# Suryadev Pathak v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 898
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-28
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 28215 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Kunal Ravi Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/suryadev-pathak-v-u-o-i-ors-54805
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

A.S.G.I., Anuj Agrawal, C.S.C. Mahendra
Pratap, Pranjal Mehrotra, Rajesh Kumar
Jaiswal

Issue for Consideration
The matter pertains to maintainability of a writ
petition seeking a mandamus for the timebound
disposal
of
arbitration
proceedings
initiated under section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956. The court also has to
examine the applicability of section 29A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 to such
statutory arbitrations and whether the High
court under Article 226 is the appropriate forum
for seeking extensions or directions for these
proceedings.

Headnotes
Civil matter-Constitution of India,1950Article 226- Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,1996-Section 29A- National Highways
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
899
Act, 1956-Section 3G(5)-Maintainability
and Jurisdiction-The existence of specific
statutory remedy under section 29A(4) of
the Arbitration act (approaching a civil
court
for
extension
or
substitution)
precludes the exercise of extraordinary
writ jurisdiction under Article 226-Under
section 29A of the Act 1996 an arbitrator
has a specific statutory timeline (12
months, extendable by 6 months by
consent) to make an award- Once this
period expires, the arbitrator's mandates
terminates by operation of law unless
extended by a competent court-Writ
petition dismissed. (E-6)

Held
The court held that Arbitration proceedings
initiated under the National Highways Act are
governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

## Text

_Characters 0–39,900 of 59,827. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39900 for what follows._

898 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
justification given by the counsel for the
respondent-authority for shifting the pond
under the authority of the Government
Order dated 03.06.2016 has a Shaky
Constitutional
Foundation.
From
the
aforesaid discussion, it is therefore clear
that plot no. 312 which is still recorded as a
pond has not been handed over to the
petitioner.

31. In this view of the matter, the
Court is more than satisfied that claim of
relocation of the pond is both factually
and legally incorrect.

32. In view of the facts as stated
above, it is clear that possession of plot
no.313 and 315 was not handed over to
the petitioner due to the fact that
possession of these plots were not with
the Respondent Noida Authority. Insofar
as the plot no.312 is concerned, it is
clear that the same is still recorded as a
pond in the revenue records.

33. In this view of the matter, the
Court is of the opinion that impugned
order dated 30.08.2024 passed by the
respondent no.1, as well as the order
dated
06.03.2023
passed
by
the
Additional Chief Executive Officer,
Greater Noida Industrial Development
Authority/respondent No.2 (Annexure
Nos. 1 and 2) are liable to be set aside
and is hereby quashed.

34. Mandamus is issued to the
respondents to grant the benefit of zero
period
for
the
entire
duration
commencing from execution of the lease
deed till delivery of actual physical
possession
of
the
entire
land,
in
particular Plot Nos.312, 313 and 315.
The authority shall not levy any lease
rent or interest (delayed or penal
interest) from the petitioner for nonpayment of sums due.

35. With the aforesaid observations,
the writ petition is allowed. No order as to
costs.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 898
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J.

Writ - C No. 28215 of 2025
Alongwith other cases

Suryadev Pathak ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Vishveshwar Mani Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Anuj Agrawal, C.S.C. Mahendra
Pratap, Pranjal Mehrotra, Rajesh Kumar
Jaiswal

Issue for Consideration
The matter pertains to maintainability of a writ
petition seeking a mandamus for the timebound
disposal
of
arbitration
proceedings
initiated under section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956. The court also has to
examine the applicability of section 29A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 to such
statutory arbitrations and whether the High
court under Article 226 is the appropriate forum
for seeking extensions or directions for these
proceedings.

