# The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P. Lucknow Revisionist v. S/s D.I.C. India Ltd

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 133
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-01-24
- **Case number:** Commercial Tax Revision No. 36 of 2021
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/the-commissioner-commercial-tax-u-p-lucknow-revisionist-v-s-s-d-i-c-india-ltd-51350
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008
- Definition of Capital Goods - The
revisionist challenged the Tribunal's order dated
27.11.2019, which classified "Cello" (a container
used for storing ink) as capital goods under
Section 2(f) of the Act for assessment years
2011-12 and 2012-13 - Held, the Tribunal's
finding that the Cello is an integral part of the
manufacturing process, as it is fitted to the
machinery
for
storing
manufactured
ink,
qualifies it as a storage tank under Section
2(f)(iii), and its movable nature or use in supply
does not exclude it from being capital goods.
(Paras 4, 5, 7, 13)

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction Under
Section 58 - The revisionist argued that the
Cello is merely a transport container, not part of
plant and machinery - Held, the High Court's
revisional jurisdiction under Section 58 of the
Act is Ltd. to questions of law, jurisdictional
errors, or procedural irregularities, and it cannot
reappreciate factual findings unless they are
perverse or lack evidence, as per Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs Dilbahar Singh -
The Tribunal's factual determination that the
Cello is integral to manufacturing was not
perverse, precluding interference. (Paras 8, 9,
10, 11, 12)

Interpretation of "Capital Goods" Under
Section 2(f) - The revisionist contended that
the Cello, being a movable apparatus used for
supply, does not fall within the definition of
capital goods - Held, Section 2(f) includes
storage tanks used in manufacturing, and the
Tribunal's finding that the Cello is fitted to
machinery for storing ink during production
aligns
with
this
definition,
supported
by
Commissioner of Commercial Tax Vs Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and J.K. Cotton SPG & WVG Mills
Co. Ltd. Vs Sales Tax Officer, which emphasize
apparatus integral to manufacturing. (Paras 4,
5, 6, 13)

Factual Findings of Tribunal - Binding
Nature - The Tribunal found that the Cello is
automatically fitted to the machinery, collects
ink during production, and is reused after being
returned by customers - Held, as the last factfinding authority, the Tribunal's findings are
binding unless perverse or unsupported by
evidence, and the evidence supported the
conclusion that the Cello is a storage device
integral to the manufacturing process, not
merely a transport container. (Paras 7, 8, 12,
13)

Dismissal of Revision - No Error of Law -
The revisionist failed to demonstrate any legal
error, perversity, or jurisdictional excess in the
Tribunal's
order
-
Held,
the
Tribunal's
classification of the Cello as capital goods under
134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 2(f) was consistent with the statutory
definition and judicial precedents, and no
compelling grounds existed to disturb the
Tribunal's decision, leading to the dismissal of
the revisions. (Paras 12, 13, 14)

Revisions Dismissed - Tribunal's Order
Dated 27.11.2019 Upheld.

List of Cases Cited:

## Text

2 All. The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P. Lucknow Vs. S/s D.I.C. India Ltd.
133
detention
of
the
petitioner
herein
subsequent to the expiry of three months
from
30.01.2023
is
illegal
and
all
subsequent orders extending the detention
of the petitioner herein are illegal and not
in accordance with law. Therefore, all
further orders extending period of detention
of the petitioner herein are hereby quashed
and set-aside.

14.

We,
therefore,
direct
the
petitioner, Sri Sunil Chachuda (the detenue)
to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is
required in any other case.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 133
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Commercial Tax Revision No. 36 of 2021
With
Sales/Trade Tax Revision No. 54 of 2021

The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P.
Lucknow ...Revisionist
Versus
S/s D.I.C. India Ltd. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Bipin Kumar Pandey (Addl. C.S.C.)

