# Syed Mohammad Manzar Revisionist v. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 56
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-02
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 12 of 2023
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/syed-mohammad-manzar-revisionist-v-u-p-waqf-tribunal-jawahar-bhawan-iiird-floor-50242
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Order 43 - Rule 1, (5(1), - Waqf Act, 1995
- Sections 83 & 83(9): - Civil Revision -
Challenging the order - in a Waqf case -
whereby tribunal rejected the Application filed
by plaintiff-revisionist for grant of temporary
injunction - preliminary objection - regarding
maintainability of Revision u/s 83(9) of Act,
1995 by relying on various judgments - because
of, impugned order is interlocutory in nature as
no appeal or revision is maintainable - Court
observed that, considering the aspects and
importance of a provision to an enactment, it is
thus evident that the judgment rendered earlier
in the cases of Hafiz Abdullah & ors. and Shakil
Ahmad (relied upon by the opposite party) have
not considered the aspect of proviso in section
83(9) of the Act, cannot be said to be a binding
precedent on that aspect - since, it is evident
that, an application granting or rejecting
temporary injunction would have the trapping of
finality with regard to question determined by
Tribunal - held, a Revision under section 83(9)
of the Act, would therefore be maintainable
before this Court - order on its merit accordingly
- Revision is allowed.
 (Para - 10, 27, 38)
5 All. Syed Mohammad Manzar Vs. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow &
 Ors.
57
Revision Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

56 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of various Apex Court judgments placed
above by the counsel for the applicants.

23. Thus on the basis of the discussion
and the judgments placed above, it is found
that applicant no.1 had resigned from the
Company much prior to the issuance of the
cheque in question. Admittedly, the cheque
did not bear the signatures of any of the
applicants. On the date of issuance of the
cheque the applicants were mere the
shareholders of the Company. There was no
active participation of the applicants in the
day to day business and transactions of the
Company and in the complaint itself, it is not
mentioned that as to how and in what manner
the applicants were in-charge or were
responsible to the accused Company for the
conduct of its business. Thus, in the opinion
of the Court, as on the face of the record,
participation of the applicants is not found in
the day to day functioning of the Company,
hence, on the basis of the version that the
defence would be seen at the time of
evidence, it would be travesty of justice to
drag the persons to face the prosecution who
are no way connected with the issuance of the
cheque or its being dishonour thereof.

24. On the basis of above discussion,
the summoning of the applicants to face
trial under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act is found to be against the
mandate of law laid down by the Apex
Court in above mentioned judgments.

25. The summoning order dated
25.11.2016 passed by the Upper Nyayalaya
Pratham, Ghaziabad and the judgment
dated 22.02.2018 passed by the Additional
Session Judge, Court No.15, Ghaziabad in
criminal revision are quashed.

26. The application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is, hereby, allowed.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 56
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Civil Revision No. 12 of 2023

Syed Mohammad Manzar ...Revisionist
Versus
U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd
Floor Lucknow & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sabir Ali, Mohd. Mansoor

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Syed Aftab Ahmad, Mohammad Ehtesham
Khan, SAA Rizvi

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Order 43 - Rule 1, (5(1), - Waqf Act, 1995
- Sections 83 & 83(9): - Civil Revision -
Challenging the order - in a Waqf case -
whereby tribunal rejected the Application filed
by plaintiff-revisionist for grant of temporary
injunction - preliminary objection - regarding
maintainability of Revision u/s 83(9) of Act,
1995 by relying on various judgments - because
of, impugned order is interlocutory in nature as
no appeal or revision is maintainable - Court
observed that, considering the aspects and
importance of a provision to an enactment, it is
thus evident that the judgment rendered earlier
in the cases of Hafiz Abdullah & ors. and Shakil
Ahmad (relied upon by the opposite party) have
not considered the aspect of proviso in section
83(9) of the Act, cannot be said to be a binding
precedent on that aspect - since, it is evident
that, an application granting or rejecting
temporary injunction would have the trapping of
finality with regard to question determined by
Tribunal - held, a Revision under section 83(9)
of the Act, would therefore be maintainable
before this Court - order on its merit accordingly
- Revision is allowed.
 (Para - 10, 27, 38)
5 All. Syed Mohammad Manzar Vs. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow &
 Ors.
57
Revision Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Union of India & ors. Vs Priyankan Sharan &
anr. (AIR 2009 (SC) Supp. 972),

