# Tej Singh &Ors v. State of U.P&Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 124
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-04-24
- **Case number:** CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No.3239 of 2005
- **Bench:** Karuna Nand Bajpaee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/tej-singh-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44442
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A.G.A.

A.
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 - A
single criminal case can be basis to
impose the Gangsters Act - object of the
offence or the motive behind it crucial -
nature of allegations is more relevant
1 All. Tej Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
125
than number the number of cases
registered against a particular accused
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 -Section 2 (b)- "Gang" - if
offence under Chapter XVI, XVII, XXII IPC is
committed with the object or motive of disturbing
public order or gaining any undue temporal,
pecuniary or material advantage or wrongful
economic gain then only accused liable to face
Gangsters Act. (Para 5)

B. U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 - merely because
some grave crime is committed - does not
make accused liable to face Gangsters Act
unless there was object to gain any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other
similar kind of advantage for himself or for
any other person indulged in anti-social
activities. (Para 7)

U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 - Crimes arising out of
some trivial personal dispute - Not make a
good ground to impose Gangsters Act (Para
5).
Accused-facing
allegations
of
having
committed murder-but there was no motive of
making any wrongful economic gains. No
material on the basis of which it may be held
that the prime object behind committing the
crime in question was so as to disturb the
public order. Or committed with the object of
gaining
any
undue
temporal,
pecuniary,
material or other similar kind of advantage for
itself or for any other person indulged in antisocial activities.

C.
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention)
Act,
1986-
Section 2 (b)- "Gang"-'other advantage'-
meaning- preceding words 'temporal,
pecuniary and material' constitute a
genus and the words 'other advantage'
has to be read as an species of the same.
(Para 8)

Charge
sheet
and
the
consequent
proceedings
quashed.
Application
allowed

List of cases cited:-

## Text

124 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
been moved with oblique motive just to
delay the proceedings of the complaint
case as observed by the Magistrate in its
order while rejecting the application.

18. The Apex Court as well as this
Court in the cases mentioned above i.e.
Ajay Dikshit (Supra) has specifically
held
that
the
order
rejecting
the
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is
an interlocutory order and no revision
against the said order is maintainable, in
view of the bar under Section 397 (2)
Cr.P.C. In this regard, paragraph no. 4 of
the decision of the Apex Court in
Sethuraman case (supra) is relevant
which reads as under:

"4. Secondly, what was not
realized was that the order passed by the
Trial Court refusing to call the documents
and rejecting the application under
Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory
orders and as such, the revision against
those orders was clearly barred under
Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court,
in its common order, had clearly
mentioned that the cheque was admittedly
signed by the respondent/accused and the
only defence that was raised, was that his
signed cheques were lost and that the
appellant/complainant had falsely used
one such cheque. The Trial Court also
recorded a finding that the documents
were not necessary. This order did not, in
any manner, decide anything finally.
Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the
application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for
production of documents and other on the
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for
recalling the witness, were the orders of
interlocutory nature, in which case, under
Section 397(2), revision was clearly not
maintainable. Under such circumstances,
the learned Judge could not have
interfered in his revisional jurisdiction.
The impugned judgement is clearly
incorrect in law and would have to be set
aside. It is accordingly set aside. The
appeals are allowed."

19. Taking into consideration the
entire facts and circumstances of the case as
well as the law enunciated in the decisions
of the Apex Court and this Court as
indicated above coupled with the fact that
present complaint proceedings are pending
for the last more than nine years, in the
considered opinion of this Court, I do not
find any illegality or infirmity in the orders
impugned passed by the Revisional Court
and the Trial Court.

20. The application lacks merit and,
is accordingly, dismissed.
-------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.04.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KARUNA NAND BAJPAEE, J.

CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No.3239 of 2005
(u/s -482 Cr. P.C.)

Tej Singh &Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P&Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Mohd. Israr, Sri Amit, Sri Krishna
Kapoor.

