# TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd v. Aman Kumar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 30
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-05
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 182 of 2023
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/tata-aig-general-insurance-company-ltd-v-aman-kumar-ors-53060
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168, 169 & 173 - Motor Accident
Claim - Duty of Tribunal - Mandatory
inquiry - Tribunal failed to conduct
proper inquiry under Section 168 -
Contradictory
vehicle
registration
numbers in FIR and claim petition -
Tribunal
proceeded
without
deciding
application to summon key eyewitness for
cross-examination
-Plea
of
accident
involving insured vehicle not proved -
Award passed without adequate scrutiny
- Judgment and award set aside - Matter
remitted for fresh adjudication-Appeal
partly allowed. (Paras 10 to 13, 14,16, and
23)

HELD:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mohamed Haji Latif &
ors.; 1968 AIR SC 1413/1968 SCC OnLine SC
63, has held that if a party, even if the burden
of proof does not lie on him/her, withholds
important evidence in his possession which can
throw light on the facts in issue, the adverse
inference may be drawn by the court. (Para 14)

The aforesaid facts were required to be
examined by the Tribunal under the facts and
circumstances of the case because the accident
was denied by the owner and driver. They
adduced evidence to the effect that the vehicle
was being driven in their village on the date of
accident, though they have specifically not St.d
that at the time of the accident the vehicle was
not at the place of accident, but there are
several discrepancies in the pleadings and
evidence adduced by the claimant-respondent,
which were required to be inquired by the
Tribunal in inquiry under Section 168 of the
M.V.Act. Section 168 of the M.V.Act provides
that
on
receipt
of
an
application
for
compensation made under Section 166, the
claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice to the
insurer and parties (including the insurer) an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into
the claim or as the case may be, subject to the
provisions of Section 163, and may make an
award determining the amount of compensation
which appears to it to be just. (Para 16)

In view of aforesaid Section 169 of the M.V.Act
the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules
that may be made in this behalf, follow such
summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-Section
(2) of Section 169 provides that the Claims
Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil
Court for the purpose of taking evidence on
oath and of enforcing the attendance of
witnesses and of compelling the discovery and
production of documents and material objects
and for such other purposes as may be
prescribed and it shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court. Thus the Claims Tribunal has to hold the
inquiry following the summary procedure to
ascertain the truth to be just. It is true that the
claim petition under the M.V.Act has to be
decided on the preponderance of probabilities
and the strict proof beyond doubt as required
under the Criminal Cases is not required but
when discrepancies as above were pointed out
before the Tribunal and an application was also
moved by the appellant for summoning the eye
witness for cross-examination, whose evidence
could have been material to clarify the
discrepancies, the same was required to be
inquired by the Tribunal or adverse inference
could have been drawn. (Para 18)

In view of above and considering the overall facts
and circumstances of the case, this court is of the
view that the learned Tribunal has not only failed
to make inquiry as required under Section 168 of
the M.V.Act, but also failed to given sufficient
opportunity to the appellant by not considering
and disposing of its applications before passing the
impugned judgment and award, therefore the
same is liable to be set aside with the direction to
the Tribunal to consider and decide the case afresh
in accordance with law and in the light of the
observations made here-in-above in this order.
(Para 23)

Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

30 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

xxx
 xxx

 xxx

34. In view of the aforesaid, we
have reached to the conclusion that the
High Court committed no error much less
any error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising
its
supervisory
jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of
this Court, it has been said that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to prove
that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons,
this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs."

Applying
the
above
legal
proposition to the facts of the present case,
we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold."

14. In the aforesaid judgments, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has been of the
view that where a case has been presented
in the Court beyond limitation, the person
has to explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation.
Though limitation may harshly affect the
rights of a party, it has to be applied with
all rigour when prescribed by statute.

