# Tejveer v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 71
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 3822 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir, Nalin Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/tejveer-v-state-of-u-p-53974
- **Pages:** 30

## Text

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1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
71
Imprisonment, without any remission, but along with the fine as stipulated in the impugned
judgment of conviction and sentence dated 22.09.2011 of the learned Trial Court.

61. Having said so, it is directed that the appellant- Yasin shall be released only after
undergoing the sentence of punishment of 15 years, rigorous imprisonment, without any remission,
as aforesaid, under the Sessions Trial No. 371 of 2009 (State Vs. Yasin and others) arising out of
Crime Case No. 154 of 2009. The Jail Authorities are accordingly directed to calculate the period
of custody and in calculating the said period the benefit of Section 427 and 428 Cr.P.C. shall be
granted to the Appellant.

62. There shall be no order as to cost(s).
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(2026) 1 ILRA 71
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
THE HON'BLE NALIN KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 3822 of 2022

Tejveer ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to conviction of the appellants under S. 302 read with S. 34 IPC, where the Trial Court
acquitted them of charges under S.s 304-B, 498-A IPC and S.s 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and
the prosecution case rests substantially on circumstantial evidence and testimony of hostile witnesses,
particularly relating to an unnatural death within the matrimonial home.
Headnotes
Criminal Trial - Murder - S. 302 read with S. 34 IPC - Hostile Witnesses - Circumstantial Evidence
- Complete chain of circumstances - Unnatural death of wife in matrimonial home - Burden on
prosecution to establish circumstances beyond reasonable doubt - Subsequent shifting of
evidential burden on accused - Failure of accused to explain incriminating circumstances -
Conviction upheld (Paras 17-19, 72, 79)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - S. 154 - Evidentiary value of hostile witness - Evidence of hostile
witness not to be rejected in toto - Court entitled to rely on those portions which inspire
confidence - Conduct, contradictions, and admissions examined cumulatively. (Paras 35-42)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - S.s 101, 102, 106 - Distinction between burden of proof and
evidential burden - S. 106 not attracted where an independent eyewitness was available -
Nevertheless, failure of accused to rebut incriminating circumstances decisive. (Paras 72-73, 79)
Penal Law - S. 302/34 IPC - Common intention - Death by poisoning - Medical and forensic
evidence corroborative - Organochloro insecticide found in viscera - Guilt established beyond
reasonable doubt.(Paras 4-6, 66, 79) (E-7)
72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held: The prosecution has successfully established its case beyond all reasonable doubt, both on the basis of
evidence of witnesses, notwithstanding their hostility, and ignoring that evidence, by the circumstances alone
- this is not a case where S. 106 of the Evidence Act could be invoked, yet upon establishment of
incriminating circumstances, the burden shifted upon the appellants under S. 102 of the Evidence Act, which
they failed to discharge - all these circumstances put together form a complete chain that exclude any other
possibility, except that of the appellants' guilt", and no defence evidence or explanation was offered - the
appeals fail and are dismissed, and the conviction and sentence under S. 302/34 IPC are affirmed.(Paras 72 -
80)

Case Law Cited
Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar and another, (2012) 4 SCC 379; K.P. Tamilmaran v. State by Deputy
Superintendent of Police, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958 ; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727 ;
Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi), (1975) 3 SCC 562 ; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984)
4 SCC 116 ; State of U.P. v. Vijay Prakash Sharma, 2024 (12) ADJ 256 (DB) (LB) ;State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, (2025) 8 SCC 545.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), 1973; Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Dowry
Prohibition Act (DP Act), 1961

List of Keywords
hostile witness; unnatural death; matrimonial home; circumstantial evidence; complete chain of
circumstances; evidential burden; S. 106 of the Evidence Act; forced to ingest poison; organocloro insecticide;
beyond reasonable doubt; Compromise; Dying declaration (oral).