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
Sri Atul Gupta

Civil Law - U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008
- Definition of Capital Goods - The
revisionist challenged the Tribunal's order dated
27.11.2019, which classified "Cello" (a container
used for storing ink) as capital goods under
Section 2(f) of the Act for assessment years
2011-12 and 2012-13 - Held, the Tribunal's
finding that the Cello is an integral part of the
manufacturing process, as it is fitted to the
machinery
for
storing
manufactured
ink,
qualifies it as a storage tank under Section
2(f)(iii), and its movable nature or use in supply
does not exclude it from being capital goods.
(Paras 4, 5, 7, 13)

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction Under
Section 58 - The revisionist argued that the
Cello is merely a transport container, not part of
plant and machinery - Held, the High Court's
revisional jurisdiction under Section 58 of the
Act is Ltd. to questions of law, jurisdictional
errors, or procedural irregularities, and it cannot
reappreciate factual findings unless they are
perverse or lack evidence, as per Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs Dilbahar Singh -
The Tribunal's factual determination that the
Cello is integral to manufacturing was not
perverse, precluding interference. (Paras 8, 9,
10, 11, 12)

Interpretation of "Capital Goods" Under
Section 2(f) - The revisionist contended that
the Cello, being a movable apparatus used for
supply, does not fall within the definition of
capital goods - Held, Section 2(f) includes
storage tanks used in manufacturing, and the
Tribunal's finding that the Cello is fitted to
machinery for storing ink during production
aligns
with
this
definition,
supported
by
Commissioner of Commercial Tax Vs Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and J.K. Cotton SPG & WVG Mills
Co. Ltd. Vs Sales Tax Officer, which emphasize
apparatus integral to manufacturing. (Paras 4,
5, 6, 13)

Factual Findings of Tribunal - Binding
Nature - The Tribunal found that the Cello is
automatically fitted to the machinery, collects
ink during production, and is reused after being
returned by customers - Held, as the last factfinding authority, the Tribunal's findings are
binding unless perverse or unsupported by
evidence, and the evidence supported the
conclusion that the Cello is a storage device
integral to the manufacturing process, not
merely a transport container. (Paras 7, 8, 12,
13)

Dismissal of Revision - No Error of Law -
The revisionist failed to demonstrate any legal
error, perversity, or jurisdictional excess in the
Tribunal's
order
-
Held,
the
Tribunal's
classification of the Cello as capital goods under
134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 2(f) was consistent with the statutory
definition and judicial precedents, and no
compelling grounds existed to disturb the
Tribunal's decision, leading to the dismissal of
the revisions. (Paras 12, 13, 14)

Revisions Dismissed - Tribunal's Order
Dated 27.11.2019 Upheld.

List of Cases Cited:

1. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Lucknow
Vs Ambuja Cement Ltd., 2018 (8) GSTL 161
(All)

2. J.K. Cotton SPG & WVG Mills Co. Ltd. Vs Sales
Tax Officer, Kanpur, 1997 (91) E.L.Y. 34 (S.C.)

3. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs
Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. Heard Sri Bipin Kumar Pandey,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
for the revisionist and Sri Atul Gupta,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent/assessee.

2. Present revisions are in relation to
the assessment years 2011-12 and 2012-13
against the order dated November 27, 2019
passed by the Tribunal.

3. Both the revisions were admitted
by this Court on the following question of
law:

"Whether the cello used by the
assessee were capital goods or merely
usable containers used for sale of the ink
manufactured by the assessee ?"

4. Sri Bipin Kumar Pandey, learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the revisionist has
taken the Court through the entire order
passed by the Tribunal. He submitted that
the definition of "capital goods" as per
Section 2(f) of the Uttar Pradesh Value
Added Tax Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Act".) means any plant and
machinery as also apparatus, tool and
appliances used for "manufacture or
processing of any goods". He has submitted
that even though storage tank is included in
the said definition in clause (iii) of Section
2(f) of the Act, however the Cello in
question is not a fixed part of the plant and
machinery and is an apparatus used for
supply of the ink, that is already
manufactured, to the customers. Once a
customer uses the said ink, the Cello is
returned to the factory and is once again
attached to the plant that fills the cello
again. He has further submitted that one
would see that certain goods have been
excluded specifically from the definition in
Section 2(f) of the Act such as vehicles
used
for
transporting
the
goods
or
passengers or both. It is his submission that
the Cello is an apparatus used only for
transporting and cannot be treated as a part
of plant and machinery.

