# The State Of U.P. & Ors v. Vinay & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 191
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-15
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 1233 of 2025
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Swarupama Chaturvedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/the-state-of-u-p-ors-v-vinay-ors-52820
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

12 All. The State Of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinay & Ors.
191
same reason has resulted in the salary of
the petitioner being diminished with
cumulative effect which effect is still
continuing when the petitioner has attained
the age of superannuation, as he is getting a
lesser amount as pension. Thus, the denial
of crossing efficiency bar has in effect
resulted in a major punishment being
awarded to the petitioner, for misconducts
for which he had already been awarded two
minor punishments.

17. In view of the aforementioned
facts, I am of the considered view that the
denial of crossing of efficiency bar to the
petitioner was illegal and so was the
rejection of his representations against the
order denying crossing the efficiency bar.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition
stands allowed. The Efficiency Bar Board
proceedings published on 24.06.1993, so
far as same relate to the petitioner, are
quashed. A Writ of Mandamus is issued
directing the respondents to treat the
petitioner as having been crossed efficiency
bar in the years 1991, 1992 & 1993 and
they shall re-calculate the salary/pension
payable to him accordingly and also pay
the amount of arrears to him within a
period of four months from the date, the
certified copy of this order is produced
before them.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 191
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J.

Special Appeal No. 1233 of 2025

The State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Vinay & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Constitutional validity of treating the
candidates of the same selected list, as different
class on the basis of the date of their respective
appointment letters and the date mentioned for
their training, on the touchstone of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Constitution of India -
Article 14 - Intelligible differentia -
Reasonable classification - Benefit of pay
protection - The candidates selected for
the post of Police Constable through direct
recruitment
were
divided
into
four
batches for training for different periods -
Appointment letters were also issued on
different dates - The candidates of first
batch were extended the benefit of pay
protection treating them differently from
other batches - Validity challenged -
Contended on behalf of State that the
different
treatment
accorded
to
candidates belonging to different batches,
which are selected from the same list, is
within the scope of Article 14 of the
Constitution - Permissibility. (E-1)
Held : The training to be conducted in phases
was necessitated solely by the infrastructural
limitations faced by the appellant State and
exigencies arising from the Covid-19 pandemic
and not due to any intelligible differentia
amongst the candidates in the select list.
Therefore, depriving candidates placed under
training on later batches, is grossly arbitrary and
suffers the vice of hostile discrimination - While
this Court accepts the existence of pandemicrelated exigencies and infrastructural limitations
but such external and temporary administrative
compulsions cannot justify differential treatment
among candidates belonging to a homogeneous
class. The legal position governing permissible
classification under Article 14 is too well settled
to require elaboration and when tested on
settled parameters, the justification offered by
the appellant State does not withstand scrutiny.
[Paras 17 and 19]

Case Law Cited
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Manilal vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2024 SC
4404; Writ A No. 55606 of 2008, Mahesh
Narayan and others vs. State of U.P. and others
decided on 19.12.2019; The State of West
Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) 1 SCC 1;
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers'
Association vs. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2
SCC 715 - referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India - Article 14; Uttar Pradesh
Police Constable and Head Constable Services
Rules, 2015 - Rules 18 and 19.

List of Keywords
Recruitment;
Selection
list;
Process
of
appointment; Different phases of training;
Homogeneous
class;
Benefit
of
last
pay
protection; Fundamental right to equality;
Discrimination;
Infrastructural
limitation;
Classification;
Intelligible
differentia;
Constitutionally permissible differentia.

Case Arising From
Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2025 passed
by Single Judge allowing the writ petition.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant : Manish Goyal,
Additional Advocate General; Tej Bhanu Pandey,
S.C.
Advs. for the Respondents : R. K. Ojha, Sr.
Advs.; Satyendra Chandra Tripathi, Aditya
Prakash Verma, Ranjana Verma, Shailesh Verma

(Delivered by Hon'ble Swarupama
Chaturvedi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned
Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri
Tej
Bhanu
Pandey,
learned
Standing
Counsel, for the appellants in all the appeals,
and Sri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Advocate,
assisted by Sri Satyendra Chandra Tripathi
and Sri Aditya Prakash Verma, learned
counsel for the respondents in their respective
appeals.

2. All these appeals have been preferred
against the common judgment and order
dated 09.04.2025 passed by learned singlejudge in connected writ petitions decided
along with Writ A No. 10689 of 2024, Sita
Ram Sharma & 13 Others Vs. State of U.P.
and 3 Others, whereby the writ petitions filed
by respondents herein were allowed and the
Appellant no. 3 (herein) has been directed to
surrender benefit of last pay protection to the
petitioners therein, as the same has been
given to the first batch of trainees, pursuant to
U.P. Police Constable Recruitment 2018 and
appropriate order shall be passed and
consequential benefit of maximum 30 days
from the date of presentation of certified copy
of the said order.