Headnotes
Civil matter-Constitution of India,1950Article 226- Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,1996-Section 29A- National Highways
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
899
Act, 1956-Section 3G(5)-Maintainability
and Jurisdiction-The existence of specific
statutory remedy under section 29A(4) of
the Arbitration act (approaching a civil
court
for
extension
or
substitution)
precludes the exercise of extraordinary
writ jurisdiction under Article 226-Under
section 29A of the Act 1996 an arbitrator
has a specific statutory timeline (12
months, extendable by 6 months by
consent) to make an award- Once this
period expires, the arbitrator's mandates
terminates by operation of law unless
extended by a competent court-Writ
petition dismissed. (E-6)

Held
The court held that Arbitration proceedings
initiated under the National Highways Act are
governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. Consequently the proper forum for
addressing delays or seeking extensions of an
arbitrator's mandate is the competent civil
court, not the High Court through writ
jurisdiction.(Para 6 to 8)

Case law Cited
M/s Pandey & Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of
Bihar and another, State of West Bengal vs.
Associated Contractors, Chief Engineer (NH)
PWD (Roads) vs. M/s BSC & C&C JV6, a NHAI
vs. Sayedabad Tea Co. Omanand Industries vs.
Secretary to the Government of India and
others, Writ-C No.41221 of 2018 (Jai Bahadur
Singh vs. State of U.P. and others), State of
West Bengal vs. Associated Contractors (supra),
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/s BSC
& C&C JV . (Writ C No. 12494 of 2017) (Kotak
Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & 5
Others) Jai Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. and
others (Writ-C No.41221 of 2018) Civil Appeal
No. 6719 of 2012 (Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union
of
India
&
Others)
[2025
INSC 1337],
ThansinghNathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent
of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419.

List of Acts
Constitution of India, 1950, Arbitration and
Conciliation Act,1996, National Highways Act,
1956.

List of Keywords
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, Section
29A- National Highways Act, 1956-Section
3G(5)-Maintainability, Jurisdiction, Arbitration
mandate,
Statutory
Arbitration,
Writ
of
Mandamus,
Land
Acquisition,
Time-bound
Disposal.

Case Arising From
CIVIL JURISDICTION: Writ - C No. 28215of
2025 Alongwith other cases
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.
2025 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad.
Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I.& Ors.

Appearances for Parties

Advs. for the Petitioner:
Vishveshwar Mani Tripathi

Advs. for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Anuj Agrawal, C.S.C. Mahendra Pratap,
Pranjal Mehrotra, Rajesh Kumar Jaiswal

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard learned counsels for the
petitioners, Sri Pranjal Mehrotra, Sri
Raghav Dwivedi and Sri Devendra Kumar,
learned counsels for the respondentNational Highway Authority of India, Sri
Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri
Paras Nath Rai, learned Senior Counsel for
the Union of India.

1.1. Since all the aforesaid writ
petitions involve a common legal issue
concerning the maintainability of writ
petitions seeking mandamus for timebound disposal of arbitration proceedings
under Section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 19561, and the applicability
of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act and
Conciliation, 19962 to such statutory
arbitrations, and with the consent of learned
counsel for the parties, the petitions have
900 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
been clubbed together, heard analogously,
and are being disposed of by this common
judgment.

A. PRAYER:

2. All the above-mentioned writ
petitions have been preferred for a direction
to the respondent - Arbitrator to decide the
respective cases of the petitioners within a
time bound period.

B. FACTS OF THE CASE:-

3. For the purpose of brevity, only the
facts of the leading writ petition, i.e. WRIT
- C No. 28215 of 2025, are being discussed
in detail hereinbelow.

3.1. The petitioner of the leading writ
petition is the recorded owner of several
parcels of land situated in Mauja Bagahi
Bhari, Tappa Bharivasi, Pargana Haveli,
Tehsil Campiorganj, District Gorakhpur,
bearing Arazi No.46 (0.075 hectare), Arazi
No.169 (0.1082 hectare) and Arazi No.269
(0.5747
hectare).
These
lands
were
acquired by the respondents for the
purposes of the Bharat Mala Scheme
relating to the widening and extension of
National
Highway
No.29E
(presently
renumbered as NH-24) from Sunauli Jungle
Kaudiya to Gorakhpur. In connection with
this acquisition, the competent authority,
i.e., the Special Land Acquisition Officer
(respondent no.4), issued a government
notice on 14.07.2022 and a revised notice
on 06.03.2023. As the compensation
assessed for his land was arbitrarily fixed at
an unreasonably low rate and he was
neither paid compensation nor informed of
the basis of assessment, the petitioner filed
a claim petition under Section 3G(5) of the
Act, 1956 before the Arbitrator/District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur (respondent no.3)
on 17.05.2023. Despite more than two
years having elapsed, the said claim
petition, registered as Case No.1176 of
2023
(Computer
Case
No.D202305310001176), has not been
decided. Aggrieved by the inaction and
delay in adjudication of his claim, the
petitioner has invoked the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court seeking a
direction to respondent no.3 - Arbitrator to
decide his claim petition expeditiously
within a time-bound period.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF
OF PETITIONERS:

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the entire acquisition process
undertaken by the respondents is vitiated
for
non-compliance
of
mandatory
provisions
of
the
Right
to
Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 20133. It is argued that
the
notices
dated
14.07.2022
and
06.03.2023 were issued mechanically,
without following due procedure, and
hence cannot be sustained. Learned counsel
further submits that the petitioners right
to property under Article 300-A of the
Constitution
has
been
infringed
by
acquiring his land without proper notice
and
without
payment
of
lawful
compensation.
Moreover,
once
the
petitioner had invoked arbitration under
Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956, it became
the
statutory
obligation
of
the
Arbitrator/District Magistrate to decide the
claim within a reasonable time. The
unexplained delay of over two years,
during which the matter has been adjourned
repeatedly without progress, is arbitrary,
unjust and violative of Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution. It is contended that
speedy justice is an integral part of the
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
901
right to life, and non-disposal of the claim
petition has caused serious financial
hardship to the petitioner who has been
deprived of both land and compensation.
Learned
counsel
argues
that
the
authorities
conduct
reflects
clear
negligence and lack of bona fides,
warranting intervention of this Honble
Court. He lastly submits that since no
effective remedy is available to the
petitioner except to seek directions under
Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court
may kindly direct respondent no.3 -
Arbitrator to decide Case No.1176 of 2023
expeditiously within a fixed time-frame, so
that the petitioner is not subjected to further
irreparable loss and injury.

D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF
OF STATE RESPONDENTS :-

5. Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned
Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar
Pradesh, opposed the writ petition and
submitted that the relief sought by the
petitioner is wholly misconceived and not
maintainable under Article 226 of the
Constitution. He argued that the petitioner
seeks a direction to the Arbitrator/District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur, to conclude the
proceedings under Section 3-G(5) of the
Act, 1956, whereas such a prayer directly
contravenes the statutory scheme governing
arbitration.

5.1. He submitted that Section 3-G(6)
of the National Highways Act expressly
provides that the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply to all
arbitrations conducted under the Act,
1956. Once the Arbitration Act, 1996
applies, any grievance relating to delay in
arbitral proceedings must be addressed
exclusively
under
the
mechanism
provided therein.

5.2.
Learned
Standing
Counsel
emphasized that Section 29A of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 provides a complete
remedy
for
extension
of
time
or
substitution of the Arbitrator, and such an
application can be moved only before the
Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e)(i) of
the Act. He pointed out that the definition
of Court under Section 2(1)(e)(i) is
exhaustive and restricts jurisdiction to the
Principal
Civil
Court
of
original
jurisdiction or the High Court exercising
ordinary original civil jurisdiction having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming
the subject matter of the arbitration if the
same had been the subject-matter of a suit.

5.3. He argued that since the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad does not
exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction,
it cannot exercise powers under Section
29A
of
the
Arbitration
Act,
1996.
Consequently, the High Court cannot issue
a
mandamus
to
the
Arbitrator
for
expeditious disposal of the proceedings
when the statute itself provides a specific
remedy before a competent court.

5.4. In support of his submission, Shri
Ansari relied on several authoritative
judgments. He referred to M/s Pandey &
Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar
and another4, State of West Bengal vs.
Associated Contractors5, and the recent
three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme
Court in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD
(Roads) vs. M/s BSC & C&C JV6, all of
which reiterate that High Courts lacking
ordinary original civil jurisdiction cannot
exercise supervisory powers under the
Arbitration Act, 1996.

5.5. He further placed reliance on the
decision of the Supreme Court in NHAI vs.
Sayedabad Tea Co.7 to submit that the
902 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act, 1956 is a self-contained code so far as
appointment of Arbitrators is concerned,
and therefore invocation of constitutional
remedies is discouraged where the statute
provides a complete scheme. Attention was
also invited to the judgment of the Bombay
High Court in Omanand Industries vs.
Secretary to the Government of India
and others8, which held that once the
Arbitration Act applies to proceedings
under Section 3-G(5), any grievance must
be addressed under the said Act alone and
not through a writ petition.