15. In the instant case, as already
indicated above, there has been a casual,
cavalier and lackadaisical approach on the
part of the appellants all along inasmuch as,
it has taken the State almost ten months to
take a decision for filing of the appeal and
despite the appeal having been allegedly
prepared, it took the pairokar eleven
months to realize that the appeal has not
been filed. This is sheer negligence on the
part of the appellants and thus, the grounds,
as taken in the applications for condonation
of delay, do not inspire confidence and
consequently,
the
applications
for
condonation of delay merit to be rejected
and are accordingly, rejected.

(Order on the Memo of Revision)

16. Since the applications for
condonation of delay have been rejected,
the revision also stands dismissed.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 30
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 182 of 2023

TATA AIG General Insurance Company
Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Aman Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Deepak Kumar Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Arunendra Nath Mishra, Praveen Chandra
3 All. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Aman Kumar & Ors.
31
Criminal Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168, 169 & 173 - Motor Accident
Claim - Duty of Tribunal - Mandatory
inquiry - Tribunal failed to conduct
proper inquiry under Section 168 -
Contradictory
vehicle
registration
numbers in FIR and claim petition -
Tribunal
proceeded
without
deciding
application to summon key eyewitness for
cross-examination
-Plea
of
accident
involving insured vehicle not proved -
Award passed without adequate scrutiny
- Judgment and award set aside - Matter
remitted for fresh adjudication-Appeal
partly allowed. (Paras 10 to 13, 14,16, and
23)

HELD:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mohamed Haji Latif &
ors.; 1968 AIR SC 1413/1968 SCC OnLine SC
63, has held that if a party, even if the burden
of proof does not lie on him/her, withholds
important evidence in his possession which can
throw light on the facts in issue, the adverse
inference may be drawn by the court. (Para 14)

The aforesaid facts were required to be
examined by the Tribunal under the facts and
circumstances of the case because the accident
was denied by the owner and driver. They
adduced evidence to the effect that the vehicle
was being driven in their village on the date of
accident, though they have specifically not St.d
that at the time of the accident the vehicle was
not at the place of accident, but there are
several discrepancies in the pleadings and
evidence adduced by the claimant-respondent,
which were required to be inquired by the
Tribunal in inquiry under Section 168 of the
M.V.Act. Section 168 of the M.V.Act provides
that
on
receipt
of
an
application
for
compensation made under Section 166, the
claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice to the
insurer and parties (including the insurer) an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into
the claim or as the case may be, subject to the
provisions of Section 163, and may make an
award determining the amount of compensation
which appears to it to be just. (Para 16)

In view of aforesaid Section 169 of the M.V.Act
the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules
that may be made in this behalf, follow such
summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-Section
(2) of Section 169 provides that the Claims
Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil
Court for the purpose of taking evidence on
oath and of enforcing the attendance of
witnesses and of compelling the discovery and
production of documents and material objects
and for such other purposes as may be
prescribed and it shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court. Thus the Claims Tribunal has to hold the
inquiry following the summary procedure to
ascertain the truth to be just. It is true that the
claim petition under the M.V.Act has to be
decided on the preponderance of probabilities
and the strict proof beyond doubt as required
under the Criminal Cases is not required but
when discrepancies as above were pointed out
before the Tribunal and an application was also
moved by the appellant for summoning the eye
witness for cross-examination, whose evidence
could have been material to clarify the
discrepancies, the same was required to be
inquired by the Tribunal or adverse inference
could have been drawn. (Para 18)

In view of above and considering the overall facts
and circumstances of the case, this court is of the
view that the learned Tribunal has not only failed
to make inquiry as required under Section 168 of
the M.V.Act, but also failed to given sufficient
opportunity to the appellant by not considering
and disposing of its applications before passing the
impugned judgment and award, therefore the
same is liable to be set aside with the direction to
the Tribunal to consider and decide the case afresh
in accordance with law and in the light of the
observations made here-in-above in this order.
(Para 23)

Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mohamed Haji Latif
& ors.; 1968 AIR SC 1413/1968 SCC OnLine SC
63

2. Kuldeep Singn Bawa & ors. Vs Tika Ram &
ors.; 2009 SCC OnLine Del. 4293

3. Bhagat Singh Vs Jai Bhagwan & ors.; 2011
SCC OnLine P&H 12472
32 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. Mayur Arora Vs Amit @ Pange & ors.; 2011
(1) TAC 878 (Del.)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1.
Heard,
Shri
Deepak
Kumar
Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant
and Shri Praveen Chandra, learned counsel
for the respondent no.1. None appeared on
behalf of respondents no.2 and 3.

