# The Committee of Management, Meerut & Anr v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 9 ILRA 834
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-16
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 13576 of 2023
- **Bench:** Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/the-committee-of-management-meerut-anr-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-50770
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Societies Registration Act,
1860 - Sections 23 , 2 & 25(1) - Petitioner
challenges order dated 05.04.2023, by
which
Respondent
no.
3
appointed
Divisional Director as Administrator to
manage its affairs until fresh elections and
also order dated 09.09.2022, by which
Respondent no. 4 under Section 25(2) of
Act, 1860, dissolved petitioner's executive
body, directed fresh elections - Under
Section 25(2) of Act, 1860, any action like
removing office bearer or setting aside
election must be based on order under
Section 25(1) - Respondents cannot act
unilaterally - No proceedings initiated or
order passed under Section 25(1) - If
allegations
regarding
immovable
property exist, Clause 38 of Bye-laws
requires
Commission
to
refer
such
matters to parent Society or Registrar
for action, not to act directly against
petitioners - Bye-laws do not permit
Deputy Registrar to directly remove
elected body or order fresh elections
under Section 25(2) - Registrar could
proceed under Sections 23 or 24 for
audit or mismanagement - Since no such
proceedings held and no order under
Section 25(1) passed, Deputy Registrar
had
no
jurisdiction
-
Order
dated
09.09.2022 is without authority - No
provision
in
Bye-laws
that
allows
appointment of Administrator - Clause
38 does not give authority - Appointing
Divisional Director as Administrator has
no legal basis, quashed. (Para 2, 23, 24,
25, 26)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

834 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
some time because the borrowers are
negotiating with the bank in the light of
interim order dated 26-3-2015 of the
Tribunal, delay in depositing 75% of the
bid amount by four days in no manner
would frustrate the rights of the parties
inter se, more so, when the conduct of the
borrowers in getting extension orders on
two different occasions and still not
depositing Rs 6 lakhs in terms of the order
of the Tribunal would clearly reflect that
the intention of the borrowers was only to
frustrate the auction-sale by one reason or
the other, which they could not succeed."

(Emphasis supplied)

35. The outcome of above discussion
is that impugned order dated 19.11.2013
passed by DRAT is erroneous and
therefore, is liable to be set-aside, hence,
set-aside.

36. The writ petition is allowed.
Legal consequence thereof shall follow
forthwith.
----------
(2023) 9 ILRA 834
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ-C No. 13576 of 2023

The Committee of Management, Meerut &
Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Shiivendu Ojha, Sri Shiv Prakash Gupta,
Sri Radha Kant Ojha (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Abhishek Pandey, Sri Rajiv
Sharma

Civil Law - Societies Registration Act,
1860 - Sections 23 , 2 & 25(1) - Petitioner
challenges order dated 05.04.2023, by
which
Respondent
no.
3
appointed
Divisional Director as Administrator to
manage its affairs until fresh elections and
also order dated 09.09.2022, by which
Respondent no. 4 under Section 25(2) of
Act, 1860, dissolved petitioner's executive
body, directed fresh elections - Under
Section 25(2) of Act, 1860, any action like
removing office bearer or setting aside
election must be based on order under
Section 25(1) - Respondents cannot act
unilaterally - No proceedings initiated or
order passed under Section 25(1) - If
allegations
regarding
immovable
property exist, Clause 38 of Bye-laws
requires
Commission
to
refer
such
matters to parent Society or Registrar
for action, not to act directly against
petitioners - Bye-laws do not permit
Deputy Registrar to directly remove
elected body or order fresh elections
under Section 25(2) - Registrar could
proceed under Sections 23 or 24 for
audit or mismanagement - Since no such
proceedings held and no order under
Section 25(1) passed, Deputy Registrar
had
no
jurisdiction
-
Order
dated
09.09.2022 is without authority - No
provision
in
Bye-laws
that
allows
appointment of Administrator - Clause
38 does not give authority - Appointing
Divisional Director as Administrator has
no legal basis, quashed. (Para 2, 23, 24,
25, 26)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs
M/s Price Waterhouse & anr., AIR 1998 SC 74