Case Arising From
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3822 of 2022 and Criminal Appeal No. 5320 of 2021 arising
out of judgment and order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-I, Bulandshahr in
Sessions Trial No. 644 of 2019, State v. Tejveer and others, concerning Crime No.106 of 2019, P.S. Ramghat,
District Bulandshahr.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Mr. Santosh Kumar Rai
Mr. Hemant Sharma
Mr. Omvir Singh Rajpoot
Advs. for the Respondents:
Mr. Rahul Asthana, learned Additional Government Advocate

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. By this judgment, we propose to decide the present criminal appeal and the connected
Criminal Appeal No.5320 of 2021, both of which arise out of a judgment and order of Ms. Deepika
Tiwari, the then Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-I, Bulandshahr dated 25.10.2021 in Sessions Trial
No.644 of 2019, State v. Tejveer and others. By the said judgment and order, the learned Trial
Judge has convicted the appellants in both the appeals for an offence punishable under Section 302
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') and sentenced each of them to
suffer imprisonment for life, besides ordering them to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each. In default of
payment of fine, the appellant in default has been directed to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years. At the same time, all the appellants have been acquitted of
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
73
the charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
(for short, 'DP Act'). It is the conviction and sentence that each of the appellants challenge in the
present appeal.

2. A First Information Report ('FIR' in short) was lodged by Chokhelal son of Kamal Singh, a
resident of Chauganpur, Police Station Harduaganj, District Aligarh on 30.07.2019 at 5:45 p.m.
with Police Station Ramghat, District Bulandshahr, saying that he had got married two of his
daughters, Mamta and Chandrawati, to two brothers, Tejveer and Rakesh, both sons of Nanakram,
a resident of Village Gangagarh, Police Station Ramghat, District Bulandshahr. He reported in his
written first information that today, i.e. on 30.07.2019, his younger daughter, Chandrawati, called
him over telephone to say that her sister, Mamta, had been given poison by Tejveer son of
Nanakram, Rama daughter of Nanakram, Munni wife of Nanakram and Nanakram son of Kishori
Lal, besides others, after conspiring amongst themselves, on account of demand of dowry and her
sister not being able to bear a child. Chokhelal said that immediately upon receipt of this
information, all family members reached Gangagarh by car, but by that time, the poison had
overtaken the body. It is also said in the FIR that the informant's daughter, Mamta, told him that
her mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and sister-in-law (Nanad) had forcibly made her drink
poison. The informant added that they were rushing Mamta for medical aid to the hospital, when on
way at Atarauli, she died. The FIR requested necessary action in the matter and added that Mamta's
dead body was with the informant in the vehicle parked in front of Police Station Ramghat.

3. On the basis of the said case, Crime No.106 of 2019, under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and
Section 3/4 of the DP Act, P.S. Ramghat, District Bulandshahr, was registered against the three
appellants, besides Rama daughter of Nanakram.

4. An inquest was done on 30.07.2019 jointly by Sub-Inspector Chandrapal Singh from Police
Station Ramghat, District Bulandshahr and Manoj Kumar Singh, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dibai,
District Bulandshahr, in the presence of panch witnesses. An autopsy for the deceased followed,
which was carried out on 31.07.2019. The following ante-mortem injuries were noticed:

"(1) Puncture wound size 0.3x0.3cm on right side supra clavicular area present mid
clavicular region.

(2) Puncture would size 0.3x0.3cm on right side neck 3cm above from right medial and
of clavicle bone.

(3) Cotton swab with Licoplast tape present on right Dorsal Part of hand just below right
wrist joint.

(4) Cotton swab with Licoplast tape present on right lower limb just on calf muscle.

(5) Injury No.(1) and (2) on exploration subclavicular region was found punctured and
internal jugalar vein was found punctured respectively."
74 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. The autopsy doctor remarked that no opinion can be given (as to cause of death) and the
viscera were preserved for chemical and forensic examination. In the opinion of the doctor, the
cause of death could not be ascertained and, therefore, viscera were preserved for chemical,
toxicological and forensic analysis.

6. There is a report from the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ghaziabad dated 08.08.2019, which
opines that the viscera received in five parts showed presence of Organochloro Insecticide.

