# Sushila Singh Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 282
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 247 of 2026
- **Bench:** Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sushila-singh-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54502
- **Pages:** 10

## Text

282 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners shall place on record the printed version
of all the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and other relevant documents.'

It will be appropriate if the Registry of this Court stops referring to the Trial Courts as
'Lower Courts'. Even the record of the Trial Court should not be referred to as Lower Court
Record (LCR). Instead, it should be referred as the Trial Court Record (TCR). The Registrar
(Judicial) to take a note of this order. A copy of this order be sent to him.'

68. In view of the aforesaid order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the terminology
'court below' may be replaced with 'trial court.' or the concerned court, as in the present case, is
the Special Court under the SC/ST Act.

69. In view of the aforesaid order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this may be included
in the procedure of this Court.

70. A copy of this order, for this purpose only, may be placed before the learned Registrar
General for perusal and may be considered for implementation of these directions of the Supreme
Court after due procedure on the administrative side.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 282
REVISIONIST JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J.

Criminal Revision No. 247 of 2026

Sushila Singh ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whethe an application u/s 173(4) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking a
direction for registration of an FIR in respect of alleged financial irregularities under the MNREGA Act, 2005,
was maintainable at the instance of the revisionist, and whether the learned A.C.J.M.-I was justified in
refusing to direct registration of an FIR in view of the statutory scheme contained in s. 28 r/w Sch.-I
Paragraphs 26, 29(f) and 32 of MNREGA Act, 2005.

Headnotes
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - s. 173(4) - Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 - s. 28, paragraph 26, 29(f), 32 of Sch. I - The Uttar Pradesh
Panchayat Raj Act 1947 - s. 26 - Registration of FIR - Magistrate's discretion - Financial
irregularity - Alleged misappropriation of Government funds - Gram pradhan - Ward member -
Locus standi - Revisional jurisdiction - Supervisory power - Administrative Inquiry - CDO report -
Criminal proceedings - Statutory remedy - Maintainability - The revisionist, an elected Ward
Member of Gram Panchayat Majhauva Bakunth, moved an application u/s 173(4) of Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking a direction for registration of an FIR against the Gram
4 All. Sushila Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
283
Pradhan and other officials, alleging financial irregularities, fraudulent preparation of job cards,
misappropriation of MNREGA funds and misuse of government money - During the proceedings,
an inquiry report submitted by the Chief Development Officer, Basti, recorded that no major
financial embezzlement had been found, though certain procedural irregularities relating to
issuance of job cards to relatives of Gram Pradhan were noticed and had already been addressed
departmentally - Relying upon the statutory mechanism provided under the MNREGA Act, 2005,
the learned A.C.J.M.-I rejected the application as not maintainable - Aggrieved thereby, the
revisionist filed instant criminal revision challenging the said order.

Held: Consequently, on a holistic consideration of inquiry report, the statutory bar under MNREGA Act, and
absence of authorisation in favour of revisionist, the conclusion arrived at that the application was not legally
maintainable cannot be faulted -The impugned order, thus, neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor
from any material illegality or perversity warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction - There
are catena of judgments to the effect that when a Statute is a complete Code in itself and have the provision
for overriding effect then the interpretation is to be given in a way that it gives prominence to subsequent
legislation - The application u/s 173(4) BNSS is not maintainable at the instance of the revisionist, and the
learned A.C.J.M.-I was justified in declining to direct registration of an FIR on her application - Consequently,
the impugned order is justified, having duly considered all allegations for which registration of FIR was
sought, and rightly relying on report of CDO, which records that opposite party nos. 1 and 2 did not commit
any irregularities, while noting that the minor procedural lapse identified has already resulted in appropriate
action against the concerned secretary - Accordingly, criminal revision petition is devoid of merit and
dismissed. [Para 30 to 32] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305; Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,
(2015) 3 SCC 123; Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 - referred
to

Books and Periodicals Cited
Black's Law Dictionary - referred to

List of Acts
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005;
The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947