2. Crawford Vs Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1

3. St. of Gujarat & ors. Vs Dilipbhai Nathjibhai
Patel & anr. JT 1998 (2) SC 253
9 All. The Committee of Management, Meerut & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
835
4. Stock Vs Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., 1978 (1)
All ER 948 (HL)

5. Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. Vs Evans,
(1910) AC 445 (HL)

6. Jamma Masjid, Mercara Vs Kodimaniandra
Deviah & ors., AIR 1962 SC 847

7. Lenigh Valley Coal Co. Vs Yensavage, 218 FR 547

8. U.O.I.& ors. Vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem
Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981

9. D.R. Venkatchalam & ors. etc. Vs Dy.
Transport Commissioner & ors. Etc., AIR 1977
SC 842

10. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Vs Popular
Trading Company, Ujjain, 2000 (5) SCC 515

11. Grey Vs Pearson 6 H.L. Case 61

12. Abley Vs Dale 11, C.B. 378

13. The Central India Spinning and Weaving
Manufacturing
Comp.
Vs
The
Municipal
Committee, Wardha AIR 1958 SC 341

14. Girdhari Lal & Sons Vs Balbir Nath Mathur,
1986(2) SCC 237

15. Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. Vs St.
of Orissa, 1987 (3) SCC 279

(Delivered by Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

1. Heard Shri Radha Kant Ojha, learned
Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Shiv Prakash
Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners,
learned Standing Counsel for the Staterespondent Nos. 1 and 4, Shri Rajiv Sharma,
learned counsel representing respondent Nos. 2
and 3 and Shri Abhishek Pandey, learned
counsel for the complainant in exercise of
power under Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 inasmuch as
the said complainant had filed caveat
application, but has not been impleaded as
respondent.

2. This writ petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 05.04.2023
whereby the Director, Khadi & Village
Industries Commission (respondent no.3)
has communicated the Divisional Director
that
the
Competent
Authority
has
authorized him to act as an Administrator
to take care of the day to day affairs of the
Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Meerut in
anticipation of the Commission's approval
till a new management is elected after
following due procedure, with a view to
safeguard the funds deployed by the Khadi
and Village Industries Commission (KVIC)
and also to protect the large number of
artisans and workers associated with Khadi
Industry. Another order under challenge is
dated 09.09.2022 whereby the Deputy
Registrar (respondent no.4) has dislodged
the executive body of the petitioner
Committee
of
Management
and
has
directed for holding of fresh elections in
purported exercise of powers under Section
25(2) of the Societies Registration Act,
1860.

3. As per the pleadings contained in
the writ petition, Kshetriya Shri Gandhi
Ashram, Garh Road, Meerut is a registered
Society under the Societies Registration
Act, 1860. Its parent body is Shri Gandhi
Ashram, Lucknow, as provided in Clause21 of the Bye-laws of the Society. It has
two types of members; one is trustee and
another is general member and at this
moment total 11 members are alive and
working, 4 are trustees and 7 are general
members. The Committee consists of (1)
three permanent trustees amongst the alive
trustees and (2) amongst the general
members for a period of 3 years, members
will be elected for the Committee of
Management. In Clause 6 of the Bye-laws,
it is provided that (1) out of the members of
the Committee of Management one will be
836 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
elected as Sabhapati (2) one or many
Secretary will be appointed and there are 4
working trustees and 7 general members of
the
Committee
of
Management.
A
procedure has also been provided for
enrollment/
election
of
the
general
members. As it is permanent body: (a)
trustees are permanent members of the
Committee and (b) amongst the total
elected members, 1/3rd members will retire
from the Committee. If Secretary/ President
of the Committee is retired or a vacancy
arises, then on the same post a person is
elected for remaining period of 3 years.
The present working President, namely,
Mr. Ram Naresh Singh was elected as
President in the month of August, 2021,
therefore, he will continue upto the month
of August, 2024. So far as the Secretary,
namely, Mr. Prithvi Singh Rawat is
concerned, he was elected as Secretary in
the month of July, 2020, therefore, new
election to the post of Secretary will be
held in the month of July, 2023. Similarly,
the general election of 1/3rd members of
the Committee will be held in the month of
July, 2023. Parent body i.e. Shri Gandhi
Ashram, Lucknow has directed to the
Khestriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Garh Road,
Meerut to lease out certain property in
favour of one Ranuka Ashiyana Private
Limited, Resident of 239 Asoda House
Western Kutchery Road, Meerut and on
this instructions, the Secretary, Kshetriya
Shri Gandhi Ashram, Garh Road, Meerut
has executed registered sale deed in favour
of Ranuka Ashiyana Private Limited,
Resident of 239 Asoda House Western
Kutchery
Road,
Meerut
on
rent
of
Rs.1,80,000/- and also advance money to a
sum of Rs.5 crore was given in favour of
parent body i.e. Shri Gandhi Ashram,
Lucknow and after aforesaid lease was
executed, certain complaints were made, on
which, the District Magistrate, Meerut has
conducted an enquiry and enquiry was duly
conducted
by
the
Additional
City
Magistrate (Civil Lines), Meerut who has
submitted its report on 29.09.2022 before
the District Magistrate, Meerut and in
which it was found that there is nothing
contrary in executing the aforesaid sale
deed.