3. The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh
has raised identical issue in all these appeals,
and therefore, they were heard together and
are being decided by this common order. The
core question involved in all appeals is that
whether candidates placed in the same
selected list, could be treated as different
class, based on the date of their respective
appointment letters and the date mentioned
for their training. The factual details
regarding candidates in each appeal, such as
their past service details, the date of
appointment letter and date mentioned in the
letter for their training period, may differ.

4. For convenience, the factual details
are being taken from Special Appeal No.
1240 of 2025, as the same was leading
petition in the judgment and order dated
09.04.2025 passed by the learned singlejudge, however, the outcome of the present
common order shall apply to all connected
matters. Only factual difference being the
number of respondents/candidates in the
connected appeals.

5. After perusal of records in this
consolidated group of Special Appeal
matters, it appears that all respondents
12 All. The State Of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinay & Ors.
193
herein are former members of the Indian
Armed Forces, having been enrolled at
different
points
in
time
in
various
regiments. It further appears that each
respondent was discharged or retired upon
due completion of his term of engagement.
Notwithstanding
differences
in
their
individual periods of service, the common
fact emerges across these matters is that all
respondents had concluded their military
service and got selected after following due
procedure and secured their place in the
same selection list, which is the subject of
these batch of appeals.

6.
Learned
Additional
Advocate
General, appearing for the State, submits
that the select list prepared pursuant to the
direct recruitment of October 2018 did not
conclude the process of appointment, as
training forms an integral component of the
process. He submits that, owing to the
restrictions imposed during the Covid-19
pandemic, it became necessary for the State
to
conduct
the
training
of
selected
candidates in phased manner, and therefore,
appointment letters were issued on different
dates corresponding to the respective
training phases of the candidates. It is
further submitted that the U.P. Directorate
of Police Training, by its order dated
25.07.2020, divided the selected candidates
into four batches for training on separate
dates and for different periods. Thereafter,
the first batch commenced training in
August 2020 for a period of six months.
The second batch commenced in March
2021 for six months. The third batch
commenced in October 2021 for six
months, and the fourth batch commenced in
May 2022, also for a period of six months.

7. According to the learned Additional
Advocate General, the State was well
within its authority to prescribe different
pay structure for candidates scheduled to
go for training in different batches, at
different point in time, and appellant State
was further justified in giving appointment
letter to candidates in other batches without
offering same pay protection, which was
granted to members who went for training
in the first batch. It is also submitted that
the select list cannot be regarded as a
homogeneous class for all purposes, and
that the State is justified in placing the later
three batches on a distinct footing from the
first batch, which had already completed
training earlier to other batches

8. It is undisputed that the first batch,
which completed its training in January
2021, was extended the benefit of pay
protection.
The
principal
contention
advanced
by
the
learned
Additional
Advocate General is that the differential
treatment accorded to candidates belonging
to different batches, which are selected
from the same list, is within the permissible
scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, and therefore the State is entitled to
prescribe distinct pay structures for the four
batches
that
commenced
training
at
different points in time.

9. In support of his submission,
learned Additional Advocate General has
placed reliance upon Rules 19 of the Uttar
Pradesh
Police
Constable
and
Head
Constable Services Rules, 2015, which is
reproduced below for easy reference:

"Rule - 19. Training.

(1) (a) The candidates finally
selected to the posts of constable under
Rules 15 and 16 shall be required to pass
the training prescribed by the Head of the
Department. Provisions of Police Training
College Manual shall be effective on the
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cadets during the basic training. If the
candidate finally selected for basic training
does not report for training within the
prescribed
time
limit
then
his
selection/candidature shall be cancelled.

(b) Re-examination of the cadets
failing in basic training shall be organized
by the Head of the Department after doing
supplementary training. The proceeding for
termination of service of candidates failing
in
examination
of
training
after
supplementary training shall be done by
the Appointing Authority.

(2) The candidates appointed by
promotion under Rule 17 shall be required
to complete the training prescribed by the
Head of the Department."

10. Learned Additional Advocate
General, contends that candidates finally
selected to the post of Constable are
mandatorily required to undergo and pass
the basic training prescribed by the Head of
the
Department,
failing
which
their
selection is liable to be cancelled. It is
submitted that the Rule also empowers the
authorities
to
conduct
supplementary
training
and
re-examination,
and
to
terminate the services of candidates who
fail even thereafter, while candidates
appointed by promotion are likewise
required to complete the prescribed training
and therefore, until training is complete, the
State is at liberty to provide changes in the
salary structure because the selection
process is not complete.