2. This First Appeal From Order
(here-in-after referred as F.A.F.O.) has
been filed under Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (here-in-after referred
as M.V.Act) against the judgment and
order dated 10.03.2023 and award dated
13.03.2023 passed in Motor Accident
Claim Petition No.287 of 2017; Aman
Kumar Versus Arun Kumar and others by
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Hardoi.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant
submits that the First Information Report
was lodged with a delay of four months and
odd without any explanation for delay
because the alleged accident was occurred
on 23.04.2017 and the First Information
was lodged on 26.08.2017. He further
submitted that the First Information Report
was lodged alleging the accident from the
Motorcycle having Registration No.UP-30AJ-7710, but the claim petition was filed
against the Motorcycle having Registration
No.UP-30-AF-7710
and
the
learned
Tribunal has accepted the same on the
ground that the application was submitted
by the claimant-respondent for correction
in the First Information Report, whereas he
denied to give the same before the
Tribunal. In the First Information Report
lodged by the claimant-respondent the final
report was filed against the Motorcycle
having Registration No.UP-30-AJ-7710.
He further submitted that learned Tribunal
has also failed to consider the factum of the
accident appropriately as there are glaring
discrepancies in the description of the
respondent-claimant.
The
respondentclaimant had lodged the First Information
Report alleging therein that he was
standing alongwith one Desh Raj when the
alleged accident occurred and it has also
been pleaded in the claim petition and his
evidence on affidavit (examination-inchief) was also filed alongwith the affidavit
of claimant-respondent, but the said Desh
Raj did not appear in the cross-examination
and despite the application moved by the
appellant for summoning him for crossexamination, the same was not considered
and no orders were passed by the Tribunal
before passing the impugned judgment and
award. Thus the submission is that the
learned Tribunal has failed to make the
inquiry as required under Section 168 of
the M.V.Act and failed to record any
finding after considering as to whether the
alleged Motorcycle having Registration
No.UP-30-AF-7710 was involved in the
accident or not. Thus the impugned
judgment and award is not sustainable in
the eyes of law and liable to be set aside.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for
the claimant-respondent submits that the
claimant-respondent had suffered serious
injuries in the accident, on account of
which his one leg was amputated and he
had remained hospitalized for about one
month and on account of the mental and
physical shock he could not lodge the First
Information Report in time and the reason
for delay has been given in the First
Information Report itself, therefore, the
delay in lodging the First Information
Report cannot be a ground for rejection of
claim petition. Even otherwise once the
accident and rash and negligent driving of
3 All. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Aman Kumar & Ors.
33
the offending vehicle is proved before the
Tribunal
under
the
M.V.Act,
the
proceedings of the criminal case has no
bearing on it. He further submits that
merely because the final report was filed in
regard to the vehicle having Registration
No.UP-30-AJ-7710 the involvement of
vehicle having Registration No.UP-30-AF7710 cannot be denied as it could not be
found by the investigating officer. The
respondent no.2 i.e. the owner of the
offending vehicle has admitted that Ram
Sagar was driving the vehicle on the date of
accident. Though a plea has been taken that
he was driving in the village, but no
evidence of the same has been given. Even
otherwise he has not disputed the accident
and the respondent no.3 i.e. the driver of
the Motorcycle has also supported the
evidence of the respondent no.2, but they
have not denied that they were not at the
place of accident on the date and time of
the accident. Thus learned counsel for the
claimant-respondent
submits
that
the
impugned judgment and award has rightly
been passed by the learned Tribunal after
considering the pleadings, evidence and
material on record, which does not suffer
from any illegality or error, which may call
for any interference by this court. The
appeal has been filed on misconceived and
baseless grounds, which is liable to be
dismissed.