4. The submission of Sri R.K. Ojha,
learned Senior Counsel is to the effect that
although execution of certain deeds was in
pursuance of the directions issued by the
parent body, by the orders impugned,
action
has
been
taken
against
the
petitioners which is not warranted in the
facts of the case. He has further argued that
in so far as dislodging the Committee under
the order dated 09.09.2022 and directing
holding of elections is concerned, the order
is without jurisdiction as none of the
exigencies contemplated under Section 25
ever existed in the present case. He further
submits that for the aforesaid reason, the
subsequent
order
dated
05.04.2023
appointing Administrator is also illegal and
is liable to be set aside.

5. A counter affidavit has been filed
by the contesting respondents stating
therein that the respondents no.2 and 3 are
the
officials
of
Khadi
and
Village
Industries
Commission
which
is
an
institution established by Government of
India under Act of Parliament with a view
to fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the
father of nation - late Mahatma Gandhi
about the upliftment of the poor in rural
and village areas through the promotion of
Khadi and Village Industries activities. The
programs of KVIC are implemented mainly
through societies and institutions registered
under Societies Registration Act. KVIC
provides all sorts of financial and other
supports to the societies and institutions for
9 All. The Committee of Management, Meerut & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
837
undertaking Khadi and Village Industries
activities
with
zero
interest,
besides
providing grants for creation of the
infrastructure. All those societies and
institutions which are financed by KVIC
either create equitable mortgage of their
properties in favour of KVIC or incorporate
a condition in their Bye-laws that they will
not dispose of their any immovable
properties
without
the
approval
and
permission of KVIC till the entire dues of
KVIC are repaid together with interest. It
has also been provided that if any society
or institution disposes of any of its
properties without the prior permission of
KVIC, the respondents no.2 and 3 have to
initiate legal proceedings both civil as well
as criminal against the office bearers of the
said society or institution. It has been
clearly provided in Clauses 37, 38 and 40
of the Bye-laws of the petitioner that so
long as the dues of KVIC are not repaid no
moveable or immoveable property of the
society will be transferred to anyone. The
society will be entitled to dispose of its
properties only when the entire dues of
KVIC are repaid and a clearance certificate
is obtained. It has further been provided
that if it comes in the notice of KVIC that
the office bearers of any society are not
working properly then KVIC will have
right to interfere in the working of the
society and it will refer the matter either to
the parent society or to the Registrar for
removal of such office bearers. In this case,
the total outstanding dues of the petitioners
as against KVIC as per the balance sheet of
2021-22
is
Rs.6,46,57,252.29.
An
information
was
received
that
the
petitioners are going to create a lease deed
of the property of the Society without the
permission
and
approval
of
the
Commission and this information was
brought to the notice of the respondent no.4
who was pleased to stay vide its order
dated 08.01.2021 the sale/ transfer of this
property until further orders. Despite all
this, the petitioners have executed the lease
deed of 3271.40 sq mtr land recorded at
Nagar Nigam, Khasra No.4674 situated at
Shri Gandhi Ashram, Gandhi Nagar, Garh
Road, Meerut in favour of M/s Renuka
Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. This lease deed was
executed by the petitioner without the
permission and approval of KVIC and as
such it is illegal, unjust and arbitrary on the
face of it. However, the respondent no.4
vide his letter 17.12.2021 was pleased to
set aside the lease deed in view of the
circular dated 26.10.2007 passed by KVIC.
The order dated 17.12.2021 passed by the
respondent no.4 was not challenged before
any court of law by the petitioners. As per
the certified copy of the registry of this
lease deed, it is clear that the land of the
petitioners is 18 biswa 3 biswansi (2745 sq
yards only) whereas the lease deed has
been signed for 3271.40 sq mtr (3912.59 sq
yard) which means excess land of 1167.50
sq yard has been given on lease to M/s
Renuka Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. The market
value of this excess land of 1167.59 sq yard
is Rs.7.59 crores as per the valuation report
of
adjoining
land/
property
of
the
petitioners bearing khasra No.4674 which
has clearly resulted loss to the Society on
account of the petitioners.

