# Surij Pal Singh v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 3 ILRA 757
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-03-28
- **Bench:** Huluvadi G. Ramesh, Raghvendra Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/surij-pal-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43599
- **Pages:** 4

## Text

3 All. Surij Pal Singh Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
757

9. In view of the above position of law, the matter would now have to be considered
from the perspective of the condition in the lease deed between UPSIDC and BPCL. The
condition which has been extracted above, merely provides that BPCL shall give preference
to one or two able bodied persons from the families whose land has been acquired while
employing labour for the unit in the industrial area. The condition does not specifically
provide a reservation or quota but a preference in the matter of employment. The condition
does not preclude BPCL from laying down reasonable terms and conditions to define norms
of eligibility. The norms which were prescribed by BPCL, as stated in the counter affidavit,
stipulated an educational requirement of having passed the seventh standard and a minimum
and maximum age requirement. The criteria has not been questioned in writ proceedings
before the learned Single Judge as being unreasonable or ultra vires. Nor can the criteria be
held to suffer from manifest unreasonableness or perversity. We find no substance in the
submission that the age relaxation in favour of SC/ST candidates of five years and of three
years in favour of OBC candidates must be extended to the general category. Such an age
relaxation to the reserved category cannot be held to be unreasonable. In the present case,
the appellant did not fulfill the eligibility criteria specified by BPCL.

10. In this view of the matter, the appellant having been considered in terms of the
policy and having been found to be ineligible, no fault could have been found in the
decision. The finding of the learned Single Judge that no employment could be granted after
a lapse of nearly forty five years from the date of acquisition shades into the background
since, even in terms of the policy as laid down for employment by BPCL, the case of the
appellant was evaluated and he was not found to be eligible.

11. For these reasons, we find no merit in the special appeal. The special appeal is
accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.03.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE HULUVADI G. RAMESH, J.
THE HON'BLE RAGHVENDRA KUMAR, J.

Special Appeal No. - 652 of 2014

Surij Pal Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for Appellant
Siddharth Khare, Ashok Khare

Counsel for Respondents
C.S.C.,Ashok Gupta, Ashok Kumar
758 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The appellant was appointed as Headmaster of the Institution, which is a private institution, on
16.7.1977 in the pay scale as prescribed by the State Government. On 25.4.1989 the Basic Education
Officer, Banda accorded approval to the appointment of the appellant/petitioner. On 26.6.1997 the
Regional Assistant Director of Education (Basic) granted permanent recognition to the institution as a
junior high school. The appellant/petitioner had not been paid salary in the pay scale as prescribed by
the State Government. Against the order dated 19.5.2014 of learned single judge, appellant has filed
this special appeal.

The appellant/petitioner is directed to approach before the Regional Assistant Direction of Education
(Basic), respondent no.3 with a fresh representation alongwith a copy of this order, who shall consider
and decide the same by a speaking and reasoned order, in accordance with law, after hearing the
management of the institution.

However, remedy for the appellant is to approach civil court for recovery of salary difference as
arrears of salary or to approach the tribunal, if the same is constituted under the law.

The special appeal is disposed of.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Huluvadi G. Ramesh, J.
&
Hon'ble Raghvendra Kumar, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Standing Counsel and perused
the record.

2. By means of this Special Appeal, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the
judgment dated 19.5.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition
being misconceived.

3. According to the appellant, the appellant/petitioner was appointed as Headmaster of
the Institution, which is a private institution, on 16.7.1977 in the pay scale as prescribed by
the State Government. On 25.4.1989 the Basic Education Officer, Banda accorded approval
to the appointment of the appellant/petitioner. On 26.6.1997 the Regional Assistant Director
of Education (Basic) granted permanent recognition to the institution as a junior high school.
The appellant/petitioner had not been paid salary in the pay scale as prescribed by the State
Government.

4. Aggrieved, the appellant/petitioner filed writ petition before this Court which
was decided on 7.1.2013 directing the Basic Education Officer to consider and
decide the representation of the appellant/petitioner. On 30.4.2013 the Basic
Education Officer hold that the appellant/petitioner to be a part time teacher, was
entitled to minimum of wages at the rates applicable to the skilled workers in terms
of Minimum Wages Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant/petitioner again
filed writ petition before this Court, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge
on 2.7.2013. The Basic Education Officer rejected the representation of the
appellant/petitioner on 11.10.2013. The appellant/petitioner filed representation
3 All. Surij Pal Singh Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
759
before the Regional Assistant Direction of Education (Basic) on 26.12.2013, which
is still pending for consideration.