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A.
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 - A
single criminal case can be basis to
impose the Gangsters Act - object of the
offence or the motive behind it crucial -
nature of allegations is more relevant
1 All. Tej Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
125
than number the number of cases
registered against a particular accused
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 -Section 2 (b)- "Gang" - if
offence under Chapter XVI, XVII, XXII IPC is
committed with the object or motive of disturbing
public order or gaining any undue temporal,
pecuniary or material advantage or wrongful
economic gain then only accused liable to face
Gangsters Act. (Para 5)

B. U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 - merely because
some grave crime is committed - does not
make accused liable to face Gangsters Act
unless there was object to gain any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other
similar kind of advantage for himself or for
any other person indulged in anti-social
activities. (Para 7)

U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 - Crimes arising out of
some trivial personal dispute - Not make a
good ground to impose Gangsters Act (Para
5).
Accused-facing
allegations
of
having
committed murder-but there was no motive of
making any wrongful economic gains. No
material on the basis of which it may be held
that the prime object behind committing the
crime in question was so as to disturb the
public order. Or committed with the object of
gaining
any
undue
temporal,
pecuniary,
material or other similar kind of advantage for
itself or for any other person indulged in antisocial activities.

C.
U.P.
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention)
Act,
1986-
Section 2 (b)- "Gang"-'other advantage'-
meaning- preceding words 'temporal,
pecuniary and material' constitute a
genus and the words 'other advantage'
has to be read as an species of the same.
(Para 8)

Charge
sheet
and
the
consequent
proceedings
quashed.
Application
allowed

List of cases cited:-
1. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur
vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company, 1991 AIR (SC)
506 followed (E-5)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Karuna Nand
Bajpayee, J.)

1. This application under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. has been moved by the
applicants seeking quashing of the charge
sheet dated 02.6.2002 and all subsequent
proceedings initiated against them in
S.S.T. No. 14 of 2003, State of U.P. vs.
Tej Singh and others, under Section 3(1)
U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986.

2. Heard learned counsel for the
applicants.

3. Submission of learned counsel for
the applicants is that an F.I.R. was lodged
against the applicants as Case Crime No. 220
of 2001 under Sections 147,148, 149, 324,
323, 307, 302 I.P.C. P.S.- Mandawar,
Distict- Bijnor. This F.I.R. is annexure no. 1
to
the
present
application.
Further
submission is that it is this solitary case
which was made the basis to impose
Gangsters Act and such a course is bad in the
eyes of law. The perusal of the same would
show that the same was lodged against about
20 persons who were alleged to have made
assault and resorted to firing also that
eventually resulted in the death of two
persons. There is also a cross case registered
against the other side as Case Crime No.
220A of 2001, under Sections 147, 323, 324
I.P.C., in the police station Mandawar,
District- Bijnor. Submission is that perusal of
the F.I.R. would show that though it was a
grave crime but it was nonetheless a regular
kind of crime that unfortunately keeps taking
place between the parties. The motive of
personal hostility, feud, village factionalism,
126 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
local disputes are most of the times in the
background of commission of such offence.
According to the counsel it is certainly not a
crime which may be said to have been
committed either to make undue economic
gain or to perpetrate some terror or to
continue any such criminal activities which
is, by and large, detrimental to the safety and
security of the society. Counsel has gone to
the extent of arguing that Gangsters Act in
the present case has been imposed only on
the basis of a single aforesaid case that has
been registered against the applicants which
is an illegal misuse of the Act and can not
survive the scrutiny of law. Submission of
learned counsel for the applicants is that
actually it is a case of such nature during the
trial of which the plea of self defense has to
be necessarily decided by the Court.
Contention is that when the trials of two
cases shall be completed it is also quite
probable that the court may come to the
conclusion that the incident in question took
place in the exercise of self defense or may
be, the court would hold that the incident
took place in which the accused persons
simply exceeded their right of private
defense
and
they
were
never
rank
aggressOrs. In that eventuality imposition of
the case Gangster Act does not appear to be a
justified exercise. Submission of learned
counsel
is
that
therefore
in
such
circumstances it shall result in the abuse of
court's process if the single case of aforesaid
kind is made the basis to impose Gangsters
Act as the ingredients of the offence shall not
be born out and thus in such circumstances,
the impugned proceedings deserve to be
quashed.