7. The Circle Officer, Debai, Bulandshahr, who investigated the crime, submitted a chargesheet against the three appellants, but exculpated Rama, the deceased's sister-in-law, finding it to
be a case of false implication for her.

8. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahr took cognizance on 02.12.2019 and
summoned the accused. They appeared before the Court, whereupon the learned Magistrate
furnished them copies of the relevant prosecution papers under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.'). Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions
for trial, also on 02.12.2019, by Mr. Sumit Premi, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahr.

9. Four charges were framed by Ms. Shweta Verma, the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
FTC-I, Bulandshahr vide order dated 06.01.2020. The appellants were charged under Section 498A IPC on the first count, Section 304-B IPC on the second count and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP
Act on the third and fourth counts, respectively. An alternate charge was framed under Section 302/
34 IPC. The appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The appellants stood their trial before
Ms. Deepika Tiwari, who heard all the evidence in this case. The trial commenced on 21.10.2020.

10. In order to prove their case, the prosecution have examined the following witnesses:

(1) PW-1, Chokhelal, the informant and the father of the deceased;

(2) PW-2, Chandrawati, another witness of fact and sister of the deceased;

(3) PW-3, Omwati, mother of the deceased;

(4) PW-4, Banti Singh, brother of the deceased;

(5) PW-5, Dr. Ajay Kumar, conducted autopsy;

(6) PW-6, Lady Constable Ritu, got registered the check FIR; and,

(7) CO Vikram Singh, Investigating Officer of the case, who drew up a site-plan and
submitted the charge-sheet.

11. The prosecution have relied upon the following documentary evidence:
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
75
Sr.
No.
Exhibit
No.
Exhibited documents with brief particulars
1
Ex. Ka-1 Written report dated 30.07.2019 lodged with the Police Station Ramghat, District
Bulandshahr and proved by PW-1, Chokhelal
2
Ex. Ka-2 Postmortem Report of the deceased, Mamta, dated 31.07.2019, proved by PW-5,
Dr. Ajay Kumar
3
Ex. Ka-3 Check FIR dated 30.07.2019, proved by PW-6, Lady Constable Ritu
4
Ex. Ka-4 Carbon copy of the G.D. Entry No.30, Time 17.45, dated 30.07.2019 relating to
Crime No.106 of 2019, proved by PW-6, Lady Constable Ritu
5
Ex. Ka-5 Site-plan of the place of incident dated 02.08.2019, proved by PW-7, CO Vikram
Singh
6
Ex. Ka-6 Charge-sheet, proved by PW-7, CO Vikram Singh
7
Ex. Ka-7 Panchayatnama (inquest report) dated 30.07.2019
8
Ex. Ka-8 Challan Nash of the dead body
9
Ex. Ka-9 Photo corpse
10
Ex. Ka-10 Letter to CMO
11
Ex. Ka-11 Sample seal
12
Ex. Ka-12 FSL Report dated 26.09.2019

12. The learned Trial Judge, vide judgment and order dated 25.10.2021, convicted and
sentenced the appellants, as specified earlier.

13. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order, Criminal Appeal No.3822 of 2022 has
been preferred by the appellant, Tejveer, whereas Criminal Appeal No.5320 of 2021 by the
appellants, Nanakram and Munni.

14. We have heard Criminal Appeal No.3822 of 2022 as the leading appeal as both the appeals
arise out of a common judgment and order passed by the Trial Judge and relate to the same crime
as well.

15. Heard Mr. Santosh Kumar Rai, Mr. Hemant Sharma and Mr. Omvir Singh Rajpoot,
learned Counsel for the appellants in support of both the appeals and Mr. Rahul Asthana, learned
Additional Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State.

16. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we find that there is no cavil that the Trial
Court has acquitted the appellants of charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC and Section 3/4 of
the DP Act but convicted them on the alternate charge under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced
them, accordingly. It is this conviction and sentence,which the appellants assail before us.