List of Keywords
Criminal Revision; s. 173(4); Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005; The Uttar
Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947; Gram Pradhan; Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita; Application by
revisionist; Registration of First Information Report; Inquiry report; Village Development Officer; Financial
irregularities; Misappropriation and misuse of MNREGA funds; Fraudulent payments by preparing fake job
cards; Embezzling government funds; Cognizable offence; Maintainable; Statutory scheme; Overriding effect;
District Programme Coordinator; Disciplinary action; Criminal proceedings; Locus standi; Revisional
jurisdiction; Perversity; Special enactment; Complete code; Revision devoid of merit and dismissed.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Revision No. - 247 of 2026

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2024 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Basti,
in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2043 of 2024 arising out of Misc. Case No. 173/12/2024.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Revisionist(s):
Adarsh Kumar, Subahsh Chandra Yadava
284 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Adv. for the Opposite Party(s):
G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, J.)

1. The present criminal revision petition has been preferred assailing the order dated
20.12.2024, passed by the learned A.C.J.M., 1st, Basti in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2043 of 2024,
Sushila Singh Vs. Resham Singh and others whereby the application filed by the revisionist under
Section 173(4) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as
'B.N.S.S.') has been rejected.

2. This Court has condoned the delay in filing this revision petition vide its order dated
13.01.2026, and thereafter the matter was listed for hearing today.

3. The undisputed facts in this case are that the revisionist is an elected ward member of Gram
Panchayat Majhauva Bakunth, Block- Saltauva Gopalpur, who moved an application no Misc. Case
No. 173/12/2024 dated 30.09.2024 under Section 173(4) B.N.S.S. before the court of A.C.J.M.-I,
Basti, seeking a direction for registration of a First Information Report ((hereinafter referred to as
'FIR') at Police Station Rudhauli.

4. During the course of proceedings before learned A.C.J.M.-I, Basti, an inquiry report dated
26.11.2024, bearing No. 756/MNREGA/Shi. Janch/2024-25, was submitted by the Chief
Development Officer (hereinafter referred as 'CDO'), Basti, before the court concerned. Thereafter,
learned A.C.J.M.-I, Basti, by order dated 20.12.2024, passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2043 of
2024, arising out of Misc. Case No. 173/12/2024, rejected the said application of the revisionist,
which has given rise to the present revision.

5. Heard Sri Subhash Chandra Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the revisionist, who
submits that prior to the year 2021 elections, job cards under the MNREGA scheme were created in
the names of family members of the Gram Pradhan. He further submits that during the period 20212022, the said Gram Pradhan, in collusion with the Village Development Officer and other block
level officers, committed financial irregularities by re-billing for works already completed in the
year 2018- 19 and by withdrawing funds against fictitious MNREGA works, particularly on canal
bandh.

6. Sri Yadav further submits that on 22.10.2022, the Gram Pradhan transferred MNREGA
funds into her personal account. In addition, she also made fraudulent payments by preparing fake
job cards in the names of her husband Vipin Singh, brothers-in-law Vikas Kumar and Vishal, and
father-in-law's brother Ramchandra, thereby embezzling government funds. Specific amounts have
been attributed to such alleged transfers and withdrawals.

7. Sri Yadav contends that upon a complaint made to the District Magistrate, an inquiry was
conducted by the Block Development Officer, Saltauva Gopalpur, culminating in the issuance of a
show-cause notice dated 06.12.2022 to the Gram Pradhan regarding the use of substandard
materials in the construction of a school boundary wall. He further contends that the aforesaid acts
4 All. Sushila Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
285
collectively disclose cognizable offences involving misappropriation and misuse of MNREGA
funds, however, despite the said allegations and material, no FIR was registered, compelling the
revisionist to invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 173(4) BNSS.

8. On the other hand, Sri Chandan Singh, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State supports the
impugned order and submits that no error has been committed by the learned Magistrate in
rejecting the application of the revisionist and the order is well reasoned and based upon
established principles of law.