6. Various other allegations have been
levelled against the petitioners and, in sum
and substance, the contention of the
respondents is that the petitioners being
guilty
of
committing
financial
embezzlement and the officials of parent
and subsidiary bodies being in hand in
gloves and in collusion with each other and
transactions
of
immovable
properties
having been done contrary to the Bye-laws,
rightful decision has been taken in the
interest of Gandhi and Village Industries.
838 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. The arguments on the aforesaid
lines have been advanced by the learned
counsel for the respondents and in this
regard reference to Clauses 37, 38, 39 and
40 of the concerned Bye-laws has been
made, which read as follows:-

"37. यकद िारणवण संस्र्ा िी गकतकवकधयां पूणग या
आंकशि रूप से बंद हो जाती है और िमीशन िा देय फन्ड शेष रह
जाता है तो आयोग पहले संस्र्ा िी सिी अचल व चल सम्पकि पर
अपना प्रर्म िार रक्खेगा और संस्र्ा किसी िी प्रिार अपनी चल,
अचल सम्पकि िो तब ति किसी िी व्यकक्त या व्यकक्तयों या किसी
दूसरी एजेकन्सयों िो हस्तांतररत या बेच नहीं सिती जब ति कि
संस्र्ा द्वारा आयोग िी सिी देयतायें पूणगतया वापस नहीं िर दी
जाती और उसिो दूर नहीं िर कदया जाता।

38- यकद ििी आयोग िे नोकिस में ऐसी बातें
आती है कि संस्र्ा िा िायग सूचारू रूप से नहीं चल रहा है या
इसिा प्रबन्ध ठीि नहींंं है तो आयोग िो संस्र्ा िे िायग में
हस्तिेप िरने िा अकधिारी होगा व ऐसे िुप्रबन्धिीय मामले िे
उकचत समाधान हेतु मातृ संस्र्ा या रकजस्रार िे पास िेजने में
िमीशन सिम होगा व संस्र्ा िे ऐसे अकधिाररयों िो हिाने िे
कलए िहेगा, कजनिे रहने से संस्र्ा िे कहतों िो नुिसान पहुचता हो।

39- संस्र्ा द्वारा आयोग से ऋण व अनुदान िे रूप
में प्राप्त आकर्गि सहायता संस्र्ा द्वारा िेवल उसी उद्देश्य िे कलए
उपयोग में लाई जायेगी कजसिे कलए वह स्वीिृत िी गई है और इसे
किसी िी हालत में किसी दूसरे उद्देश्य िे कलए हस्तांतररत नहीं किया
जा सिता।