4. Heard learned A.G.A. and
perused the record.

5. This Court has the occasion to go
through the F.I.R. of the murder case that
was registered against the applicants and
it has also gone through the cross version
that was registered against the other side.
This Court does not find itself in
agreement with the submissions made by
learned counsel that a single case cannot
constitute a legitimate basis to impose the
Gangsters Act. But it is of the considered
view that it is not the number of cases
registered against a particular accused
which is so relevant as the nature of
allegations made in the F.I.R. of the
criminal case or cases registered against
the accused on which shall depend
whether the offence under the Gangsters
Act is made out or not. A man may be
involved in more than one cases but all
those cases may be of such nature which
may arise out of some trivial personal
dispute over some drainage problem or
over some connected boundary wall
dispute or over some rival competing civil
claim on some piece of land and the
relationship of the two parties may
deteriorate to the extent that they may get
involved in some squabble, quarrels or
sometimes even in making criminal
assaults upon each other. Such kind of
crimes are somewhat of a regular kind
and nature. They do not make a good
ground to impose Gangsters Act. The
definition as has been provided in the Act
and the ingredients which are required to
be fulfilled before imposition of Gangster
Act are on a different footing as is clear
from the perusal of the definition of
Gangster Act itself.

"2. Definitions.- In this Act,-

(a) "Code" means the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of
1974);

(b) "Gang" means a group of
persons, who acting either singly or
collectively, by violence, or threat or
1 All. Tej Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
127
show of violence, or intimidation, or
coercion, or otherwise with the object of
disturbing public order or of gaining any
undue temporal, pecuniary, material or
other advantage for himself or any other
person, indulge in antisocial activities,
namely:

(i) offences punishable under
Chapter XVI, or Chapter XVII, or
Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code
(Act No. 45 of 1860), or

(ii) distilling or manufacturing
or storing or transporting or importing or
exporting or selling or distributing any
liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous
drugs, or other intoxicants or narcotics or
cultivating any plant, in contravention of
any of the provisions of the U. P. Excise
Act, 1910 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1910), or the
Narcotic
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of
1985), or any other law for the time being
in force, or

(iii)
occupying
or
taking
possession
of
immovable
property
otherwise than in accordance with law, or
setting-up false claims for title or
possession
of
immovable
property
whether in himself or any other person, or

(iv) preventing or attempting to
prevent any public servant or any witness
from discharging his lawful duties, or

(v) offences punishable under
the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in
Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act No. 104
of 1956), or

(vi) offences punishable under
Section 3 of the Public Gambling Act,
1867 (Act No. 3 of 1867), or

(vii) preventing any person from
offering
bids
in
auction
lawfully
conducted, or tender, lawfully invited, by
or
on
behalf
of
any
Government
department, local body or public or
private undertaking, for any lease or
rights or supply of goods or work to be
done, or

(viii) preventing or disturbing
the smooth running by any person of his
lawful business, profession, trade or
employment or any other lawful activity
connected therewith, or

(ix) offences punishable under
Section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code
(Act No. 45 of 1860), or in preventing or
obstructing any public election being
lawfully held, by physically preventing the
voter from exercising his electoral rights,
or

(x) inciting others to resort to
violence to disturb communal harmony,
or

(xi) creating panic, alarm or terror
in public, or

(xii) terrorising or assaulting
employees or owners or occupiers of
public
or
private
undertakings
or
factories and causing mischief in respect
of their properties, or

(xiii) inducing or attempting to
induce any person to go to foreign
countries on false representation that any
employment, trade or profession shall be
provided to him in such foreign country,
or

(xiv) kidnapping or abducting
any person with intent to extort ransom,
or
128 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(xv) diverting or otherwise
preventing
any
aircraft
or
public
transport vehicle from following its
scheduled course ;