2. Shah Babulal Khmji Vs Jayaben Kania (AIR
1981 SC 1786),

3. Shahen Shan & ors. Vs Civil Judge (SD) Sand Kabir
Nagar & ors. (2012 SCC Online All 2881),

4. Mauli Moinuddin & ors. Vs Maqbool Hasan &
ors. (2008 SCC Online All 193),

5. Hafiz Abdullah & anr. Vs Akbar Ali & ors.
(2002 (5) AWC 3829),

6. UP Sunni Central Board of Waqf Vs Shakil
Ahmad & ors. (2004 (2) AWC 1768 (LB),

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Mohd. Mansoor, learned
counsel for revisionist, Mr. A. A. Rizvi,
learned counsel for opposite parties no.1,2,
3 and 4 and Mr. Mohd. M.E. Khan, learned
counsel for opposite party no.5.

2. Civil revision has been filed against
order dated 12.12.2022 passed in Waqf
Case No.113 of 2020 whereby application
for grant of temporary injunction has been
rejected.

3. Learned counsel for revisionist
submits that although prayer has been made
for quashing of order dated 31.07.2019 and
26.02.2020 passed by the U.P. Shia Central
Board of Waqf, Lucknow but since the
aforesaid
orders
are
already
under
challenge before Waqf Tribunal, he is not
pressing his relief with regard to the
aforesaid orders and the revision as such
would remain confined to raising challenge
to order dated 12.12.2022.

4. At the very out set, learned counsel
for opposite parties have raised preliminary
objection
regarding
maintainability
of
revision under section 83 (9) of the Waqf
Act, 1995 to submit that the order
impugned being interlocutory in nature, no
appeal or revision is maintainable there
against.

5. For the purposes of determination of
maintainability of revision, the provisions
of Section 83 (9) of the Waqf Act 1995 are
required to be considered and are as
follows:-

"Section 83(9) in The Waqf Act,
1995:-

(9) No appeal shall lie against
any decision or order whether interim or
otherwise, given or made by the Tribunal:

Provided that a High Court may,
on its own motion or on the application of
the Board or any person aggrieved, call for
and examine the records relating to any
dispute, question or other matter which has
been determined by the Tribunal for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of such
determination and may confirm, reverse or
modify such determination or pass such
other order as it may think fit."

6. With regard to aforesaid, learned
counsel for parties have placed reliance on
various judgments rendered by Coordinate
58 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Benches of this Court which at first glance
appear to be contradictory.

7. In the case of U.P. Sunni Central
Board of Waqf versus Shakil Ahmad &
Ors. reported in 2004 (2) AWC 1768 (LB),
it has been held that a revision under
section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 would be
maintainable only in case a dispute,
question
or
other
matter
has
been
determined by the Tribunal. In the said
case, revision was held not to be
maintainable but subsequently in the case
of Mauli Moinuddin and Ors. versus
Maqbool Hasan and Ors reported in 2008
SCC Online All 193 and Shahen Shah &
Ors versus Civil Judge (S.D.) Sant Kabir
Nagar and Ors. reported in 2012 SCC
Online All 2281 revision against grant or
rejection of temporary injunction have been
held to be maintainable.

8. It is a relevant fact that while
considering the aspect of maintainability
of revision in the judgments of Mauli
Moinuddin and Ors. versus Maqbool
Hasan and Ors and Shahen Shah & Ors
versus Civil Judge (S.D.) Sant Kabir
Nagar and Ors., the earlier judgment
rendered by this Court in the case of
Shakil Ahmad (supra) has not been
considered.

