# Sushil Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 1854
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-08-02
- **Case number:** C No. 16951 of 2019, 16956 of 2019 and 16960 of 2019
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sushil-kumar-jain-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44682
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Section 56 (1A), Section 57 & Section 56 (1-A) - confers
right of appeal only to party to the lis -
Petitioner not party, therefore appeal not
maintainable
and
consequently,
application u/s 57 of the Act-for making
reference not maintainable.

Writ Petition rejected (E-9)

Held:- A plain reading of Section 56 (1-A)
clearly suggests that it is only those who are
party to the lis have been conferred the right
of appeal and, therefore, in the opinion of the
Court, the appeal on behalf of the petitioner
against the order dated 02.11.2018 passed by
the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut
was not maintainable as petitioner was not a
party in proceeding under Section 47-A of the
Act, 1899 before Assistant Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut. Since appeal on behalf of
petitioner was not maintainable, therefore, in
the opinion of the Court, application under
Section 57 of the Act, 1899 on behalf of
petitioner was also not maintainable. (Para
26)

B. Under the scheme of the Act, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred
that the words 'otherwise coming to its
notice' used in Section 57 (1) of the Act,
1899 can be stretched to such an extent
so as to include within its periphery any
person and not only the persons who are
party to the lis. (Para 29)

List of Cases Cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,917 of 43,571. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39917 for what follows._

1854 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
figures were collated are not even
mentioned. The assertions made in
paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this affidavit
have been sworn on personal knowledge
and as per the deponent "on the basis of
information available on website, having
link of the Business Standard" as stated in
paragraph 7 of that affidavit. It is thus
evident that the assertions made in this
affidavit are devoid of material particulars
and remain unsubstantiated. The Court
consequently finds itself unable to either
countenance or accept the submissions
addressed in this regard.

21. On an overall conspectus of the
aforesaid facts, this Court is of the
considered view that the instant writ petition
lacks merit and that the challenge to the
impugned order must necessarily fail.

22. The writ petition is consequently
dismissed.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1854

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.08.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 16942 of 2019 connected with Writ
C No. 16951 of 2019, 16956 of 2019 and
16960 of 2019

Sushil Kumar Jain ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, Sri Rahul Jain.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Section 56 (1A), Section 57 & Section 56 (1-A) - confers
right of appeal only to party to the lis -
Petitioner not party, therefore appeal not
maintainable
and
consequently,
application u/s 57 of the Act-for making
reference not maintainable.

Writ Petition rejected (E-9)

Held:- A plain reading of Section 56 (1-A)
clearly suggests that it is only those who are
party to the lis have been conferred the right
of appeal and, therefore, in the opinion of the
Court, the appeal on behalf of the petitioner
against the order dated 02.11.2018 passed by
the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut
was not maintainable as petitioner was not a
party in proceeding under Section 47-A of the
Act, 1899 before Assistant Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut. Since appeal on behalf of
petitioner was not maintainable, therefore, in
the opinion of the Court, application under
Section 57 of the Act, 1899 on behalf of
petitioner was also not maintainable. (Para
26)

B. Under the scheme of the Act, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred
that the words 'otherwise coming to its
notice' used in Section 57 (1) of the Act,
1899 can be stretched to such an extent
so as to include within its periphery any
person and not only the persons who are
party to the lis. (Para 29)

List of Cases Cited: -

1. Akhlaq Vs St. of U.P. & ors. (2019) (3) ADJ
378.

2. Raymond Ltd. & anr. Vs St. of C.H. & ors.
AIR (2007) SC 2854

3. Northern Plastics Ltd. Vs Hindustan Photo
Films MFG Co. Ltd. (1997) 4 SCC 452

4. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs St. of
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1855
M.H. & ors. AIR (2013) SC 58

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

2. The issue involved in the bunch
of petition is as to whether a stranger or
third party can be said to be an aggrieved
person by an order passed by competent
authority in a proceeding under Section
47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899
(hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1899') and
has
locus-
standi
to
maintain
an
application under Section 57 of the Act,
1899 in the context of word 'otherwise
coming to its notice' used in Section 57
(1) of the Act, 1899, and on such an
application being filed, whether the Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority is under
obligation to make reference to the High
Court.