5.6. He further placed reliance upon
the order dated 03.01.2019 passed in WritC No.41221 of 2018 (Jai Bahadur Singh
vs. State of U.P. and others) and
submitted that in the said case, the
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus
directing the Superintendent Engineer,
acting as arbitrator, to conclude arbitration
proceedings. The arbitrator had entered
reference
on
19.06.2017,
but
the
proceedings remained incomplete. The
learned Single Judge noted that under
Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act, 1996,
the arbitrator had twelve months to make
an award, extendable by six months with
consent of the parties. This period expired
in May 2018, and no consent was given.
Any further extension could only be
granted by the competent civil court, not
the High Court. The petitioner relied on a
previous Division Bench decision, but in
that case the statutory period had not
expired. Since the mandate in the said case
had already lapsed, the High Court held
that no mandamus could be issued and
dismissed the petition.

5.7. On the strength of these statutory
provisions and binding precedents, it was
argued that the writ petition is not
maintainable and no mandamus can be
issued in contravention of the legislative
framework. Learned Standing Counsel
accordingly submitted that the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction as well as on merits.

DD. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF
OF THE RESPONDENT NHAI

5.8. Shri Pranjal Mehrotra, learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
NHAI,
submitted
that
the
writ
petition
is
misconceived and the relief sought is
legally untenable. He argued that the land
in question was acquired strictly in
accordance with the Act, 1956, which is a
complete and special code governing
acquisition, compensation, and statutory
arbitration. He submitted that Section 3G of
the Act, 1956 lays down a self-contained
mechanism
for
determination
of
compensation and resolution of disputes,
and
sub-section
(6)
specifically
incorporates the Arbitration Act, 1996 only
to the extent it is not inconsistent with the
Act, 1956. Thus, the statutory arbitration
conducted by the District Magistrate under
Section 3G(5) does not stand on the same
footing as consensual arbitration under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 and the timelines
prescribed in Section 29A of the 1996 Act
have no application to statutory arbitrations
unless expressly provided. Learned counsel
submitted that the petitioner, instead of
invoking the statutory remedy before the
competent
civil
court
of
original
jurisdiction for extension of time under
Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, has
directly approached this Court, though
Article 226 jurisdiction is not intended to
bypass statutory mechanisms.

5.9. He further submitted that even
assuming that a grievance regarding delay
exists, the proper remedy is not to invoke
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
903
writ jurisdiction but lies within the
statutory scheme itself. However, relying
on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Co.9,
learned
counsel
clarified
that
where
statutory obligations under the Act, 1956
are not discharged, a writ petition is
maintainable only to ensure that the
authority performs its statutory duty. He
submitted that the proceedings before the
Arbitrator are progressing, and delays, if
any,
are
largely
attributable
to
the
petitioners
own
conduct,
repeated
objections, and non-cooperation. It was
thus contended that no mandamus for timebound disposal is warranted in the facts of
the case, and the writ petition deserves to
be dismissed.

E. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:-

6. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties at length and having perused the
record, this Court is called upon to
determine
the
narrow
but
following
significant question of law:

Whether a writ of mandamus can be
issued
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution directing an arbitrator
appointed under Section 3G(5) of the
Act, 1956 to conclude the arbitration
proceedings within a time-bound period,
particularly when Section 29A of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 provides a selfcontained
mechanism
for
seeking
extension of time before the Court as
defined under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996"

6.1 Legislative Framework

6.1.1. Before delving into the merits of
the case, it is essential to understand the
legislative
framework
governing
land
acquisition for national highway projects
and the arbitration mechanism provided
thereunder. The Act, 1956 is a special
enactment that provides for the declaration
and maintenance of certain highways as
national highways. Section 3G of the Act
deals with land acquisition for national
highways
and
the
determination
of
compensation. Section 3G(5) specifically
provides for arbitration in case of disputes
regarding compensation. The said provision
reads as under:

"(5) If the amount determined by
the competent authority under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to
either of the parties, the amount shall, on
an application by either of the parties, be
determined
by
the arbitrator
to
be
appointed by the Central Government.'