9. Sri Singh contends that the allegations made by the revisionist were duly investigated in an
administrative inquiry conducted by the competent authority, and the CDO, Basti, and in the report
dated 26.11.2024, it is recorded that there is no sign of significant financial embezzlement of
government funds by the Gram Pradhan, however, certain procedural irregularities were noticed
with respect to the issuance of job cards in favour of family members of the Gram Pradhan, which
was stated to have been prepared prior to the 2021 elections. In that regard, appropriate action had
already been taken against the then Gram Panchayat Secretary, who delayed in handing over of
documents, which led to providing of benefits as alleged but as soon as documents got handed
over, the concerned job cards were cancelled, thereby addressing the irregularity at the
departmental level itself.

10. Learned A.G.A. further contends that the controversy in question is governed by the
special enactment, namely the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005
(hereinafter referred to as 'MNREGA Act'), which constitutes a complete Code in itself. Placing
reliance upon Section 28 of the said Act, he argues that the provisions of the MNREGA Act have
an overriding effect over other laws. He further referred to Schedule-I, Paragraph 26, which
provides for recovery of misappropriated funds as arrears of land revenue, and Paragraphs 29(f)
and 32 of Schedule-I, which specifically vest authority in the District Programme Coordinator to
take disciplinary action and to initiate criminal proceedings, including lodging of an FIR, upon
finding prima facie financial irregularities.

11. Relying upon above-mentioned statutory scheme, Sri Singh submits that the revisionist,
being a private person, has no locus to seek direction for registration of an FIR under Section
173(4) BNSS in absence of any recommendation or authorization by the competent authority under
the MNREGA framework. It is thus submitted that the learned Magistrate has rightly decided the
application to be not maintainable.

12. In view of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon
perusal of the record, the point for consideration before this Court is whether the application under
Section 173(4) BNSS was maintainable at the instance of the revisionist in light of the statutory
scheme provided under Section 28 read with Schedule I paragraphs 26, 29 (f) and 32 of MNREGA
Act, 2005, and whether the learned A.C.J.M.-I was justified in declining to issue a direction for
registration of FIR or the order suffers from illegality, material irregularity or patent error
warranting interference by this Court.
286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. To begin with it is important to understand the objective behind providing the power of
criminal revision. The Supreme Court has analysed the object of the revisional jurisdiction under
Section 401 Code of Criminal Procedure (1973), which now corresponds to Section 442 of the
BNSS, in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 and held that:

"130. The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon
superior criminal courts ? a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction ? in order to correct
miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of
proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted, on the one hand, or on
the other hand in some underserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High
Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and
circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and
circumstances which vary greatly from case to case."

14. Regarding scope of the revision jurisdiction, Supreme Court has held in Sanjaysinh
Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 that:

"14. In the case before us, the learned Magistrate went through the entire records of the
case, not limiting to the report filed by the police and has passed a reasoned order holding that it is
not a fit case to take cognizance for the purpose of issuing process to the appellant. Unless the
order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or
there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the
Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional
jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of
criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to
be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be
revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly
unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly
ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not
interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."

15. The basic jurisprudence of the power of revision is same while exercising revisional
jurisdiction in all revision cases, and the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the
Magistrate in any revision petition. Unless the order under challenge is shown to be perverse,
manifestly illegal, or resulting in miscarriage of justice, interference is not warranted. The
revisional jurisdiction of this Court is supervisory in nature and is intended to correct jurisdictional
errors, perversity or gross illegality. It is not an appellate forum for re-evaluating facts or
substituting another possible view. None of these parameters are attracted in the present case.

16. The Supreme Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan (supra) held that the revisional court
is not to interfere with the order of the Magistrate merely because it does not agree with the
conclusion arrived at. If the Magistrate's order is based on material on record and suffers from no
patent illegality or jurisdictional error, the High Court should not disturb the findings in its
revisional capacity and here, the CDO report and MNREGA Act provisions are discussed and
4 All. Sushila Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
287
applied correctly in the order passed by learned A.C.J.M.-I, which makes it clear that the impugned
order does not warrant interference under revision jurisdiction.