3. For the convenience, the facts are
delineated from Writ - C No. 16942 of
2019.

4. The case of the petitioner is that
he is the owner and in possession of
Khasra No.2765 (1 bigha 3 biswa), 2767
(6 bigha 1 biswa and 1 kothi), 2768 (3
biswa), 2769 (4 biswa), 2770 (3 bigha 5
biswa) in total 10 bigha and 17 biswa or
27439.65 square meters of land. One Mr.
Deep Chand Jain, Vijai Kumar Jain (S/o
Deep Chand Jain), Gopi Chand Jain and
Akshay Kumar Jain (S/o Gopi Chand
Jain) also had share in the aforesaid
khasra. According to the petitioner, a
family
settlement
was
entered
into
between the parties on 08.05.1977 in
which 7941.06 square meter of the land in
the south came to the share of Deep
Chand Jain, Vijay Kumar Jain, Gopi
Chand Jain, and Akshay Kumar Jain.
After the death of Deep Chand Jain and
Vijay Kumar Jain, the aforesaid portion
was inherited by Smt. Vaishalya Jain
widow of late Vijay Kumar Jain and his
sons Atul Kumar and Sanjay Jain. The
petitioner was given 19498.60 square
meter in the north of the aforesaid khasra
as per the settlement.

5. The further case of the petitioner is
that Smt. Vaishalya Jain and her son after long
span of time of family settlement expressed
their desire that they are entitled to more share
in the aforesaid plots and Smt. Vaishalya Jain
and Sanjay Jain illegally without having any
title sold an area of 0.2386 hectare in favour of
respondent no.3 Ravindra Kumar Tyagi by
registered sale deed executed on 21.07.2015
which in fact was given to the petitioner under
family settlement deed dated 08.05.1977.

6. From the pleadings in the writ
petition, it appears that petitioner has
obtained an exparte decree of injunction
dated 28.04.2017 with respect to the land
for which sale deed has been executed,
and the said decree has been put in
execution by filing Case No. 615 of 2015.

7. It transpires from the record that a
case No. 225 of 2017-18 (computerized
No. D-2017115203148) was registered on
the
report
of
sub-Registrar
dated
11.11.2016 for deficiency of stamp duty
against respondent no.3. The Assistant
Collector
(Stamp)/Collector
(Stamp),
Meerut determined the stamp deficiency
at Rs.50,290/- by order dated 02.11.2018
on the basis of report dated 21.12.2017
submitted by Assistant Inspector General
Registration, Meerut, .

8. The respondent no.3 feeling
aggrieved by order dated 02.11.2018
1856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
passed
by
Assistant
Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut in Case No. 225 of 201718 (computerized No. D-2017115203148)
preferred statutory appeal before Deputy
Commissioner (Stamp) Meerut Division,
Meerut which was numbered as Case No.
02385
of
2018
(computerized
no.
C201811000002385).

9. The petitioner, though, was not a
party before the Assistant Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut preferred statutory appeal
No.C201911000000162
challenging
the
order dated 02.11.2018 in Case No. 225 of
2017-18
(computerized
No.
D2017115203148) wherein he contended that
respondent
no.3
in
collusion
with
respondents authorities have evaded huge
stamp duty. The petitioner in the said appeal
also preferred an application in the month of
March, 2019 under Section 57 of the Act,
1899 seeking reference to the High Court on
the following questions:-

"1. क्ा जिलाजधकारी महोदय
द्वारा जनधाचररत जकचल रेट अिंकन ९०००/- रुपये
प्रजत वगच मीटर होने के पिात् ब रजििरार मेरठ
को उ े कम दर पर िाम्प की गड़ना करने का
अजधकार प्राप्त हैं, या नहीिं?

२. क्ा प्रश्नगत िंपजत्त की दर
जिलाजधकारी महोदय द्वारा जनधाचररत जकचल रेट के
अनु ार ९०००/- प्रजत वगच मीटर होती हैं या नहीिं?

३. क्ा भूजम आबादी की होने व
नगरपाजलका के ३५० मीटर पररजध के अिंदर होने
के कारण शा नदेश के अनुपालन में आबादी
की दर देय थी या नहीिं?

४. क्ा एक ही ज़मीन के दो अलग
अलग दरोिं के गड़ना करके बैनाम जनष्पाजदत
करके रजििरार महोदय द्वारा त्रुजट की गयी हैं?

10. According to petitioner, the land
in question is an abadi land within the
urban area and, therefore, stamp duty in
respect of aforesaid land is chargeable @ Rs.
9000 per square meter applicable to
residential land whereas the stamp duty @
Rs. 8,000/- per square meter applicable to the
agricultural land was paid by the respondent
no.3. Thus, respondent no.3 has evaded huge
stamp duty by paying the stamp duty
applicable to the agriculture land treating the
land in question as agriculture land.

