# Tahseen & Ors v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2022) 7 ILRA 218
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-06-21
- **Case number:** Crl. Appel. No. 3882 of 2010
- **Bench:** Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, Gautam Chowdhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/tahseen-ors-v-state-of-u-p-48880
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 302/34,299, 300,304B &
498A
-
Dowry
prohibition
Act,1961-
Section3/4
-
The
Code
of
criminal
procedure, 1973 - Section 313 - power to
examine
accused
murder
-
culpable
homicide not amounting to murder - not
an absolute principle of law that a dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction of an accused - twin principle
of deterrence and correction would be
served
by
reducing
the
period
of
incarceration already undergone by the
accused.(Para -19,20)

Accused-appellants - poured kerosene - set
ablaze the deceased - death caused by accused
- not premeditated - no intention to cause death
of deceased - injuries were though sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to have caused
death - no intention to do away with deceased
.(Para - 2,8,18)

HELD:- Case falls under Exceptions 1 and 4 to
Section 300 of IPC. Considering Section 299,
offence committed fall under Section 304 Part-I
of IPC .Death due to septicemia. Offence not
under
Section
302
of
I.P.C.
butculpable
homicide.
Sentence
of
accused
appellant
reduced
to
period
eight
years
with
remission.(Para -18,22 )

Appeal partly allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

218 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
maintained. Period of sentence for three
years rigorous imprisonment under Section
4/25 of Arms Act and default sentence for
the said punishment has already been
undergone by the appellant. Fine and
imprisonment for default under Section
4/25 Arms Act is maintained.

23. Accordingly, the appeal is partly
allowed with the modification of the
sentence, as above.

24. The Jailer to release the accused
on completing tenure of his rigorous
imprisonment as per jail record with
remission.

25. Record be sent back to the court
below.
----------
(2022)07ILR A218
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.06.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.
THE HON'BLE GAUTAM CHOWDHARY, J.

Crl. Appel. No. 3882 of 2010

Tahseen & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Vivek Mishra, Sri Anil Kumar Pandey, Sri
Mohd. Kalim, Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate

(A) Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 302/34,299, 300,304B &
498A
-
Dowry
prohibition
Act,1961-
Section3/4
-
The
Code
of
criminal
procedure, 1973 - Section 313 - power to
examine
accused
murder
-
culpable
homicide not amounting to murder - not
an absolute principle of law that a dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction of an accused - twin principle
of deterrence and correction would be
served
by
reducing
the
period
of
incarceration already undergone by the
accused.(Para -19,20)

Accused-appellants - poured kerosene - set
ablaze the deceased - death caused by accused
- not premeditated - no intention to cause death
of deceased - injuries were though sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to have caused
death - no intention to do away with deceased
.(Para - 2,8,18)

HELD:- Case falls under Exceptions 1 and 4 to
Section 300 of IPC. Considering Section 299,
offence committed fall under Section 304 Part-I
of IPC .Death due to septicemia. Offence not
under
Section
302
of
I.P.C.
butculpable
homicide.
Sentence
of
accused
appellant
reduced
to
period
eight
years
with
remission.(Para -18,22 )

Appeal partly allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Maniben Vs St. of Guj., 2009 (8) SCC 796

2. Chirra Shivraj Vs St. of A.P., 2010 (14) SCC
444

3. Rama Devi @ Ramakanti Vs St. of U.P.,
Criminal Appeal No.1438 of 2010

4. Smt. Kanti & anr. Vs St. of U.P., Criminal
Appeal No. 2558 of 2011

5. Govindappa & ors. Vs St. of Karn., (2010) 6
SCC 533

6. Tukaram & ors. Vs St. of Mah., (2011) 4 SCC
250

7. B.N. Kavatakar & anr .Vs St. of Karn., 1994
SUPP (1) SCC 304

8. Veeran & ors. Vs St. of M.P., (2011) 5 SCR
300
7 All. Tahseen & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
219
9. Gautam Manubhai Makwana Vs St. of Guj.,
Criminal Appeal No.83 of 2008

10. Khokan@ Khokhan Vishwas Vs St. of
Chattisgarh, 2021 LawSuit (SC) 80

11. Anversinh Vs St. of Guj., (2021) 3 SCC 12

12. Pravat Chandra Mohanty Vs St. of Odisha,
(2021) 3 SCC 529

13. Pardeshiram Vs St. of M.P., (2021) 3 SCC
238

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. This appeal challenges the
judgment and order dated 24.5.2010 passed
by Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track
Court No.2, Saharanpur in Sessions Trial
No. 06 of 2010 convicting accusedappellants under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and
sentenced them to undergo imprisonment
for life with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in
default of payment of fine, further to
undergo imprisonment for six months.