(c) "gangster" means a member or
leader or organiser of a gang and includes
any person who abets or assists in the
activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b),
whether bef6.ore or after the commission of
such activities or harbours any person who
has indulged in such activities ;

(d) "public servant" means a public
servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or any other
law for the time being in force, and includes
any person who lawfully assist the police or
other authorities of the State, in investigation
or prosecution or punishment of an offence
punishable under this Act, whether by giving
information or evidence relating to such
offence or offender or in any other manner;

(e) "member of the family of a
public servant" means his parents or
spouse and brother, sister, son, daughter,
grandson, grand-daughter or the spouses
of any of them, and includes a person
dependent on or residing with the public
servant and a person in whose welfare the
public servant is interested ;

(f) words and phrases used but
not defined in this Act and defined in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the
Indian Penal Code shall have the
meanings respectively assigned to them in
such Codes."

6. A careful perusal of the definition
of "Gangster" and "Gang" would not fail
to indicate that if an offence punishable
under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII and
Chapter XXII of Indian Penal Code is
committed with the object of disturbing
public order or with the object of gaining
any undue temporal, pecuniary or material
advantage, such activity on the part of
accused can make him liable to face the
imposition of Gangsters Act in question.
He may commit such kind of act just once
and may face a single F.I.R. or he may
commit such kind of offences many times
and may face more than one F.I.Rs. in
that connection. It is not the number of
F.I.Rs. which is relevant as it is
significant to assess whether the crime
committed by the accused was inspired
and prompted with the motive of gaining
any undue temporal, pecuniary or material
advantage or not. It is the object of the
offence or the motive behind it which is
of crucial significance in order to adjudge
whether the provisions of Gangsters Act
in
question
can
be
brought
into
application in a given case or not.

7. After having perused the record,
this Court finds itself in agreement with
the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the applicants that though the
accused are facing the allegations of
having committed murder but they cannot
be said to have committed the crime
because they were gangsters. There was
no motive of making any wrongful
economic gains. This Court also does not
see any material on the basis of which it
may be held that the prime object behind
committing the crime in question was so
as to disturb the public order. Whenever
some grave crime is committed it always
leads to a consequential result of some
kind of disturbance in society. Such
normal
disturbance
in
society
and
disturbing the public order or creating
panic or terror are different species.
Ordinary law and order problems can not
be clubbed with phenomenon of break of
public order. The crime in question does
not appear to have been committed with
the object of gaining any undue temporal,
1 All. Tej Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
129
pecuniary, material or other similar kind
of advantage for itself or for any other
person indulged in anti-social activities.

