# Tanya Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 2 ILRA 78
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-01-05
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 814 of 2020
- **Bench:** Surya Prakash Kesarwani, Shamim Ahmed
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/tanya-pandey-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46808
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India,1950-Article 226 -
Indian Penal Code,1860-Section 363,366
&
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection),2015-Section 94(2), 14, 37mother of the accused filed petition
stating that the custody of the corpus in
Balika Grih Social Welfare Society is
illegal-while the corpus in her statement
u/s 164 stated that her age to be 16
years-hence, the accused mother has no
right to ask for the custody of the corpuscorpus gave birth to a child but she would
fall in the category of "child in need of
care and protection" u/s 2(12) and 14(2)
of J.J. Act-Hence, the order passed by the
Child Welfare Committee placing in a
protection Home would be within its
power confers u/s 37 of the J.J. Actdetention of the corpus can not be said to
be illegal so as to warrant issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus-the writ is not
maintainable.(Para 2 to 17)

B. A cursory reading of the JJ Act gives a
clear indication that a girl child who is in
imminent risk of marriage before attaining
the age of 18 years of age is a child in
need of care and protection u/s 2(14)(xii)
of the Act. If this provision is ignored or
given a go by, it would put the girl child in
a worse off situation because after
marriage she could be subjected to
aggravated penetrative sexual assault for
which
she
might
not
be
physically,
mentally or psychologically ready. (Para
13)

The petition is dismissed. (E-5)
2 All. Tanya Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
79
List of Cases cited:-

## Text

78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
05.11.2003. Hence, keeping in mind the
provisions of Section 94 of the J.J. Act, the
age recorded in the educational certificate
cannot be discarded in the proceedings
under the J.J. Act moreso when corpus in
her statement recorded on 31.08.2020
under Section 164, Cr.P.C. has stated that
her age is 17 years.

15. Once the corpus has been found to
be a child as defined by Section 2(12) of
the J.J. Act and allegedly, a victim of a
crime, she would fall in the category of
"child in need of care and protection" in
view of clauses (iii), (viii) and (xii) of subSection (14) of Section 2 of the J.J. Act.
Hence the order passed by the Child
Welfare Committee placing in a protection
Home would be within its powers confers
under Section 37 of the J.J. Act.

16. For all the reasons stated above,
the action of the respondent Nos.1 to 4 is
neither without jurisdiction nor illegal nor
perverse, keeping in mind the provisions of
the J.J. Act, 2015. Therefore, the detention
of the corpus cannot be said to be illegal so
as to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. If the petitioners are aggrieved by
the order of the Child Welfare Committee,
they are at liberty to take recourse to the
remedy of an appeal provided under
Section 101 of the J. J. Act, 2015.

17. For all the reasons stated, above,
the writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2021)02ILR A78
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.
THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 814 of 2020

Tanya Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shivkumari Chauhan, Sri M.S. Chauhan

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

A. Constitution of India,1950-Article 226 -
Indian Penal Code,1860-Section 363,366
&
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection),2015-Section 94(2), 14, 37mother of the accused filed petition
stating that the custody of the corpus in
Balika Grih Social Welfare Society is
illegal-while the corpus in her statement
u/s 164 stated that her age to be 16
years-hence, the accused mother has no
right to ask for the custody of the corpuscorpus gave birth to a child but she would
fall in the category of "child in need of
care and protection" u/s 2(12) and 14(2)
of J.J. Act-Hence, the order passed by the
Child Welfare Committee placing in a
protection Home would be within its
power confers u/s 37 of the J.J. Actdetention of the corpus can not be said to
be illegal so as to warrant issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus-the writ is not
maintainable.(Para 2 to 17)

B. A cursory reading of the JJ Act gives a
clear indication that a girl child who is in
imminent risk of marriage before attaining
the age of 18 years of age is a child in
need of care and protection u/s 2(14)(xii)
of the Act. If this provision is ignored or
given a go by, it would put the girl child in
a worse off situation because after
marriage she could be subjected to
aggravated penetrative sexual assault for
which
she
might
not
be
physically,
mentally or psychologically ready. (Para
13)