11. The appeal of the petitioner was
connected with the appeal of respondent
no.3 and both the appeals came to be
decided by the Deputy Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut Division, Meerut by order
dated 15.03.2019 whereby the appellate
authority affirmed the order of the Assistant
Commissioner
(Stamp),
Meerut
and
dismissed the appeal of the respondent no.3
as well appeal of the petitioner. While
dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, the
appellate authority recorded a finding that
application under Section 57 of the Act,
1899 has been filed by the petitioner only
for the purpose of delay in disposal of
appeal and accordingly, the appellate
authority has rejected the application dated
13.03.2019/14.03.2019 of the petitioner
under Section 57 of the Act, 1899. The
appellate authority further held that though
petitioner has contended in the appeal that
the order of the Assistant Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut is against the settled
principles of law and without application of
judicial mind but the appellant/petitioner
could not establish on record that the order
of the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp),
Meerut dated 02.11.2018 is not as per law.
Accordingly, on merit also the appellate
authority found that case of petitioner is not
sustainable in law, and consequently, it
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

12. The petitioner in the present
petition has challenged the order of the
appellate authority dated 15.03.2019 only
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1857
to the extent by which his application
under Section 57 of the Act, 1899 has
been rejected which is also evident from
the prayer made by the petitioner in the
writ petition which is extracted herein
below:-

"Issue a writ order or direction
in nature of certiorari quashing the part
of order dated 15.03.2019 where by the
application under section 57 of the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899 has been dismissed by
respondent no.2 (Annexure-1)"

13. Challenging the aforesaid order,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
contends that appellate court has erred in
law in rejecting the application of the
petitioner on the ground that the petitioner
in order to delay the disposal of appeal
has filed the application under Section 57
of the Act, 1899 without appreciating the
facts on record which clearly establishes
that it was a case of evasion of heavy
stamp duty by the respondent no.3 and a
clear case of reference under Section 57
was made out, and therefore,the appellate
authority was bound to refer the matter to
the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority,
who under Section 57 of the Act, 1899
was
under
obligation
to
refer
the
questions framed in the said application to
the High Court.

14. He further submits that Section
57 of the Act, 1899 envisages two modes
to make reference. The first one is
provided under Section 56(2) of the Act,
1899 and second is by virtue of words
'otherwise coming to its notice' used in
Section 57(1) of the Act, 1899. According
to the petitioner, he derives his locus to
file application for reference from the
words 'otherwise coming to its notice' in
Section 57 (1) of the Act, 1899 and thus,
he contends that anybody who finds a
case of evasion of stamp duty can bring to
the notice of Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority by filing application under
Section 57 of the Act, 1899, and once it
has come to the notice of Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority that there
is evasion of stamp duty and there is
substantial question of law, an obligation
is imposed upon the Chief Revenue
Controlling Authority to refer the matter
to the High Court. Thus, the submission
of learned counsel for the petitioner is that
an application of petitioner under Section
57 of the Act, 1899 was maintainable, and
the appellate authority has erred in
dismissing the application of petitioner
under Section 57 of the Act, 1899. In
support of his contention, learned counsel
for the petitioner has placed reliance upon
the judgement of this Court in the case of
Akhlaq Vs. State of U.P. & Others
2019(3) ADJ 378.

15.

Rebutting
the
aforesaid
submission, learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel contends that petitioner
is not an aggrieved person and as such he
has no locus standi to file an application
under Section 57 of the Act, 1899.
According to him, the words 'otherwise
coming to its notice' used in Section 57
(1) of the Act connotes only those who
are party to the proceeding meaning
thereby that besides the State Authority,
the person against whom stamp duty is
imposed is also provided a remedy under
Section 57 (1) of the Act, 1899 for
reference of his case to the High Court if
any substantial question of law is
involved. He further submits that the
words "otherwise coming to its notice' is
to be interpreted in the context of the
scheme of the Act and legislature has
taken due care to protect the interest of
1858 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the State from evasion of stamp duty as
right of appeal is also provided to the
Government under Section 56(1-A) of the
Act, 1899 and thus, the words "otherwise
coming to its notice' cannot be stretched
to an extent to bring within its compass
the person who is not a party to lis. In
support of his aforesaid submission, he
has placed reliance upon the judgement of
Apex Court in the case of Raymond Ltd.
& Another Vs. State of Chhatisgarh and
Others AIR 2007 SC 2854.