8. Here in this context it may also be
seen that in the definition of 'gang' as
provided under Section -2(b) of the U.P.
Gangsters and Anti Social Activities
(Prevention)
Act,
1986
(hereinafter
referred to as Act) reference to the words
'gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary,
material or other advantage' for himself or
any other person has been given. One
might argue that the words 'other
advantage' is an all inclusive term and all
kinds and categories of advantages will
come under its title, and therefore, there is
hardly any need to see the facts of the
case with a fine class in order to find
whether the object of the gang is or was
of gaining undue temporal, pecuniary and
material advantage or not. If the violence
or offence committed was inspired to get
any kind of advantage for himself or for
any other person, the letter of definition as
provided by the Act shall stand satisfied.
But in the considered opinion of this
Court such kind of approach will lead to
complete misinterpretation of the Statute.
If the Legislature in its wisdom has used a
number of qualifying words with regard
to Anti Social Activity as has been
referred to and contemplated in the Act,
then its whole purpose shall stand
defeated by providing such an all
sweeping meaning to the words 'other
advantage' as has been used in the
definition. If the term 'other advantage'
was meant to include all advantages or
was meant to include any kind of
advantage whatsoever where was the need
to use different other defining words like
'temporal, pecuniary and material' which
immediately precede the words 'or other
advantage' ! It is self evident that the use
of the preceding words have a qualifying
effect and must be seen lending its
complexion to the subsequently used
words 'other advantage'. The words 'other
advantage' has got to be seen in the
context
and
perspective
and
with
reference to the preceding aforesaid
words and must be understood in the
same light. Just as a man is often known
by the company he keeps, the import of
words in Statute also are often to be seen
and understood by the company of the
words in which they appear. In this regard
this Court deems it appropriate to keep in
perspective the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis'
in order to correctly appreciate the scope
and the actual ambit of the general words
which follow the aforesaid specific words
used in the Statute. The Court is of the
view that the aforesaid preceding words
'temporal, pecuniary and material' are
constituting a genus and the words 'other
advantage' has to be read as an species of
the same. Though ordinarily the general
words must be provided to bear their
natural and larger meaning but they have
to be confined Ejusdem generis to the
class of things previously enumerated by
certain specific words because it is not
difficult to see clearly the intention of the
Statute which it spells out by using a
specific class and category of qualifying
words. This Court sees reasons and
therefore feels persuaded to limit the
scope of the meaning of the general words
'other advantage' because if we provide to
it a larger all embracing meaning it is
likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen
results. The general expression has to be
read contemplating to imply the things of
the same kind which have been referred to
by the preceding specific class of things
constituting a genus. If we do not adhere
to this rule and do not impute specific
complexion to the general words in the
130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
light of the preceding words the blatant
misuse and plain absurdity to which it
shall lead is that the administrative
executives and the police would feel free
to impose the provisions of this Act upon
anybody and everybody who is facing the
charge of committing any sort of offence
or any breach of law howsoever trivial it
be because hardly any violence or threat
or show of violence or intimidation or
coercion is done without having the object
of gaining some kind of advantage
himself or for any other person. The word
'advantage' has an all sweeping natural
meaning and may include material and
psychological both kinds of advantages.
In that view of the matter the use of the
words 'other advantage' will bring in its
mischief everything under the sun. It is
therefore very expediently needed to read
these words in right perspective and read
them Ejusdem generis with the things or
words previously enumerated by the
Statute. In order to substantiate its view
this Court finds strength from the
pronouncement given by the Apex Court
in the case of Assistant Collector of
Central Excise, Guntur vs. Ramdev
Tobacco Company, 1991 AIR (SC) 506.
In this case the principle of Ejusdem
generis was expatiated upon at some
length and was
also brought into
application while giving interpretation to
the issues involved in the case with which
it was dealing. It would be profitable to
extract the relevant portion of the
pronouncement which reads as under :

"5. But the question is whether
the issuance of a show cause notice and
the
initiation
of
the
consequential
adjudication proceedings can be described
as `other legal proceedings' within the
meaning of sub-section (2) of section 40
of the Act? If the said departmental action
falls within the expression `other legal
proceeding' there can be no doubt that the
action would be barred as the same
indisputably was initiated six months after
the accrual of the cause action. So the
crucial question is whether the issuance of
the show cause notice dated August 30,
1972 and the passing of the impugned
order
in
adjudication
proceedings
emanating therefrom constitutes `other
legal proceeding' within the meaning of
section 40 (2) of the Act to fall within the
mischief of that sub-section which bars
such proceedings if commenced after a
period of six months from the accrual of
the
cause
of
action.
The
learned
Additional Solicitor General submitted
that
the
expression
`other
legal
proceeding' must be read ejusdem generis
with the preceding expressions `suit' and
`prosecution' and if so read it becomes
crystal clear that the department's action
cannot come within the purview of `other
legal proceeding'. How valid is this
contention is the question which we are
called upon to answer in the present
appeal.