6.1.2.
More
importantly,
Section
3G(6) of the Act, 1956 creates a vital link
with the Arbitration Act, 1996 by providing
that:

"(6) Subject to the provisions of
this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)
shall apply to every arbitration under this
Act."

6.1.3.
Once
Section
3G(6)
incorporates
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996 into the statutory
arbitration mechanism under the Act, 1956,
the timeline for making an arbitral award
becomes governed by Section 29A of the
Arbitration
Act,
1996.
Section
29A,
inserted by the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 3 of 2016)
with effect from 23.10.2015 and further
amended
by
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act
33 of 2019) with effect from 30.08.2019,
904 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prescribes
specific
timelines
for
the
completion of arbitration proceedings. The
relevant provisions of Section 29A are as
follows:

"29A. Time limit for arbitral
award. - (1) The award in matters other
than international commercial arbitration
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal
within a period of twelve months from the
date of completion of pleadings under
sub-section (4) of section 23:

Provided that the award in the matter
of international commercial arbitration
may be made as expeditiously as possible
and endeavor may be made to dispose of
the matter within a period of twelve months
from the date of completion of pleadings
under sub-section (4) of section 23.

(2) If the award is made within a
period of six months from the date the
arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference,
the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to
receive such amount of additional fees as
the parties may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent,
extend the period specified in sub-section
(1) for making award for a further period
not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made
within the period specified in sub-section
(1) or the extended period specified under
sub-section (3), the mandate of the
arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the
Court has, either prior to or after the
expiry of the period so specified, extended
the period:

Provided that while extending the
period under this sub-section, if the Court
finds that the proceedings have been
delayed for the reasons attributable to the
arbitral tribunal, then, it may order
reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not
exceeding five per cent. for each month of
such delay.

Provided further that where an
application
under
sub-section
(5)
is
pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall
continue till the disposal of the said
application:

Provided also that the arbitrator
shall be given an opportunity of being
heard before the fees is reduced.

(5) The extension of period
referred to in sub-section (4) may be on
the application of any of the parties and
may be granted only for sufficient cause
and on such terms and conditions as may
be imposed by the Court.

(6) While extending the period
referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be
open to the Court to substitute one or all
of the arbitrators and if one or all of the
arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral
proceedings shall continue from the stage
already reached and on the basis of the
evidence and material already on record,
and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this
section shall be deemed to have received
the said evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s)
being appointed under this section, the
arbitral
tribunal
thus
reconstituted
shall be deemed to be in continuation of
the
previously
appointed
arbitral
tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court
to impose actual or exemplary costs upon
any of the parties under this section.
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
905

(9) An application filed under
sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the
Court as expeditiously as possible and
endeavour shall be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of sixty days from
the date of service of notice on the opposite
party."

(Emphasis supplied)

6.1.4. The definition of "Court" under
the Arbitration Act, 1996 is crucial for
determining which forum has jurisdiction
to entertain applications under Section
29A(4) for extension of the mandate of the
arbitrator.
Section
2(1)(e)(i)
of
the
Arbitration Act, 1996 defines "Court" as:

"(e)"Court" means "

(i) in the case of an arbitration
other
than
international
commercial
arbitration, the principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction in a district, and
includes the High Court in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction
to
decide
the
questions
forming
the
subject-matter
of
the
arbitration if the same had been the
subject-matter of a suit, but does not
include any Civil Court of a grade inferior
to such principal Civil Court, or any Court
of Small Causes;"

(Emphasis supplied)

6.2 Jurisdictional Bar

6.2.1. The first and foremost
question that requires consideration is
whether this Court, in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, can direct the Arbitrator to
conclude
the
arbitration
proceedings,
especially when a specific statutory remedy
is provided under Section 29A(4) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996, which can be
invoked before the competent civil court.

