at the instance of son be
entertained after a lapse of four decades.

17. In such above view of the matter,
therefore, I decline to interfere in the matter.

18. It is, however, open for the
petitioner to apply for residential lease if
Gaon Sabha proposes to do in future.
Insofar as the petitioner's right to continue
in a house constructed upon such land
without there being any interference of
third party is continued the petitioner
always enjoys liberty to apply for a
common law remedy.

19. Writ petition lacks merit and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 129
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.11.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Writ C No. 19871 of 2021

Suresh Singh Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Phool Singh Yadav, Sri Ajay Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Vijay Shankar

A. Civil Law - Arms Act, 1959 - Section
17(3) - Cancellation of arm licence -
Pendency of criminal cases and enmity
with other persons, how far permissible as
the ground - No finding was recorded by
DM that it was necessary for the security
of the public peace or for public safety to
revoke the licence - Effect - Duty of the
cancelling
authority,
how
can
be
discharged - Held, the mere existence of
enmity between a licensee & anr. person
would
not
establish
the
'necessary'
connection with security of the public
peace or public safety - There should be
some
evidence
of
the
provocative
utterances of the licensee or of his
suspicious movements or of his criminal
designs and conspiracy in reinforcement
of
the
evidence
of
enmity
-
The
cancellation of a licence destroys a
130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
valuable privilege of a free citizen of a free
country - The District Magistrate and the
Commissioner ought to fairly consider the
facts and circumstances of each case and
should also bear in mind the provisions of
Section 17 - The law does not give them a
free hand. (Para 12 and 13)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:-
1. Ram Murti Madhukar Vs D.M., Sitapur; 1998
(16) LCD-905
2. Ram Karpal Singh Vs Commissioner, Devi
Patan Mandal, Gonda & ors.; 2006 (24) LCD 114
3. Writ-C No. 56378 of 2006; Ram Prasad Vs
Commissioner & ors. decided on 07.02.2020
4. Jay Bhagwan Kanodia Vs The Commissioner
& anr. decided on 26.07.2012
5. Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors. decided on
28.03.2019
(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)

1.

Heard
Shri
Ajay
Kumar,
Advocate, holding brief of Shri P. S.
Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner,
Shri Vijay Shankar along-with Shri A. P.
Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel for
the respondent-State.

2. By means of present petition,
petitioner is seeking for quashing of the
order dated 05.04.2021 passed by the
respondent
no.2-District
Magistrate,
Fatehpur in Case No.00743 of 2021 under
Section 17(3) of the Arms Act (State Vs.
Suresh Singh Yadav) and order dated
14.07.2021
passed
in
Appeal
No.00425/2021 under Section 18 of the
Arms Act by the respondent no.3 namely
Commissioner,
Prayagraj
Division,
Prayagraj, P.S. Hathgaon, District Fatehpur.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that only ground for cancellation
of armed license no.2579/DM (F)/Police
Station Hathgaon, District Fatehpur NP
Bore Rifle No.AB02-8281 is that three
criminal cases has been registered against
the petitioner namely Case Crime No.236
of 2017, under Section 3/7 Essential
Commodity Act, 1955 and Case Crime
No.237 of 2017, under Section 3/25 Arms
Act and N.C.R.No.21 of 2018, under
Section 323, 504 IPC. He further submits
that there is no material on record to
show that armed license granted to the
petitioner has been misused or there is
any danger to public safety except the
allegations
that
criminal
cases
are
pending against him. It is further argued
that license can only be cancelled only to
reasons assigned to Section (3) of Section
17 of the Arms Act, 1959.

4. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the judgments passed
by this Court in the cases of Ram Murti
Madhukar
vs.
District
Magistrate,
Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD-905], Ram
Karpal Singh vs. Commissioner, Devi
Patan Mandal, Gonda and Ors. [2006
(24) LCD 114] and Ram Prasad vs.
Commissioner and Ors. decided on
07.02.2020 in Writ-C No. 56378 of 2006,
wherein it has been held that mere
pendency
of
criminal
case
or
apprehension of misuse of arms are not
sufficient grounds for passing the order of
suspension or revocation of licence under
Section 17 of the Act.