17. The conviction being one for an offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC, it is the
prosecution, who have to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt.
76 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

18. This is a case, where apparently, all the four prosecution witnesses of fact have turned
hostile and refused to support their version before the Police, at the time of registration of the
crime, and in subsequent statements made before the Police, during investigation. There are two
features of this case, which must be borne in mind; one commonplace, and, the other, not so
common, if not rare. The oft-occurring feature or challenge that this case carries is the fact that the
deceased died within the four corners of her matrimonial home, where the appellants were in
control of all affairs. This is commonplace because in any Indian home, except in certain places in
the country, it is the wife, who, upon marriage, leaves her home and settles down with her husband
or/ and in-laws in their home. Therefore, if an unnatural death or a death by violence is the fate of
the wife in her matrimonial home, after the prosecution have established the basic facts about the
wife's death, which is unnatural or the result of a crime, burden falls upon the shoulders of the
deceased's husband and his relatives, with whom she resided, to explain how the unnatural death
happened.

19. The uncommon feature of this case is that in most such cases, a wife, who dies in her
matrimonial home an unnatural death, has no witness to tell her story, for the obvious reason that
her husband and in-laws, tied as they are together, with a thread of common interest, would not
come forward to testify against their own kin and expose them to the consequences of being
punished for a heinous offence; but not so here. Here, the uncommon feature, of which we have
spoken of, is that in the confines of her matrimonial home, the deceased had a sister of full-blood as
an eye-witness to everything that befell her. This happened because the two sisters were married to
two brothers of full-blood. The testimony of this witness, who is undoubtedly an eye-witness,
would have carried great weight, if she had treaded the path of idealism, spoken forthrightly and
truthfully. But, it seems that she has not and fallen victim to the very mundane consideration of
saving her in-laws, who are also in-laws to her sister. She is married in the same home and if
convicted, the ones who would suffer the penalties of law, would be her husband's parents and next
of kin. It is perhaps this consideration, which has made this uncommon eye-witness speak some
falsehood and other half truths in her dock evidence. Of course, like other witnesses, she too has
been got declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined. If indeed, the witnesses,
including the deceased's sister, PW-2, Chandrawati, have spoken falsehood and half truths, we
would shortly scrutinize in this judgment.

20. The genesis of the crime shows that the informant and PW-1, Chokhelal, the deceased's
father, received information on 30.07.2019 over phone from his younger daughter, Chandrawati, to
the effect that her sister, Mamta, had been poisoned by her husband Tejveer, sister-in-law Rama,
mother-in-law Munni and father-in-law Nanakram on account of unmet demand for dowry and her
failure to bear a child. The FIR, lodged after the deceased had expired, shows that upon receipt of
the aforesaid information, the informant along with all the family members, drove to the deceased's
matrimonial home in their car, only to find that the poison had spread in the whole of her body. It is
also said in the FIR by the informant that his daughter Mamta (later on deceased) told him that her
mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and sister-in-law (nanad) had forced her to consume poison.
Upon learning the said fact, the informant started of with his daughter to the hospital to seek
medical aid, but unfortunately she expired, when they had reached Atrauli. It is after her death that
the first informant reported the crime to the Police.
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
77

21. This stand of the informant and the deceased's other family members, who are the
witnesses here, remained consistent during investigation.

22. PW-1, the deceased's father and the first informant, turned hostile in the dock and did not
support the prosecution. About the incident, he has said in his examination-in-chief that on
30.07.2019, he received information from his younger daughter Chandrawati that Mamta had died.
When he, along with other family members, reached the deceased's in-laws' home, Mamta was
already dead. He dictated the FIR to Banti Singh, a boy from his village (when, in fact, Banti Singh
is his son) and handed it over at Police Station Ramghat. The written information that he dictated is
on record, which bore his signatures. He has proved it. He has further on said in his examinationin-chief that he had no knowledge of the fact that his daughter Mamta had been poisoned to death
by her husband Tejveer, mother-in-law Munni and father-in-law Nanakram. It was at this stage that
the witness was prayed to be declared hostile and upon grant of that prayer, he was cross-examined
by the prosecution.

