# Syed Hamidul Bari v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 1039
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-02-27
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 11383 of 2023
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary, Om Prakash Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/syed-hamidul-bari-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51404
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1962 - Section 2(i) -
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973 - Section 27 - Principles of Natural
Justice - Public Trust Doctrine - Slum Dwellers
- Illegal Encroachment - Article 226

The petitioners, 25 individuals claiming to be
slum dwellers of Akbar Nagar (I) and (II),
Lucknow, challenged proceedings under the
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973, seeking to protect their alleged slum
1040 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
properties,
primarily
furniture
showrooms/workshops on St.-owned land along
the Lucknow-Faizabad Roa They obtained
interim stay orders by representing themselves
as poor slum dwellers, but evidence revealed
they were affluent, filing GST and income tax
returns, owning properties in posh Lucknow
areas,
and
having
constructed
large,
unauthorized commercial structures. The court
segregated their cases from genuine slum
dwellers due to their misrepresentation. Held:
The petitioners did not qualify as slum dwellers
under the U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1962, or common parlance, as
their
properties
were
not
in
unhygienic,
substandard conditions typical of slums, being
located on a main road with municipal facilities.
The term "slum" implies areas inhabited by the
poor in squalid conditions, as per S. Sivaprakasa
Mudaliar Vs St. of Madras (AIR 1964 Madras
115) and dictionary definitions. The petitioners'
commercial establishments, built illegally on
government land, did not entitle them to
protections
meant
for
impoverished
slum
dwellers. Their claim under the 1962 Act and
the 2021 Slum Policy, which do not explicitly
require poverty, was rejected, as common sense
and the purpose of slum legislation prioritize
aiding the underprivilege The court found no
violation of natural justice in the proceedings
under Section 27 of the 1973 Act, as per St. of U.P.
Vs Sudhir Kumar ((2021) 19 SCC 706), since
admitted facts (illegal constructions, tax filings, and
property ownership) left no prejudice from procedural
lapses, and only one conclusion-illegality-was
possible. The Supreme Court's caution in Almitra H.
Patel Vs U.O.I. ((2000) 2 SCC 679) against rewarding
encroachers was applied, noting the petitioners'
actions as organized land-grabbing. The court
dismissed the writ petitions, finding no basis for
discretionary relief under Article 226, and discharged
interim orders. The cases of genuine slum dwellers
were to be considered separately.

Case Law Cited:

## Text

2 All. Syed Hamidul Bari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1039
this Court finds the reliance of the learned
counsel for the petitioners on earlier
precedence to be unfounded and meritless.

(28) Since, this Court is of the considered
view that no directions for further lowering of
the minimum percentile can be granted, the
other consequential prayer for extending the
time for completion of admission for AYUSH
Courses is also rejected.

(29) In view of the aforesaid observation
and discussion, this Court is of the opinion that
no case for lowering of the minimum percentile
beyond the already lowered percentile by the
authority is possible as the same would result in
frustrating the very purpose of prescription of
minimum eligibility criteria. Further, this Court
finds that prescription of minimum eligibility
criteria is in the overall public interest to
maintain the standard of education in the field
of AYUSH, especially when these days
AYUSH is perceived as one of the most ancient
well documented system of medicine, wherein
prominence to prevention of disease is given
rather than cure and there is a dearth of well
trained and well qualified AYUSH doctors in
the country.

(30) Although, this Court has refrained
from lowering the minimum percentile for
admission for the academic session 2023-24,
however, this Court hope and trust that NCISM
should be alive to the perennial problem of
these precious medical seats remaining vacant
for each academic year and appreciate that
vacancy of these seats in a particular year leads
to vacancy of these seats for five successive
years in a row, which is a national loss, hence
NCISM may look into these issues and if it
deem fit, may frame a policy in consultation
with the Central Government and all the stake
holders to ensure that minimum seats goes
vacant by prescribing for a more pragmatic and
scientific mechanism for exercising the
discretionary power of lowering the minimum
percentile by balancing the ambitious objective
of maintaining the standard of education vis-àvis the number of seats going vacant each year.