16.

He
further
submits
that
petitioner is not a bona fide litigant
inasmuch as it is clear from the pleadings
in the writ petition that petitioner has
obtained some exparte injunction decree
against respondent no.3, and to settle his
personal score, he has preferred the
appeal against the order dated 02.11.2018
and filed application under Section 57 in
the said appeal. He submits that it is
settled principles of law that a person who
is espousing a cause of public interest
should not have any personal interest in
espousing the said cause, and in the
present case, it is evident from the
pleadings in the writ petition that the
petitioner has personal grievance against
respondent no.3, therefore, the appeal as
well as application under Section 57 of
the Act, 1899 preferred by the petitioner
was not bona fide and deserves to be
dismissed on this ground also.

17. I have considered the rival
submissions of the parties and perused the
record of the case.

18. Before adverting to the rival
submissions of the parties, it is pertinent
to have glance at Sections 56 and 57 of
the Act, 1899 which are extracted herein
below:-

"56 Control of and statement
of case to Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority-(1) The powers exercisable by
a Collector under Chapter IV and
Chapter V and under clause (a) of the
first proviso to section 26 shall in all
cases be subject to the control of the Chief
Controlling Revenue-authority.

(1-A) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other provisions of this
Act, any person including the Government
aggrieved by an order of the Collector
under Chapter IV, Chapter V or under
clause (a) of the first proviso to Section
26 may, within sixty days from the date of
receipt of such order, prefer an appeal
against
such
order
to
the
Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority, who shall,
after giving the parties a reasonable
opportunity of being heard consider the
case and pass such order thereon as he
thinks just and proper and the order so
passed shall be final:

Provided that no application for
stay or recovery of any disputed amount
of stamp duty including interest thereon
or penalty shall be entertained unless the
applicant has furnished satisfactory proof
of the payment of not less than one-third
of such disputed amount:

Provided further that where the
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority passes
an order for the stay of recovery of any
stamp duty, interest thereon or penalty or
for the stay of the operation of any order
appealed against and such order results in
the stay of recovery of any stamp duty,
interest thereon or penalty, such stay order
shall not remain in force for more than
thirty days unless the appellant furnishes
adequate security to the satisfaction of the
Collector concerned for the payment of the
outstanding amount].

(2) If any Collector, acting
under section 31, section 40 or section 41,
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1859
feels doubt as to the amount of duty with
which any instrument is chargeable, he
may draw up a statement of the case, and
refer it, with his own opinion thereon, for
the decision of the Chief Controlling
Revenue-authority.

...

57. Statement of case by Chief
Controlling Revenue-authority to High
Court. -- (1) The Chief Controlling
Revenue-authority may state any case
referred to it under section 56, subsection (2), or otherwise coming to its
notice, and refer such case, with its own
opinion thereon, --

[(a) if it arises in a State, to the
High Court for that State;

[(b) if it arises in the Union
territory of Delhi, to the High Court of
Delhi;

[(c) if it arises in the Union
territory
of
Arunachal
Pradesh
or
Mizoram, to the Gauhati High Court (the
High
Court
of
Assam,
Nagaland,
Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura)];

(d) if it arises in the Union
territory of the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, to the High Court at Calcutta; and

(e) if it arises in the Union
territory of the [Lakshadweep], to the
High Court of Kerala];

(ee) if it arises in the Union
territory of Chandigarh, to the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana;

[(f) if it arises in the Union
territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, to
the High Court of Bombay.]

(2) Every such case shall be
decided by not less than three Judges of
the High Court 1*** to which it is
referred, and in case of difference the
opinion of the majority shall prevail."

19. Section 56 (1-A) provides appeal
by any person including the Government
aggrieved by an order of the Collector
under Chapter IV, Chapter V or under
clause (a) of the first proviso to Section
26 to the Chief Controlling Revenue
Officer. Thus, the legislature has taken
due care to safeguard the interest of the
State in case of evasion of stamp duty by
conferring the power of appeal upon the
Government against the order of Collector
under the chapter IV & V or clause (a) of
first proviso to Section 26.