40- किसी मामले में यकद िमीशन िा िोई ऋण
बिाया है तो संस्र्ा अपनी चल-अचल सम्पकि िो बेचने िी तिी
पात्र होगी जब उसने िमीशन िे सिी ऋणों िो वापस िर कदया हो
और उसिे कलए आयोग से अकधिृत जानिारी या अकधिाररयों से
क्लीयरेन्स सकिगकफिेि ले कलया हो।"

8.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents has argued that certain FIRs
were registered against the office bearers of
the petitioners and despite the fact that a
final report was illegally submitted by the
investigating agency, the same has not been
approved so far by the court concerned.
Learned counsel for the respondents has
relied upon a Division Bench decision of
Lucknow Bench of this Court dated
13.05.2019
passed
in
Misc.
Bench
No.31167 of 2018 as well as order dated
22.09.2022 passed in Writ-C No.28763 of
2022 and it has been contended that once
on the ground of financial embezzlement
and misappropriation of properties, the
authorities of Gandhi and Village Industries
Commission took action of the identical
nature which they have taken in the present
case, no interference is warranted.

9. Having heard the learned counsel
for the parties, I find it appropriate to refer
the provisions under which the order
impugned dated 09.09.2022 has been
passed. As stated above, the Deputy
Registrar has directed holding of fresh
elections in purported exercise of powers
under Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860. The
said provision reads as follows:-

"25 (2) Where by an order made
under sub-section (1), an election is set
aside or an office-bearer is held no longer
entitled to continue in office or where the
Registrar is satisfied that any election of
office-bearers of a Society has not been
held within the time specified in the rules of
that Society, he may call a meeting of the
general body of such Society for electing
such office-bearer or office-bearers, and
such meeting shall be presided over and be
conducted by the Registrar or by any
officer authorised by him this behalf, and
the provisions in the rules of the Society
relating to meetings and elections shall
apply to such meeting and election with
necessary modifications."

10.

The
issue
that
falls
for
consideration by this Court is as to whether
the Deputy Registrar had power to dislodge
the existing Committee of Management and
9 All. The Committee of Management, Meerut & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
839
issue a direction for holding of fresh
elections in exercise of powers under
Section 25(2) of the Act.

11. Sri Ojha submits that an order
under sub-section (2) of Section 25 can be
passed only when by an order made under
sub-section (1), an election is set aside or
an office bearer is held no longer entitled to
continue in office or where the Registrar is
satisfied that any election of office bearers
of a Society has not been held within the
time specified in the Rules of that Society.
He submits that no order has been passed
under Section 25(1) of the Act to the
aforesaid effect and, therefore, the direction
for dislodging the existing Committee or
for holding of fresh elections is contrary to
law. He also submits that the consequential
order appointing Administrator is also
invalid in the facts of the case.

12. Per contra, the submission of
learned counsel for the respondents is that
for the reasons stated in the counter
affidavit and the arguments advanced, the
action has been taken by invoking Clauses
37 to 40 of the Bye-laws, as already quoted
in this judgment.

13. Sri Rajiv Sharma has vehemently
argued that though action under sub-section
(2) is dependent upon an order passed
under sub-section (1), however, that is not
the only contingency in law and action can
be taken even in absence of an order passed
under sub-section (1), where the Registrar
is otherwise satisfied to direct for holding
of elections and, in the present case, since
there are serious grounds for taking action
against the petitioners in the light of
concerned Bye-laws, which empower the
authorities to take over the management,
the consequential action for holding fresh
elections is according to law.

14. Since different interpretations in
relation to Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860
are being made by learned counsel for both
sides, this Court feels necessary to refer the
law settled by the Apex Court with regard
to interpretation of a Statute with reference
to the context.

15. Words and phrases are symbols
that
stimulate
mental
references
to
referents. The object of interpreting a
statute or any statutory provision is to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature or
the Authority enacting it. (See Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s
Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR 1998 SC
74). The intention of the maker is primarily
to be gathered from the language used,
which means that attention should be paid
to what has been said as also to what has
not been said. As a consequence, a
construction which requires for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words as meaningless
has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford
v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1, Courts,
cannot aid the Legislatures, defective
phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend,
and by construction make up deficiencies
which are left there. (Also See State of
Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai
Patel and Anr,. JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is
contrary to all rules of construction to read
words into an Act unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank
Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., 1978 (1) All ER 948
(HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit
Courts to do so, unless the provision as it
stands is meaningless or of doubtful
meaning. Courts are not entitled to read
words into an Act of Parliament unless
clear reason for it is to be found within the
four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord
Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim
Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted
840 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in
Jamma
Masjid,
Mercara
v.
Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR 1962
SC 847.