5.
I
have
considered
the
submissions of learned counsel for the
parties and perused the records.

6. The claim petition was filed by
the claimant-respondent alleging therein
that he alongwith Desh Raj was waiting for
the transport for coming to his house from
village Singuwamau, Police Station-Sursa,
District-Hardoi on 23.04.2017 at about 7 in
the evening, when the Motorcycle having
Registration No.UP-30-AF-7710, coming
from the side of Lucknow, being driven
rashly and negligently by its driver, came
on the wrong side and hit him, in which he
suffered serious injuries. He was admitted
to District Government Hospital, Hardoi,
but on account of serious condition he was
referred to Lucknow. During treatment his
left leg was amputated and the other leg
was operated and the treatment is still
going on. He has become completely
handicapped from both the legs. The First
Information Report in regard to the
accident was lodged by the order of the
Superintendent of Police, Hardoi vide case
Crime No.208 of 2017, under Sections 279,
338 IPC, at Police Station-Sursa, DistrictHardoi. The claimant-respondent was a
vegetable
trader
and
used
to
earn
Rs.15,000/- per month, but on account of
the injuries suffered in the accident he is
unable to earn the livelihood, therefore, he
is entitled for compensation from the
respondents.

7. Owner of Motorcycle having
Registration
No.UP-30-AF-7710,
the
respondent no.2, filed his written statement
mainly denying the averments made in the
claim petition. He also stated that the
alleged accident has not occurred from his
vehicle. The vehicle involved in the
accident is different. He has no concern
with the accident. He has been implicated
on account of enmity and party rivalry. His
vehicle was validly registered and insured
with the Tata AIG Insurance Company Ltd.
and its Driver Ram Sagar had the valid
driving licence. Thus the claim petition is
liable to be dismissed against him.

8. The respondent no.3 i.e. the
appellant filed the written statement mainly
denying the averments made in the claim
petition. It was further stated that looking
34 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the nature of accident it appears that the
accident had occurred from unknown
vehicle and false case has been lodged in
collusion with the police to get the claim.
The First Information Report has been
lodged against the Motorcycle having
registration
No.UP-30-AJ-7710,
but
subsequently
the
Motorcycle
having
Registration No.UP-30-AF-7710 has been
planted in the accident. The documents
such as proof of age, medical prescriptions
seems to be fabricated, therefore, the
Insurance Company is not liable to make
the payment of interest for the said period
and the claim petition is liable to be
dismissed with costs.

9. On the basis of pleadings of the
parties four issues were framed. Thereafter
documentary as well as oral evidence was
adduced by the parties.

10. The learned Tribunal, while
considering the issue no.1 in regard to
accident on 23.04.2017 at about 7 in the
evening near village Singuwamau, Police
Station-Sursa,
District
Hardoi
from
Motorcycle having Registration No.UP-30AF-7710 being driven by its driver rashly
and
negligently
in
which
claimantrespondent got serious injuries and has
become
handicapped,
considered
the
evidence of P.W.-1, O.P.W.-1 and O.P.W.-
2 and recorded a finding that the accident
had occurred on account of rash and
negligent driving of the respondent no.2
Ram Sagar i.e. respondent no.3 in the
present
appeal
on
23.04.2017
by
Motorcycle having Registration No.UP-30AF-7710, but failed to consider the
pleadings of the claimant-respondent that
he was standing and waiting for transport
alongwith Desh Raj of his village, when the
accident had occurred and the First
Information
Report
was
also
lodged
mentioning this fact and an affidavit of
Desh Raj in evidence (examination-inchief) was also filed alongwith the affidavit
of the claimant-respondent, but he was not
produced for cross-examination, whereas
he could have been the best independent
witness to prove the accident and rash and
negligent driving of respondent no.3. On
02.03.2023 an application bearing paper
No.30-ga was filed by the appellantInsurance Company for summoning the
paper book of Criminal Case relating to the
claim petition, which was taken on record.
On 10.03.2023 two applications were
moved
by
the
appellant-Insurance
Company.