20. Further, as per Section 56(2) if
the Collector, acting under section 31,
section 40 or section 41, feels doubt as to
the amount of duty with which any
instrument is chargeable, he may draw a
statement of the case and refer it with his
own opinion for the decision of Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority. Thus,
Section 56(2) postulates another mode of
determination of the amount of duty
chargeable on any instrument by Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority in case of
any doubt about the amount of duty
chargeable on the said instrument.

21. Section 57(1) envisages two
modes
when
the Chief
Controlling
Revenue Authority can make reference to
the High Court. Firstly, if any case is
referred to him by the Collector under
Section 56(2), and the secondly the cases
which 'otherwise coming to its notice'. In
the context of the present case, one of the
pertinent
question
which
arises
for
consideration is as to whether the appeal
under Section 56(1-A) by the petitioner
against the order dated 02.11.2018 passed
by Assistant Commissioner (Stamp),
Meerut in Case No. 225 of 2017-18
(computerized No. D-2017115203148)
was maintainable and if not, whether the
application under Section 57 of the Act,
1899 could be filed by the petitioner in an
1860 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal which was not maintainable on his
behalf.

22. To appreciate the question as to
whether the appeal could be filed by the
petitioner against the order of the
Assistant Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut
dated 02.11.2018, it would be useful to
refer the judgement of the Apex Court in
the case of Northern Plastics Ltd. Vs.
Hindustan Photo Films MFG Co. Ltd.
(1997) 4 SCC 452. In the said case,
appellant (Northern Plastics Ltd.) was
allowed by the order passed by the
Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay
dated 05.06.1989 whereby he agreed with
the notings made by the Assistant
Collector of Customs, Bombay dated
31.05.1989 recommending the release of
the imported goods to the appellant on
payment of full custom duty. The
aforesaid order was challenged by one
M/s Hindustan Photo Films MFG Co. Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as 'HPF') and also
by Union of India in several legal
proceedings.
However,
having
not
succeeded in those proceedings, HPF and
Union of India preferred separate appeals
challenging the order dated 05.06.1989
passed by the Assistant Collector of
Customs, Bombay before the Customs,
Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
'CEGAT') under Section 129-A of the
Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as 'Act, 1962'). The CEGAT held the
appeals preferred by the HPF as well as
Union of India not maintainable on the
ground that they do not fall within the
ambit of words 'any person aggrieved'
used in Section 129-A of the Act, 1962,
and consequently, it dismissed both the
appeals. The HPF as well as Union of
India preferred two writ petitions against
the order of CEGAT dismissing the
appeal, and the High Court allowed the
writ petition of HPF as well as Union of
India holding that appeal on behalf of
HPF as well as Union of India was
maintainable.

23.
Feeling
aggrieved
by
the
judgement of the High Court in the two
writ petitions, the appellant (Northern
Plastics Ltd.) preferred Special Leave
Petition before the Apex Court. The Apex
Court after considering the scheme of the
Act, 1962 affirmed the order passed by
the CEGAT holding appeal of Union of
India and the HPF not maintainable. The
Apex Court also held that principle
underlying in respect of concept of locus
standi in public interest litigation filed
before Apex Court under Article 32 of
Constitution of India or under Article 226
of Constitution of India before High Court
cannot be imported for deciding the right
of appeal under the statutory provisions
contained in the Customs Act, 1962. The
Apex Court further held that only those
permitted by the statute to prefer appeal
can exercise the right of appeal subject to
the conditions regarding filing of such
appeals. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
aforesaid judgement are being extracted
herein below:-

"8. At the outset it must be kept
in view that appeal is a creature of
statute. The right to appeal has to be
exercised by persons permitted by the
statute to prefer appeals subject to the
conditions regarding the filing of such
appeals. We may in this connection
usefully refer to a decision of four learned
judge of this Court in the case of The
Anant Mills Co. Ltd. etc. etc. v. State of
Gujarat & others etc. etc. [AIR 1975 SC
1234 = (1975) 2 SCC 175]. In that case
Khanna, J., speaking for the Court had to
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1861
consider
the
question
whether
the
provision of statutory appeal as per
Section
406(2)(e)
of
the
Bombay
Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,
1949 which required the appellant to
deposit the disputed amount of tax before
appeal could be entertained could be said
to be in any way violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. Repelling the
aforesaid challenge to the vires of the
said provision the following pertinent
observations were made in para 40 of the
Report :