The petition is dismissed. (E-5)
2 All. Tanya Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
79
List of Cases cited:-

1. Jarnail Singh Vs St. of Har.,(2013) 7 SCC 263

2. Mahadeo Vs St of Mah.(2013) 14 SCC 637

3. St. of M.P. Vs Anoop Singh,(2015) 7 SCC 773

4. Independent Thought Vs U.O.I.,(2017) 10
SCC 800

(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.
&
Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

1. Heard Sri M.S. Chauhan, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Patanjali
Mishra, learned A.G.A.-I, for respondent
nos. 1 to 5.

2. This writ petition has been filed
seeking the following reliefs:-

"(A) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus to
set the corpus free at her liberty from
illegal detention of respondent no.5.

(B) issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents to handover
the custody of corpus to the petitioner."

3. This writ petition has been filed on
behalf of petitioner (corpus) through Smt.
Usha
Devi
mother
of
the
accused
Ravishankar Thakur against whom F.I.R.
No.0050 dated 25.04.2020 under Section
363/366 I.P.C. was lodged. During course
of the investigation Section 176(3) I.P.C.
and Section 5(j)(ii), and 5(1)/6 of the
POCSO Act were also added. As per the
statement of the corpus recorded on
07.08.2020 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in
which she had stated her age to be 16 years.
As per F.I.R. version the age of the corpus
is 15 years. The corpus was sent in the
custody of Superintendent, Balika Grih
Social Welfare Society, district Mau by
order dated 31.7.2020 passed by Chairman,
Child Welfare Committee. As per education
certificate of the corpus, her date of birth is
20.05.2005. On 23.11.2020 the aforesaid
order was challenged by the mother of the
accused by filing an application before
Incharge, CWC, Ballia praying for the
custody of the corpus Tanya Pandey This
application was rejected by the Chairman
by order dated 28.11.2020 on the ground
that the corpus Tanya Pandey is minor. The
aforesaid rejection order dated 28.11.2020
has not been challenged by the petitioner in
the present writ petition. However, a
photostat copy of the order has been
produced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner before the Court, which is kept
on record.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that corpus Tanya Pandey, has
given birth to a child on 18.12.2020 and,
that therefore, custody of the corpus is
illegal and she may be set free at her liberty
and her custody may be given to the mother
of the accused. He further submits that the
child has born after filing the writ petition,
therefore, no averment in this regard could
be made in the writ petition.

5. Learned A.G.A. submits that the
corpus is a child below 16 years as her date
of birth is 20.05.2005. In her own statement
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. the
corpus has stated her age to be as 16 years.
Therefore, there is no illegality in the
impugned order to keep the corpus in
Balika Grih Social Welfare Society, district
Mau/ Bal Kalyan Samti, Mau. The mother
of the accused has no right to ask for the
custody of the corpus to her, particularly,
when the accused is in jail. The order
passed by the CWC is a judicial order,
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which has not been challenged in the
present writ petition and even against the
said order remedy of appeal lies under
Section 101 of Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

6. We have carefully considered the
submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record of the writ
petition.

7. Section 94(2) of the Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection),
2015
(hereinafter referred to as ''the J.J. Act")
provides
for
presumption
and
determination of age, as under:

"(2) In case, the Committee or the
Board has reasonable grounds for doubt
regarding whether the person brought before
it is a child or not, the Committee or the
Board, as the case may be, shall undertake
the process of age determination, by seeking
evidence by obtaining--

(i) the date of birth certificate from
the school, or the matriculation or equivalent
certificate from the concerned examination
Board, if available; and in the absence
thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i)
and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an
ossification test or any other latest medical
age determination test conducted on the
orders of the Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination
test conducted on the order of the Committee
or the Board shall be completed within fifteen
days from the date of such order."