(31) For all the reasons as stated herein
above and subject to the observation made by
this Court, the above-captioned writ petitions
are dismissed. There shall be no order as to
cost.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1039
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Writ - C No. 11383 of 2023
Along With
Writ - C No. 514 of 2024
And other connected cases

Syed Hamidul Bari ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Kazim Ibrahim, Amrit Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Pushpila Bisht, Ratnesh Chandra,
Ruchir

Civil Law - U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1962 - Section 2(i) -
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973 - Section 27 - Principles of Natural
Justice - Public Trust Doctrine - Slum Dwellers
- Illegal Encroachment - Article 226

The petitioners, 25 individuals claiming to be
slum dwellers of Akbar Nagar (I) and (II),
Lucknow, challenged proceedings under the
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973, seeking to protect their alleged slum
1040 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
properties,
primarily
furniture
showrooms/workshops on St.-owned land along
the Lucknow-Faizabad Roa They obtained
interim stay orders by representing themselves
as poor slum dwellers, but evidence revealed
they were affluent, filing GST and income tax
returns, owning properties in posh Lucknow
areas,
and
having
constructed
large,
unauthorized commercial structures. The court
segregated their cases from genuine slum
dwellers due to their misrepresentation. Held:
The petitioners did not qualify as slum dwellers
under the U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1962, or common parlance, as
their
properties
were
not
in
unhygienic,
substandard conditions typical of slums, being
located on a main road with municipal facilities.
The term "slum" implies areas inhabited by the
poor in squalid conditions, as per S. Sivaprakasa
Mudaliar Vs St. of Madras (AIR 1964 Madras
115) and dictionary definitions. The petitioners'
commercial establishments, built illegally on
government land, did not entitle them to
protections
meant
for
impoverished
slum
dwellers. Their claim under the 1962 Act and
the 2021 Slum Policy, which do not explicitly
require poverty, was rejected, as common sense
and the purpose of slum legislation prioritize
aiding the underprivilege The court found no
violation of natural justice in the proceedings
under Section 27 of the 1973 Act, as per St. of U.P.
Vs Sudhir Kumar ((2021) 19 SCC 706), since
admitted facts (illegal constructions, tax filings, and
property ownership) left no prejudice from procedural
lapses, and only one conclusion-illegality-was
possible. The Supreme Court's caution in Almitra H.
Patel Vs U.O.I. ((2000) 2 SCC 679) against rewarding
encroachers was applied, noting the petitioners'
actions as organized land-grabbing. The court
dismissed the writ petitions, finding no basis for
discretionary relief under Article 226, and discharged
interim orders. The cases of genuine slum dwellers
were to be considered separately.

Case Law Cited:

1. S. Sivaprakasa Mudaliar Vs St. of Madras, AIR
1964 Madras 115

2. St. of U.P. Vs Sudhir Kumar, (2021) 19 SCC
706

3. Almitra H. Patel Vs U.O.I., (2000) 2 SCC 679
4. Olga Tellis Vs Bombay Municipal Corporation,
(1985) 3 SCC 545

5. Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity
Supply Company of Orissa Lt Vs Sri Seetaram
Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108

6. Dhian Singh Sobha Singh Vs U.O.I., AIR 1958
SC 274

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.
&
Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla, J.)