2. Factual scenario as culled out from
the record and the judgment of the Court
below is that the accused-appellants are
alleged to have set ablaze the deceased on
16.10.2009.

3. On the complaint of the brother of
the deceased, First Information Report
being No.434 of 2009 was registered under
Section 498A, 304B IPC and Section 3/4
Dowry Prohibition Act and thereafter, the
investigation was moved into motion. After
recording statements of various persons,
the investigating officer submitted the
charge-sheet
against
accused
under
Sections 498A, 304B I.P.C. and Section 3/4
Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate before whom charge
sheet was laid committed the same to the
learned Sessions Judge. The learned
Sessions Judge, on hearing the learned
Government Advocate and learned counsel
for the accused, framed charges under
Section 498A, 304 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4
of Dowry Prohibition Act.

4. On being read over the charges, the
accused pleaded not guilty and wanted to
be tried, hence, the trial started and the
prosecution examined 12 witnesses who are
as follows:

1
Safdar
PW1 (hostile)
2
Jubeda
PW2 (hostile)
3
Abdul Gafur
PW3 (hostile)
4
Mahamood
PW4 (hostile)
5
Rajesh
Chandra
PW5
6
Vivek Kumar
Tripathi
PW6
7
Dr.
Naresh
Chandra
PW7
8
Raj
Kumar
Singh
PW8
9
Deepka Garg
PW9
10
Dr.
M.
R.
Singh
PW10
11
Chandra
Shekhar
PW 11
12
Dr.
Namrata
Pahuja
PW 12
13
Dr.
Sunil
Kumar
PW 13

5. In support of ocular version
following documents were filed:
220 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1
F.I.R.
Ex.Ka.15
2
Written Report
Ex.Ka.1
3
Dying Declaration
Ex. Ka.2
4
Injury Report
Ex.
Ka13
5
Postmortem Report
Ex.
Ka.
19
6
Charge-sheet
Ex.Ka-12
7
Recovery Memo of Burnt
Sandal
Match
Box,
Plastic Botte
Ex.
Ka10
8
Recovery
Memo
of
Electric
Watch,
Foam
Gadda
Ex.
Ka11
9
Injury report
Ex.
Ka13
10
Death Report
Ex. Ka. 5
11
Post mortem report
Ex.
Ka.
19
12
Report
of
Forensic
Medicine and Toxicology
Ex.
Ka.
21
13
Statement of Bhuri
Ex. Ka. 4

6. At the end of the trial and after
recording the statement of the accused under
section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments
on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the
learned
Sessions
Judge
convicted
the
appellant as mentioned above.

7. Heard learned counsel for the
appellant, learned A.G.A for the State and
perused the record.

8. It is submitted that the deceased in
her dying declaration mentioned that the
accused poured kerosene and set her ablaze.
Her statement was recorded at 8.00 a.m. on
18.10.2009.

9. Learned counsel has thereafter taken
us to the depositions of other witnesses who
are hostile witnesses. Be that as it may, the
main crux on which submission is made by
learned counsel for the appellant are that the
deceased died out of burn injuries after two
days. The medical evidence according to the
counsel for the appellant shows that she died
due to septicemic shock and, therefore, it is
submitted that looking to the F.I.R. and the
dying declarations, it cannot be said that the
deceased was done to death and she was
murdered. It is submitted that even if it is
considered that it was culpable homicide, it
would be culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.

10. In support of the his submissions,
learned counsel for the appellant has relied on
the decisions in Maniben vs. State of
Gujarat, 2009 (8) SCC 796, Chirra Shivraj
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2010 (14)
SCC 444, Criminal Appeal No.1438 of 2010
(Rama Devi alias Ramakanti vs. State of
U.P.) decided on 7.10.2017 & Criminal
Appeal No. 2558 of 2011 (Smt. Kanti and
another vs. State of U.P.) decided on
1.2.2021.

11. Learned A.G.A. for the state has
vehemently submitted the death of the
deceased was though due to septicemic
shock, the burn injuries goes to show that it
would not be an offence punishable under
Section 304 part I or II of I.P.C.

12. While going through the evidence
of the witnesses in light of the judgments of
the Apex Court referred by both the learned
Advocates, we would have to evaluate
whether deceased was done to death with a
premeditation. Just because death was due
to septicemic shock will not take it out
from the purview of Section 300 of I.P.C.
The evidence of most of the witnesses
7 All. Tahseen & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
221
which has been recorded goes to show that
most of them have given go by of their
statements before the police under Section
161 of Cr.P.C. But, the medical evidence
and dying declaration which are multiple in
number have to be evaluated.