17. Moving further, to understand the power of the Magistrate under Section 173(4) BNSS, it
is necessary to note that the provision is to ensure that no incident goes without investigation and if
there is such situation with anyone, then this provision provides the remedy. For ready reference
Section 173(4) BNSS is reproduced below:

"Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station
to record the information referred to in sub-section (1), may send the substance of such
information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that
such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case
himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the
manner provided by this Sanhita, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge
of the police station in relation to that offence failing which such aggrieved person may make an
application to the Magistrate."

18. A careful reading of Section 173(4) BNSS shows that while the legislature has used the
expression "any person aggrieved", thereby conferring a remedy, the same is qualified by the use of
the expression "may" and the requirement that the authority must be "satisfied" that the information
discloses a cognizable offence. Thus, the provision is to be understood as enabling in nature and
does not mandate mechanical exercise of power by the Magistrate.

19. It is a settled principle of interpretation, embodied in the Latim maxim "noscitur a sociis",
that the meaning of words used in a statutory provision must be derived from the context in which
they occur and from the words surrounding them. A provision cannot be read in fragments by
isolating individual expressions, rather, it must be construed as a whole so as to give coherent and
consistent meaning to all words in it. Applying this principle to Section 173(4) of BNSS, the
expressions "may", "satisfied", and "any person aggrieved", though occurring at different places,
are required to be read together and in conjunction with the scheme of the provision, so as to
ascertain the true legislative intent and to avoid an interpretation that renders any part internally
inconsistent.

20. Harmonious reading of Section 173(4) BNSS demonstrates a balance between ensuring
access to justice and preventing misuse of the criminal process. It contemplates application of mind
and a judicious assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. The scheme of the Section
173(4) BNSS indicates a mechanism, where recourse to the Magistrate arises only upon failure in
getting earlier remedy, hence, the magistrate is required to assess the circumstance led to the filing
of the application. The expression "may" used in the provision, as per Black's Law Dictionary, is to
confers discretion, rather than imposing a mandatory obligation. It indicates that the authority is
empowered to act, but is not bound to do so in every case, the exercise of such power being
dependent upon the facts and circumstances presented.

21. In the light of the above interpretation, the facts of the present case is to be seen which
gives right to any person aggrieved but the discretion remains with the Magistrate. The exercise of
288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
power under Section 173(4) BNSS is not automatic and requires due consideration of the
surrounding circumstances, including the sequence of events and the conduct of the parties. Where
the application is moved for which the departmental action is concluded as per Statute, the
Magistrate would be justified in exercising restraint. The requirement of satisfaction under the
provision necessarily entails such scrutiny and precludes mechanical directions for registration of
an FIR.

22. Considering the impugned order in the backdrop of the rival submissions, statutory
framework and established principles of law, it is evident that the learned A.C.J.M.-I has proceeded
on a correct understanding of law and material on record, warranting no interference in revisional
jurisdiction.

23. Learned A.C.J.M.-I has duly considered the inquiry report dated 26.11.2024 submitted by
the CDO, Basti. The said report does not disclose any case of major financial embezzlement of
State or Central Finance Commission funds. However, it records a limited irregularity pertaining to
issuance of job cards in favour of relatives of the Gram Pradhan prior to the 2021 elections, which
was already addressed at the administrative level by fastening responsibility upon the then Gram
Panchayat Secretary and by cancellation of the said job cards. The impugned order records that the
job cards provided to the relatives of the Gram Pradhan was due to delay in document transfer by
the Secretary and the moment it was identified the said cards were cancelled. Thus, the
foundational factual premise for directing registration of FIR on allegations of large-scale
embezzlement was not substantiated at the level of inquiry.

24. The learned A.C.J.M.-I has correctly appreciated the statutory scheme of the MNREGA
Act, 2005, which is a special enactment containing a self-contained mechanism for dealing with
allegations arising under it. Schedule-I, Paragraph 26 provides that misappropriated amounts are
recoverable as arrears of land revenue, while Paragraphs 29(f) and 32 specifically vest authority in
the District Programme Coordinator as the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action and to
direct criminal proceedings, including registration of FIR, upon satisfaction of prima facie
irregularity. In view of this special statutory mechanism, the competence for initiating such action
is not left open-ended but it has prescribed the designated authority. Relevant provisions read as
under:

"Schedule I

Minimum Features of a Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

...