23. It is noteworthy that in the FIR, this witness has categorically said that he had received a
phone call from his younger daughter Chandrawati, informing him that Mamta had been poisoned
by her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law, also specifying the issues that led them to commit
the evil deed. He has next said in the FIR that when he along with the family reached Mamta's
place, the poison had overtaken the body, but Mamta told him that her mother-in-law, father-inlaw, husband and sister-in-law had forcibly made her drink poison. He immediately rushed his
daughter to the hospital, but she passed away while they were still at Atrauli.

24. Now, the contents of this FIR, the witness has affirmed and proved in his examination-inchief, but spoken contrariwise about the incident in his dock evidence. It is indeed unbelievable that
if the witness has affirmed the contents of the FIR, where it is said that Mamta was alive, when he
reached her and told him that she had been forced to consume poison by the appellants, how could
this witness say in his dock evidence that when he reached Mamta's place, she was already dead
and that he did not know if the appellants had poisoned her. He has not said anywhere that he
lodged the FIR under some misconception of fact or out of some motivation, setting forth false
facts there. An FIR has a special importance in any criminal trial. Though, it is not substantive
evidence, it is the earliest account of the occurrence, and, therefore, regarded as most truthful, free
from embellishment, afterthought, design or manipulation. It is for this reason that the weight given
to an FIR is lost or much lessened, if it is shown not to be prompt under the circumstances and one
lodged after an unexplained delay, with possible pre-meditation.

25. In this connection, reference may be made to the authority of the Supreme Court in Jai
Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar and another, (2012) 4 SCC 379, where it has been held:

"12. The FIR in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not
be substantive piece of evidence. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR in respect
of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in
which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as
well as the names of the eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in
lodging the FIR, it loses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of
78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of large number of
consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the FIR is an assurance
regarding truth of the informant's version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the first hand account of
what has actually happened, and who was responsible for the offence in question. (Vide Thulia Kali
v. State of T.N. [(1972) 3 SCC 393 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 1973 SC 501] , State of Punjab v.
Surja Ram [1995 Supp (3) SCC 419 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 937 : AIR 1995 SC 2413] , Girish Yadav v.
State of M.P. [(1996) 8 SCC 186 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 552] and Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat [(2011) 10 SCC 158 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 218 : AIR 2012 SC 37] .)".

26. Apparently, this witness has spoken falsehood and concealed truth from the Court, which
nevertheless peeps from behind all the armour of his false testimony. In his cross-examination,
PW-1 has stated:

"घटना के समय मेरी बेटी चन्द्रवती पत्नी राकेश भी अपनी ससुराल ग्राम गंगागढ़ में थी। मुलजिमान गंगागढ़ में एक ही मकान में रहते है और
वही एक ही खाते पीते हैं। मैं घटना की बावत बोलता गया था और तहरीर बन्द्टी जलखता गया। तहरीर बन्द्टी जसंह ने जलखने के बाद मुझे पढ़कर सुनायी थी
जिर मैने तहरीर पर अपने हस्ताक्षर जकये थे। तहरीर मे बंटी जसंह ने वही जलखा था िो मैने बोला था।

यह कहना गलत है जक िब हम लोग सूचना पर अपनी बेटी ममता की ससुराल पह ंचे तो उस समय तक ममता िीजवत हो। यह भी कहना
गलत है जक ममता ने मुझे व मेरे अन्द्य पररवारी िन को मेरी छोटी बेटी चन्द्रवती की मौिूदगी में यह बताया हो जक "मुझे मेरी सास, ससुर, पजत व ननद ने
िबरन िहर जपला जदया है।" यह कहना भी कहना गलत है जक हम उपचार के जलये ममता को अलीगढ़ ले िा रहे थे तो रास्ते में अतरौली पर ममता ने दम
तोड़ जदया हो और ममता की मृत्यु हो गयी हो।