11. The learned Tribunal, by means
of the order dated 02.03.2023, fixed the
case for defence evidence, if any, and
arguments on 10.03.2023. Paper No.31-ga
was moved under Section 169 of the
M.V.Act for providing the photocopy of
the documents relating to treatment filed by
the claimant-respondent on 20.02.2023 and
Paper No.34-ga for summoning Desh Raj
alleging therein that the evidence of Desh
Raj as witness has been filed, but he has
not been produced for cross-examination
and
the
claimant-respondent
got
his
evidence
recorded
and
closed
on
15.02.2023,
therefore,
the
claimantrespondent may be directed to produce
Desh Raj for his cross-examination. On the
paper No.31-ga, the Tribunal ordered to
'keep on file' and on paper No.34-ga
ordered to 'keep on file only'. Though the
Tribunal taken all the aforesaid three
applications on record, but without passing
any order thereon, passed the impugned
judgment and award on 10.03.2023 itself.

12. The learned Tribunal passed the
impugned judgment and award without
considering that the First Information
3 All. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Aman Kumar & Ors.
35
Report was lodged against the vehicle
No.UP-30-AJ-7710, but the claim petition
has been filed against the vehicle No.UP30-AF-7710 and final report has been filed
on the ground of non involvement of
vehicle No.UP-30-AJ-7710 and that no
correct information of the vehicle involved
in the accident could be obtained and it is
not traceable in future and the vehicle
which was named in the First Information
Report was purchased subsequent to the
accident, therefore, though it is apparent
that the said vehicle could not have been
involved in the accident, but whether the
other vehicle was involved in the accident
or not, as the number of the same was
corrected subsequently and there were
discrepancies in pleadings and evidence of
claimant-respondent in regard to accident,
has not been considered appropriately.

13. The learned Tribunal also failed
to consider specific pleading of the
claimant-respondent that Desh Raj of his
village was with him at the time of accident
and his evidence as witness was also filed
by the claimant-respondent alognwith his
evidence, but he has not been produced for
cross-examination, whereas he was a
material eye witness of the accident as he
was present alongwith the claimantrespondent at the time of accident and
when his evidence was filed he should also
have been produced for cross-examination.
He has admitted in his affidavit filed on
record that he was present on the spot of
accident
alongwith
the
claimantrespondent. It was also required to be
considered as to why he has not been
produced for cross- examination.

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar
Versus Mohamed Haji Latif and others;
1968 AIR SC 1413/1968 SCC OnLine SC
63, has held that if a party, even if the
burden of proof does not lie on him/her,
withholds
important
evidence
in
his
possession which can throw light on the
facts in issue, the adverse inference may be
drawn by the court.

15. The learned Tribunal also failed
to consider that the claimant-respondent
though lodged the First Information Report
stating that Desh Raj was present with him
on the spot of accident, pleaded the same in
the claim petition and also filed an affidavit
of Desh Raj, who admitted this fact, but he
in his evidence denied. He stated in his
evidence in cross-examination that he was
coming back alone from Singuwamau on
the date of accident. He also failed to tell
the names of the in-laws of his brother,
where he stated to have gone. He also
stated that he had given the information of
the accident to the Police Station on
23.08.2024 and he had not given any
application to the Superintendent of Police,
Hardoi and the First Information Report
was lodged on the information given by
him at the Police Station, whereas the
documents placed on record by the
claimant-respondent himself indicate that
the application was given by the claimantrespondent to the Superintendent of Police,
Hardoi on 25.08.2017, on the basis of
which the First Information Report was
lodged, which is mentioned in the First
Information Report also. The application
for correction of the number of the vehicle
was also given to the Superintendent of
Police, Hardoi, which is referred in final
report.