5. Per contra, Sri Atul Gupta, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the
assessee/respondent has submitted that the
Tribunal has come to a particular fact
finding that the Cello is an intricate part of
the
manufacturing
process
which
is
attached to the machinery wherein the
manufactured ink is directly stored. He has
further submitted that the Cello being
moveable in nature will not prevent it for
being treated as capital goods. Reliance is
placed on Commissioner of Commercial
Tax, Lucknow v. Ambuja Cement Limited,
reported in 2018 (8) GSTL 161 (All) is
relied upon by him. He has further relied
upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in
J.K. Cotton SPG & WVG Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur reported in 1997
2 All. The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P. Lucknow Vs. S/s D.I.C. India Ltd.
135
(91) E.L.Y. 34 (S.C.) to emphasise that if a
particular apparatus is an integral part
relating to manufacture of goods without
which
that
process
or
activity
of
manufacture would not be possible, it
should be treated as an apparatus that is "in
connection with" manufacture, or "in
relation to" manufacture.

Analysis and Conclusion

6. Before delving into the controversy
in the instant case, I feel it is important to
extract Section 2(f) of the Act herein:

"2. Definitions

In this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or
context;

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) ...

(d) ...

(e) ...

(f) "capital goods" means any
plant, machine, machinery, equipment,
apparatus, tool, appliance or electrical
installation used for manufacture or
processing of any goods for sale by the
dealer and includes:-

(i) components, spare parts and
accessories
of
such
plant,
machine,
machinery, equipment, apparatus, tool,
appliance or electrical installation;

(ii) moulds and dies;

(iii) storage tank;

(iv) pollution control equipment;

(v) refractory and refractory
materials;

(vi) tubes and pipes and fittings
thereof,

(vii) lab equipments, instruments
and accessories,

(viii)
machinery,
loader,
equipment for lifting or moving goods
within factory premises, or

(ix) generator and boiler used in
manufacture of goods for sale by him but
for the purpose of section 13, does not
include:-

(i) air-conditioning units or air
conditioners, refrigerators, air coolers,
fans, and air circulators if not connected
with manufacturing process;

(ii)
an automobile
including
commercial vehicles, and two or three
wheelers, and parts, components and
accessories for repair and maintenance
thereof;

(iii)
goods
purchased
and
accounted for in business but utilised for
the purpose of providing facility to the
employees.

(iv) vehicle used for transporting
goods or passengers or both; and (v)
capital goods used in the execution of a
works contract"

7. The finding of the Tribunal in the
instant case is also extracted below:-

"...करदाता
द्वारा
संगत
वर्ष
में
रू0
7522903.00 के खरीदे गये सीलो वे गुड्स है जो प्रिप्र्टंग इंक
प्रिमाषण िप्रकया का एक अप्रि्ि अंग है जो एक पाट्षस के रूप में
मशीि में स्वतः प्रिट हो जाता है और प्रिप्रमषत हो रही इंक इसमें एकत्र
होती है इसके प्रिल हो जािे पर यह स्वतः अलग हो जाता है और
इसके स्थाि पर अगला दूसरा सीलो स्वतः प्रिट हो जाता है यह
िप्रिया इंक प्रिमाषण के दौराि प्रिरंतर आटोमोप्रटक होती रहती है। इंक
प्रिल्ड सीलो िेता के प्रिप्र्टग पलांट में एक पाटष के रूप में प्रिट हो
जाती है। इंक क््यूम होिे के उपरा्त ए्टी सीलो वापस करदाता के
व्यापार स्थल पर पुिः प्रिप्रलंग हेतु आ जाता है और पला्ट एण्ड
मशीिरी के एक िाग के रूप में पुिः ियोग होता है। कर प्रिर्ाषरण
अप्रर्कारी द्वारा उक्त वस्तु को केवल प्रिप्र्टगं इंक को लािे ले जािे
का सार्ि मािते हुए जो मत आर आई टी सी करिे हेतु प्रलया गया
है वह उप्रित िहीं है क्योंप्रक वैट अप्रर्प्रियम के अ्तगषत जो कैप्रपटल
गुड्स की पररिार्ा दी गई है उस में पूजीगत माल का तात्पयष
व्यवहारी द्वारा प्रविय के प्रलए प्रकसी माल के प्रवप्रिमाषण यह
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
िसंस्करण में ियुक्त प्रकसी संयत्र मशीि, मशीिरी, उपस्करों, यंत्रों,
औजारों, सार्िो, प्रवद्युत व्यवस्थापि प्रजसमें िण्डारण टंकी
सप्रममप्रलत है से है। प्रिवाप्रदत वस्तु सीलो प्रिप्रवषवाप्रदत रूप से इंक के
प्रवप्रिमाषण में ितौर पाटष आि पलांट एडं मशीिरी ियोग में लायी
जाती है जो यथा पररिाप्रर्त पूजीगत माल है।..."

