# Suvansh Prasad v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 8 ILRA 96
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-07-15
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 678 of 2022
- **Bench:** Chandra Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/suvansh-prasad-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48955
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Civil Law -Limitation Act,1963 - Section 5
- Condonation of Delay - Petitioner was
allotted abadi land -Subsequently SDM
cancelled
earlier

approval
order
-
Petitioner challenged it in revision -
Revision was fixed for 14.05.2016 but due
to absence of counsel for the petitioner
revision was dismissed as default on
14.05.2016 - Petitioner came to know
about the aforesaid order on 01.05.2018 -
restoration application along with delay
condonation
was
filed
-
respondent
rejected the restoration application on the
ground of delay - Held - Petitioner
explained delay in filing the restoration
8 All. Suvansh Prasad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
97
application, as such in the interests of
justice in place of dismissing the matter
on technical ground, matter should be
decided on merits. (Para 7)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
age of superannuation and being retired as
such.

29. The above discussions, and
analysis lead me to conclude that rights and
duties of employees of three different
bodies working in the area of city
development and public utility services are
all alike in nature and if the employees of
Municipalities and Municipal Corporations
like local bodies, who had initially worked
on
daily
wage
basis,
upon
their
regularization have been held entitled to get
benefit of such period to be counted
towards pension, why not such benefit be
extended also to the employees of Local
Development
Authority
created
and
constituted under the Act, 1973.

30. In my considered view, since the
Local Development Authority is directly
created by the State Government and is
governed under the rule making power of
the State Government and its byelaws and
regulations are also subject to the approval
of State Government, its employees stand
on a better footing than the employees of
the local self governing bodies for the
purpose of counting period spent as daily
wager by them for pensionable service, if
such
employees
are
retiring
from
establishment which is pensionable.

31. In view of the above, the
argument advanced by learned counsel for
the respondent does not hold merit and is
hereby rejected. It is admitted to the
respondent that petitioner has retired from
the establishment which has retirement
benefits such as pension etc. for its
employees, and so the petitioner's claim
for pension is liable to be upheld in the
light of judgments of Supreme Court and
this Court referred hereinabove to in this
judgment.

32.

Accordingly,
writ
petition
succeeds and is allowed, the order passed
by
the
respondent
authority
dated
18.11.2020
is
hereby
quashed.
The
respondents are directed to calculate the
pension of the petitioner within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order and to pay the
same
to
the
petitioner
immediately
thereafter.

33. Cost made easy.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 96
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ B No. 678 of 2022

Suvansh Prasad ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Manish Kumar Nigam

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Sudhir Bharti

Civil Law -Limitation Act,1963 - Section 5
- Condonation of Delay - Petitioner was
allotted abadi land -Subsequently SDM
cancelled
earlier

approval
order
-
Petitioner challenged it in revision -
Revision was fixed for 14.05.2016 but due
to absence of counsel for the petitioner
revision was dismissed as default on
14.05.2016 - Petitioner came to know
about the aforesaid order on 01.05.2018 -
restoration application along with delay
condonation
was
filed
-
respondent
rejected the restoration application on the
ground of delay - Held - Petitioner
explained delay in filing the restoration
8 All. Suvansh Prasad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
97
application, as such in the interests of
justice in place of dismissing the matter
on technical ground, matter should be
decided on merits. (Para 7)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag & anr.
Vs Mst Kantiji; A.I.R. 1987 SC 1353

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Kumar Rai, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar Nigam
learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
standing counsel for respondent Nos.1, 2,
3, 4 and 6 and Mr. Sudhir Bharti, learned
counsel for the respondent No.5.Gaon
Sabha.