यह कहना भी गलत है जक जदनांक 30.7.19 को मेरी पुत्री ममता को अजतररक्त दहेि की मांग पूर्ण न होने के कारर् मुलजिमान तेिवीर
नानकराम, मुन्द्नी ने जमलकर एकराय मशवरा होकर ममता को िहर देकर मार जदया हो।

यह कहना भी गलत है जक मुलजिमान से जमलकर उन्द्हें बचाने के जलये आि मै झूठी गवाही दे रहा ह ं और सही बात को जछपा रहा ह ं।

मैने आि से पहले कहीं पर भी जकसी को भी या जकसी पुजलस अजिकारी को या जकसी प्रशासजनक अजिकारी को यह नही बताया जक मेरी
बेटी ममता की हत्या (िहर देकर) मुलजिमान तेिवीर, नानराम व मुन्द्नी देवी व रामा ने नही की । यह बात आि मै पहली बार कह रहा ह ं।

यह बात सही है जक अब हमारा इस मुकदमे के मुलजिमान तेिवीर आजद से िैसला हो गया है।

यह कहना सही है जक मुलजिमान से िैसला हो िाने के कारर् मुलजिमान के पक्ष में गवाही दे रहा ह ं।

यह बात सही है जक मृतका ममता के साथ घटना ससुराल में ह ई थी और मृत्यु रास्ते में ह ई थी।"

(emphasis by Court)

27. If we look to the cross-examination of this witness, his stand, in the early part of it, is
affirmative of his examination-in-chief that Mamta was already dead when the informant and other
members of his family reached there and that she did not die on way to Aligarh at Atrauli, while
being conveyed there for treatment. He has also affirmed the fact, in the earlier part of his crossexamination, that Mamta never told him that her mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and sisterin-law had forced her to consume poison. However, in the later part of his cross-examination, this
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
79
witness has clearly acknowledged the fact that it is correct to say that while the occurrence took
place at the house of the deceased's in-laws, she died on way. In the early part of his crossexamination, this witness has affirmed the fact that the FIR was scribed spontaneously by Banti
Singh on his dictation and that it bore his signatures. He has also acknowledged the fact that the
written information carries only those facts, which he had dictated to Banti Singh. The FIR clearly
says the fact that when the informant reached Mamta's place, she told him that her mother-in-law,
father-in-law, husband and sister-in-law had made her forcibly drink poison and that they rushed
her to hospital, but she died on way at Atrauli.

28. It is next to be noticed that this witness has clearly acknowledged in his cross-examination
that he had earlier, at no point of time, told any police or administrative officer that the appellants
had not poisoned the deceased. The clincher figures in the cross-examination, where this witness
acknowledges that he had spoken in his dock evidence exculpatory, because he had compromised
with the appellants.

29. It is not the law that a prosecution witness, who turns hostile, makes his evidence
nugatory. Even if a prosecution witness goes hostile, or for that matter, a defence witness, he/ she
retains his character as a prosecution or a defence witness. The character or orientation of a witness
never changes. Therefore, the testimony of a prosecution witness, who turns hostile, is not to be
rejected altogether or discounted from record. Rather, it can still be considered for such relevant
portions of it, as supports the prosecution, or may be in some measure, the defence too. After all,
the object of a trial, where the witnesses testify whether they remain faithful or turn hostile to the
side by whom they are called, is to determine the truth of it all and render justice as accurately as
can be.

30. All that the Court has to do, in a case where the witness has turned hostile, is to approach
his evidence with a certain degree of caution in the sense that before acting upon it, corroboration
must be sought from other evidence. This issue has been examined in profound detail by the
Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 958, where it has been held:

"18. When a witness, produced on behalf of prosecution, deposes against the prosecution
version and goes against his/her own previously recorded statements, the prosecution can request
the Court to declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission from the Court to cross-examine
its own witness. This is the procedure followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case, there
are as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses and it is also a fact that many of them have turned
hostile by turning against their earlier statements made before the police under section 161 CrPC,
and even before the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC, in some cases. This phenomenon is not
new, in fact it is sadly a common occurrence in our criminal Courts today, much to the despair and
frustration of the prosecution. This case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this, however, there are
witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-15 and PW-49, whose evidence,
in the form of their testimonies before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict the present
appellants. A word here about the evidentiary value of a so-called hostile witness.
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

19. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter 'Evidence Act') allows a party, with the
leave of the Court, to cross-examine its own witness. Section 154 of the Evidence Act originally
read as follows:

"154. Question by party to his own witness The Court may, in its discretion, permit the
person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by
the adverse party."

20. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal
259, while interpreting Section 154 of the Evidence Act, held that "When a witness who has been
called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution under the
provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence Act, the result of that course being permitted is to
discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony"

21. But this judgment in Khijiruddin was overruled by a five-Judge bench of the Calcutta
High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7. The High Court was
answering a reference from a Division Bench regarding the specific question of whether the
testimony of a witness, who was cross-examined by the party which produced him/her, should be
discarded totally, partially, or not discarded at all. Chief Justice Rankin, speaking for three other
Judges and himself, answered the reference in the following terms:

"24. In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt with under Section 154 of the Evidence
Act, even when under that Section he is "cross-examined" to credit, in no way warrants a direction
to the jury that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence, or that the party who
called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence. There is,
moreover, no rule of law that if a jury thinks that a witness has been discredited on one point they
may not give credit to him on another. The rule of law is that it is for the jury to say.

Of the seven questions stated by the Division Bench I propose that we should answer
four, viz.-

(3) whether the evidence of a witness treated as "hostile" must be rejected in whole or in
part;

(4) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of the party calling the witness;

(5) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of the opposite party.

These three questions I would answer in the negative.

(6) Whether the whole of the evidence so far as it affects both parties favourably or
unfavourably, must go to the jury for what it is worth.

25. To this question, I would be content to answer "yes",...."
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
81

22. Justice Buckland, in the above case, in his concurring opinion holds that there is no
law which states that the evidence of a witness, who has been cross-examined by its party, should
be entirely rejected. In his opinion, it is for the jury (or the Judge) to form an opinion regarding the
value of the testimony of such a witness.

23. All the same, later this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi), (1975) 3 SCC 562 held
to the contrary and approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Khijiruddin. This is what
was said in Jagir Singh by Justice Bhagwati:

"7. Now, it is apparent from the judgment of the High Court that the conviction of the
appellant rested entirely on the evidence of Pritam Singh (P.W. 10) and Sajjan Singh (P.W. 13).
Swaran Singh (P.W. 11) was also examined on behalf of the prosecution but his evidence is of no
help to the prosecution because he went back on the story of the prosecution and was permitted to
be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution. It is now well settled that when a witness, who has
been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid of
a part of his testimony. See Khijiruddin v. Emperor....."

24. However, it is to be noted that Jagir Singh does not refer to the five-Judge Bench
decision of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar.

25. But then in a subsequent decision (of which Justice Bhagwati was also a part) i.e., Sat
Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727, it was held differently. Justice Sarkaria, speaking
for the Bench, clarified the earlier judgment in Jagir Singh, and held that what has been held in
Jagir Singh would only be applicable where a witness through cross-examination by the party
which calls it, is totally discredited. It is only in such a situation that the Court, as matter of
prudence, discards his/her evidence in its entirety.

26. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness who has been cross-examined by the
party which produced him/her will not stand totally discredited, and it is for the Court to consider
what value should be attached to this testimony. After referring to a series of judgments on this
point, the Court in Sat Paul held as follows:

"52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution
when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling
him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for
the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and
contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part
of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been
completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole,
with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his
testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the
testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
discredited, the Judge should, as matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.
82 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

53. It was in the context of such a case, where, as a result of the cross-examination by the
Public, Prosecutor, the prosecution witness concerned stood discredited altogether, that this Court
in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) with the aforesaid rule of caution " which is not to be treated
as a rule of law " in mind, said that the evidence of such a witness is to be rejected en bloc."