8. It is well settled that the Tribunal is
the last fact finding body and that this
Court in revision would not go into an
enquiry with regard to the factual aspects
that have been decided by the Tribunal. In
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High
Court has a limited mandate. The scope of
revisional
jurisdictional,
is
primarily
focused on questions of law, jurisdictional
errors, or procedural irregularities. The
High Court in a revision petition must
refrain from engaging in a de novo inquiry
into factual matters already adjudicated
upon by the Tribunal, unless compelling
grounds warranting such intervention are
made.

9. The limited revisional jurisdiction
under the Act is confined to only the
questions of law, and not the questions of
fact. Section 58 of the Act has been
extracted below:

58. Revision by High Court in
special cases.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by an
order made under sub-section (7) or subsection (8) of Section 57, other than an
order under sub-section (4) of that section
summarily disposing of the appeal, may,
within ninety days from the date of service
of such order, apply to the High Court for
revision of such order on the ground that
the case involves any question of law.

(2) The application for revision
under sub-section (1) shall precisely state
the question of law involved in the case,
and it shall be competent for the High
Court to formulate the question of law or to
allow any other question of law to be
raised.

(3) Where an application under
this section is pending, the High Court may,
on an application in this behalf, stay
recovery of any disputed amount of tax, fee
or penalty payable, or refund of any
amount due under the order sought to be
revised:

Provided that no order for stay or
recovery of such disputed amount shall
remain in force for more than thirty days
unless the applicant furnishes adequate
security to the satisfaction of the Assessing
Authority concerned.

(4) The High Court shall, after
hearing the parties to revision, decide the
question, of law involved therein, and
where as a result of such decision, the
amount of tax, fee or penalty is required to
be determined afresh, the High Court may
send a copy of the decision to the Tribunal
for fresh determination of the amount, and
the Tribunal shall thereupon pass such
orders as are necessary to dispose of the
case in conformity with the said decision.

(5) All applications for revision of
orders passed under Section 57 in appeals
arising out of the same cause of action in
respect of an assessment year shall be
heard and decided together:

Provided that where any one or
more of such applications have been heard
and decided earlier, if the High Court,
while hearing the remaining applications,
considers that the earlier decision may be a
legal impediment in giving relief in such
remaining applications, it may recall such
earlier decision and may thereafter proceed
to hear and decide all the applications
together.

(6) The provisions of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, shall mutatis
2 All. The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P. Lucknow Vs. S/s D.I.C. India Ltd.
137
mutandis, apply to every application, for
revision under this section.

Explanation.-For the purpose of
this section, the expression "any person"
includes the Commissioner and the State
Government."

10. This Court is not allowed in a
revision petition to reappreciate and/or reexamine and analyse evidence and findings
of the Tribunal.