6. The rule of ejusdem generis is
generally invoked where the scope and
ambit of the general words which follow
certain specific words (which have some
common characteristic and constitute a
genus) is required to be determined. By
the application of this rule the scope and
ambit of the general words which follow
certain specific words constituting a
genus is restricted to things ejusdem
generis with those preceding them, unless
the context otherwise requires. General
words must ordinarily bear their natural
and larger meaning and need not be
confined ejusdem generis to things
previously
enumerated
unless
the
language of the statute spells out an
intention to that effect. Courtshave also
1 All. Tej Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
131
limited the scope of the general words in
cases where a larger meaning is likely to
lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To
put it differently, the general expression
has to be read to comprehend things of the
same kind as those referred to by the
preceding specific things constituting a
genus, unless of course from the language
of the statute it can be inferred that the
general words were not intended to be so
limited and no absurdity or unintended
and unforeseen complication is likely to
result if they are allowed to take their
natural meaning. The cardinal rule of
interpretation is to allow the general
words to take their natural wide meaning
unless the language of the statute gives a
different indication or such meaning is
likely to lead to absurd results in which
case their meaning can be restricted by
the application of this rule and they may
be required to fall in line with the specific
things designated by the preceding words.
But unless there is genus which can be
comprehended from the preceding words,
there can be no question of invoking this
rule. Nor can this rule have any
application where the general words
precede specific words.

7. There can be little doubt that
the words `other legal proceeding' are
wide enough to include adjudication and
penalty proceedings under the Act. Even
the learned Additional Solicitor General
did not contend to the contrary but what
he said was that since this wide
expression is preceded by particular
words of a certain genus, namely, words
indicating reference to proceedings taken
in courts only, the wide words must be
limited to things ejusdem generis and
must take colour from the preceding
words and should, therefore, receive a
limited meaning to exclude proceedings
of the type in question. There can be no
doubt that `suit' or `prosecution' are those
judicial or legal proceedings which are
lodged in a court of law and not before
any executive authority, even if a
statutory one. The use of the expression
`instituted' in section 40 (2) strengthens
this belief. Since this sub-section has been
construed by this Court in Raju's case
(supra) not to be confined in its
application to only Government servants
but to extend to others including the
assessees and since the words `for
anything done or ordered to be done
under
this
Act'
are
found
to
be
comprehensive enough to include acts of
non-compliance or omissions to do what
the Act and the Rule enjoin, the limitation
prescribed
by
section
40(2)
would
undoubtedly hit the adjudication and
penalty proceedings unless the expression
`other legal proceeding' is read ejusdem
generis to limit its ambit to legal
proceedings initiated in a court of law.

8. The scope of section 40(2) as
it stood before its amendment pursuant to
Raju's case came up for consideration
before a DivisionBench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court inUniversal Cables
Ltd. v. Union of India, [1977 Tax LR
1825]: 1977 ELT (J92) wherein the
question raised for determination was
whether penalty proceedings taken under
Rule 173Q for the infraction of Rule
173C with a view to evading payment of
duty fell within the expression `other legal
proceeding' used in the said sub- section.
The High Court conceded that the
expression when read in isolation is wide
enough to include any proceeding taken in
accordance with law, whether so taken in
a court of law or before any authority or
tribunal but when read with the preceding
words `suit' or `prosecution' it must be
132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
given a restricted meaning. This is how
the High Court expressed itself at page J
106 (at page 1838 of Tax. L.R.):

"Now the language ofsection
40(2) is: `no suit, prosecution or other
legal proceeding shall be instituted'. `Suit'
and `prosecution' which precede the
expression `other legal proceeding' can be
taken only in a Court of Law".

After stating the expanse of the
ejusdem
generis
rule,
as
explained
inAmar Chandra v. Excise Collector,
Tripura, AIR. 1972 SC 1863 at 1868
(Sutherland, Volume 2 pages 399-400)
the High Court observed that there was no
indication in the said sub-section or
elsewhere in the Act that the said general
words were intended to receive their wide
meaning and were not to be construed in a
limited sense with the aid of the ejusdem
generis rule. A departmental proceeding
like penalty proceedings were, therefore,
placed outside the scope of the said subsection. This view was quoted with
approval by a learned Single Judge of the
Bombay High Court in C.C. Industries &
Others v. H.N. Ray, 1980 ELT 442 at
453. These two cases, therefore, clearly
support the view canvassed before us by
the learned Additional Solicitor General.