16. The question is not what may be
supposed and has been intended, but what
has
been
said.
"Statutes
should
be
construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge
Learned Hand said, "but words must be
construed with some imagination of the
purposes which lie behind them". (See
Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218
FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union
of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama
of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC
981.

17. In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors.
etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and
Ors. Etc., AIR 1977 SC 842, it was
observed that Courts must avoid the danger
of a priori determination of the meaning of
a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure
or scheme into which the provision to be
interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not
entitled to usurp legislative function under
the disguise of interpretation.

18. While interpreting a provision, the
Court only interprets the law and cannot
legislate it. If a provision of law is misused
and subjected to the abuse of process of
law, it is for the legislature to amend,
modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
(See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v.
Popular Trading Company, Ujjain, 2000 (5)
SCC 515. The legislative casus omissus
cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative
process.

19. The golden rule for construing
wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written
instruments has been thus stated: "The
grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to unless that would
lead to some absurdity or some repugnance
or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument, in which case the grammatical
and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v.
Pearson 6 H.L. Case 61). Words may be
modified or varied where their import is
doubtful or obscure. But we assume the
functions of legislators when we depart
from the ordinary meaning of the precise
words used, merely because we see, or
fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest
injustice from an adherence to their literal
meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B.
378).

20.

Jurisprudence
of
statutory
interpretation has moved from literal
interpretation to purposive interpretation,
which advances the purpose and object of a
legislation. The Supreme Court in catena of
judgments has dealt with the issue of literal
interpretation
vis-a-vis
purposive
interpretation. The Apex Court in The
Central India Spinning and Weaving
Manufacturing
Comp.
versus
The
Municipal Committee, Wardha; AIR
1958 SC 341 has held that it is also a
recognised principle of construction that
general words and phrases however wide
and comprehensive they may be in their
literal sense must usually be construed as
being limited to the actual objects of the
Act.

21. The Apex Court in Girdhari Lal
& Sons versus Balbir Nath Mathur;
1986(2) SCC 237, has held that the
primary and foremost task of a Court in
interpreting a statute is to ascertain the
intention of the legislature, actual or
imputed. Having ascertained the intention,
the Court must then strive to so interpret
the statute as to promote and advance the
9 All. The Committee of Management, Meerut & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
841
object and purpose of the enactment. For
this purpose, where necessary the Court
may even depart from the rule that plain
words should be interpreted according to
their plain meaning. There need no meek
and mute submission to the plainness of the
language. To avoid patent injustice, anomly
or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a
law, the court would be well justified in
departing from the so-called golden rule of
construction so as to give effect to the
object and purpose of the enactment by
supplementing
the
written
word
if
necessary. Supreme Court has generally
taken the view that ascertainment of
legislative intent is a basic rule of statutory
construction and that a rule of construction
should be preferred which advances the
purpose and object of a legislation and that
though a construction, according to plain
language, should ordinarily be adopted,
such a construction should not be adopted
where it leads to anomalies, injustices, or
absurdities, vide K.P. Varghese V. ITO,
(1981) 4 SCC 173, State Bank of
Travancore v. Mohd. M. Khan, (1981) 4
SCC 82, Som Prakash Rekhi V. Unioin of
India, (1981) 1 SCC 449, Ravula Subba
Rao V. CIT, AIR 1956 SC 604, Govindlal
v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee,
(1975) 2 SCC 482 and Babaji Kondaji v.
Nasik Merchants Co-op Bank Ltd. (1984) 2
SCC 50.