5. The appellant/petitioner once again approached this Court by filing the writ
petition, which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 19.5.2014 being
misconceived. It is against this order, the appellant/petitioner has filed this special
appeal. Admittedly, unless any ingredients which attract the running of the
institution, either in grant-in-aid or with the assistance of the Government, the
obligations for the appellant/petitioner would be to pursue the civil court to seek
payment as per the provisions of U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972. Since the
appellant/petitioner is working in a private institution and is governed with the
provisions of U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, hence in order to redress his
grievance with regard to payment of salary, the appropriate remedy for the
appellant/petitioner would be to approach before the appropriate civil courts.

6. Admittedly, the institution is not on the grant-in-aid list. There does not
appear to be any doubt that the institution is a Junior High School. The
appellant/petitioner has filed representation on 26.12.2013 before the Regional
Assistant Direction of Education (Basic), Jhansi Region, Jhansi, respondent no.3
regarding payment of salary etc. as applicable to the employees of the recognised
and grant-in-aid institution. The said representation is still pending for
consideration.

7. Be that as it may, any Government order which necessarily gives right to the
appellant/petitioner to get salary etc. As applicable to the employees of the
recognised and grant-in-aid institution to be paid by the management, then the
remedy lies to the appellant/petitioner to approach the concerned authority to pass
appropriate order, directing the management to take necessary steps for payment of
salary to the appellant/petitioner as applicable to the employees of the recognised
and grant-in-aid institution.

8. Accordingly, the appellant/petitioner is directed to approach before the
Regional Assistant Direction of Education (Basic), Jhansi Region, Jhansi, respondent
no.3 with a fresh representation alongwith a copy of this order, who shall consider
and decide the same by a speaking and reasoned order, in accordance with law, after
hearing the management of the institution, within a period of one month from the
date of filing of such representation. However, remedy for the appellant is to
approach civil court for recovery of salary difference as arrears of salary or to
approach the tribunal, if the same is constituted under the law.

9. Since the appellant/petitioner has not made out any new ground in the special
appeal in appellate jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, hence this Court is not
inclined to entertain this special appeal.

10. With the above observations, the special appeal is disposed of.
760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 1.3.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Writ - A No. - 1170 Of 1998

Ram Sharan Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner
Ashok Khare, Shashbind K. Srivastava

Counsel for Respondents
C.S.C.

Petitioner, who is a Sub Inspector in U.P. Police, is aggrieved by an order dated 26th December, 1997,
passed under Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Sub ordinate Ranks (Punishment
and Appeal) Rules, 1991, dismissing him from service, without holding any disciplinary proceedings on
the ground that a chargesheet had been submitted against him by C.B.C.I.D. The short question that
arises for consideration in the facts of the present case is as to whether necessary ingredients existed
on record of the respondents to invoke authority under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Police
Officers of the Sub ordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991?

The exercise of power under Rule 8(2) (b) of the Rules of 1991 has to be based upon consideration of
valid materials available on record, and such a conclusion cannot be drawn merely on surmises and
conjectures. Court is satisfied that no material existed on record of the respondents to invoke its
authority under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. Since the action of dismissal has been taken without
conducting any enquiry in the matter, and the petitioner has been deprived of his right to defend
himself in such an enquiry, dispensation whereof has already been found to be arbitrary, the order
impugned cannot be sustained, and is set aside. petitioner's implication since was the chargesheet
against the petitioner, which has vanished with the order of acquittal, as such, no material exists on
record to proceed departmentally against the petitioner. Sufficiency or otherwise to proceed
departmentally against the petitioner is an aspect, which has to be examined by the department, and
this Court is not required to undertake any such exercise, at the first instance, at this stage.

Court held that it shall be open for the respondent State to proceed to conduct disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner, in case it comes to a conclusion that material exist on record to
proceed departmentally against him.

The writ petition stands allowed.

List of cases cited

1. Pushpendra Singh (C.P. 2187) & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Another [2008 (3) ADJ 689]
2. Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others [2012 (7) ADJ 74]
3. Union of India Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel [AIR 1985 SC 1416]