9. We have given our careful
consideration to the submission made on
behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the
view expressed in the aforesaid two
decisions. In considering the scope of the
expression `other legal proceeding' we
have confined ourselves to the language
of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act
before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973
and should not be understood to express
any view on the amended provision. On
careful consideration we are in respectful
agreement with the view expressed in the
aforesaid
decisions
that
the
wide
expression `other legal proceeding' must
be read ejusdem generis with the
preceding words `suit' and `prosecution'
as they constitute a genus. In this view of
the matter we must uphold the contention of
the learned Additional Solicitor General that
the penalty and adjudicationproceedings in
question did not fall within the expression
`other legal proceeding' employed in section
40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its
amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and
therefore, the said proceedings were not
subject to the limitation prescribed by the
said sub-section."

9. Illumined by the aforesaid view
adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
this Court sees good reason to hold that
the use of phrase 'other advantage' as it
finds place in the Act must take its hue
from the accompanying words which
immediately precede the same and which
have a qualifying effect.

10. The definition as has been
provided in the Gangster Act is very
exhaustive and has very wide contours.
While dealing with the issues involved in
the case of Gangster Act, the court has to be
cautious and should not stretch it too much
or to the extent where any kind of crime
committed by anybody or all kinds of
offences committed by anybody would
make him a "gangster". In fact it is a
question of fact and the court will have to
see it as per the allegations made in each
individual case whether the nature of crime
committed was such on the basis of which
an accused can be brought under the bracket
of the definition of the gangster or not.
There cannot be a over generalized formula
on this point and the Court has to satisfy
itself on a subjective basis as well as on the
objective basis as per the allegations and the
1 All. Hanif Malik Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
133
circumstances as they may appear from the
nature of crime said to have been committed
by a particular accused and see for itself
whether he can be brought within the
mischief of the Act or not. In the present
case this Court is of the considered opinion
that the nature of crime committed, the
background in which it was committed, the
motive and the object which appears to have
been behind this incident were such, which
fall far short of bringing the case under the
category where the provisions of U.P.
Gangsters and Anti Social Activities
(Prevention
)
Act,
1986
could
be
successfully attributed or imposed.

11. In such view of the matter, the
charge sheet under the said act and the
consequent proceedings thereof stand
quashed.

12. The application stands allowed.

13. A copy of this order be certified
to the lower court forthwith.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.04.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA-I, J.

CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No.35628of
2018
(u/s -482 Cr. P.C.)

Hanif Malik ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. &Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Chandrakesh Mishra, Sri Daya Shankar
Mishra.

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Krishna Dutt Tiwari.

A. Section 190 Cr.P.C. - Dowry death.
FIR lodged. Final report submitted by
police -Application u/s 156(3) filed -
treated protest petition as complaint
case - Magistrate duly examined the
postmortem
report,
statement
of
witnesses - disagreed with the final
report - found that death of victim not
caused by injury.

Held:- Section 190(1) Cr.P.C. gives an
unequivocal expression and impression that
the
Magistrate
is
competent
to
take
cognizance upon " information received from
any person other than a police officer"
therefore cognizance of case in shape of the
protest petition falls under clause (c) of
Section 190(1) Cr.P.C. The Magistrate was of
the view that the material produced can be
scrutinized in better way on the judicial side
and to meet the ends of justice treated protest
petition as complaint thereby rightly exercising
power under Section 190(1) Cr.P.C.

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. dismissed
(E-10)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Mishra-I, J.)

1. Heard Sri Daya Shankar Mishra,
learned counsel for the applicant, Sri K.D.
Tiwari, learned counsel for opposite party
nos.2 to 6, Sri Om Narain Tripathi,
learned A.G.A.-I assisted by Sri Bhanu
Pratap, Brief Holder for the State and
perused the material brought on record.

2. By way of the instant application,
the applicant has sought for quashment of
the order dated 08.06.2018 passed by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bijnor, in Misc.
F.R. Case No.411 of 2017 whereby final
report submitted by the police in Case
Crime No.70 of 2017 under Sections
498A, 304B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry
Prohibition
Act,
Police
Station
Shivalakala, District Bijnor was treated as