8. Thus, as per provisions of Section
94(2) of the J.J. Act, the Child Welfare
Committee or the Board has reasonable
grounds for doubt as to whether the person
brought before it, is a child or not, the
Committee or the Board, as the case may
be, shall undertake the process of age
determination by seeking evidence by
obtaining, firstly, the date of birth
certificate from school, or matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; and in the
absence thereof; secondly, the birth
certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat; and
thirdly,
in
absence
of
educational
certificate
or
birth
certificate
as
aforementioned,
the
age
shall
be
determined by an ossification test or any
other latest medical age determination test
conducted
on
the
orders
of
the
Committee or the Board. Thus, as per
statutory mandate of Section 94(2) of the
J.J. Act, primacy is to be accorded to the
date of birth certificate from the school or
the matriculation or equivalent certificate
from the concerned Examination Board and
only in absence thereof, the birth certificate
of a corporation or municipal authority or a
panchayat can be looked into. When the
certificates as provided under sub-clauses
(i) and (ii) of sub-Section (2) of Section 94,
is not available, only then the medical
evidence as provided in sub-clause (iii) is
to be taken into consideration. In the
present set of facts, as per educational
certificate, the date of birth of the petitioner
is 20.05.2005.

9. The "juvenile" has been defined in
Section 2(35) of the J.J. Act to mean a child
below the age of eighteen years. The word
"child" has been defined in Section 2(12) of
the J.J. Act to mean a person who has not
completed eighteen years of age. The
phrase "child in conflict with law" has been
defined under Section 2(13) of the J.J. Act
to mean a child who is alleged or found to
2 All. Tanya Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
81
have committed an offence and who has
not completed eighteen years of age on the
date of commission of such offence.
Section 2(14) of the J.J. Act defines the
phrase "child in need of care and
protection", as under:

"(14) "child in need of care and
protection" means a child--

(i) who is found without any home
or settled place of abode and without any
ostensible means of subsistence; or

(ii) who is found working in
contravention of labour laws for the time
being in force or is found begging, or living
on the street; or

(iii) who resides with a person
(whether a guardian of the child or not) and
such person--

(a) has injured, exploited, abused
or neglected the child or has violated any
other law for the time being in force meant
for the protection of child; or

(b) has threatened to kill, injure,
exploit or abuse the child and there is a
reasonable likelihood of the threat being
carried out; or

(c) has killed, abused, neglected or
exploited some other child or children and
there is a reasonable likelihood of the child in
question being killed, abused, exploited or
neglected by that person;or

(iv) who is mentally ill or mentally
or physically challenged or suffering from
terminal or incurable disease, having no one
to support or look after or having parents or
guardians unfit to take care, if found so by the
Board or the Committee; or

(v) who has a parent or guardian
and such parent or guardian is found to be
unfit or incapacitated, by the Committee or
the Board, to care for and protect the safety
and well-being of the child; or

(vi) who does not have parents
and no one is willing to take care of, or
whose
parents
have
abandoned
or
surrendered him; or

(vii) who is missing or run away
child, or whose parents cannot be found
after making reasonable inquiry in such
manner as may be prescribed; or

(viii) who has been or is being or
is likely to be abused, tortured or exploited
for the purpose of sexual abuse or illegal
acts; or

(ix) who is found vulnerable and
is likely to be inducted into drug abuse or
trafficking; or

(x) who is being or is likely to be
abused for unconscionable gains; or

(xi) who is victim of or affected
by any armed conflict, civil unrest or
natural calamity; or

(xii) who is at imminent risk of
marriage before attaining the age of
marriage and whose
parents,
family
members, guardian and any other persons
are
likely
to
be
responsible
for
solemnisation of such marriage;"

10. Section 37 empowers the Child
Welfare Committee that on being satisfied
through the inquiry that the child before the
Committee is a child in need of care and
protection, it may, on consideration of
Social Investigation Report submitted by
Child Welfare Officer and taking into
account the child's wishes in case the child
is sufficiently mature to take a view, pass
one or more of the following orders as
provided in clauses (a) to (h) of SubSection (1) of Section 37. Section 37 of the
J.J. Act is reproduced below:

"37. Orders passed regarding a
child in need of care and protection.- (1)
The Committee on being satisfied through
the inquiry that the child before the
Committee is a child in need of care and
protection, may, on consideration of Social
82 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Investigation Report submitted by Child
Welfare Officer and taking into account the
child's wishes in case the child is
sufficiently mature to take a view, pass one
or more of the following orders, namely:--

(a) declaration that a child is in
need of care and protection;

(b) restoration of the child to
parents or guardian or family with or
without supervision of Child Welfare
Officer or designated social worker;

(c) placement of the child in
Children's
Home
or
fit
facility
or
Specialised Adoption Agency for the
purpose of adoption for long term or
temporary care, keeping in mind the
capacity of the institution for housing such
children,
either
after
reaching
the
conclusion that the family of the child
cannot be traced or even if traced,
restoration of the child to the family is not
in the best interest of the child;

(d) placement of the child with fit
person for long term or temporary care;

(e) foster care orders under
section 44;

(f) sponsorship orders under
section 45;

(g) directions to persons or
institutions or facilities in whose care the
child is placed, regarding care, protection
and rehabilitation of the child, including
directions relating to immediate shelter and
services
such
as
medical
attention,
psychiatric and psychological support
including
need-based
counselling,
occupational
therapy
or
behaviour
modification therapy, skill training, legal
aid,
educational
services,
and
other
developmental activities, as required, as
well as follow-up and coordination with the
District Child Protection Unit or State
Government and other agencies;

(h) declaration that the child is
legally free for adoption under section 38.

(2) The Committee may also pass
orders for--

(i) declaration of fit persons for
foster care;

(ii) getting after care support
under section 46 of the Act; or

(iii) any other order related to
any other function as may be prescribed."

11. Section 37(1)(c) of the J.J. Act
empowers the Child Welfare Committee to
place a child in Children's Home or fit facility
or Specialised Adoption Agency for the
purpose of adoption for long term or
temporary care, keeping in mind the capacity
of the institution for housing such children,
either after reaching the conclusion that the
family of the child cannot be traced or even if
traced, restoration of the child to the family is
not in the best interest of the child. The
impugned order passed by the Child Welfare
Committee is in exercise of powers under
Section 37 of the J.J. Act. Under the
circumstances, when undisputedly corpus -
petitioner is a juvenile within the meaning of
Section 2(35) and is in need of care and
protection within the meaning of Section
2(14), the impugned order passed by the
Child Welfare Committee under Section 37 is
in exercise of powers under the J.J. Act,
cannot be said to suffer from any illegality.

12. It would be relevant to observe that
Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently
taken the view that the principles applicable
for determining the age of "juvenile in
conflict with law" are to be applied for
determining the age of child victim vide
Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana1,
Mahadeo Vs. State of Maharashtra2, and
State of M.P. Vs. Anoop Singh3, (paras 14
to 18).

13. In the case of Independent
Thought v. Union of India4, (paras-95,
2 All. Tanya Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
83
96, 97, 107), Hon'ble Supreme Court held
as under:

"95. Whatever be the explanation,
given the context and purpose of their
enactment, primacy must be given to prochild statutes over IPC as provided for
inSections 5and41 IPC. There are several
reasons for this including the absence of
any rationale in creating an artificial
distinction, in relation to sexual offences,
between a married girl child and an
unmarried girl child. Statutes concerning
the rights of children are special laws
concerning a special subject of legislation
and therefore the provisions of such
subject-specific legislations must prevail
and take precedence over the provisions of
a general law such as IPC. It must also be
remembered that the provisions of the JJ
Act as well as the provisions of the POCSO
Act are traceable toArticle 15(3)of the
Constitution which enables Parliament to
make special provisions for the benefit of
children. We have already adverted to some
decisions relating to the interpretation
ofArticle 15(3)of the Constitution in a
manner that is affirmative, in favour of
children and for children and we have also
adverted
to
the
discussion
in
the
Constituent Assembly in this regard. There
can therefore be no other opinion regarding
the pro-child slant of the JJ Act as well as
the POCSO Act.