1. These are 24 writ petitions out of
which 22 are filed by individual petitioners
and two writ petitions namely Writ-C
No.642 of 2024 and Writ-C No.527 of
2024 are filed by 10 and 9 petitioners
respectively. Out of them Mohd. ShafeekPetitioner no.1 and Smt. Shahana-Petitioner
No.5 in Writ-C No.642 of 2024 and
Abdulla-Petitioner No.6 in Writ-C No.527
of 2024 are involved in present bunch of
writ petitions. These 25 petitioners relate to
large bunch of writ petitions regarding
slum known as Akbar Nagar (I) and (II),
Lucknow. The said slum situates along the
sides of Kukrail river/nala and falls much
inside the city. Petitioners, persons of
resources, claiming themselves as slum
dwellers, obtained stay orders from the
High Court and also attempted to be heard
along with actual poor slum dwellers. It
was only during course of the argument,
that this Court came to know that they
actually have illegally occupied large
pieces of land of State Government and
raised
multi-story
furniture
showrooms/workshops
on
the
main
Lucknow-Faizabad Road, or immediately
at the back of first row of showrooms, are
filing their GST and income tax returns and
mostly are living in their own houses in
posh or well developed, old settled
residential areas/colonies of Lucknow and
2 All. Syed Hamidul Bari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1041
in most of the cases also owning other
properties.

2. Looking into their GST and income
tax returns, location and size of the land
occupied and constructions raised by them
and also other properties owned by them,
their cases are segregated from the main
bunch of actual poor slum dwellers and
slum
areas.
Before
coming
to
the
submissions of counsel for the parties, the
chart, provided by the petitioners on
directions of this court, and also added to
by the respondents, regarding the GST and
income
tax
returns,
area
occupied,
constructions raised, and other properties
owned by these petitioners is as follows:-

3. In the said background, Mr. Sudeep
Kumar, Advocate, Sri Anuj Kudesia,
Advocate assisted by Sri Ratnesh Chandra,
Advocate for the respondent, Lucknow
Development Authority, as well as learned
Chief Standing Counsel strongly raise
preliminary objection, that, these persons
are neither slum dwellers nor their
properties fall in the category of a slum.
They state that by concealing the aforesaid
correct facts, with regard to their status, the
location and nature of construction and the
area occupied by them, they have, by
giving false impression to the Court,
obtained interim orders on parity. It was
incumbent upon them to have approached
this Court with clean hands, providing
entire details about their status. They have
wrongly represented before this Court as
poor landless slum dwellers and in the garb
thereof are trying to save their huge, illegal
and unauthorised constructions on the
government land.

4. Attention of this Court is also
drawn with regard to case of Sayed
1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Hamidul Bari & Najma who are husband
and wife and have occupied two separate
plots of land and are running two separate
businesses and have filed two petitions
being Writ-C No.11383 of 2023 and WritC No.514 of 2024 (at Sl. 1 & 2 in the
chart). Similarly, Shafeeq and Shahana,
petitioner no.1 and 5 of Writ-C No.642 of
2024 (Sl. No.8 in chart) are husband and
wife and have made their two separate
claims. However they have not provided
details of separate properties occupied by
them. Similarly, Naushad and Abrar (Sl
No.6 and 7 in the chart) are two real
brothers, have occupied two separate
properties and have filed two separate
petitions being Writ-C No.11360 of 2023
and Writ-C No.11362 of 2023 who now
claim that they have merged their shops
and entire property is owned by one of the
brothers. Nameera Khan, petitioner in WritC No.11372 of 2023 (Sl. no.13 in chart) has
rented
out
her
illegally
constructed
showroom while herself lives in posh
Indira Nagar, Colony, Lucknow.

5. In support of their case respondents
have placed reliance upon the judgment in
the case of S. Sivaprakasa Mudaliar Vs.
The State of Madras; AIR 1964 Madras
115. Relevant portion of the same reads :-

"11........The expression "slum
dwellers though in popular parlance has
acquired some special meaning, namely,
those who are economically and socially
backward and who huddle themselves
together
in
openings
in
unhealthy
surroundings, the term as such has no
such
technical
meaning.
The
word
"slum" in its, true import means a "street
or alley situate in a crowded district of a
town or city and inhabited by people of in
low class or by the poor". It may be that in
some cases the slum area may be a thickly
populated one and of a squalid and
wretched character, but essentially the
word slum is of wide import including
within it a crowded place in a city
inhabited by the poor....." (emphasis added)