5. Per contra learned Standing
Counsel submits that since the petitioner
is having three criminal cases registered
against him, public peace and safety are
in danger, therefore, the order has rightly
been passed cancelling the fire arms
license of the petitioner.
11 All. Suresh Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
131

6. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

7. In the case of Ram Murti
Madhukar (supra), this Court has held in
paragraph no. 8 as under :-

"(8) It is also well settled in law
that mere pendency of criminal case or
apprehension of abuse of Arms Act, are not
sufficient ground for passing of the order of
suspension or revocation of licence under
Section 17 of the Act. A reference in this
regard may be made to the decisions of this
Court in Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. D. M.
Almora, AIR 1993 All 291"

8. In the case of Ram Karpal Singh
(supra), this Court has held as following in
paragraph nos. 6 and 7, which are being
reproduced hereunder:-

"6, Learned counsel for the
petitioner
had
relied
upon
the
two
judgments of this Court reported in 2002
ACC; Habib v. State of U.P.

7. Para 3 of the said judgment is
reproduced as under:

"Para 3: The question as to
whether mere involvement in a criminal
case or pendency of a criminal case can be
a ground for revocation of the license under
Arrns Act, has been deal with by a Division
Bench in this Court reported in Sheo Prasad
Misra v. The District Magistrate, Basti and
others, wherein the Division Bench relying
upon the earlier decision reported in Mai
Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, found
that mere involvement in criminal case
cannot be in any way affect the public
security or public interest and the order
canceling or revoking the .licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned order also suffers from the same
infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench that these
orders cannot be sustained and deserve to
be quashed and are hereby quashed."

9. This Court in the case of Ram
Prasad (supra) has held as under. Relevant
paragraphs of the said judgments i.e.
16,19,22,23,24,25,28,32 and 36 are being
quoted hereunder:-

"16. The matter which requires
consideration is, whether on the ground of
pendency
of
the
criminal
case
the
petitioner's fire arm licence could be
cancelled
and
his
appeal
could
be
dismissed, notwithstanding his acquittal on
17.1.2003. It also requires consideration if
the ground in the impugned orders that if
the petitioner's fire arm licence remain with
the petitioner, it would not be in the public
interest and public security, are justified for
cancellation and based on substantial
material."

19.
In
Masiuddin
Vs.
Commissioner,
Allahabad
Division,
Allahabad and another reported in 1972
A.L.J. 573 this Court held in paragraph
Nos. 4 and 7 as under:

"4. After a license is granted, the
right to hold the license and possess a gun
is a valuable individual right in a free
country. The security of public peace and
public safety is a valuable social interest.
Section 17 shows that Parliament had
decided that neither of the two valuable
interests should unduly impinge on the
other Section 17 seeks to establish a fair
equilibrium between the two contending
interests. It says: Hear the licensee first;
and then cancel the license "if necessary for
the security of the public peace or for
public safety". True, there is no express
provision for hearing. But the nature of the
132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
right affected, the language of Sec. 17, the
grounds for cancellation, the requirement
of a reasoned order and the right of appeal
plainly implicate a fair hearing procedure.
Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate,
Azamgarh. While cancelling a licence, the
District Magistrate acts as a quasi-judicial
authority.

7. A license may be cancelled,
inter alia on the ground that it is "necessary
for the security of the public peace or for
public safety" to do so. The District
Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it
was necessary for the security of the public
peace or for public safety to revoke the
license. The mere existence of enmity
between a licensee and another person
would
not
establish
the
''necessary'
connection with security of public peace or
public safety. There should be something
more than mere enmity. There should be
some
evidence
of
the
provocative
utterances of the licensee or of his
suspicious movements or of his criminal
designs and conspiracy in reinforcement of
the evidence of enmity. It is not possible to
give an exhaustive list of facts and
circumstances from which an inference of
threat to public security or public peace
may be deduced. The District Magistrate
will have to take a decision on the facts of
each case. But in the instant case there is
nothing in his order to indicate that it was
necessary for the security of the public
peace or for public safety to cancel the
license of the petitioner. Mere enmity is not
sufficient."