(Emphasis Provided)

27. An examination of the cases referred above shows that there can be no doubt about the fact
that the evidence of a witness, who has been cross-examined by the side which produced him/her,
cannot be totally discarded [Also see : Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731].

28. It may also be worthwhile to mention here that by the Criminal Law Amendment Act
of 2005, sub-section 2 was added to section 154 of the Evidence Act. The amended section 154 of
the Evidence Act now reads as under:

154. Question by party to his own witness. - (1) The Court may, in its discretion, permit
the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination
by the adverse party.

(2) Nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so permitted under sub-section (1),
to rely on any part of the evidence of such witness.

(Emphasis Provided)

29. By way of the above amendment, the position which had been reiterated by this Court
has now come in the statute itself.

30. The word "hostile" or "hostile witness" has not been used anywhere in the Evidence
Act. The logic behind this exclusion seems to be that the declaration of witness as "hostile witness"
carries a specific significance under the English law, from where this term has been derived, where
liberty is only granted to a side to cross-examine its own witness when such declaration of
"hostility" is made. The position in India is different and here it is left to the discretion of the Court
to allow a party to cross-examine its own witness, regardless of a declaration of "hostility". This
has been explained by this Court in Sat Paul:

"38. To steer clear of the controversy over the meaning of the terms "hostile" witness,
"adverse" witness, "unfavourable" witness which had given rise to considerable difficulty and
conflict of opinion in England, the authors of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 seem to have
advisedly avoided the use of any of those terms so that, in India, the grant of permission to crossexamine his own witness by a party is not conditional on the witness being declared "adverse" or
"hostile". Whether it be the grant of permission under Section 142 to put leading questions, or the
leave under Section 154 to ask questions which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse
party, the Indian Evidence Act leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the court (see the
observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Baikuntha Nath v. Prasannamoyi, [AIR 1922 PC 409 : 72
IC 286]). The discretion conferred by Section 154 on the court is unqualified and untrammelled and
1 All. Tejveer Vs. State of U.P.
83
is apart from any question of "hostility". It is to be liberally exercised whenever the court from the
witnesses demeanour, temper, attitude, bearing, or the tenor and tendency of his answers, or from a
perusal of his previous inconsistent statement, or otherwise, thinks that the grant of such permission
is expedient to extract the truth and to do justice. The grant of such permission does not amount to
an adjudication by the court as to the veracity of the witness. Therefore, in the order granting such
permission, it is preferable to avoid the use of such expressions, such as 'declared hostile', 'declared
unfavourable', the significance of which is still not free from the historical cobwebs which, in their
wake bring a misleading legacy of confusion, and conflict that had so long vexed the English
Courts."

(Emphasis Provided)

31. The phrase "hostile witness" is commonly used in criminal jurisprudence and court
proceedings. We too cannot escape the blame of using the term "hostile witness" in our judgment.
We do it for pragmatic reasons. Some words like "hostile witness" in this case are now a part of our
legal vocabulary. There is no point in inventing or substituting new words or phrases, at least in the
present case, and we leave that for the future. But what is necessary, however, is to explain the
meaning of the term as it is now to be understood. The phrase "hostile witness" has come to be
used for a witness who gives a statement contrary to the story of the side for which he/she is a
witness. All the same, because a witness has supported some, though not all, aspects of a case, it
would not automatically mean that this witness has to be declared "hostile". A party can crossexamine its own witness under Section 154 Evidence Act, even without getting a declaration of
"hostility". The only restriction to cross-examination under Section 154 Evidence Act is that the
party, who seeks to cross-examine its own witness, must obtain the leave of the Court. Whether
there is a declaration of "hostility" or not, one thing is clear that evidence of witness, who has been
cross-examined under Section 154 Evidence Act by the party who called such witness, cannot be
washed off entirely and it is for the Court to see what can be retrieved from such evidence.

32. This can be understood from another aspect.