6. Mr. Jaideep Narain Mathur, Senior
Advocate assisted by Mr. Apoorva Tewari,
Ms. Aishvarya Mathur, Mr. Amrit Khare
and Mr. Kazim Ibrahim is leading
arguments for petitioners. He submits that
it is not necessary for a slum dweller to be
a poor person. Anyone from the slum areas
can be a slum dweller, whether he is living
there or is running his commercial
activities in that area. Since petitioners are
running their commercial activities in the
said Akbar Nagar area they would fall
within the definition of slum dweller. Mr.
Mathur submits that the concept of rich and
poor has nothing to do either with slum or
slum areas. He submits that it is the U.P.
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act, 1962 which applies and hence, we
should look at the said Act to understand
these terms. He refers to Section 2(i) of the
Act of 1962 and Clause 4(1) of the Policy
dated 29.10.2021 issued under the said Act
which defines the term 'Slum'. The same
read:-

"2(i) Slum area means an area
declared as such under Section 3;"

4. पररभमिम-
 इस नीनत में, जब तक सींदर्द से
अन्यथा अपेनक्षत न िो, ननम्ननलक्तखत शब्ोीं के
ििी अथद िोींगे, जो ननम्नित पररर्ानषत नकये गये
िैैंः-
 1. मनलन बस्ती (िम) का अनर्प्राय
उत्तर प्रदेश मनलन बस्ती क्षेत्र (सुधार और
ननपातन) अनधननयम, 1962 की धारा-3 के
अनुसार पररर्ानषत िम से िै, नजसमें ऐसी
बक्तस्तयाीं सिनलत िोींगी, जिाूँ स्वच्छता, स्वास्थ्य,
सुरक्षा, सड़क आनद का समुनचत व्यिस्था न िो
2 All. Syed Hamidul Bari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1043
तथा मानि ननिास के नलए अनुपयुक्त िो। इस
नीनत के अन्तगदत ऐसे िम मान्य िोगें, नजनमें
न्यूनतम 300 व्यक्तक्त िोीं।

7. He submits that neither of the said
definitions uses the word 'poor' with regard
to a sum dweller or slum area. Therefore,
the concept of poor and rich is wrongly
being applied. He submits that it is very
much possible that a person may earn
money with time and become rich but still
could continue to remain in a slum area and
he can not be denied the benefits as
available to other slum dwellers. Mr.
Mathur states that judgment in case of S.
Sivaprakasaa Mudaliar (Supra), arising
from the Madras High Court, is a case
relating to acquisition of land and the main
issue before the Court was, whether the
purpose of acquisition of land would be
treated to have changed in case along with
slum dwellers, the scheme also permits
allotment of certain house sites to low and
middle-income group persons. He submits
that the main issue before the Court was
not definition of the slum dwellers and,
hence, judgment of the said case is of no
assistance. He further submits that the court
cannot take GST or income tax returns of
the petitioners, or the location or size of
area occupied and nature of constructions
raised or other properties owned by them,
into consideration for not treating them as
slum dwellers or their area as slum.

8. Counsel for petitioners fairly
accepted before this court that the land
occupied by all the petitioners belongs to
State Government and furniture or related
products
showrooms/workshops
constructed by the petitioners upon the
same are without any authorisation and,
thus, are illegal. It is also accepted that they
exist on the main Lucknow-Faizabad road
or immediately at the back of first row of
showrooms. Also admitted are tax returns
and other property details as detailed in the
chart above. Thus, we proceed to consider
rival submissions on aforesaid admitted
facts.

9. The term 'slum' and 'slum
dweller'
is
defined
in
number
of
dictionaries, some of which read:-

Collins
COBUILD
Advanced
Learner's English Dictionary New Edition

Slum / slum (slums) A slum is an
area of a city where living condition are
very bad and where the houses are in bad
condition
 WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY

Slum (slum)
n.,v.,
slummed
slumming often slums a street, alley, or
building in where a crowded, run -down,
dirty part of the city or town, where the
poorest people live. Poverty and disease
are common in the slums. we hear stories
now and then of some boys from a slum
who makes good and wind up with a
fortune. if [his] philosophy prevails, we
shall have taken a long step backward
toward the sweetshop and the slum (Time)