16. The aforesaid facts were
required to be examined by the Tribunal
under the facts and circumstances of the
case because the accident was denied by
the owner and driver. They adduced
36 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
evidence to the effect that the vehicle was
being driven in their village on the date of
accident, though they have specifically not
stated that at the time of the accident the
vehicle was not at the place of accident, but
there are several discrepancies in the
pleadings and evidence adduced by the
claimant-respondent, which were required
to be inquired by the Tribunal in inquiry
under Section 168 of the M.V.Act. Section
168 of the M.V.Act provides that on receipt
of an application for compensation made
under Section 166, the claims Tribunal
shall, after giving notice to the insurer and
parties
(including
the
insurer)
an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry
into the claim or as the case may be,
subject to the provisions of Section 163,
and may make an award determining the
amount of compensation which appears to
it to be just. Section 168 of the M.V.Act is
extracted here-in-below:-

 "168. Award of the Claims
Tribunal. - (1) On receipt of an application
for compensation made under section 166,
the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving
notice of the application to the insurer and
after giving the parties (including the
insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold
an inquiry into the claim or, as the case
may be, each of the claims and, subject to
the provisions of [section 163] may make
an award determining the amount of
compensation which appears to it to be just
and specifying the person or persons to
whom compensation shall be paid and in
making the award the Claims Tribunal shall
specify the amount which shall be paid by
the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle
involved in the accident or by all or any of
them, as the case may be:

[***]

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall
arrange to deliver copies of the award to
the parties concerned expeditiously and in
any case within a period of fifteen days
from the date of the award.

(3) When an award is made under
this section, the person who is required to
pay any amount in terms of such award
shall, within thirty days of the date of
announcing the award by the Claims
Tribunal,
deposit
the
entire
amount
awarded in such manner as the Claims
Tribunal may direct."

17. In view of above the Tribunal
has to hold an inquiry into the claim before
passing an award. Section 169 of the
M.V.Act provides the procedure and
powers of claims tribunal, which is
extracted here-in-below:-

 "169. Procedure and powers of
Claims Tribunals. - (1) In holding any
inquiry under section 168, the Claims
Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may
be made in this behalf, follow such
summary procedure as it thinks fit.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall
have all the powers of a Civil Court for the
purpose of taking evidence on oath and of
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and
of compelling the discovery and production
of documents and material objects and for
such other purposes as may be prescribed;
and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to
be a Civil Court for all the purposes of
section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

 (3) Subject to any rules that may
be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal
may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon
any claim for compensation, choose one or
more persons possessing special knowledge
of any matter relevant to the inquiry to
assist it in holding the inquiry.

[(4)
For
the
purpose
of
enforcement of its award, the Claims
3 All. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Aman Kumar & Ors.
37
Tribunal shall also have all the powers of a
Civil Court in the execution of a decree
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as
if the award were a decree for the payment
of money passed by such court in a civil
suit.]"

18. In view of aforesaid Section
169 of the M.V.Act the Claims Tribunal
may, subject to any rules that may be made
in this behalf, follow such summary
procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-Section (2)
of Section 169 provides that the Claims
Tribunal shall have all the powers of a
Civil Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on oath and of enforcing the
attendance of witnesses and of compelling
the discovery and production of documents
and material objects and for such other
purposes as may be prescribed and it shall
be deemed to be a Civil Court. Thus the
Claims Tribunal has to hold the inquiry
following the summary procedure to
ascertain the truth to be just. It is true that
the claim petition under the M.V.Act has to
be decided on the preponderance of
probabilities and the strict proof beyond
doubt as required under the Criminal Cases
is not required but when discrepancies as
above were pointed out before the Tribunal
and an application was also moved by the
appellant for summoning the eye witness
for cross-examination, whose evidence
could have been material to clarify the
discrepancies, the same was required to be
inquired by the Tribunal or adverse
inference could have been drawn.

19. It is noticed that the application
for summoning the file of the criminal case,
providing the copies of the evidence on
record
and
the
witness
for
crossexamination were moved on the date of
evidence, therefore, without deciding the
same
the
Tribunal
could
not
have
proceeded to decide the claim petition on
the very same date.