22. In Chhanga Prasad Sahu Vs.
State of U.P. and others reported in 1984
AWC
145
(FB),
after
noticing
the
provisions of Section 17 (3) of the Arms
Act the Full Bench in paragraph 5 held as
follows:

"A perusal of abovementioned
provisions indicates that the licensing
authority has been given the power to
suspend or revoe an arms licence only if
any of the conditions mentioned in subclauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3) of
Section 17 of Act exists." sub section (5) of
Section 17 makes it obligatory upon the
licensing authority to, while passing the
order revoking/suspending an arms licence,
record in writing the reasons therefore and
to, on demand, furnish a brief statement
thereof to the holder of the license unless it
considers that it will not be in the public
interest to do so."

In
paragraph-9
it
has
been
emphasised as under:-

"it is true that in order to
revoke/suspend
an
arms
licence,
the
licensing authority has necessarily to come
to the conclusion that the facts justifying
revocation/suspension of licence mentioned
in grounds (a) to (e) of section 17 exist"

23.
In
Ilam
Singh
v.
Commissioner, Meerut Division and others
[1987 ALL. L.J. 416] this Court held that
under Section 17(3) (b) the licencing
authority may suspend or revoke a licence
if it becomes necessary for the security of
public peace or public safety. In this case
no report was lodged against the licensee
indicating that he had used the gun in the
incident which led to the breach of public
peace or public safety. It was held that there
must be some positive incident in which the
petitioner participated and used his gun
which led to breach of public peace or
public safety and in the absence of the use
of the gun by the licencee against the
security of public peace or public safety the
licence of the gun could not be suspended
or revoked. The relevant paragraphs 4 and
5 of the judgment in Ilam Singh (supra) are
being reproduced as under:

"4. Having heard the learned
counsel for the petitioner I am of the view
that the submissions raised by the learned
11 All. Suresh Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
133
counsel for the petitioner cannot be said to
be without substance. Section 17(3) (b) of
the Arms Act enacts that licensing authority
may by order in writing suspend a licence
or revoke the same if it becomes necessary
for the security of public peace or the
public safety. When once a person has been
granted a licence and he acquires a gun, it
becomes one of his properties. In the
present case no incident of breach of
security of the public peace or public sfety
at the behest of the petitioner has been
pointed out. Even no report was lodged
against the petitioner indicating that he
used his gun in the incident which led to
the breach of public peace or public safety.
Even though some reports might have been
lodged but that could not be said to be a
sufficient reason to cancel the licence."

5. There must be some positive
incident in which the petitioner participated
and used his gun which led to the breach of
the public peace or public safety. In the
absence of the use of the gun by the petitioner
against the security of public peace or public
safety the licence of the gun of the petitioner
was not liable either to be suspended or
revoked. The licensing authority as well as
the Commissioner committed errors on the
face of the record in cancelling the licence of
the gun held by the petitioner in utter
disregard of the provisions of Section 17 (3)
(b) of the Arms Act. In view of these facts the
impugned orders cannot be sustained and
deserves to be quashed."

24. In Habib v. State of U.P. and
others [2002 (44) ACC 783] this Court held
that mere involvement in a criminal case
cannot in any way affect the public security
or public interest and the order cancelling or
revoking licence of fire arm was not justified.
Paragraph 3 of this judgment reads as under:

"3. The question as to whether
mere involvement in a criminal case or
pendency of a criminal case can be a
ground for revocation of the licence under
Arms Act, has been dealt with by a
Division Bench of this court reported in
Sheo Prasad Misra Vs. The District
Magistrate, Basti and others, wherein the
Division Bench relying upon the earlier
decision reported in Masi Uddin v.
Commissioner, Allahabad, found that mere
involvement in criminal case cannot in any
way affect the public security or public
interest and the order cancelling or
revoking the licence of fire arm has been
set aside."