13. The evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 6
who recorded the so called statement of
deceased on 16.10.2009 and 18.10.2009.
Both have their oral testimony that the
deceased
was
in
hr
senses.
Dying
declaration recorded as Ext. 2 is by the
Tehsildar that her sister-in-law Najo and
other accused had pored kerosene on her.
The statement 9/3 by witness six is also
important for us and, therefore, the
evidence of witnesses goes to show that the
accused had set the deceased on ablaze.
The dying declaration has not been
challenged by the counsel for the appellant
and in the light of the decision in
Govindappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, there is no
reason for us not to accept the dying
declaration and its evidentiary value under
Section 32 of Evidence Act, 1872.
However, it is submitted that looking to the
facts,
the
accused-appellant
had
no
intention to do away with the deceased. The
reason the D.W. 1, 2 and 3 have also opined
and the statement in 313 Cr.P.C. is also to
serve extet a rebuttal of the charges and she
is a mother. She has been wrongly roped
and she tried to on the contrary douse the
girl with water. They have taken her to the
hospital. Baseem who is D.W.-1 who is
husband of the deceased has also opined to
the said defect. All these facts go to show
punishment under Section 302 IPC is
unwarranted.

14. Considering the evidence of the
witnesses and also considering the medical
evidence including post mortem report,
there is no doubt left in our mind about the
guilt of the present appellants.

15. However, the question which falls
for our consideration is whether, on
reappraisal of the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the conviction of
the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. of
the Indian Penal Code should be upheld or
the conviction deserves to be converted
under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the
Indian Penal Code. It would be relevant to
refer Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code,
which read as under:

"299. Culpable homicide: Whoever
causes death by doing an act with the
intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, or with the knowledge
that he is likely by such act to cause death,
commits the offence of culpable homicide."

16. The academic distinction between
''murder' and ''culpable homicide not
amounting to murder' has always vexed the
Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts
losing sight of the true scope and meaning
of the terms used by the legislature in these
sections, allow themselves to be drawn into
minute abstractions. The safest way of
approach
to
the
interpretation
and
application of these provisions seems to be
to keep in focus the keywords used in the
various clauses of Section 299 and 300 of
I.P.Code. The following comparative table
will be helpful in appreciating the points of
distinction between the two offences.

Section 299
Section 300
A person commits
culpable homicide if
the act by which the
death is caused is
Subject to certain
exceptions culpable
homicide is murder
if the act by which
222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
done-
the death is caused is
done.

INTENTION

(a) with the intention of
causing death; or
(1)
with
the
intention
of
causing
death;
or
(b) with the intention of
causing
such
bodily
injury as is likely to
cause death; or
(2)
with
the
intention
of
causing
such
bodily injury as
the
offender
knows
to
be
likely to cause
the death of the
person to whom
the
harm
is
caused;
KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE
(c)
with
the
knowledge that the
act is likely to
cause death.
(4)
with
the
knowledge that the act
is
so
immediately
dangerous that it must
in all probability cause
death or such bodily
injury as is likely to
cause
death,
and
without any excuse for
incurring the risk of
causing death or such
injury as is mentioned
above.

17. On overall scrutiny of the facts
and circumstances of the present case
coupled with the opinion of the Medical
Officer and considering the principle laid
down by the Apex Court in the Case of
Tukaram
and
Ors
Vs.
State
of
Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 4 SCC
250 and in the case of B.N. Kavatakar and
Another Vs. State of Karnataka, reported
in 1994 SUPP (1) SCC 304, we are of the
considered opinion that the offence would
be one punishable under Section 304 part-I
of the IPC.

18. From the upshot of the aforesaid
discussions, it appears that the death caused
by the accused was not premeditated,
accused had no intention to cause death of
deceased,
the
injuries
were
though
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to have caused death, accused had no
intention to do away with deceased, hence
the instant case falls under the Exceptions 1
and 4 to Section 300 of IPC. While
considering Section 299 as reproduced
herein above offence committed will fall
under Section 304 Part-I as per the
observations of the Apex Court in Veeran
and others Vs. State of M.P. Decided,
(2011) 5 SCR 300 which have to be also
kept in mind.