11.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
appearing for the respondents submits that
the action of the State is in violation of
fundamental right to equality guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
He
further
submits
that
the
respondents were selected pursuant to the
recruitment process initiated in 2018 for the
posts of Constables in the Civil Police and
PAC and were duly placed in the exservicemen category in the result declared
in March 2020. He further contends that the
Government
Order
dated
23.12.2020,
insofar as it provides that all appointments
made after the said date shall not be
entitled
to
pay
protection,
are
not
acceptable, being contrary to the settled
principles of law, particularly when all
candidates are placed in the same select
list. It is further submitted that candidates
appointed in the first phase were extended
the benefit of pay protection, which fact
has been consistently admitted by the State
Government.

12. Learned counsel for respondents
further relies upon Manilal vs. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 2024 SC 4404, and
submits that all the candidates who were
selected pursuant to a common selection
would constitute a single homogeneous
group and discrimination inter se among
this homogeneous group is in violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution. He also
relies upon Mahesh Narayan and others v.
State of U.P. and others, Writ A No. 55606
of 2008 decided on 19.12.2019 decided by
this High Court. Relying upon above
judgments, learned counsel contends that
such a distinct treatment can only be
justified on some intelligible differentia,
which does not exist in facts of these cases.

13. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondents also responds to the argument
advanced by the Learned Additional
Advocate General regarding training i.e.,
Rule 19 of the U.P. Police Constables and
Head Constables Rules, 2015. According to
him, the learned single-judge has rightly
observed that the training is an exercise for
12 All. The State Of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Vinay & Ors.
195
selected candidates and no more stage of
selection remained to be attended, once
selected list was prepared for the candidate
to be sent for training for appointment
purposes. He further relies upon Rule 18 of
the U.P. Police Constables and Head
Constables
Rules,
2015,
which
is
reproduced below for easy reference:

"Rule - 18. Appointment.

(1) Subject to the provisions of
Rules 15 and 16 the appointing authority
shall make appointment by taking the
names of candidates in the same order in
which they stand in the list prepared under
clause (g) of Rule 15. The appointing
authority shall issue the appointment letter
to the candidates with the direction that
they should report for service/training
within one month of the date of issue of the
letter or any date specified for this purpose
in the appointment letter. If he does not do
so his selection/appointment shall be
cancelled:

Provided
that
any
person
appointed to a post in the service prior to
the commencement of these rules and is
working on the post, shall be deemed to
have been substantively appointed under
these rules.

(2) If more than one order of
appointments are issued in respect of any
one selection under Rule 17, then a
combined order shall also be issued,
mentioning the names of the persons in
order of seniority as determined in the
selection or, as the case may be, as it stood
in the cadre from which they are promoted:

Provided
that
any
person
appointed before the commencement of
these rules to a post in the service and
working on that post shall be deemed to
have been substantively appointed under
these
rules
and
such
substantive
appointment shall be deemed to have been
made under these rules."

14. Placing reliance on the aforesaid
provision,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
submits
that
Rule
18
contemplates issuance of the appointment
letter to candidates selected under Rules 15
and 16, and only then Rule 19 requires such
candidates to report for training. Learned
counsel for the respondents submits that the
scheme of the Rules clearly demonstrates
that the appointment letter precedes the
training, and therefore, the training cannot
be treated as a part of the selection process,
as has been rightly held by the learned
single-judge, since the training is to be
conducted after the appointment.

15. We have heard learned counsel for
the appellants/State as well as learned
counsel for the respondents and have
perused the record, including the findings
recorded by the learned single-judge.
Certain foundational facts are not in
dispute. All candidates, irrespective of the
batch in which they were subsequently
deputed for training, were selected pursuant
to the same recruitment advertisement
issued in October 2018. The select list was
common, the selection process uniform,
and the appointments were inseparably
linked to the same recruitment exercise.

16. From simple perusal of records, it
appears that all appointment letters pertain
to appointments made pursuant to the same
direct
recruitment
of
October
2018,
originating from a single advertisement and
selection process. It is also not the case of
any party that the advertisement led to the
select
list
has
stipulated
any
such
196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
classification or category-wise distinction.
Moreover, the State has not demonstrated
that placing candidates to be sent in four
different
phases
for
training
were
attributable to any rational classification.

17. In the light of aforesaid discussion,
we are of the considered view that the
training to be conducted in phases was
necessitated solely by the infrastructural
limitations faced by the appellant State and
exigencies arising from the Covid-19
pandemic and not due to any intelligible
differentia amongst the candidates in the
select list. Therefore, depriving candidates
placed under training on later batches, is
grossly arbitrary and suffers the vice of
hostile discrimination.