2. With the consent of the parties, writ
petition is being finally disposed of at
admission stage.

3. Brief facts of the case are that
petitioner was allotted abadi land of Arazi
No. 225/1 in the year 1993 in accordance
with rules and the same was approved by
Sub-Divisional-Magistrate on 21.03.1993.
Petitioner comes under first category of
sub-section
(3)
of
Section
122
of
U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act. The construction was
raised by the petitioner over the land
allotted to him. On an application dated
23.07.1999
under
Section
115-P
of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act filed by the Gram
Pradhan after six year, proceedings were
imitated against the petitioner. Petitioner
filed objection in the aforesaid proceeding.
The Sub-Divisional-Magistrate vide order
dated 05.09.2013 cancelled the approval
order
dated
22.03.1993.
Petitioner
challenged the order dated 05.09.2013
through revision No.447 of 2013 before
respondent No.3 in which interim order
was granted by the respondent No.3 staying
operation of the order passed by the courts
below and matter was fixed for disposal.
Revision was fixed for 14.05.2016 but due
to absence of counsel for the petitioner
revision was dismissed as default on
14.05.2016. Petitioner came to know about
the order dated 14th May, 2016 on
01.05.2018 accordingly, the restoration
application along with delay condonation
was filed to recall the order dated
14.05.2016. The respondent No.3 vide
order
dated
06.10.2018
rejected
the
restoration application on the ground of
delay. Petitioner challenged order dated
06.10.2018 by way of revision before the
respondent No.4. In the revision interim
order was passed, but later on, revision was
rejected
by
impugned
order
dated
27.10.2021 saying that matter was rightly
decided by the courts below and the
revision filed by the petitioner dismissed,
hence the present writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that petitioner was allotted abadi
land of the gaon sabha himself after
following due procedure of law even
approval was also granted by the SubDivisional-Magistrate but in order to harass
the petitioner-proceeding of under Rule
115-P of U.P.Z.A.& L.R.Act has been
initiated which was arbitrarily decided
against
the
petitioner,
against
which
revision was filed and the revision was
dismissed on the technical ground. He
submitted that in place of dismissal of the
revision, on technical grounds matter
should be decided on merits.

5. On the other hand, learned
Standing counsel and learned counsel for
the Gaon Sabha submitted that petitioner
has not explained the delay satisfactorily
and have not appeared on the date fixed in
98 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the revision in order to linger on the
proceeding as such, the restoration was
rejected and revision has been rightly
dismissed by the courts below.

6. I have considered the submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

7. There is no dispute about the fact
that the petitioner is an allottee of gaon
sabha land and the proceeding initiated
after six years by the gaon sabha was
decided arbitrarily, against which petitioner
has filed the statutory revision which was
dismissed
on
the
technical
ground.
Petitioner has explained delay in filing the
restoration application, as such in the
interests of justice in view of the law laid
by the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1987 SC 1353
Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and
another Vs. Mst Kantiji and others in place
of dismissing the matter on technical
ground, matter should be decided on
merits.

8. Para No.3 of the above mentioned
Supreme Court judgment is as follows:

"The legislature has conferred
the power to condone delay by enacting
Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act
of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to
do substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on 'merits'. The
expression "sufficient cause" employed
by the legislature is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice that being the life-purpose
for the existence of the institution of
Courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably
liberal approach in matters instituted in
this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all
the other Courts in the hierarchy. And
such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:-

"Any
appeal
or
any
application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such
period."

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal
late.

2. Refusing to condone delay
can result in a meritorious matter being
thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the
highest that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing
the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made. Why
not every hour's delay, every second's
delay? The doctrine must be applied in a
rational
common
sense
pragmatic
manner.

4. When substantial justice and
technical
considerations
are
pitted
against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested
right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that
delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk.
8 All. Nishant Poonia & Ors. Vs. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
99

6. It must be grasped that
judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do
so.

Making
a
justice-oriented
approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in
the institution of the appeal. The fact that
it was the 'State' which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant,
are accorded the same treatment and the
law is administered in an even handed
manner. There is no warrant for according
a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State'
is the applicant praying for condonation of
delay. In fact experience shows that on
account of an impersonal machinary (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit
or hurt by the judgment sought to be
subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file pushing and passingon-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigantnon-grata status. The Courts therefore
have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of
the
interpretation
of
the
expression
"sufficient cause". So also the same
approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the
end in view to do even handed justice on
merits in preference to the approach which
scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to
the facts of the matter giving rise to the
present appeal, we are satisfied that
sufficient cause exists for the delay. The
order of the High Court dismissing the
appeal before it as time barred, is
therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And
the matter is remitted to the High Court.
The High Court will now dispose of the
appeal
on
merits
after
affording
reasonable opportunity of hearing to both
the sides."

9. In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case as mentioned
above, writ petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 27.10.2021 passed
by the respondent No.4 in revision No.421
of 2019 and the orders dated 14.05.2016
and 06.10.2018 passed by the respondent
No.3 are hereby set aside. The matter is
sent back before the respondent No.3 to
decide the petitioner's revision on merit
after affording opportunity of hearing to
both parties expeditiously preferably within
a period of six months from the date of
production of certified copy of this order
before him.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 99
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ B No. 847 of 2022

Nishant Poonia & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri D.K. Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Mrs. Anita Srivastava, Sri Sunil
Kumar Singh