11. A Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limtied v. Dilbahar Singh,
reported in (2014) 9 SCC 78, expounded on
the
scope
of
revisional
jurisdiction.
Relevant paragraphs have been extracted
below:

"31. We are in full agreement
with the view expressed in Sri Raja
Lakshmi Dyeing Works [Sri Raja Lakshmi
Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar,
(1980) 4 SCC 259] that where both
expressions "appeal" and "revision" are
employed in a statute, obviously, the
expression "revision" is meant to convey
the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction
than that conveyed by the expression
"appeal". The use of two expressions
"appeal" and "revision" when used in one
statute conferring appellate power and
revisional power, we think, is not without
purpose
and
significance.
Ordinarily,
appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing
while it is not so in the case of revisional
jurisdiction when the same statute provides
the remedy by way of an "appeal" and so
also of a "revision". If that were so, the
revisional power would become coextensive
with that of the trial court or the
subordinate tribunal which is never the
case. The classic statement in Dattonpant
[Dattonpant
Gopalvarao
Devakate
v.
Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2
SCC 246] that revisional power under the
Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as
the revisional power under Section 115 of
the Code but, at the same time, it is not
wide enough to make the High Court a
second court of first appeal, commends to
us and we approve the same. We are of the
view that in the garb of revisional
jurisdiction under the above three rent
control statutes, the High Court is not
conferred a status of second court of first
appeal and the High Court should not
enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction
to that extent.

32. Insofar as the three-Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Ram Dass
[Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3
SCC 131] is concerned, it rightly observes
that revisional power is subject to wellknown limitations inherent in all the
revisional jurisdictions and the matter
essentially turns on the language of the
statute investing the jurisdiction. We do not
think that there can ever be objection to the
above statement. The controversy centres
round the following observation in Ram
Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)
3 SCC 131] , "... that jurisdiction enables
the court of revision, in appropriate cases,
to examine the correctness of the findings
of facts also...." It is suggested that by
observing so, the three-Judge Bench in
Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander,
(1988) 3 SCC 131] has enabled the High
Court to interfere with the findings of fact
by reappreciating the evidence. We do not
think that the three-Judge Bench has gone
to that extent in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v.
Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] . The
observation in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v.
Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] that as
the expression used conferring revisional
jurisdiction is "legality and propriety", the
High
Court
has
wider
jurisdiction
138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
obviously means that the power of revision
vested in the High Court in the statute is
wider than the power conferred on it under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
it is not confined to the jurisdictional error
alone. However, in dealing with the
findings of fact, the examination of findings
of fact by the High Court is limited to
satisfy itself that the decision is "according
to law". This is expressly stated in Ram
Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)
3 SCC 131] . Whether or not a finding of
fact
recorded
by
the
subordinate
court/tribunal is according to law, is
required to be seen on the touchstone
whether such finding of fact is based on
some legal evidence or it suffers from any
illegality like misreading of the evidence or
overlooking and ignoring the material
evidence
altogether
or
suffers
from
perversity or any such illegality or such
finding has resulted in gross miscarriage of
justice. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not lay
down as a proposition of law that the
revisional power of the High Court under
the Rent Control Act is as wide as that of
the appellate court or the appellate
authority or such power is coextensive with
that of the appellate authority or that the
concluded finding of fact recorded by the
original
authority
or
the
appellate
authority can be interfered with by the High
Court by reappreciating evidence because
Revisional
Court/authority
is
not
in
agreement with the finding of fact recorded
by the court/authority below. Ram Dass
[Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3
SCC 131] does not exposit that the
revisional power conferred upon the High
Court is as wide as an appellate power to
reappraise or reassess the evidence for
coming to a different finding contrary to the
finding recorded by the court/authority
below. Rather, it emphasises that while
examining the correctness of findings of
fact, the Revisional Court is not the second
court of first appeal. Ram Dass [Ram Dass
v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does
not cross the limits of Revisional Court as
explained
in
Dattonpant
[Dattonpant
Gopalvarao
Devakate
v.
Vithalrao
Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2 SCC 246]
."