25. In Satish Singh v. District
Magistrate, Sultanpur 2009 (4) ADJ 33
(LB), this Court elaborately explained what
is detrimental to the security of the public
peace or public safety and held that mere
involvement in criminal case cannot in any
way affect the public security or public
interest. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Satish Singh
case (supra) are being reproduced as under:

"6. A plain reading of section 17
indicates that the arms licence can be
cancelled or suspended on the ground that
the licensing authority deems it necessary
for security of the public peace or the
public safety. In the present case, while
passing the impugned order, neither the
District Magistrate nor the appellate
authority has recorded the finding as to
how and under what circumstance, the
possession
of
arms
licence
by
the
petitioner, is detrimental to the public peace
or the public security and safety. Merely
because criminal case is pending more so,
does not seem to attract the provisions of
section 17 of the Arms Act. To attract the
provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act
with regard to public peace, security and
safety it shall always be incumbent on the
authorities to record a finding that how,
under
what
circumstances
and
what
manner, the possession of arms licence
shall be detrimental to public peace, safety
134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and security. In absence of such finding
merely on the ground that a criminal case is
pending
without
any
mitigating
circumstances with regard to endanger of
public peace, safety and security, the
provisions contained under Section 17 of
the Arms Act, shall not satisfy.

7. Needless to say that right to
life and liberty are guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India and the arms
licences are granted for personal safety and
security after due inquiry by the authorities
in accordance with the provisions contained
in Arms Act, 1959. The provisions of
section 17 of the Arms Act with regard to
suspension or cancellation of arms licence
cannot be invoked lightly in an arbitrary
manner. The provisions contained under
Section 17 of the Arms Act should be
construed strictly and not liberally. The
conditions provided therein, should be
satisfied
by
the
authorities
before
proceeding ahead to cancel or suspend an
arms licence. We may take notice of the
fact that any reason whatsoever, the crime
rate is raising day by day. The Government
is not in a position to provide security to
each and every person individually. Right
to possess arms is statutory right but right
to
life
and
liberty
is
fundamental
guaranteed
by
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India. Corollary to it, it is
citizen's right to possess firearms for their
personal safety to save their family from
miscreants. It is often said that ordinarily in
a civilised society, only civilised persons
require arms licence for their safety and
security and not the criminals. Of course, in
case the government feels that arms licence
are abused for oblique motive or criminal
activities, then appropriate measures may
be adopted to check such mal-practice. But
arms licence should not be suspended in a
routine
manner
mechanically,
without
application of mind and keeping in view
the letter and spirit of Section 17 of the
Arms Act."

28. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State of
U.P. and others reported 2013(31) LCD
1460 (LB) this Court after referring to the
earlier pronouncements in the case of Ram
Murli Madhukar Vs. District Magistrate,
Sitapur [1998 (16) LCD 905] and Habib
Vs. State of U.P., 2002 ACC 783, held in
paragraphs 10 and 11 as follows:

"10. "Public peace" or ''public
safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of
law and order public safety means safety of
the public at large and not safety of few
persons only and before passing of the
order of cancellation of arm license as per
Section 17 (3) of the Act the Licensing
Authority is under an obligation to apply
his mind to the question as to whether there
was eminent danger to public peace and
safety involved in the case in view of the
judgment given by this court in the case of
Ram
Murli
Madhukar
v.
District
Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 916) LCD 905],
wherein it has been held that license can
not be suspended or revoked on the ground
of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the
registration of an F.I.R. and pendency of a
criminal case."

11. Further, this Court in the case
of Habib v. State of U.P. 2002 ACC 783
held as under:

"The question as to whether mere
Involvement in a criminal case or pendency
of a criminal case can be a ground for
revocation of the licence under Arms Act,
has been dealt with by a Division Bench of
this Court in Sheo prasad Misra Vs. District
Magistrate, Basti and Others, 1978 AWC
122, wherein the Division Bench relying
upon the earlier decision in Masi Uddin Vs.
Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573,
found that mere involvement in criminal
case cannot, in any way, affect the public
security or public interest and the order
11 All. Suresh Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
135
cancelling or revoking the licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned orders also suffer from the same
infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench that these
orders cannot be sustained and deserves to
be quashed and are hereby quashed.