9. It is also noticed that in another
judgment rendered in the case of Hafiz
Abdullah & Anr. versus Akbar Ali & Ors.
reported in 2002 (5) AWC 3829 also,
revision was held not to be maintainable
against an interlocutory order.

10.
Upon
consideration
of
the
aforesaid judgments on the point, it
transpires that in the case of Hafiz
Abdullah & Ors (supra) revision had been
filed against an order allowing interim
injunction
pending
decision
on
the
application for temporary injunction, which
according to learned judge was only
interlocutory in nature and therefore
revision was held not to be maintainable.

11. In the case of Shakil Ahmad
(supra) learned judge has adverted to the
fact that order impugned in the revision
pertained to grant of temporary injunction
which was extended from time to time.
Thereafter provisions of Section 83(9) of
the Waqf Act have been quoted alongwith
proviso but subsequently it has been held as
follows:-

"7. For the maintainability of the
revision under Section 83(9), there must be
an impugned order, by which any dispute,
question
or
other
matter
has
been
determined by the Tribunal. I find that by
the impugned order, the dispute between the
Mutawalli and the Waqf Board has not
been determined."

12. In the entire body of judgment, it
appears that emphasis has been laid only on
the primary provision under Section 83(9)
of the Waqf Act, 1995 without adverting to
the proviso contained therein and therefore
it has been held that for maintainability of a
revision there must be an impugned order
whereby any disputed question or other
matter has been determined.
5 All. Syed Mohammad Manzar Vs. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow &
 Ors.
59

13. It is thus quite evident that the
order passed in Shakil Ahmad (supra)
despite noticing the proviso, adverts only to
the primary clause of Section 83 (9) of the
Act.

14. The aforesaid aspect however
has been considered in detail in judgments
rendered by Coordinate Benches of this
Court in the case of Mauli Moinuddin and
Ors. versus Maqbool Hasan and ors.
reported in 2008 SCC Online All 193 in
the following manner:

"6. The other point is that
revision against interim order is not
maintainable. In this regard, an authority
of this Court reported in 1991 AWC
620U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf v.
Abdul Rashid and Ors. has been cited.
However, in the said case, revision was
directed against an order through which an
earlier order had been recalled by the
tribunal. Similarly, in the other authority
reported in 2002 AWC 1430 Hafeez
Abdulla v Akbar Ali also temporary
injunction had not finally been decided by
the tribunal. Last sentence of Para-6 of the
said authority is quoted below:

The order is totally interlocutory
and the question whether the operation of
the order should be stayed or not is still to
be decided by the trial court.

7. Under Section 83(9) of the
Waqf Act, 1995, revision is directed against
determination by the tribunal of any
dispute, question or other matter. In my
opinion,
final disposal of
temporary
injunction
application
is
such
determination, which is amenable to
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
under the aforesaid section."

15. In the case of Shahen Shah
and others versus Civil Judge (S.D.) Sant
Kabir Nagar & Ors. coordinate bench of
this Court has considered the provision of
Revision under section 76 of the Act of
1960 as compared to the ambit of Section
83 of the Act of 1995 and has thereafter
concluded that the scope of Section 83(9)
of the Act of 1995 is much wider than the
provision of Revision under the Act of
1960.

16. Learned counsel for opposite
parties has also adverted to judgment and
order dated 13.06.2022 passed in Civil
Revision No.23 of 2022 holding that the
order granting interim relief is purely
interlocutory order which does not suffer
from any jurisdictional or legal error so as
to warrant interference in exercise of
revisional power under section 83 (9) of the
Waqf Act 1995.

17. It appears that the aforesaid
judgment does not take into account any of
the judgments rendered by Coordinate
benches
passed
prior
thereto.
Even
otherwise the judgment does not appear to
be a proposition that an interlocutory order
granting interim relief would not be
amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this
Court but on the contrary has declined
revisional interference on the ground that
the order is not only purely interlocutory in
nature but also does not suffer from any
jurisdictional or legal error. The corollary
of the aforesaid judgment may be that an
interlocutory order which suffers from
jurisdictional or legal error may be
reviseable under section 83(9) of the Act of
1995.
60 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

18. It is thus quite evident that the
earlier judgments in the cases of Hafiz
Abdullah & Ors (supra) and Shakil Ahmad
(supra) cannot be said to be a proposition
that revision under section 83 (9) of the
Waqf Act, 1995 would not be maintainable
against an order allowing or rejecting an
application for temporary injunction.