20. In view of above this court is of
the view that the Tribunal has failed to
make an inquiry as provided under the
M.V.Act and has also passed the impugned
judgment and award without affording
sufficient opportunity to the appellant by
not deciding the applications fled by him.

21. The Delhi High Court, in the
case of Kuldeep Singn Bawa and others
Versus Tika Ram and others; 2009 SCC
OnLine Del. 4293, has held that Section
168 of the M.V.Act casts a duty on the
learned Tribunal to conduct an inquiry in a
meaningful manner. The relevant paragraph
5 is extracted here-in-below:-

22. Similar view has been taken by
the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the
case
of
Bhagat
Singh
Versus
Jai
Bhagwan and others; 2011 SCC OnLine
P&H 12472 and the Delhi High Court, in
the case of Mayur Arora Versus Amit
alias Pange & others; 2011 (1) TAC 878
(Del.).

23.
In
view
of
above
and
considering
the
overall
facts
and
circumstances of the case, this court is of
the view that the learned Tribunal has not
only failed to make inquiry as required
under Section 168 of the M.V.Act, but also
failed to given sufficient opportunity to the
appellant by not considering and disposing
of its applications before passing the
impugned judgment and award, therefore
the same is liable to be set aside with the
direction to the Tribunal to consider and
decide the case afresh in accordance with
law and in the light of the observations
made here-in-above in this order.
38 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
24. With the aforesaid the appeal is
partly allowed. The impugned judgment
and order dated 10.03.2023 and award
dated 13.03.2023 passed in Motor Accident
Claim Petition No.287 of 2017; Aman
Kumar Versus Arun Kumar and others by
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Hardoi is hereby set aside. The matter is
remitted back to the concerned Tribunal to
decide the claim petition afresh in the light
of the above observations/directions.

25. Since the matter is of the year
2017, this court deems it appropriate to
direct to the Tribunal to decide the claim
petition afresh expeditiously and preferably
within a period of four months from the
date fixed before the Tribunal in this order
for appearance of the parties without
granting unnecessary adjournment to either
of the parties.

26. The parties shall appear before
the concerned Tribunal on 24th of March,
2025.

27. The statutory deposit made
before this court and any other amount
under any order passed by this court shall
be remitted to the concerned Tribunal
forthwith and in any case within a period of
four weeks from today, the disbursement of
which shall abide by the fresh decision
taken by the Tribunal.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 38
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

First Appeal No. 27 of 2018
Khajanchi ...Appellant
Versus
Preete ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Umesh Chandra Saxena, Santosh Kumar
Maurya

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sanjay Kumar Patel (S.K.), Shrawan Kumar
Verma)

Family Law - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 -
Sections 13 & 13B - Divorce - Appeal
against dismissal of divorce petition by
Family Court - Long separation and
absence of cohabitation - Settlement
arrived
at
before
Mediation
and
Conciliation
Centre
-
Payment
of
permanent
alimony
completed
-
All
pending
litigations
agreed
to
be
withdrawn - No further claims to be
raised - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Section 89(2)(d), Order XXIII Rule 3 -
Mediation - Court empowered to pass
decree based on voluntary and lawful
mediated settlement - Satisfaction of
statutory requirements under CPC and
Mediation Rules - Decree of divorce
rightly passed on basis of compromise-
U.P. Civil Procedure Mediation Rules, 2009
- Rule 26 - Settlement recorded by
Mediation Centre found to be voluntary
and non-collusive - Court satisfied before
passing decree-Held, decree of divorce by
mutual consent granted in terms of
Settlement Agreement - Appeal allowed.
(Paras 10 to 14)

HELD:
In this regard, this Court is guided by Section
89(2)(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
which St.s that where a dispute has been
referred for mediation, the mediator will assist
the parties in reaching a settlement, and if a
settlement is arrived at, the Court may pass a
decree in accordance with its terms. This
ensures that mediated settlements have legal
enforceability and enables courts to grant
decrees based on mutually agreed terms,