19. We can safely rely upon the
decision of the Gujarat High court in
Criminal Appeal No.83 of 2008 (Gautam
Manubhai
Makwana
Vs.
State
of
Gujarat) decided on 11.9.2013 wherein the
Court held as under:

"12. In fact, in the case of Krishan vs.
State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3
SCC 280, the Apex Court has held that it is
not an absolute principle of law that a
dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction of an accused. Where
the dying declaration is true and correct,
the attendant circumstances show it to be
reliable and it has been recorded in
accordance with law, the deceased made
the dying declaration of her own accord
and upon due certification by the doctor
with regard to the state of mind and body,
then it may not be necessary for the court
7 All. Tahseen & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
223
to look for corroboration. In such cases,
the dying declaration alone can form the
basis for the conviction of the accused. But
where the dying declaration itself is
attended by suspicious circumstances, has
not been recorded in accordance with law
and settled procedures and practices, then,
it may be necessary for the court to look for
corroboration of the same.

13. However, the complaint given by
the deceased and the dying declaration
recorded by the Executive Magistrate and
the history before the doctor is consistent
and seems to be trustworthy. The same is
also duly corroborated with the evidence of
witnesses and the medical reports as well
as panchnama and it is clear that the
deceased died a homicidal death due to the
act of the appellants in pouring kerosene
and setting him ablaze. We do find that the
dying declaration is trust worthy.

14. However, we have also not lost
sight of the fact that the deceased had died
after a month of treatment. From the
medical reports, it is clear that the
deceased suffered from Septicemia which
happened due to extensive burns.

15. In the case of the B.N. Kavatakar
and another (supra), the Apex Court in a
similar case of septicemia where the
deceased therein had died in the hospital
after five days of the occurrence of the
incident
in
question,
converted
the
conviction under section 302 to under
section 326 and modified the sentence
accordingly.

15.1 Similarly, in the case of Maniben
(supra), the Apex Court has observed as
under:

"18. The deceased was admitted in the
hospital with about 60% burn injuries and
during the course of treatment developed
septicemia, which was the main cause of
death of the deceased. It is, therefore,
established that during the aforesaid period
of 8 days the injuries aggravated and
worsened to the extent that it led to
ripening of the injuries and the deceased
died due to poisonous effect of the injuries.

19. It is established from the dying
declaration of the deceased that she was
living separately from her mother-in-law,
the appellant herein, for many years and
that on the day in question she had a
quarrel with the appellant at her house. It
is also clear from the evidence on record
that immediately after the quarrel she
along with her daughter came to fetch
water and when she was returning, the
appellant came and threw a burning tonsil
on the clothes of the deceased. Since the
deceased was wearing a terylene cloth at
that relevant point of time, it aggravated
the fire which caused the burn injuries.

20. There is also evidence on record to
prove and establish that the action of the
appellant to throw the burning tonsil was
preceded by a quarrel between the
deceased and the appellant. From the
aforesaid evidence on record it cannot be
said that the appellant had the intention
that such action on her part would cause
the death or such bodily injury to the
deceased, which was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause the
death of the deceased. Therefore, in our
considered opinion, the case cannot be said
to be covered under clause (4) of Section
300 of IPC. We are, however, of the
considered opinion that the case of the
appellant is covered under Section 304
Part II of IPC."

16. In the present case, we have come
to the irresistible conclusion that the role of
the appellants is clear from the dying
declaration and other records. However,
the point which has also weighed with this
court are that the deceased had survived
for around 30 days in the hospital and that
his condition worsened after around 5 days
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and ultimately died of septicemia. In fact he
had sustained about 35% burns. In that
view of the matter, we are of the opinion
that the conviction of the appellants under
section 302 of Indian Penal Code is
required to be converted to that under
section 304(I) of Indian Penal Code and in
view of the same appeal is partly allowed.

17. The conviction of the appellants -
original accused under Section 302 of
Indian Penal Code vide judgment and
order dated 19.12.2007 arising from
Sessions Case No. 149 of 2007 passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track
Court No. 6, Ahmedabad is converted to
conviction under Section 304 (Part I) of
Indian
Penal
Code.
However,
the
conviction of the appellants - original
accused under section 452 of Indian Penal
Code is upheld. The appellants - original
accused are ordered to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of ten years and
fine of Rs. 5000/- each in default rigorous
imprisonment for six months under section
304 (Part I) of Indian Penal Code instead
of life imprisonment and sentence in default
of fine as awarded by the trial court under
section 302 IPC. The sentence imposed in
default of fine under section 452 IPC is
also reduced to two months. Accordingly,
the appellants are ordered to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten
years and fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default,
rigorous imprisonment for six months for
offence punishable under section 304(I) of
Indian
Penal
Code
and
rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years and
fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, rigorous
imprisonment for two months for offence
punishable under section 452 of Indian
Penal Code. Both sentences shall run
concurrently. The judgement and order
dated 19.12.2007 is modified accordingly.
The period of sentence already undergone
shall be considered for remission of
sentence qua appellants - original accused.
R & P to be sent back to the trial court
forthwith."