"...The right of appeal is the
creature of a statute. Without a statutory
provision creating such a right the person
aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal.
We fail to understand as to why the
Legislature while granting the right of
appeal cannot impose conditions for the
exercise of such right. In the absence of
any special reasons there appears to be
no legal or constitutional impediment to
the imposition of such conditions. It is
permissible, for example, to prescribe a
condition in criminal cases that unless a
convicted person is released on bail, he
must surrender to custody on bail, he
must surrender to custody before his
appeal
against
the
sentence
of
imprisonment
would
be
entertained.
Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law
that no appeal shall lie against an order
relating to an assessment of tax unless the
tax had been paid. Such a provision was
on the statute book in Section 30 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The proviso
to the section provided that '..........no
appeal shall lie against an order under
sub-section (1) of Section 46 unless the
tax had been paid'. Such conditions
merely regulate the exercise of the right
of appeal so that the same is not abused
difficulty in the enforcement of the order
appealed against in case the appeal is
ultimately dismissed. It is open to the
Legislature to impose an accompanying
liability upon a party upon whom legal
right is conferred or to prescribe
conditions for the exercise of the right.
Any requirement for discharge of that
liability or the fulfilment of that condition
in case the party concerned seeks to avail
of the said right is a valid piece of
legislation, and we can discern no
contravention of Article 14 in it ........."

9. It has also be noted that the
wider concept of locus standi in public interest
litigation moved before this Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India which
itself is a fundamental right or under Article
226 before High Courts which also offers a
constitutional remedy cannot be imported for
deciding the right of appeal under the
statutory provisions contained in the Customs
Act. Whether any right of appeal is conferred
on anyone against the orders passed under
the Act in the hierarchy of proceedings before
the authorities has to be judged from the
statutory settings of the Act and not before
them. Therefore, in our view, the High Court
in the impugned judgment had erred in
drawing the analogy from the more elastic
concept of locus standi under Article 32 of
Article evolved by this Court by its decisions
on the subject. It is also to be appreciated that
the decision of this Court in Bar Council of
Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc. etc. AIR
1975 SC 2092 was based on an entirely
different statutory scheme. For judging the
competence and locus standi of the Union of
India or the HPF for moving appeals before
CEGAT against the order of Additional
Collector of Customs passed under Section
122 of the Act the answer must be found from
within the four corners of the Act itself."

24. In paragraph 10 of the judgment
of Northern Plastics Ltd. (supra), the
Apex Court held that the only the parties
1862 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to proceedings before the Adjudicating
Authority i.e. Collector of Customs could
prefer such an appeal to the CEGAT.
Relevant portion of paragraph 10 of the
aforesaid judgement is being extracted
herein below:-

10.... "In the light of this
statutory scheme, therefore, it is not
possible to agree with the contention of
learned
counsel
for
the
contesting
respondents that sub-section (1) of
Section 129-A entitles any and every
person feeling aggrieved by the decision
or order of the Collector of Customs as an
adjudicating authority, to prefer statutory
appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Neither
the
Central
Government,
through
Industries Department, nor the rival
company or industry operating in the
same field as the importer can as a matter
or right prefer an appeal as 'person
aggrieved' is wider than the phrase 'party
aggrieved'. But in the entire context of the
statutory scheme especially sub-section
(3) of Section 129-A it has to be held that
only the parties to the proceedings before
the adjudicating authority Collector of
Customs could prefer such an appeal to
the
CEGAT
and
the
adjudicating
authority under S.122 can prefer such an
appeal only when directed by the Board
under
Section
129-D(1)
and
not
otherwise. It is easy to visualise that even
a third party may get legitimately
aggrieved by the order of the Collector of
Customs being the adjudicating authority
if it is contended by such a third party
that the goods imported really belonged
to it and not to the purported importer or
that he had financed the same and,
therefore, in substance he was interested
in the goods and consequently the release
order in favour of the purported importer
was prone to create a legal injury to such
a third party which is not actually
arraigned
as
a
party
before
the
adjudicating authority and was not heard
by it. Under such circumstances such a
third party might perhaps be treated to be
legally aggrieved by the order of the
Collector of Customs as an adjudicating
authority and may legitimately prefer an
appeal to the CEGAT as a 'person
aggrieved'. That is the reason why the
Legislature in its wisdom has used the
phrase 'any person aggrieved' by the
order of Collector of Customs as
adjudicating authority in Section 129A(1). But it order to earn a locus standi as
'person
aggrieved'
other
than
the
arraigned party before the Collector of
Customs as an adjudicating authority it
must be shown that such a person
aggrieved being third party has a direct
legal interest in the goods involved in the
adjudication process. It cannot be a
general public interest or interest of a
business rival as is being projected by the
contesting respondents before us............."