6.2.2. It is well settled that the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution is not meant to be
exercised when an adequate, efficacious
and
alternative
statutory
remedy
is
available. The constitutional courts have
consistently held that the existence of an
alternative remedy is a bar to the exercise
of writ jurisdiction, though not an absolute
bar. However, when the statute itself
prescribes a specific forum and a specific
mechanism for redressal of a particular
grievance, the High Court, while exercising
its writ jurisdiction, must be extremely
cautious not to usurp the jurisdiction vested
in the statutory forum.

6.2.3. In the present case, the
legislative intent is clear and unambiguous.
The Parliament, while enacting Section
29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996, has
specifically designated the "Court" as
defined in Section 2(1)(e)(i) as the
competent
authority
to
entertain
applications for extension of the mandate
of the arbitrator beyond the stipulated
period. The definition of "Court" is
exhaustive and does not include High
Courts that do not exercise ordinary
original civil jurisdiction. The High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad admittedly does
not
exercise
ordinary
original
civil
jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court cannot
take over or exercise the powers that the
law has specifically given to the proper
civil court.

6.2.4.
The
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court in M/s Pandey & Co. Builders Pvt.
Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and another
(supra) has categorically held that High
Courts which do not have ordinary original
906 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
civil jurisdiction cannot exercise powers
under the Arbitration Act, 1996. The ratio
of this decision squarely applies to the facts
of the present case. Similarly, in State of
West Bengal vs. Associated Contractors
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated the same principle and held that
the
supervisory
powers
under
the
Arbitration Act are vested exclusively in
the courts defined under Section 2(1)(e)(i).

6.2.5. More recently, the theeJudge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs.
M/s BSC & C&C JV (supra) has
authoritatively settled the position that
when the Arbitration Act, 1996 applies to
statutory arbitrations, the jurisdiction to
extend the mandate of the arbitrator vests
exclusively with the court as defined in the
Act, and not with the High Court exercising
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution.

6.3 Expiry of Statutory Period
and Appropriate Forum

6.3.1. In the present leading case,
the petitioner filed his claim petition under
Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 on
17.05.2023. Therefore, in terms of Section
29A(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the
arbitral award ought to have been made
within twelve months from the date when
the arbitrator entered upon the reference,
i.e., by May 2024. Under Section 29A(3),
this period could be extended for a further
period of six months, but only with the
consent of the parties. Admittedly, no such
consent has been placed on record.

6.3.2. Once the period of twelve
months plus the additional six months (i.e.,
eighteen months in total) has expired
without any extension having been granted
by the competent court, the mandate of the
arbitrator stands exhausted in terms of
Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act,
1996. After expiry of the mandate, the
arbitrator becomes functus officio and loses
the authority to continue with the arbitral
proceedings unless the mandate is extended
by an order of the competent court under
Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5)
and Section 29A(6).

6.3.3. In the present leading case,
more than two years have elapsed since the
filing of the claim petition. Even if we
generously construe the timelines, the
statutory period of eighteen months (twelve
months plus six months) has long since
expired.
In
such
circumstances,
the
mandate of the arbitrator has lapsed, and he
cannot be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to decide the matter unless his
mandate is first restored by the competent
civil court in accordance with law.

6.3.4. The petitioner has placed
reliance on a Division Bench decision of
this Court dated 08.05.2017 passed in Writ
C No. 12494 of 2017 (Kotak Mahindra
Bank Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & 5 Others)
wherein the Division Bench had extended
the mandate of the arbitrator by exercising
writ jurisdiction. However, on a careful
reading of that judgment, it is evident that
in that case, the period of eighteen months
had not expired when the writ petition was
filed. The Division Bench specifically
noted that the petitioner had approached the
Court before the expiry of the statutory
period, and therefore, in the interest of
substantial justice and to avoid further
litigation, the mandate was extended. The
Division Bench itself acknowledged that
ordinarily the power to extend time is
available with the court of original
jurisdiction, but in the facts of that case,
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
907
where the statutory period had not yet
expired,
the
Court
exercised
its
extraordinary jurisdiction.