19. The aspect of maintainability of
revision against grant or rejection of
temporary injunction would be quite
evident from a perusal of proviso to Section
83(9) which on first principles clearly
indicates jurisdiction of a High Court to
examine records relating to any dispute,
question or other matter which has been
determined by the Tribunal. The provision
itself clearly indicates power of High Court
akin to revisional jurisdiction with regard
to not only any dispute but question or
other matter as well which has been
determined by the Tribunal. The aspect of
not only a dispute but a question or other
matter having been determined by the
Tribunal is a relevant provision required to
be understood in that perspective.

20. The question as to when the grant
or rejection of an application for temporary
injunction can be said to amount to a
'judgment' has been dealt with by Hon'ble
the Supreme Court in the case of Shah
Babulal
Khimji
vs.
Jayaben
Kania
reported in AIR 1981 SC 1786 in the
following manner:-

"113. Thus, under the Code of
Civil Procedure, a judgment consists of the
reasons and grounds for a decree passed by
a court. As a judgment constitutes the
reasons for the decree it follows as a matter
of course that the judgment must be a
formal adjudication which conclusively
determines the rights of the parties with
regard to all or any of the matters in
controversy. The concept of a judgment as
defined by the Code of Civil Procedure
seems to be rather narrow and the
limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of
Section 2 cannot be physically imported
into the definition of the word ?judgment?
as used in clause 15 of the letters patent
because the letters patent has advisedly not
used the terms ?order? or ?decree?
anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the
givers of the letters patent was that the
word ?judgment? should receive a much
wider and more liberal interpretation than
the word ?judgment? used in the Code of
Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot
be said that any order passed by a trial
Judge would amount to a judgment;
otherwise there will be no end to the
number
of
orders
which
would
be
appealable under the letters patent. It
seems to us that the word ?judgment? has
undoubtedly a concept of finality in a
broader and not a narrower sense. In other
words, a judgment can be of three kinds:-

1. A final Judgment: A judgment
which decides all the questions or issues in
controversy so far as the trial Judge is
concerned and leaves, nothing else to be
decided. This would mean that by virtue of
the judgment, the suit or action brought by
the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part
or in full. Such an order passed by the trial
Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a
judgment within the meaning of the Letters
Patent and even amounts to a decree so
that an appeal would lie from such a
judgment to a Division Bench.

2. A preliminary judgment: this
kind of a judgment may take two forms (a)
5 All. Syed Mohammad Manzar Vs. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow &
 Ors.
61
where the trial Judge by an order dismisses
the suit without going into the merits of the
suit but only on a preliminary objection
raised by the defendant or the party
opposing on the ground that the suit is not
maintainable. Here also, as the suit is
finally decided one way or the other, the
order passed by the trial Judge would be a
judgment finally deciding the cause so far
as the trial Judge is concerned and,
therefore, appealable to the larger Bench,
(b) Another shape which a preliminary
judgment may take is that where the trial
Judge passes an order after hearing the
preliminary objections raised by the
defendant relating to maintainability of the
suit, e.g. bar of jurisdiction, resjudicata, a
manifest defect in the suit, absence of
notice under Section 80 and the like, and
these objections are decided by the trial
Judge against the defendant, the suit is not
terminated but continues and has to be
tried on merits but the order of the trial
Judge rejecting the objections doubtless
adversely affects a valuable right of the
defendant who, if his objections are valid,
is entitled to get the suit dismissed on
preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order
even though it keeps the suit alive,
undoubtedly decides an important aspect of
the trial which affects a vital right of the
defendant and must, therefore, be construed
to be a judgment so as to be appealable to
a larger Bench.