96. A rather lengthy but useful
discussion on this subject of special laws is
to be found inL.I.C. v. D.J. Bahadur in
paras 52 and 53 of the Report. Briefly, it
was held that the subject-matter and the
perspective of the statute are determinative
of the question whether a statute is a
general law or a special law. Therefore, for
certain purposes a statute might be a
special law but for other purposes, as
compared to another statute, it might be a
general law. In respect of a dispute between
the Life Insurance Corporation and its
workmen qua workmen, the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 would be a special law
vis-à-vis theLife Insurance Corporation
Act, 1956; but, "when compensation on
nationalisation is the question, theLIC Actis
the special statute". It was held as
follows:(SCC pp.350-51)

"52. In determining whether a
statute is a special or a general one, the
focus must be on the principal subjectmatter plus the particular perspective. For
certain purposes, an Act may be general
and for certain other purposes it may be
special and we cannot blur distinctions
when dealing with finer points of law. In
law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not
absolutes -- so too in life.The ID Actis a
special
statute
devoted
wholly
to
investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes which provides definitionally for
the nature of industrial disputes coming
within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure
for investigation into, solution of and
adjudication upon industrial disputes. It
also provides the necessary machinery for
enforcement of awards and settlements.
From alpha to omega theID Acthas one
special mission -- the resolution of
industrial disputes through specialised
agencies
according
to
specialised
procedures and with special reference to
the weaker categories of employees coming
within
the
definition
of
workmen.
Therefore, with reference to industrial
disputes between employers and workmen,
theID Actis a special statute, and theLIC
Actdoes not speak at all with specific
reference to workmen. On the other hand,
its powers relate to the general aspects of
nationalisation,
of
management
when
private businesses are nationalised and a
plurality of problems which, incidentally,
involve transfer of service of existing
84 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
employees of insurers. The workmen qua
workmen and industrial disputes between
workmen and the employer as such, are
beyond the orbit of and have no specific or
special place in the scheme of theLIC Act.
And whenever there was a dispute between
workmen
and
management
theID
Actmechanism was resorted to.

53.What are we confronted with
in the present case, so that I may determine
as between the two enactments which is the
special? The only subject which has led to
this litigation and which is the bone of
contention between the parties is an
industrial dispute between the Corporation
and its workmen qua workmen. If we refuse
to be obfuscated by legal abracadabra and
see plainly what is so obvious, the
conclusion that flows, in the wake of the
study I have made, is that vis-a-vis
"industrial disputes" at the termination of
the settlement as between the workmen and
the Corporation, theID Actis a special
legislation
and
theLIC Acta general
legislation. Likewise, when compensation
on nationalisation is the question, theLIC
Actis the special statute. An application of
the generalia maxim as expounded by
English textbooks and decisions leaves us
in no doubt that theID Actbeing special
law, prevails over theLIC Actwhich is but
general law."
(Emphasis in original)

The scope and amplitude of the
two significant pro-child statutes may now
be examined in light of the law laid down
by this Court includingSections 5and41of
the IPC.

(i) The JJ Act

97. A cursory reading of the JJ
Act gives a clear indication that a girl child
who is in imminent risk of marriage before
attaining the age of 18 years of age is a
child in need of care and protection
(Section 2(14) (xii) of the JJ Act). In our
opinion, it cannot be said with any degree
of rationality that such a girl child loses
her status as a child in need of care and
protection soon after she gets married. The
JJ Act provides that efforts must be made to
ensure the care, protection, appropriate
rehabilitation or restoration of a girl child
who is at imminent risk of marriage and
therefore a child in need of care and
protection. If this provision is ignored or
given a go by, it would put the girl child in
a worse off situation because after
marriage she could be subjected to
aggravated penetrative sexual assault for
which she might not be physically, mentally
or psychologically ready. The intention of
the JJ Act is to benefit a child rather than
place her in difficult circumstances. A
contrary view would not only destroy the
purpose and spirit of the JJ Act but would
also take away the importance ofArticle
15(3)of the Constitution. Surely, such an
interpretation and understanding cannot be
given to the provisions of the JJ Act."