22. Reference to similar decision of
Apex Court in Utkal Contractors &
Joinery Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Orissa;
1987 (3) SCC 279 can also be made.

23. In the light of aforesaid judicial
pronouncements, Section 25(2) of the Act,
1860 is to be examined by this Court. The
comma (,) used after the words and figure
"sub-section (1)" in the first line of subsection (2) makes it clear that the
subsequent portion of the said sub-section
(2) has to be read in connection with an
order made under sub-section (1) and not
separately. The words "or an office bearer
is held no longer entitled to continue in
office" used in sub-section (2) of Section
25 cannot be read separately from words
immediately following Comma (,), i.e. an
election is set aside or an office bearer is
held no longer entitled to continue in
office and both the said situations have to
come into existence in pursuance of an
order made under sub-section (1) of
Section 25 and not otherwise. Therefore,
even if the respondents feel that by any act
of the petitioners any office bearer of the
petitioner Committee/Society is held no
longer entitled to continue in office, they
cannot, at their own, take a decision against
the petitioners by either removing any
office bearer nor can they dislodge the
Committee/Society of the governing body
which they have done in the present case.

24. Admittedly, no proceedings were
held under sub-section (1) of Section 25
nor was any order passed by any authority
under that provision. I also find that even if
there were certain allegations against the
petitioners in relation to the transactions
qua immovable properties, Clause 38 of
the
Bye-laws
provides
that
the
Commission shall have a right to
interfere in the management and for the
purposes of appropriate solution of
mismanagement, the Commission would
be competent to refer the matter to the
parent Society or Registrar and would
ask them to take action against such
officers whose presence in the Society
was causing harm to the interest of the
Society.

25. I do not find anything in the Byelaws that the Deputy Registrar can directly
842 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order for holding elections under Section
25(2) of the Act or that he can directly
dislodge an elected body and, in the
opinion of the Court, if there were certain
allegations against the petitioners, the
Commission was competent to refer the
matter to the parent body and if the
allegation is against the parent body also,
the matter could be referred to the
Registrar. In such event, the Registrar
could have initiated the procedure under
Section 23 or 24 of the Act which are the
provisions for conducting audit on the basis
of production of financial documents by the
Society and also for mismanagement of the
affairs or of any breach of fiduciary or
other like obligations and consequential
investigation into the affairs of the society.
Admittedly, no proceedings under Sections
23 and 24 of the Act have been held in the
present case nor has any order been passed
under Section 25(1) of the Act. In absence
of any such action or proceedings, I do not
find it to be within jurisdiction of the
Deputy Registrar to directly dislodge the
Committee and direct holding of fresh
elections. Therefore, the order impugned
dated 09.09.2022 is found to be without
jurisdiction.

26. In so far as the order dated
05.04.2023 is concerned, I do not find any
provision in the Bye-laws under which
Administrator can be appointed. It appears
that considering the nature of allegations
against the petitioners, the Director has
proceeded
to
appoint
the
Divisional
Director, Meerut as Administrator. In the
order dated 05.04.2023 reference to Clause
38 of the Bye-laws has been made and even
after perusing the said clause, power to
appoint Administrator is not inferred.

27. For all the aforesaid reasons, the
impugned orders dated 09.09.2022 and
05.04.2023 do not sustain and are hereby
quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is
allowed.

28. However, setting aside of the orders
impugned will not preclude the respondents
to hold proceedings under Sections 23 and 24
or any other proceedings under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 as may be warranted
in the facts of the case, keeping in view the
role of the parent body also and the fact as to
who actually is guilty of misappropriation
etc., if at all anybody is. This order shall also
not preclude the respondent Commission to
make a reference as provided under Clause
38 of the Bye-laws. It is expected that in case
any action is proposed under the said
provisions, fullest opportunity of hearing
shall be provided to the petitioners as well as
parent body, keeping in view the provisions
themselves and also the registered Bye-laws.
----------
(2023) 9 ILRA 842
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ-C No. 18585 of 2023

Sudheer Kumar Jain ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, Sri Mridul
Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Held -
Civil Law - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 (now Section 104
of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006) - Section