2. Extreme poverty and low social
class, as in the slums : to rise from the
slums to power and wealth.

BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY

Slum,n.(1825) 1. An urban area
where very poor people live in substandard
condition characterized by filth squalor,
and frequent violence

2. A house or apartment located
in such a place .

THE
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY

Slum

2. a. A Street, alley, court, etc,
situated in a crowded district of a town or
city and inhabited by people of a low class
or by the very poor; a number of these
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
streets
or
courts forming
a
thickly
populated neighbourhood or district where
the houses and the conditions of life are of
a squalid and wretched character Chiefly
pl., and freq. in the phrase back slum(s).
Also rarely, a house materially for human
habitation."

10. From the aforesaid dictionary
meanings, it is clear that in normal parlance
the term slum relates to an area in a city
where poor and needy people live in an
unhealthy, unhygienic and in conditions not
fit and suitable for human habitat and poor
living in the said conditions are called slum
dwellers.

11.

Admittedly,
all
these
showrooms/workshops,
engaged
in
furniture and related businesses, exist on
main road or are immediately adjacent to it.
They are getting all benefits of any regular
area of the city. They have widest road
possible in the city. The main road is not
filthy or lacks in any possible municipal
facility. Their huge showrooms/workshops
cannot be called filthy, run-down or unfit
for humans. It is only that their address is
shown as Akbar Nagar. The actual slum,
covered by aforesaid definitions, begins
behind these showrooms. Thus, petitioners
are not suffering any of the challenges
faced by the actual slum dwellers of the
said slum. In the given circumstances, it is
not possible for this court to accept that the
showrooms/workshops of petitioners can
be called as existing in a slum area. At best
they exist at the edge of Akbar Nagar slum
area and not in the said slum area.
Similarly, the facts that they have had
enough
money
to
spend
on
illegal
construction
of
huge
showrooms/workshops, are paying their
GST and filing income tax returns and/or
most of them are having their own
residences in good and posh localities of
city and/or other properties, we are unable
to hold them as slum dwellers. We are here
also reminded the words of Supreme
Court:-

"Common sense, which is a
cluster of life's experiences, is often more
dependable than the rival facts presented
by warring litigants." stated in paragraph
35 of (1985) 3 SCC 545; 'Olga Tellis and
Others
Vs.
Bombay
Municipal
Corporation';

"It must be understood that an
interpretation which upon application of
the provisions at the ground reality, would
frustrate the very law should not be
accepted against the common sense view
which will further such application." in
Paragraph 48 of (2012) 2 SCC 108;
'Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity
Supply Company of Orissa Limited
(Southco) and Another Vs. Sri Seetaram
Rice Mill and,

"We are constrained to observe
that the approach of the High Court to this
question was not well-founded. The Privy
Council no doubt laid down in Bhagchand
Dagadusa v. Secretary of State [(1927) LR
54 IA 338] that the terms of this section
should be strictly complied with. That does
not however mean that the terms of the
notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic
manner or in a manner completely
divorced from common sense. As was
stated by Pollock C.B. in Jones v. Nicholls
[(1844) 13 M & W 361, 363 : 153 ER 149,
150] "We must import a little common
sense into notices of this kind". Beaumont,
C.J., also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal
v. Government of Bombay [ILR (1943) Bom
128.] :"One must construe Section 80 with
some regard to common sense and to the
object with which it appears to have been
passed...." in paragraph 30 of AIR 1958
2 All. Syed Hamidul Bari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1045
SC 274; 'Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and
another vs. Unin of India'.