There is yet another reason that
during the pendency of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has been acquitted
from the aforesaid criminal case and at
present there is neither any case pending,
nor any conviction has been attributed to
the petitioner, as is evident from Annexure
SA-I and II to the supplementary affidavit
filed by the petitioner. In this view of the
matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the
fire-arm licence."

32. In Ghanshyam Gupta v. State
of U.P. and others [2016 (34) LCD 3035]
this Court has again held that the necessary
ingredients to invoke jurisdiction of the
licencing authority in terms of Section 17
were clearly lacking and no finding had
been returned on the basis of materials
produced in that regard by the licencing
authority, which must justify passing of the
order of cancellation. Paragraph 9 of the
said judgment is being quoted as under:

"9. In a recent decision of
Lucknow Bench of this court in Surya
Narain Mishra v. Stae of U.P. and others,
reported in 2015 (7) ADJ 510, similar view
has been taken by this Court relying upon
subsequent decisions. Para-14 of the
judgment is reproduced:

"14. In the case of Raj Kumar
Verma v. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 231
this court in paragraph No.3 held as under:-

"The ground for issue of showcause notice, suspension and ultimately
cancellation of the licence is that one and
precisely one criminal case was registered
against
the
petitioner.
The
District
Magistrate has also held that the petitioner
has been enlarged on bail. He has gone
further to observe that if the licence
remained intact, the petitioner, may disturb
public peace and tranquility. The same
findings
have
been
given
by
the
Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that
this Court is repeating the law of the land,
but the deaf ears of the administrative
officers do not ready to succumb the law of
the land. The settled law is that mere
involvement in a criminal case without any
finding that involvement in such criminal
case shall be detrimental to public peace
and tranqulity shall not create the ground
for the cancellation of Armed Licence. In
Ram Suchi v. Commissioner, Devipatan
Division reported in 2004 (22) LCD 1643,
it was held that this law was relied upon in
Balram Singh Vs. Satate of U.P. 2006 (24)
LCD 1359. Mere apprehension without
substance is simply an opinion which has
no legs to stand. Personal whims are not
allowed to be reflected while acting as a
public servant.

36. In the present case the
petitioner's licence was cancelled by the
District Magistrate on the ground of
pendency of criminal case against him. The
petitioner was later on acquitted of the
criminal case by order dated 17.1.2003. A
perusal of the order of acquittal does not
show the use of fire arm. After acquittal the
very basis of the order of cancellation
vanished. The finding of the District
Magistrate
as
affirmed
by
the
Commissioner, that it was not in the
interest of public peace and the public
security that the licence remained with the
petitioner/licencee, is not based on any
evidence/material, except the police reports
which in their turn were in view of the
pendency of the criminal case against the
petitioner. On mere apprehension expressed
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the impugned orders that the petitioner
would misuse the fire arm and would
extend threat to the persons of the weaker
section of the society, the arm licence could
not be cancelled."

10. This Court in the case of Jay
Bhagwan Kanodia Vs. The Commissioner
and another decided on 26.07.2012 and
Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others
decided on 28.03.2019 has held that fire
arms licence can only be cancelled if it falls
within sub Section (3) of Section 17 of the
Act.

11. The provision of Sub-section (3)
of Section 17 of the Arms Act provides
various
conditions
for
variation/cancellation or suspension of the
arms licence, which is reproduced as
under:-

"17.Variation,
suspension
and
revocation of licences-

3.The licensing authority may by
order in writing suspend a licence for such
period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence-

(a) if the licensing authority is
satisfied that the holder of the licence is
prohibited by this Act or by any other law
for the time being in force, from acquiring,
having in his possession or carrying any
arms or ammunition, or is of unsound
mind, or is for any reason unfit for a
licence under this Act ; or

(b) if the licensing authority
deems it necessary for the security of the
public peace or for public safety to suspend
or revoke the licence; or

(c)if the licence was obtained by
the suppression of material information or
on the basis of wrong information provided
by the holder of the licence or any other
person on his behalf at the time of applying
for it;or

(d) if any of the conditions of the
licence has been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has
failed to comply with a notice under subsection (1) requiring him to deliver-up the
licence."