26. Any misappropriation of amounts spent under the Act shall be recoverable under the
Revenue Laws for recovery prevailing in the State.

...

29. Establish an effective grievance redressal mechanism consisting of :

....

(f) In case of a prima facie evidence regarding financial irregularities are noticed after
preliminary enquiry of the complaint or of findings in the social audit report, the District
Programme Coordinator after obtaining legal advice will ensure that a First Information Report is
lodged;
4 All. Sushila Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
289

32. Wherever contravention of the provisions of the Act has been proved after due
enquiry by the State Government or the District Programme Coordinator or the Programme
Officer or the Ombudsperson or any other authority authorized by the State Government, action in
accordance with the provisions of section 25 of the Act shall be taken."

25. Further, Section 28 of the MNREGA Act, 2005, gives overriding effect to its provisions
over other laws. For ready reference the provisions mentioned above are quoted below :

"28. Act to have overriding effect. The provisions of this Act or the Schemes made
thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other
law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of such law:

Provided that where a State enactment exists or is enacted to provide employment
guarantee for unskilled manual work to rural households consistent with the provisions of this Act
under which the entitlement of the households is not less than and the conditions of employment are
not inferior to what is guaranteed under this Act, the State Government shall have the option of
implementing its own enactment:

Provided further that in such cases the financial assistance shall be paid to the concerned
State Government in such manner as shall be determined by the Central Government, which shall
not exceed what the State would have been entitled to receive under this Act had a Scheme made
under this Act had to be implemented. "

26. Since the revisionist has asserted its locus being the elected ward member of the Gram
Panchayat, the status which she has earned as per provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj
Act 1947, therefore, it is relevant to see that whether the provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat
Raj Act 1947 would have primacy or the MNREGA Act, 2005, which is a subsequent special
enactment having the provision of overriding effect.

27. Panchayat Raj Act enumerates rights of individual members which includes that a member
of a Gram Panchayat may at any meeting, move any resolution and put question to the Pradhan and
Up-Pradhan on matters connected with the administration of the Gram Panchayat in the manner
prescribed. The plain reading of the Section 26 of Panchayat Raj Act makes it clear that the
provision does not extend right to members for filing an FIR as attempted by the revisionist.

28. Although, there seems to be no inconsistency in between both enactments regarding filing
of FIR against the Gram Pradhan in case of allegations of financial irregularity, the analysis by the
Supreme Court in case of primacy to be given to the subsequent enactment can be referred. In
Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71, the Supreme has
held that:

"9. It is clear that both these Acts are special Acts. This Court has laid down in no
uncertain terms that in such an event it is the later Act which must prevail. The decisions cited in
the above context are as follows: Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corpn.
of Maharashtra Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 144 : (1993) 78 COMP CAS 803]; Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi
Lal [(1977) 1 SCC 750 : (1977) 2 SCR 421]; Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank [(2000) 4 SCC 406 :
290 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2000) 101 Comp Cas 64] and Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. [(1956) 2 SCC
75 : (1956) 26 Comp Cas 280 : AIR 1956 SC 614 : 1956 SCR 603].

10. We may notice that the Special Court had in another case dealt with a similar
contention. In Bhoruka Steel Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. [1996 SCC OnLine Bom
717 : (1997) 89 Comp Cas 547 (Special Court)] it had been contended that recovery proceedings
under the Special Court Act should be stayed in view of the provisions of the 1985 Act. Rejecting
this contention, the Special Court had come to the conclusion that the Special Court Act being a
later enactment would prevail. The headnote which brings out succinctly the ratio of the said
decision is as follows:

"Where there are two special statutes which contain non obstante clauses the later statute
must prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the legislature was aware
of the earlier legislation and its non obstante clause. If the legislature still confers the later
enactment with a non obstante clause it means that the legislature wanted that enactment to
prevail. If the legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it could and would
provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment continue to apply."