25. Further in paragraph 12 of the
judgment of Northern Plastics Ltd.
(supra),
Apex
Court
repelled
the
contention of Union of India that appeal
on behalf of Union of India was
maintainable as it has to subserve a larger
public interest. Relevant portion of
paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgement
is being extracted herein below:-

".......12. So far as the Union of
India is concerned we may proceed on the
basis that it may have to subserve a larger
public interest by raising the present
dispute
and
may
legitimately
feel
aggrieved by the order of the Additional
Collector of Customs. But even if it is so,
the statutory procedure laid down by the
Parliament in its wisdom for enabling the
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1863
challenge to the adjudication order of the
Collector of Customs by way of appeals
or revisions, to which we have made a
mention, has got to be followed in such an
eventuality........"

26. Now, in the case in hand, it is
evident that Section 56 (1-A) of the Act,
1899 confers the right of appeal to those
aggrieved by the order of the Collector
passed under Chapter IV, Chapter V or
under clause (a) of the first proviso to
Section 26 or to the Government. A plain
reading of Section 56 (1-A) clearly
suggests that it is only those who are party
to the lis have been conferred the right of
appeal and, therefore, in the opinion of
the Court, the appeal on behalf of the
petitioner
against
the
order
dated
02.11.2018 passed by the Assistant
Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut was not
maintainable as petitioner was not a party
in proceeding under Section 47-A of the
Act, 1899 before Assistant Commissioner
(Stamp), Meerut. Since appeal on behalf
of petitioner was not maintainable,
therefore, in the opinion of the Court,
application under Section 57 of the Act,
1899 on behalf of petitioner was also not
maintainable.

27. The present controversy can also
be viewed from one more perspective i.e.
whether any application preferred by any
person to the Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority under Section 57 of the Act,
1899
would
fall
within
the
word
'otherwise'
which
entitles
him
for
reference under Section 57 of the Act,
1899. In this regard it is pertinent to
notice the judgement of Apex Court in the
case of Raymond Ltd. & Another (supra)
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondents wherein Apex Court while
interpreting Section 56(4) inserted by way
of State amendment held that revisional
power conferred under Section 56(4) of
the Act, 1899 is to be exercised by the
Board of Revenue either on its own
motion or on application of 'any party'.
The Apex Court further held that the word
'any party' implies both parties to the lis.
Paragraph 16 of the aforesaid judgement
is being extracted herein below:-

"16. It is true that Sub-section (2)
of Section 56 of the Act does not refer to
Section 32 but the same, in our opinion, was
not necessary. Sub-section (4) of Section 56
was inserted by way of a State Amendment.
The intention of the legislature in inserting
the said provision is clear and explicit as by
reason thereof a power of revision has been
conferred upon the highest authority of
Revenue in the State, viz., Board of
Revenue. The revisional power is to be
exercised by the Board of Revenue either on
its own motion or on an application by any
party. The term "any party" used in the said
provision is of some significance. By reason
of the said provision, not only the State but
also the person who had filed an
application under Section 31 of the Act,
thus, may file a revision application before
the Board of Revenue. The terms "any
party", therefore, implies both the parties to
the lis and not the party filing an
application under Section 31 of the Act
alone. The revisional power is to be
exercised by the Board so as to enable it to
satisfy itself in regard to the amount with
which the instrument is chargeable with
duty. The revisional proceeding has a direct
nexus with determination of an instrument
being charged with duty and not the
endorsement
made
thereupon
at
a
subsequent stage."

28. Even in the case of Banarsi Das
Ahluwalia Vs. The Chief Controlling
1864 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Revenue Authority, Delhi, the Apex
Court held that the person against whom
any order of Revenue Authority imposing
penalty or deficient stamp duty is passed,
and if it involves substantial question of
law, he has remedy under Section 57 of
the Act, 1899 to approach the Chief
Controlling
Revenue
Authority
for
referring the case to the High Court.
Relevant portion of aforesaid judgement
is being extracted herein below:-

".....It also must now be taken as
settled that that duty is not affected by the
question whether the case is pending
before the Authority or not. The principle
underlying the decision is that sec. 57
affords a remedy to the citizen to have his
case referred to the High Court against
an order of a revenue authority imposing
stamp duty and/or penalty provided the
application
involves
a
substantial
question
of
law
and
imposes
a
corresponding obligation on the authority
to refer it to the High Court for its
opinion. Such a right and obligation
cannot be construed to depend upon any
subsidiary circumstance such as the
pendency
of
the
case
before
the
Authority......."