12. There is a presumption of finality
attached to judgments and orders passed by
Appellate Authorities and the High Courts
should not lightly disturb such judgments
unless there are compelling reasons to do
so. Revisional jurisdiction is not intended
to be a mechanism for relitigating cases or
reopening settled matters. High Courts
cannot ordinarily interfere with factual
findings arrived at by lower courts or
tribunals unless such findings are perverse,
based on no evidence, or suffer from a
manifest
error
of
law.
Revisional
jurisdiction does not empower High Courts
to revaluate factual evidence or substitute
their own findings for those of the lower
courts or tribunals. Revisional jurisdiction
is aimed at correcting jurisdictional errors
and excesses of law.

13. Upon a plain reading of what has
been written by the Tribunal, it appears that
Cello is an apparatus that is fitted to the
plant and machinery where the final
product is stored, and once the Cello is
filled up, the same is removed from the
plant and machinery and it is replaced with
another Cello. The fact that the Cello is
directly
sent
to
the
customers
for
consumption would not take away from the
fact that it is used as a storage device for
the manufactured ink. Mere fact that the
Cello is a moveable apparatus that is sent to
the customers, would not take away from
the fact that it is only a storage tank in the
2 All. M/s Southern Petrochemical Industries Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Commercial Tax,
 U.P., Vibhuti Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow
139
factory. This by itself makes it an essential
part of the manufacturing process and
would qualify it under Section 2(f)(iii) of
the Act.

14. In light of the aforesaid findings, I
find no justification to intervene in the
decision made by the Tribunal. As a result,
both
the
revisions
are,
accordingly,
dismissed.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 139
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Sales/ Trade Tax Revision No. 38 of 2023
Connected with
Sales/Trade Tax Revision No. 39 of 2023
and other connected cases

M/s Southern Petrochemical Industries
Ltd. ...Revisionist
Versus
The Commissioner of Commercial Tax,
U.P., Vibhuti Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow
 ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Ritwick Rai, Alok Kumar Singh, Aviral Raj
Singh,
Dhruv
Kumar
Singh,
Palash
Banerjee, Vaibhav Tiwari

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
C.S.C.

Sales Tax - U.P. Value Added Tax Rules,
2008 - Rule 63(5) - Principles of Natural
Justice - Revisionist challenged Commercial Tax
Tribunal's order dated 08.12.2016 dismissing
second appeals for assessment years 2004-05 to
2008-09 and 2010-11, and orders dated
04.11.2022
rejecting
recall/rectification
applications - Held, Tribunal's order lacked
reasoning, violating Rule 63(5) requiring written
judgment with points of determination, decision,
and reasons - Non-recording of reasons contravenes
natural justice, rendering order unsustainable -
Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Vs Howrah
Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Chandana Impex Pvt.
Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Customs followed - Tribunal
failed to consider assessee's explanation for nonappearance - Impugned orders set aside, matter
remanded for fresh determination within three
months with opportunity to parties - Questions on
inter-St. sale exemption and penalty not addressed
due to remand. (Para 15-27)

Revisions allowed, matter remanded.

List of Cases Cited:

1. Mamta Steel India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Commissioner
of C.Ex., Allahabad; 2019 (368) E.L.T. 529 (All.)

2. Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Vs
Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity; JT 2010(2)
SC 566

3. Chandana Impex Pvt. Ltd. Vs Commissioner
of Customs, New Delhi; 2011 (269) E.L.T. 433
(S.C.)

4. St. of Orissa Vs Dhaniram Luhar; JT 2004(2)
SC 172

5. St. of Raj.n Vs Sohan Lal; (2004) 5 SCC 573

6. Raj Kishore Jha Vs St. of Bihar; AIR 2003 SC
4664

7. Vishnu Dev Sharma Vs St. of U.P.; (2008) 3
SCC 172

8. Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs Sales Tax
Officer, Rourkela I Circle; (2008) 9 SCC 407

9. St. of Uttaranchal Vs Sunil Kumar Singh Negi;
AIR 2008 SC 2026

10. U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs Jagdish Prasad Gupta; AIR
2009 SC 2328

11. Ram Phal Vs St. of Har.; (2009) 3 SCC 258

12. Mohammed Yusuf Vs Faij Mohammad;
(2009) 3 SCC 513