29. It is in this context that the learned Magistrate has rightly held that the revisionist, even
being a ward member, she will be considered as a private individual, and not being authorised by
the District Programme Coordinator under the statutory framework, and hence, she lacked locus
standi to seek a direction for registration of FIR under Section 173(4) BNSS. The finding on locus
standi, therefore, flows directly from the statutory scheme and cannot be said to suffer from any
legal infirmity.

30. Consequently, on a holistic consideration of the inquiry report, the statutory bar under
the MNREGA Act, and the absence of authorisation in favour of the revisionist, the conclusion
arrived at that the application was not legally maintainable cannot be faulted. The impugned
order, thus, neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor from any material illegality or
perversity warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. There are catena of
judgements to the effect that when a Statute is a complete Code in itself and have the provision
for overriding effect then the interpretation is to be given in a way that it gives prominence to
the subsequent legislation.

31. In view of the above, the application under Section 173(4) BNSS is not maintainable at the
instance of the revisionist, and the learned A.C.J.M.-I was justified in declining to direct
registration of an FIR on her application. Consequently, the impugned order dated 20.12.2024 is
justified, having duly considered all allegations for which registration of the FIR was sought, and
rightly relying on the report of the CDO, which records that opposite party nos. 1 and 2 did not
commit any irregularities, while noting that the minor procedural lapse identified has already
resulted in appropriate action against the concerned secretary.

32. Therefore, there is no error in the impugned order dated 20.12.2024. The criminal revision
petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. However, it is clarified that if any proceeding
regarding the identified irregularity is ongoing under MNREGA Act the same shall continue
independent to the observation made in this order.
----------
4 All. Mohd. Chand Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
291
(2026) 4 ILRA 291
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 30265 of 2025

Mohd. Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether a vehicle could be confiscated u/s 5-A(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow
Slaughter Act, 1955 in the absence of any conclusive evidence or authorized laboratory report establishing
that the meat allegedly recovered from the vehicle was "beef" within the meaning of s. 2(a) of the Act, and
whether the confiscation orders passed by District Magistrate and affirmed by Commissioner were legally
sustainable.

Headnotes
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - s. 109 - Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 -
ss. 2(a), 3, 5, 5A/8 - Arms Act, 1959 - ss. 25, 27 and 3 - Confiscation of vehicle - Transportation
of Beef - Burden of proof upon State authorities to prove that seized meat was "beef" - Arbitrary
action of State - Seizure of commercial vehicle - Compensation - Award of damages - Release of
vehicle - The petitioner challenged the confiscation of his Mahindra Pickup, which was allegedly
intercepted by police on 18.10.2024 and found carrying meat purported to be beef of five cows -
Consequent thereto, an FIR was registered under the various provisions of Uttar Pradesh
Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Arms Act,
1959 - Relying upon the alleged recovery, the District Magistrate, Baghpat initiated confiscation
proceedings u/s 5-A of Act of 1955 and ordered confiscation of the vehicle - The petitioner's
statutory appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division - Before the High Court,
the petitioner contended that the veterinary examination report merely expressed suspicion
regarding the origin of meat and no authorized laboratory report conclusively established that
the seized substance was beef - While the State submitted meat examination report, which also
disclosed that the seized meat was suspected of cow or its progeny - State admitted that there is
no documentary evidence on record to conclusively establish
that the said seized meat was beef.
Held: It is evident that the Examiner was not confident whether the seized meat was beef or not, as such,
without conclusively proving that the seized meat was beef, the vehicle of petitioner could not have been
confiscated - The Authorities below without examining this issue has proceeded to confiscate the vehicle of
petitioner, which is arbitrary, illegal and unwarranted under the provisions of Act of 1955 - It is apparent that
due to illegal and arbitrary action of functionaries of State, the petitioner has suffered serious economic loss
because the vehicle was a transport vehicle, which was the source of livelihood of petitioner - The petitioner
has been deprived from earning through this vehicle, since 18.10.2024, when it was illegally seized by
respondents - A period of more than 18 months has elapsed since then - In the facts and circumstances of
the case, for the economic loss/deprivation caused to petitioner and to compensate for arbitrary action of
State, it would be appropriate to award damages of Rs. 2 lacs to petitioner - The instant writ petition has