3. Intermediary or interlocutory
judgment: Most of the interlocutory orders
which contain the quality of finality are
clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of
Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been
held by us to be judgments within the
meaning of the Letters Patent and,
therefore, appealable. There may also be
interlocutory orders which are not covered
by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess
the characteristics and trappings of finality
in that, the orders may adversely affect a
valuable right of the party or decide an
important aspect of the trial in an ancillary
proceeding. Before such an order can be a
judgment the adverse effect on the party
concerned must be direct and immediate
rather than indirect or remote. ...................

115. Thus, in other words every
interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a
judgment but only those orders would be
judgments which decide matters of moment
or affect vital and valuable rights of the
parties and which work serious injustice to
the party concerned. Similarly, orders
passed by the trial Judge0 deciding
question of admissibility or relevancy of a
document also cannot be treated as
judgments because the grievance on this
score can be corrected by the appellate
court in appeal against the final judgment."

21. The aforesaid judgment is a
leading proposition of law on the point that
even
interlocutory
orders
possessing
characteristics and trappings of finality or
affecting valuable rights of a party or
deciding important aspects of a trial in
main or in an ancillary proceedings, would
be 'judgment'.

22. Upon applicability of aforesaid
judgment, it is evident that an application
granting or rejecting temporary injunction
would amount to final determination of a
question referred to the Tribunal for its
adjudication and since such an order would
have the effect of adversely affecting one
party to the dispute with regard to a
valuable right with such effect being direct
and immediate rather than indirect or
remote, would possess the characteristics
62 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and trappings of finality so far as that
question is considered. In that sense, even
an
application
granting
or
rejecting
temporary injunction clearly has the
trappings of finality and would therefore
amount to a dispute or question or other
matter having been determined by the
Tribunal.

23. It is also relevant to indicate that
while first part of Section 83(9) of the Act
pertains to non-maintainability of appeal
against any decision or order whether
interim or otherwise by the Tribunal but it
is the proviso which indicates powers of
High Court akin to revisional jurisdiction.

24. It is settled law that a proviso
though required to be seen and read along
with the main portion of an enactment
carves out an exception to the main
provision and that the ordinary and proper
function of a proviso coming after a general
enactment is to limit the applicability of
general enactment. The concept of proviso
therefore clearly is separate and distinct
from the main enactment, though required
to be read in the same terms, but carves out
an exception to the main enactment.

25. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the
case of Union of India & Ors versus
Priyankan Sharan & Anr. reported in AIR
2009 SC (Supp) 972 has held as follows
with regard to a proviso :

"12. The normal function of a
proviso is to except something out of the
enactment or to qualify something enacted
therein which but for the proviso would be
within the purview of the enactment. As was
stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey
[1880 (5) QBD 170, (referred to in Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning
Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha
(AIR
1961 SC 1596)
and Calcutta
Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of
Calcutta (AIR 1965 SC 1728); when one
finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the
enacting part of the section would have
included the subject matter of the proviso.
The proper function of a proviso is to
except and to deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language
of the main enactment and its effect is
confined to that case. It is a qualification of
the preceding enactment which is expressed
in terms too general to be quite accurate.
As a general rule, a proviso is added to an
enactment to qualify or create an exception
to what is in the enactment and ordinarily,
a proviso is not interpreted as stating a
general rule. "If the language of the enacting
part of the statute does not contain the
provisions which are said to occur in it you
cannot derive these provisions by implication
from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in West
Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance
Co. (1897 AC 647)(HL). Normally, a proviso
does not travel beyond the provision to which
it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to
the main provision to which it has been
enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A.
N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram &
Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1406),Tribhovandas
Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue
Tribunal and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1538) and
Kerala State Housing Board and Ors v.
Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994
(5) SCC 672)."

26. Considering the aspects and
importance of a proviso to an enactment, it
5 All. Syed Mohammad Manzar Vs. U.P. Waqf Tribunal Jawahar Bhawan IIIrd Floor Lucknow &
 Ors.
63
is thus evident that the judgments rendered
earlier in the cases of Hafiz Abdullah &
Ors (supra) and Shakil Ahmad (supra)
having not considered the aspect of proviso
in section 83(9) of the Act, cannot be said
to be a binding precedent on that aspect.