6.3.5. With utmost respect to the
Division
Bench
decision
in
Kotak
Mahindra Bank (supra), this Court is of
the considered opinion that even in cases
where the statutory period of eighteen
months has not yet expired, the appropriate
forum for seeking extension of time or for
seeking directions for expeditious disposal
of arbitration proceedings is the competent
civil court as defined under Section
2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and
not this Court in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The reason is simple: the
statute itself has provided a complete
mechanism under Section 29A for dealing
with delays in arbitration proceedings and
has designated a specific forum for
entertaining applications for extension of
mandate. Once the legislative intent is
clear, this Court should ordinarily refrain
from
exercising
its
extraordinary
jurisdiction and direct the parties to avail
the statutory remedy.

6.3.6. The situation in the
present leading case is directly covered
by the decision in Jai Bahadur Singh vs.
State of U.P. and others (Writ-C
No.41221
of
2018)
decided
on
03.01.2019, wherein the learned Single
Judge held that once the statutory period
of eighteen months has expired, no
mandamus can be issued by the High
Court directing the arbitrator to conclude
the proceedings. Any extension of time
beyond the statutory period can only be
granted by the competent civil court upon
a
proper
application
under
Section
29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This
Court
respectfully
agrees
with
and
follows the reasoning and conclusion in
Jai Bahadur Singh (supra).

6.3.7. Furthermore, this Court is
of the firm view that the principle laid
down in Jai Bahadur Singh (supra)
should not be confined only to cases
where the statutory period has already
expired. The same principle should apply
with equal force even to cases where the
statutory period has not yet expired. The
underlying rationale is that Section 29A
of the Arbitration Act, 1996 itself
provides the complete machinery for
addressing grievances relating to delay in
arbitral proceedings, and the competent
civil court is the designated forum for
entertaining such applications. Therefore,
whether the statutory period has expired
or not, the proper course of action for an
aggrieved party is to approach the
competent
civil
court
under
the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996,
and not to invoke the writ jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, except in cases of proven
mala fides, gross abuse of power, or
complete breakdown of the statutory
machinery.

6.3.8. In its recent judgment dated
12.11.2025 in Civil Appeal No. 6719 of
2012 (Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of
India & Others) [2025 INSC 1337], the
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
considered
the
challenge to the judgment and order dated
14.03.2011 passed by the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench,
whereby the appellant's writ petition had
been dismissed on the grounds that he
failed to pursue the alternative statutory
remedy of appeal available under the
Customs Act, 1962, and also on merits.
While deciding the appeal, the Hon'ble
Apex Court also examined the Constitution
908 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v.
A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR
1964 SC 1419. For ready reference,
paragraph 10 of the said judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:

"10. We may profitably refer, in
this context, to the Constitution Bench
decision inThansingh Nathmal v. A.
Mazid,
Superintendent
of
Taxes.InThansingh Nathmal(supra),
this Court had the occasion to lay down a
principle of law which is salutary and not
to be found in any other previous decision
rendered by it. The principle, plainly, is
that, if a remedy is available to a party
before
the
high
court
in
another
jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not
normally be exercised on a petition
underArticle 226, for, that would allow
the machinery set up by the concerned
statute to be bye-passed. The relevant
passage from the decision reads as follows:

"The jurisdiction of the High
Court
underarticle
226of
the
Constitution is couched in wide terms and
the exercise thereof is not subject to any
restrictions
except
the
territorial
restrictions which are expressly provided in
the article. But the exercise of the
jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not
exercised merely because it is lawful to do
so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction
demands that it will ordinarily be exercised
subject to certain self-imposed limitations.
Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as
an alternative remedy for relief which may
be obtained in a suit or other mode
prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court
will not entertain a petition for a writ
underarticle 226, where the petitioner
has an alternative remedy, which, without
being unduly onerous, provides an equally
efficacious remedy. Again the High Court
does
not
generally
enter
upon
a
determination of questions which demand
an elaborate examination of evidence to
establish the right to enforce which the writ
is claimed. The High Court does not
therefore act as a court of appeal against
the decision of a court or tribunal, to
correct errors of fact, and does not by
assuming
jurisdiction
underarticle
226trench upon an alternative remedy
provided by statute for obtaining relief.
Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner
to move another tribunal, or even itself in
another jurisdiction for obtaining redress
in the manner provided by a statute, the
High Court normally will not permit, by
entertaining
a
petition
underarticle
226of the Constitution, the machinery
created under the statute to be by-passed,
and will leave the party applying to it to
seek resort to the machinery so set up."