18. Complete basis of the argument of
the learned Additional Advocate General is
that the phased training itself created four
different categories, thereby enabling the
State to prescribe different pay structures to
withhold
pay
protection
from
the
respondents who formed part of the later
batches.

19. While this Court accepts the
existence of pandemic-related exigencies
and infrastructural limitations but such
external and temporary administrative
compulsions cannot justify differential
treatment among candidates belonging to a
homogeneous class. The legal position
governing permissible classification under
Article 14 is too well settled to require
elaboration and when tested on settled
parameters, the justification offered by the
appellant State does not withstand scrutiny.

20. In The State of West Bengal Vs.
Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1,
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
classification
should
not
be
vague,
uncertain or elusive. To pass the test of
equality
as
per
Article
14
of
the
Constitution of India, the classification
must be based upon an
intelligible
differentia because the purpose of the
Article 14 is to protect every person from
arbitrary
discrimination,
whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute
or by the improper application of a statute.
Any classification must rest upon an
intelligible differentia having a rational
nexus with the object sought to be
achieved, failing which, such classification
results in impermissible discrimination.

21. In Direct Recruit Class II
Engineering Officers? Association v. State
of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715,
Supreme Court has held that candidates
forming part of the same recruitment
notification and selection process constitute
a single class for the purpose of service
benefits.
Regarding
determination
of
seniority the Apex Court has held that once
the incumbent is appointed to a post
according to rule, his seniority must be
counted from the date of his appointment
and not according to the date of his
confirmation. Applying this principle, the
completion
of
training
cannot
be
considered as a point to be considered for
creating a sub-class amongst candidates
placed in same select list.

22. The appellants have not pointed to
any statutory rule which authorizes the
State to create sub-categories within a
select list for the purpose of pay fixation or
pay protection. Indeed, the State's own
stand is that the phased dispatch for
training
was
compelled
solely
by
administrative necessity. Administrative
exigency, even when bona fide, cannot be
elevated to a constitutionally permissible
differentia under Article 14. To permit such
12 All. Jai Prakash Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
197
a course would enable the State to fragment
uniform entitlements on the basis of
arbitrary or accidental circumstances, a
practice repeatedly disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

23. The learned single-judge was
therefore, correct in holding that the
respondents and other similarly situated
candidates, who were selected through the
same recruitment process of October 2018,
could not be deprived of pay protection and
service benefits extended to the first batch
of candidates, sent for the training, earlier.
Upon
independent
application
of
constitutional
standards,
we
find
no
infirmity in the conclusion recorded by
learned single-judge.

24. For the reasons recorded herein
above, we are of the view that the
differentiation made by the appellants State
among candidates placed in the same select
list, based solely on the dates on which they
were send for training, constitutes an
impermissible classification in violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

25. The benefit of pay protection and
the corresponding pay structure, extended
by the State to the first batch, cannot be
withheld from candidates of the second,
third, and fourth batches who were part of
the same recruitment process and placed in
the same selection list.

26. We, therefore, find no ground to
interfere with the judgment of the learned
single-judge. The batch of special appeals
accordingly fails and is dismissed. The
direction issued by the learned single-judge
to extend pay protection and consequential
benefits to the respondents and all other
similarly placed candidates is affirmed. The
State shall ensure compliance within twelve
weeks from the date of this order. No order
as to costs.

27. Pending applications, if any,
stands disposed of.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 197
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE MANJIVE SHUKLA, J.

Writ A No. 4460 of 2013
&
Connected With Other Cases

Jai Prakash Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Entitlement of Statistical Assistant to get
IInd promotional pay scale in the light of G.O.
dated 02.12.2000, 03.09.2001 and 20.08.2004.
(2) Binding effect of Judgment and order of the
Supreme Court dismissing the SLP against the
decision of R.P. Shukla's case.
(3) Correctness of R. P. Shukla's case entitling
the Statistical Assistant to get IInd promotional
pay scale.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Post of Statistical
Assistant - IInd promotional pay scale -
Entitlement - Petitioner sought benefits of
R.P.
Shukla's
case,
in
which
the
entitlement of second promotional pay
scale on the post of Statistical Assistant
had been decided - Matter was referred to
larger Bench looking into two conflicting
views expressed by two different Division
Bench in R. P. Shukla's case and Ashok
Tomar's case - Effect of G.O. dated
02.12.2000, 03.09.2001 and 20.08.2004
as well as the applicability of Rules of
1994 felt into consideration. (E-1)