27. In view of discussion made
hereinabove, since it is evident that an
application granting or rejecting temporary
injunction would have the trappings of
finality with regard to question determined
by Tribunal, it is held that a revision under
section 83 (9) of the Act would therefore be
maintainable before this Court.

28. With regard to merits of the case,
learned counsel for revisionist submits that
initially the property pertaining to Gata
No.491 having an area of one bigha eight
biswa related to creation of Waqf by the
name
of
Waqf
Qarbala
Abdullapur
Akbarpur. It is submitted that the aforesaid
Waqf was registered with Shia Waqf Board
as Waqf No.2018. Attention has been
drawn to the fact that father of opposite
party no.5, Syed Ameer Hasan was one of
the Waqif of the deed. It is submitted that
inadvertently revenue records did not
reflect the correct name of Waqf which was
recorded in the individual name of Mutwali
and therefore a report dated 26.01.1988
was submitted for correction of the name of
Waqf in the revenue records particularly
indicating that vide earlier order dated
31.12.1987, the aforesaid Waqf has been
wrongly entered in the revenue records as
Waqf Qarbala Kabristan Shia Sadaat. It is
submitted that the aforesaid report was
reiterated by the subsequent report dated
30.03.2018 by the Lekhpal concerned but
the actual corrections as recommended in
the reports were not made and vide
subsequent order dated 13.05.2022 passed
by Sub Divisional Magistrate in Case
No.03816 of 2018, the incorrect name of
Waqf was expunged but instead of
indicating the correct name, only the name
of Mutwali i.e. Syed Ameer Hasan was
indicated.

29. It is submitted that in the
meantime,
one
Naseem
Bano
was
appointed Mutwali of the Waqf, which was
challenged by opposite party no.4 before
the Tribunal and arising out of the said
proceedings, Civil Revision No.37 of 2019
was filed before this Court in which vide
order dated 08.05.2019, it was directed that
no third party right including tenancy rights
would be created by either of the parties. It
is submitted that in the meantime vide
order dated 31.07.2019, the Waqf Board
modified the nature of the Waqf from Waqf
ALAL- Khair to Waqf ALAL-Aulad, a fact
brought to the notice of this Court, which in
its order dated 07.11.2019 noticed the same
and recorded the submission of learned
counsel for Waqf Board that the order dated
31.07.2019 had been passed without
knowledge of interim directions issued by
this Court and therefore his submission that
the said order would be revisited was also
recorded.

30. It is submitted that in pursuance to
the submissions advanced before this
Court, the order dated 31.07.2019 was
thereafter cancelled vide order dated
14.11.2019. In pursuance thereof, the
aforesaid revision was also disposed of.

31. It is submitted that upon disposal
of aforesaid civil revision, the Waqf Board
64 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vide its resolution dated 26.02.2020 again
revived the earlier order dated 31.07.2019,
which was challenged by the revisionist
before the Waqf Board which although
initially
granted
interim
order
but
subsequently by means of impugned order
dated 12.12.2022 has rejected application
for interim injunction with time being
granted for filing of written statement.

32. Learned counsel for revisionist as
such submits that once it was admitted that
the Waqf has been registered with the Waqf
Board in a particular name, the same could
not have been changed by the Board
without indicating cogent reason for the
same. It is submitted that reliance placed in
the impugned order on the sale-deed dated
16.04.1968 allegedly in favour of father of
opposite party no.5 was in itself misplaced
since the father of opposite party no.5 as
Waqif was well aware of the nature of Waqf
being created by the Waqf deed and never
set up a case of his individual rights by
means of the aforesaid sale-deed, which
was
produced
and
relied
upon
by
answering opposite party only in the year
2018.

33. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of answering opposite party no.5 has
refuted submissions advanced by learned
counsel for revisionist with the submission
that the Waqf deed itself indicates its nature
to be that of ALAL-Aulad since a narration
in the Waqf deed clearly stipulates that the
beneficiaries of the Waqf would be
successors of initial beneficiaries and
therefore the wrong name indicated in the
Waqf deed is only an omission and the
intention of the deed has to be seen from
the aforesaid narration in the Waqf deed. It
is in that context that he submits that the
deed was required to be treated as ALALAulad particularly in view of the sale-deed
dated 16.04.1968 in favour of father of
opposite party no.5.

34. It is also submitted that the
impugned order has rightly recorded the
fact that the aforesaid sale-deed is a
registered document, which has not been
challenged by any person till date and as
such
a
presumption
regarding
its
genuineness has been correctly drawn in
terms of the Evidence Act.

35. Upon consideration of submissions
advanced by learned counsel for parties and
perusal of material available on record, it is
an admitted fact that Waqf was created with
regard to Gata No.491 having an area of one
bigha, eight biswa. It is also admitted that the
Waqf deed clearly indicates the name of Waqf
as Waqf Qarbala Abdullapur Akbarpur.
Neither of the parties are denying the
execution of aforesaid Waqf deed. It is also
an admitted fact that the said deed is recorded
with the Board as Waqf No.2018. The report
of revenue authorities also indicates the fact
that the name of Waqf was wrongly recorded
inadvertently in the revenue records and
therefore recommendation was made for their
correction. However no concrete order has
been
passed
on
the
aforesaid
recommendations
and
by
means
of
subsequent order dated 13.05.2022 passed in
Case No.3816 of 2018, while expunging the
name of Waqf as Waqf Qarbala Kabristan
Shia Sadaat, the name of Mutwali was
recorded.

36. Upon perusal of impugned order, it
does not evidence as to the material which
5 All. Ram Ratan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
65
was before the Waqf Board from which it
could deduce at this stage that the Waqf
deed inadvertently omitted it to be
indicated as Waqf ALAL-Aulad. The
aforesaid contradiction in Waqf deed is
required to be proved before the Tribunal
by leading of evidence and at this stage the
prima facie finding recorded by the
Tribunal does not appear to be supported by
any evidence.

37. It also appears that Tribunal has given
considerable weight to the fact that a sale-deed
was executed in favour of father of opposite
party no.5 on 16.04.1968 which was a
registered deed and has not been challenged by
any one. The said aspect also, would require
corroboration and substantiation by evidence.
The Tribunal as such was required to take into
consideration the prima facie contradiction in
the Waqf deed and the aforesaid sale-deed and
at this stage, it appears to have wrongly placed
heavy reliance on the aforesaid fact pertaining
to the sale-deed without adverting to the fact
that there did not appear to be any material on
record, at the stage of grant of interim
injunction by which it would be deemed that
the Waqifs of the Waqf deed deliberately or by
omission recorded a wrong name and purpose
of Waqf.

38.
In
view
aforesaid
facts
and
circumstances, the order impugned dated
12.12.2022
passed
by
Waqf
Tribunal,
Lucknow in Waqf Case No.113 of 2020, being
apparently against the material on record, is set
aside. The aspect of validity of Waqf deed, the
sale-deed and revenue entries would definitely
be subject to evidence being led during course
of proceeding.

39. It is observed that the narration of
events and facts as indicated in the body of
this order would be subject to evidence
being led before the Tribunal.

40. The revision as such succeeds and
is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 65
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 16 of 2023

Ram Ratan ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Sri Vijay Bahadur Shivhare, Sri Ram Lalit
Chaudhary, Sri Vijay Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 397/401 -
Revision - The Food Safety and Standards
Act,
2006
-
Section
97
(4)
-
Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force,
no court shall take cognizance of an
offence under the repealed Act or Orders
after the expiry of a period of three years
from the date of the commencement of
this Act - Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954 (repealed) ,Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 2006 - Section 2(m),
2(n), 2(ia)(m), 7/16, 13(2) , 16, Section
13 - Report of public analyst , Section16A
- Power of court to try cases summarily,
Probation of the Offenders Act,1958 -
Section 4.