107. On a complete assessment of
the law and the documentary material, it
appears that there are really five options
before us: (i) To let the incongruity remain
as it is -- this does not seem a viable option
to us, given that the lives of thousands of
young girls are at stake; (ii) To strike down
as unconstitutional Exception 2 to Section
375 IPC -- in the present case this is also
not a viable option since this relief was
given up and no such issue was raised; (iii)
To reduce the age of consent from 18 years
to 15 years -- this too is not a viable option
and would ultimately be for Parliament to
decide; (iv) To bring the POCSO Act in
consonance with Exception 2 to Section
375 IPC -- this is also not a viable option
since it would require not only a retrograde
amendment to the POCSO Act but also to
several other pro-child statutes; (v) To read
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC in a
purposive manner to make it in consonance
2 All. Shigorika Singh Vs. Dr. Abhinandan Singh & Ors.
85
with the POCSO Act, the spirit of other
pro-child legislations and the human rights
of a married girl child. Being purposive
and harmonious constructionists, we are of
opinion that this is the only pragmatic
option available. Therefore, we are left with
absolutely no other option but to harmonise
the system of laws relating to children and
require Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC to
now be meaningfully read as: "Sexual
intercourse or sexual acts by a man with
his own wife, the wife not being under
eighteen years of age, is not rape." It is
only through this reading that the intent of
social justice to the married girl child and
the constitutional vision of the Framers of
our Constitution can be preserved and
protected and perhaps given impetus."

14. In the present set of facts, it is not
in
dispute
that
as
per
educational
certificate, the date of birth of the corpus is
20.05.2005. Hence, keeping in mind the
provisions of Section 94 of the J.J. Act, the
age recorded in the educational certificate
cannot be discarded in the proceedings
under the J.J. Act moreso when corpus in
her statement recorded on 07.08.2020
under Section 164, Cr.P.C. has stated that
her age is 16 years.

15. Once the corpus has been found to
be a child as defined by Section 2(12) of
the J.J. Act and allegedly, a victim of a
crime, she would fall in the category of
"child in need of care and protection" in
view of clauses (iii), (viii) and (xii) of subSection (14) of Section 2 of the J.J. Act.
Hence the order passed by the Child
Welfare Committee placing in a protection
Home would be within its powers confers
under Section 37 of the J.J. Act.

16. For all the reasons stated above,
the action of the respondent Nos.1 to 5 is
neither without jurisdiction nor illegal nor
perverse, keeping in mind the provisions of
the J.J. Act, 2015. Therefore, the detention
of the corpus cannot be said to be illegal so
as to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the
order of the Child Welfare Committee, she
is at liberty to take recourse to the remedy
of an appeal provided under Section 101 of
the J. J. Act, 2015.

17. For all the reasons stated, above,
the writ petition is dismissed.
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(2021)02ILR A85
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Habeas Corpus No. 8820 of 2020

Shigorika Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Dr. Abhinandan Singh & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Chandra Shekhar Sinha

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Dr. Abhinandan Singh,
Kuldeep Srivastava, Padma Verma, Sunit
Kumar

A. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226application-allowed-petitioner
(mother)
and her husband admittedly are living
separately and their minor daughter was
living in the custody of mother and fathere
was used to visit her-one day he drove
away his daughter with the car-mother
requested to sent back her daughter to
her but he refused-aggrieved mother
preferred writ -the rule nisi is made
absolute- the applicant becomes entitled