6.4 Nature of Statutory Arbitration

6.4.1. Learned counsel for the
respondent - NHAI has rightly submitted
that the arbitration under Section 3G(5) of
the Act, 1956 is a statutory arbitration and
not a consensual arbitration. Although
Section 3G(6) makes the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 applicable to such
arbitrations, it does so subject to the
overriding provisions of the Act, 1956. The
arbitrator in such cases is appointed by the
statute itself and not by agreement between
the parties.

6.4.2. In NHAI vs. Sayedabad
Tea Co. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that the Act, 1956 is a selfcontained code insofar as the appointment
of
arbitrators
and
determination
of
compensation is concerned. The Court held
that the provisions of the Act, 1956 must be
read harmoniously with the Arbitration
11 All. Suryadev Pathak Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
909
Act, 1996, and where there is any
inconsistency, the provisions of the special
Act (i.e., the National Highways Act)
would
prevail.
For
ready
reference,
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment
is reproduced hereinbelow:

"18. After analysing the scheme,
it can be assumed that the legislature
intended the 1956 Act to act as a complete
code in itself for the purpose of acquisition
until culmination including disbursement
and for settlement of disputes and this
conclusion is further strengthened in view
of Section 3-J of the Act which eliminates
the application of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, to an acquisition under the 1956 Act.

19. It is settled principles of law
that when the special law sets out a selfcontained code, the application of general
law would impliedly be excluded. In the
instant case, the scheme of the 1956 Act
being a special law enacted for the purpose
and for appointment of an arbitrator by the
Central Government under Section 3-G(5)
of the 1956 Act and sub-section (6) of
Section 3-G itself clarifies that subject to
the provisions of the 1956 Act, the
provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply to
every arbitration obviously to the extent
where the 1956 Act is silent, the arbitrator
may take recourse in adjudicating the
dispute invoking the provisions of the 1996
Act for the limited purpose. But so far as
the appointment of an arbitrator is
concerned, the power being exclusively
vested with the Central Government as
envisaged under subsection (5) of Section
3-G of the 1956 Act, Section 11 of the 1996
Act has no application."

6.4.3. The judgment in Omanand
Industries
vs.
Secretary
to
the
Government of India and others (supra)
rendered by the Bombay High Court also
supports the proposition that once the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is made applicable to
proceedings under Section 3G(5), any
grievance relating to the conduct of
arbitration, including delay, must be
addressed under the said Act and not
through a writ petition. The Bombay High
Court categorically held that the remedy of
approaching the competent civil court
under Section 29A is the appropriate
remedy and the High Court should not
entertain writ petitions seeking mandamus
for expeditious disposal of arbitration
proceedings.
For
ready
reference,
paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment
is reproduced hereinbelow:

"16. There is no doubt, a
difference between the procedure laid down
in the appeals to be dealt with under the
L.A. Act and the RFCTLARR Act on the one
hand and the N.Η. Act on the other, all of
which relates to acquisition of land,
inasmuch as the N.H. Act applies the A & C
Act to matters before the Arbitrator,
because of which the course of action to be
followed in matters governed by the N.H.
Act, after the award by the Arbitrator has
to be the one as contemplated by the A & C
Act. That however, is something which
cannot be avoided, for if a matter is
governed by a particular statute, then what
is provided in the statute, has to be the
course of action which the matter has to
follow in case a litigant desires to agitate it
further. Different ways a matter has to take
while in its journey, based upon the
remedies for challenges to the higher
forums the statute provides and the
parameters for such challenges. The scope
and parameters for such challenges also
goes on reducing as a higher forum is to be
approached, for that is the very basis of the
hierarchical form of system without which
910 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the system may not work at all. That too,
such statute govern the same subject matter
i.e. acquisition of land in this case but
provided for different ways in which to deal
with matters thereunder including the right
to
challenge
in
higher
forums
and
narrowing down the parameters for such
challenges, cannot be a ground to create
an additional remedy by invoking the writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution.

17. Thus since the National
Highways Act, is a special statute and
provides for a remedy, for such acquisition,
by permitting the filing of an application
under section 34 of the A & C Act, against
the award passed by the Arbitrator under
Section 3-G (5) of the N.H.