12. As per the law settled, the words
are to be interpreted in such a manner that
they serve the purpose and are not given an
interpretation which goes against very
common sense. Lets take a hypothetical
example to explain the issue further.
Presuming in a slum, a businessman
finding good business opportunity, takes
possession of a large piece of land from the
actual slum dwellers and illegally, without
required sanctions, constructs a multiplex
or a big hotel or a big shopping complex or
raises
any
other
such
big
business
constructions. Can he, merely because he
did these activities within a slum, claim to
be a slum dweller entitled to the protection
given to dingy houses of slum dwellers,
despite all aspects of the matter reflecting
his disparity with actual slum dwellers?
The answer 'NO' comes to us too loudly.
Thus we do not find our common sense
accepting the sense of argument raised for
the
petitioners.
The
purpose
of
all
legislation as well as law developed and
settled by the courts, with regard to slum
dwellers is, that these people, due to their
poorness and circumstances are forced to
live under inhuman conditions of a slum
and all possible sympathies be applied and
considered for improving their conditions
and also while disturbing their possession.
We do not find petitioners entitled to any
such sympathies. We shall definitely
consider these aspects while hearing the
segregated bunch of petitions of actual
slum dwellers.

13. The next submission of Mr.
Mathur is that proceedings initiated against
petitioners and the appeal decided under
Section 27 of the U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter Act of
1973), both are in violation of principles of
natural justice. He states that the large
number of documents were accepted by the
prescribed authority as well as by the
appellate authority at the time of hearing of
the matter, copies of which were not
provided to the petitioners. Further, the
appeals were placed for hearing of stay
applications, but were heard on merits.
Thus matters should be remanded.

14. We have perused both the
proceedings at length with the assistance of
counsel for parties. A perusal of the same
shows that the documents were called for
and considered to ascertain the status of
Kukrail river/water channel next to the
slum area and impact of slum on the said
water channel. Once we have held that
neither the petitioners are slum dwellers
nor their establishments fall within the
slum area, the said documents do not in any
manner have any impact on the rights of
the petitioners. Both before the prescribed
authority as well as appellate authority
petitioners represented themselves to be
slum dwellers and did not place correct
facts. Both the authorities have held
proceedings and passed orders against
petitioners on the basis of the said incorrect
presumption.

15. Further, we have given an
exhaustive hearing to the parties. The facts
of the case are admitted to both sides. The
law is well settled that this court should not
issue futile writs. We refer to one of the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court
reported in (2021) 19 SCC 706;'State of
U.P. Vs. Sudhir Kumar and Others;
wherein, after referring to nearly all earlier
judgments, supreme court in para 42 held:

"42. An analysis of the aforesaid
judgments thus reveals:
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(1) Natural justice is a flexible
tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach
out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The
breach of the audi alteram partem Rule
cannot by itself, without more, lead to the
conclusion
that
prejudice
is
thereby
caused.

(2) Where procedural and/or
substantive provisions of law embody the
principles
of
natural
justice,
their
infraction per se does not lead to invalidity
of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice
must be caused to the litigant, except in the
case of a mandatory provision of law which
is conceived not only in individual interest,
but also in public interest.

(3) No prejudice is caused to the
person complaining of the breach of
natural justice where such person does
not dispute the case against him or it. This
can happen by reason of estoppel,
acquiescence, waiver and by way of nonchallenge or non-denial or admission of
facts, in cases in which the Court finds on
facts that no real prejudice can therefore
be said to have been caused to the person
complaining of the breach of natural
justice.

(4) In cases where facts can be
stated to be admitted or indisputable,
and only one conclusion is possible,
the Court does not pass futile orders of
setting aside or remand when there is,
in fact, no prejudice caused. This
conclusion must be drawn by the Court
on an appraisal of the facts of a case,
and not by the authority who denies
natural justice to a person.

(5) The "prejudice" exception
must be more than a mere apprehension or
even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It
should exist as a matter of fact, or be based
upon a definite inference of likelihood of
prejudice flowing from the non-observance
of natural justice."

16. In the admitted facts of the case
we
have
duly
considered
the
rival
contentions and already given our findings.
Thus, we do not find any reason to remand
the matter.