20. In latest decision in Khokan@
Khokhan
Vishwas
v.
State
of
Chattisgarh, 2021 LawSuit (SC) 80
where the facts were similar to this case,
the Apex Court has allowed the appeal of
the accused appellant. The decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Anversinh v.
State of Gujarat, (2021) 3 SCC 12 which
was related to kidnapping from legal
guardian, wherein it was established that
the Court while respecting the concerns of
both society and victim, propounded that
the twin principle of deterrence and
correction would be served by reducing the
period of incarceration already undergone
by the accused. In our case, this is not that
gruesome matter where the accused cannot
be dealt with in light of all these judgments.
Judgments in Pravat Chandra Mohanty
v. State of Odisha, (2021) 3 SCC 529 &
Pardeshiram v. State of M.P., (2021) 3
SCC 238 will also enure for the benefit of
the accused.

21. All others judgments which were
pressed into service by the learned counsel
for the appellant are not discussed as that
would be repetition of what we have
decided.

22. We come to the definite
conclusion that the death was due to
septicemia. The judgments cited by the
learned counsel for the appellant would
permit us to uphold our finding which we
conclusively hold that the offence is not
under Section 302 of I.P.C. but is culpable
homicide and, therefore, sentence of the
accused appellant is reduced to period
eight years with remission. The fine is
reduced to Rs.5000/- to be paid to the
7 All. Prakash Bajaj Vs. Sri Arun Singh & Ors.
225
original
complainant.
The
default
sentence would be six month without
remission and will run after completion
of eight years of incarceration. The
accused is in jail since long. At least he
has
suffered
for
eight
years
imprisonment and must have repented to
his deed which was out of anger.

23. Appeal is partly allowed. Record
and proceedings be sent back to the Court
below forthwith.

24. This Court is thankful to learned
Advocates for ably assisting the Court.
----------
(2022)07ILR A225
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Election Petition No. 1 of 2020

Prakash Bajaj ...Petitioner
Versus
Sri Arun Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
In Person, Jitendra Saxena, Narendra Kumar
Pandey, Vivek Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
Anurag Kumar Singh, Gaurav Mehrotra, H.P.
Singh, Kuldeep Vidyarthi, Sunil Chaudhary,
Surya Prakash Singh, Vinod Kumar Shukla

(A) Election Law - The Representation of
People Act, 1951(RPA ) - Sections 33 , 36 ,
79 , 79(b) , 81 , 82 , 83 , 86 , 100(c) ,
100(d)(i) , 123 & 152 - The Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961 - Rule 4, 4-A , 94-A -
Code of Civil Procedure ,1908 - Order VII,
Rule 11 CPC - Rejection of Plaint , Order 6
Rule 16 CPC - Striking out pleadings -
"candidate" - distinction between material
particulars and cause of action - litigant
not entitled to create an illusion of a cause
of action by resorting to clever drafting -
cause of action must be clearly stated
with material particulars.(Para -179 )

Biennial elections of Members of Council of
State - ground of challenge - results of election -
illegal rejection of nomination of the petitioner -
illegal acceptance of nomination of the returned
candidate - under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC -
under Section 81 read with Sections 83 and 86
of RPA . (Para -173)

(B) Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure
,1908 - Dismissal of petition under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC read with Section 33 of
RPA - petitioner not duly nominated candidate -
nomination did not have requisite number of
valid proposers - "misnomer" - giving an
incorrect or wrong name to a person even in a
legal document - held - election petition cannot
be dismissed at this stage on the ground of
incorrect mention of name of one proposer - in
order to ascertain the proper and full effect of
the proviso appended to Section 33(4) of RPA
and whether it can save the petition would
require evidence - cannot be a ground to
dismiss the petition at this stage in exercise of
powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. (Para -
95,119)

(C) Election Law - The Representation
of People Act, 1951 - Dismissal of
petition
-
Section
123
-'corrupt
practice' - issue of corrupt practice
requires evidence to be established -
cannot be adjudicated at preliminary
stage without the written statement,
issues and evidence - lacks material
particulars regarding allegations of corrupt
practice - want of Affidavit in Form-25 in
compliance of Section 83(1) of RPA - held -
no merit to treat the averments in the
petition to be allegations of corrupt practice.
(Para -126,128)

(D) Election Law- The Representation of
People Act, 1951 - Dismissal of petition
- want of material particulars, cause of
action - want of filing a revised/fresh
affidavit in Form-26 in compliance of
Sections 33, 83 of RPA read with Rule
4-A
of
Rules
of
1961
-
held
-