12. A licence may be cancelled, inter
alia on the ground that it is "necessary for
the security of the public peace or for
public safety' to do so. The District
Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it
was necessary for the security of the public
peace or for public safety to revoke the
licence. The mere existence of enmity
between a licensee and another person
would
not
establish
the
"necessary"
connection with security of the public
peace or public safety. There should be
something more than mere enmity. There
should be some evidence of the provocative
utterances of the licensee or of his
suspicious movements or of his criminal
designs and conspiracy in reinforcement of
the evidence of enmity. It is not possible to
give an exhaustive list of facts and
circumstances from which an inference of
threat to public security or public peace
may be deduced. The District Magistrate
will have to take a decision on the facts of
each case. But in the instant case there 'is
nothing in his order to indicate that it was
necessary for the security of the public
peace or for public safety to cancel the
licence of the petitioner. Mere enmity is not
sufficient.

13. The Commissioner did not take
into consideration the provisions of Section
17 at all. His order gives an impression of
having been made in a mechanical manner.
The cancellation of a licence destroys a
valuable privilege of a free citizen of a free
country. The District Magistrate and the
Commissioner ought to fairly consider the
11 All. Smt. Shaila Tahir Vs. State of U.P.& Ors.
137
facts and circumstances of each case and
should also bear in mind the provisions of
Section 17 The law does not give them a
free hand.

14. The petition is allowed. The
orders of the Commissioner and the District
Magistrate
cancelling
the
petitioner's
licence are quashed. The petitioner shall get
costs.
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 137
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE JAYANT BANERJI, J.

Writ C No. 21595 of 2022

Smt. Shaila Tahir ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Udayan Nandan, Sr. Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashwani Kumar Sachan, Sri
Saurabh Sachan, Sri Vashishtha Dhar
Shukla, Sri Neeraj Tripathi (Addl. A.G.)

A. UP Municipalities Act, 1916 - Section
48 - Removal of President of Nagar Palika
Parishad
-
Charges
of
wrongful
withdrawal of public fund - No enquiry
was held - Effect - Principle of natural
justice,
how
far
relevance
-
Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir's case relied upon -
Removal
of
a
duly
elected
member/president of Municipal Council on
basis
of
proved
misconduct,
is
a
proceeding
quasi-judicial
in
nature.
Therefore, the principles of natural justice
are required to be given full play -
Removal of elected person casts stigma
upon him and takes away his valuable
statutory rights. The result of his removal
is that not only he, but his electoral
college
is
also
deprived
of
the
representation by him - Held, once the
petitioner had specifically denied the
charges and prayed for proper inquiry
being held, it was incumbent upon the
respondents to provide all documentary
evidence, hold oral inquiry giving full
opportunity to the petitioner to crossexamine
the
complainant
and
other
witnesses. However, that was not done -
The petitioner has been removed in a
casual manner, without holding proper
inquiry, which could pass the test of
fairness. (Para 21, 22, 47 and 48)
Writ petition allowed in part. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:-
1. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs District Collector,
Raigad & ors.; (2012) 4 SCC 407
2. Sanjeev Agrawal Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2011
(6) AWC 5502
3. Girish Chandra Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.; 2007 AWC (6) 6051
4. Umesh Baijal & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.;
(2004) 2 UPLBEC 1235
5. Shamim Ahmad (Dr.) Vs St. of U.P. & anr.;
(2005) 1 UPLBEC 171
6. Krishna Swami Vs U.O.I.; (1992) 4 SCC 605
7. Sant Lal Gupta Vs Modern Coop. Group
Housing Society Ltd.; (2010) 13 SCC 336

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.
&
Hon'ble Jayant Banerji, J.)

1. The petitioner has challenged her
removal from the post of President, Nagar
Palika Parishad, Nawabganj, Bareilly by
the order of respondent no. 1, i.e. Principal
Secretary, Nagar Vikas, U.P. Lucknow
dated 10.5.2022 and the report of District