17. Before closing, we also would like
to place on record the words of caution of
the Supreme Court in case of 'Almitra H.
Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 679
in paragraph 14:-

"14. Establishment or creating of
slums, it seems, appears to be good
business and is well organised. The number
of slums has multiplied in the last few years
by geometrical proportion. Large areas of
public land, in this way, are usurped for
private use free of cost. It is difficult to
believe that this can happen in the capital
of the country without passive or active
connivance of the land-owning agencies
and/or the municipal authorities. The
promise of free land, at the taxpayers' cost,
in place of a jhuggi, is a proposal which
attracts more landgrabbers. Rewarding an
encroacher on public land with a free
alternative site is like giving a reward to a
pickpocket. The Department of Slum
Clearance does not seem to have cleared
any slum despite its being in existence for
decades. In fact more and more slums are
coming into existence. Instead of "slum
clearance" there is "slum creation" in
Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic
waste being strewn on open land in and
around the slums. This can best be
controlled at least, in the first instance, by
preventing the growth of slums. The
authorities must realise that there is a limit
to which the population of a city can be
increased, without enlarging its size. In
other words the density of population per
square kilometre cannot be allowed to
increase beyond the sustainable limit.
2 All. Satendra Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1047
Creation of slums resulting in increase in
density has to be prevented. What the Slum
Clearance Department has to show,
however, does not seem to be visible. It is
the garbage and solid waste generated by
these slums which require to be dealt with
most expeditiously and on the basis of
priority."

18. In the said background and
looking into the entirety of the matter this
Court finds no reason to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction in favour of
petitioners. Thus, all the writ petitions are
dismissed. Writ-C No.642 of 2024 is
dismissed so far it relates to petitioner no.1
Mohd. Shafeek and petitioner no.5 Smt.
Shahana only. Similarly Writ-C No.527 of
2024 is also dismissed so far it relates to
petitioner no.6 Abdulla only. Remaining
petitioners in these two writ petitions are
being considered along with the other
bunch of writ petitions of actual slum
dwellers, leading petition being Writ-C
No.1372 of 2024.

19. Interim orders, if any, granted
earlier, stands discharged with regard to the
aforesaid petitioners.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1047
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHUTOSH SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ - C No. 31168 of 2023

Satendra Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ritesh Upadhyay, Sri Shesh Kumar
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, Sri Hridai
Narain Pandey, Sri Tarun Agrawal

Civil Law - U.P. Self Financed Independent
Schools (Fee Regulation) Act, 2018 -
Sibling Fee Relief Scheme - Transfer
Certificates - Writ of Mandamus - Article
226-- The petitioners challenged the striking off
of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 (children of petitioner
No. 1) from the rolls of a CBSE-affiliated school
(respondent Nos. 6 and 7) and the issuance of
transfer certificates dated 23.03.2023, seeking
their re-enrollment and permission to attend
classes. The dispute arose from the denial of a
50% Sibling Fee Relief Scheme for 2022-2024,
introduced by the school, due to late fee
payment by petitioner No. 1, leading to a
cumulative default of Rs. 76,122. The school's
refusal to extend the relief, coupled with alleged
misbehavior by petitioner No. 1, complaints to
the IGRS portal, police, and District Fee
Regulatory Committee, and a defamation suit by
the school, escalated the conflict. The school
issued transfer certificates, though petitioners'
children continued attending classes without fee
acceptance or attendance marking. Held: The
Sibling Fee Relief was conditional, not a right,
and the petitioners' late payment (post05.07.2022) justified its denial. The court found
mutual fault in the escalation but prioritized the
children's education. Considering the academic
session 2023-2024 was nearly over (four weeks
left),
re-admission
for
that
session
was
impractical due to closed CBSE registration and
low attendance. The court disposed of the
petition with mutual conditions: petitioner No. 1
to withdraw all complaints (IGRS, police, Fee
Regulatory Committee), deposit defaulted and
future fees, and undertake good conduct;
respondent No. 7 to withdraw the defamation
suit, cancel transfer certificates, and re-admit
petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 for 2024-2025. No costs
were awarde
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashutosh
Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Shri Shesh Kumar, learned
counsel appearing along with Shri Ritesh
Upadhyay,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for