29. Thus, the principles underlined
in
the
aforesaid
judgement
unambiguously suggests that any person
aggrieved by the order of the Revenue
Authority
can
approach
the
Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority under
Section 57 of the Act, 1899 for reference
of his case to the High Court if it involves
substantial question of law, and the Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority is under
obligation to refer the case to the High
Court. Under the scheme of the Act, there
is nothing from which it can be inferred
that the words 'otherwise coming to its
notice' used in Section 57 (1) of the Act,
1899 can be stretched to such an extent so
as to include within its periphery any
person and not only the persons who are
party to the lis.

30. The judgement of this Court in
the case of Akhlaq (supra) relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioner has
been rendered by this Court in the case of
fair price shop matter by placing reliance
upon the judgement of Apex Court in the
case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan
Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others AIR
2013 SC 58, and this Court held that
complainant has right to approach the
High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to challenge the
order passed by the appellate authority
restoring the licence of the original
licence holder. In this regard it is also
worth mentioning that this Court in the
aforsaid case has failed to notice the
judgement of the Apex Court in the case
of Northern Plastics Ltd. (supra) wherein
Apex Court has clearly held that the right
of appeal is statutory right and can be
availed only by those who are conferred
the right of appeal under the statute itself
and not by any one else.

31. Further, the Apex Court in the
case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan
(supra) which has been relied upon by
this court in the case of Akhlaq (supra)
has also reiterated the principles that the
person who is not a party to the lis has no
right to challenge an action. In the said
case, the respondent no.5 in the Special
Leave Petition before the Apex Court has
questioned the validity of the caste
certificate issued in favour of appellant
(Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan). The
High Court allowed the writ petition of
respondent no.5 holding that respondent
2 All. Sushil Kumar Jain Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1865
no.5 has locus-standi to question the
legality of caste certificate issued in
favour
of
appellant
(Ayaaubkhan
Noorkhan Pathan). The Apex Court
reversed the judgement of the High Court
and held that respondent no.5 has no locus
to challenge the caste certificate of the
appellant
(Ayaaubkhan
Noorkhan
Pathan). Paragraph 23 of the aforesaid
judgement is being extracted herein
below:-

"23. Thus, from the above it is
evident
that
under
ordinary
circumstances, a third person, having no
concern with the case at hand, cannot
claim to have any locus-standi to raise
any grievance whatsoever. However, in
the exceptional circumstances as referred
to above, if the actual persons aggrieved,
because
of
ignorance,
illiteracy,
inarticulation or poverty, are unable to
approach the court, and a person, who
has no personal agenda, or object, in
relation to which, he can grind his own
axe, approaches the court, then the court
may examine the issue and in exceptional
circumstances, even if his bonafides are
doubted, but the issue raised by him, in
the opinion of the court, requires
consideration, the court may proceed suomotu, in such respect.

32. Thus, for the reasons given
above, the judgement of this Court in the
case of Akhlaq (supra) does not come in
aid
of
the
petitioner.
Accordingly,
considering the fact that legislature has
provided sufficient safeguard in case if
there is any evasion of stamp duty by
permitting the Government to prefer
appeal under Section 56(1-A) of the Act,
1899, and further in case of any doubt
regarding the chargeability of stamp duty
under Section 31, Section 40 or Section
41, the Collector can refer the matter to
the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority,
in the opinion of the Court, the
submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner that the present is a case of
evasion of heavy stamp duty which has
been brought to the notice to Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority by the
petitioner and the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority is obliged to refer the
matter to the High Court is devoid of
merit and is rejected. Further, in the
scheme of the Act, the words ''otherwise
coming to its notice' used in Section 57 of
the Act gives remedy to the private party
also who is one of the party to the lis to
refer its case to the High Court in case it
involves substantial question of law.

33. The petitioner even otherwise is
not a bona-fide litigant for the reason that
some family dispute is pending between
the parties, and the petitioner as is evident
from the pleadings in the writ petition has
obtained an ex-parte decree of injunction.
Thus, it is evident that the petitioner in
order to espouse his personal cause, had
preferred the appeal against the order of
the Assistant Collector (Stamp)/Collector
(Stamp), Meerut and filed an application
under Section 57 of the Act, 1899 for
reference to the High Court.