# these applications in Jay Chandra Mahapatra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Raigarh reported in

- **Citation:** (2012) 3 ILRA 1530
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-11-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 679 of 2010
- **Bench:** Virendra Vikram Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/these-applications-in-jay-chandra-mahapatra-v-land-acquisition-officer-raigarh-42352
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

A.G.A.

Criminal
Revision-Magistrate
on
complaint
by
Food
Inspector-take
cognizance
and
summoned
the
revisionist-without application of judicial
mind by putting rubber stamp-strictly
prohibited under section 18 of General
Rules (Civil) as well as circular dated
07.02.2001-although
by
taking
cognizance no detail order requiredCourt explained the procedure on taking
cognizance upon investigation report as
well as on complaint-but putting rubber
stamp-shocking state of affairs-order
quashed
-direction
for
fresh
consideration issued.

Held: Para-34

Before parting with the case, the Court
shall like to record that section 18 of the
General Rules (Civil), 1857 provides for
the prohibition of the Rubber Stamp in
judicial orders and the use of Rubber
Stamp for passing any order has been
forbidden by the circular letter of the
High Court, Allahabad no. 6 of 2001
dated
7th
February,

## Text

1530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
applications under section 151 and 152
C.P.C.

28. I am unable to accept the
contentions raised by the learned counsel
for the State even if these applications are
treated as review applications even then
court has not committed any illegality in
allowing
these
applications
in
Jay
Chandra
Mahapatra
Vs.
Land
Acquisition Officer, Raigarh reported in
(2005 (9) SCC 123). The Apex Court has
clearly held that the review by the
reference court amending the decree by
allowing the enhance solatium is clearly
maintenable thus, if the arguments of the
appellant is taken correct even then the
Court has committed no illegality in
allowing such applications.

29.

Admittedly,
judgment
in
reference
court
was
passed
after
30.4.1982 and failure the reference court
to award the benefit of the amended
section of the Land Acquisition Act can
be rectified by the court by reviewing its
own judgment thus, the court has not
committed any illegality in allowing the
applications under section 151 and 152
C.P.C. Awarding the benefit of the
amendment.

30. The application u/s 5 Limitation
Act is rejected.

31. So far as the merit of the appeal
is concerned, appeal lacks merit, hence,
the appeal is dismissed.

32. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed as barred by time as well as on
merit.
---------

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.11.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIRENDRA VIKRAM SINGH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 679 of 2010

M/S V.K. Traders

 ...Revisionist
Versus
State Of U.P. & Another

 ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suddharth

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Criminal
Revision-Magistrate
on
complaint
by
Food
Inspector-take
cognizance
and
summoned
the
revisionist-without application of judicial
mind by putting rubber stamp-strictly
prohibited under section 18 of General
Rules (Civil) as well as circular dated
07.02.2001-although
by
taking
cognizance no detail order requiredCourt explained the procedure on taking
cognizance upon investigation report as
well as on complaint-but putting rubber
stamp-shocking state of affairs-order
quashed
-direction
for
fresh
consideration issued.

Held: Para-34

Before parting with the case, the Court
shall like to record that section 18 of the
General Rules (Civil), 1857 provides for
the prohibition of the Rubber Stamp in
judicial orders and the use of Rubber
Stamp for passing any order has been
forbidden by the circular letter of the
High Court, Allahabad no. 6 of 2001
dated
7th
February,
2001.
By
this
circular letter it was impressed upon the
Judicial Officers of the Subordinate
Courts that for passing any judicial
order, the Rubber Stamp shall not be
3 All] M/S V.K. Traders V. State Of U.P. & Another
1531
used. It is unfortunate to observe that
despite this circular letter of the year
2001, the Magistrate in the present case
has passed the impugned judicial order
with the use of rubber stamp and further
by filling up the date in it.
Case Law discussed:
(2008) 2 SCC 492; 2012 (5) SCC 424; 2000
(40) ACC page 441; 2003 (46) ACC 786; 2011
(73) ACC page 750

(Delivered by Hon'ble Virendra Vikram
Singh, J.)

1. As both the two revisions mentioned
above have been filed against the same order,
they are being decided by the present
common judgment.

2. By the impugned order, the learned
ACJM-I, Shahjahanpur has taken cognizance
of the offence and has issued summons
against the present two revisionists and
another to face trial.

3. The brief facts of the case are that on
25.5.2008 respondent-Manoj Kumar Tomar,
Food Inspector of district Shahjahanpur
seized bottles of Non Alcoholic Carbonated
Water prepared by M/S Priya Drinks,
revisionist,
from
the
shop
of
Rafi
Mohammad, co-accused. These bottles were
duly sealed and were sent to the public
analyst. By his report dated 5.7.2008, the
sample was found to be adulterated. The
other revisionist M/S V.K.Traders is the
stockist and the wholesaler of the drinks in
question.

4. After having obtained the sanction of
the Chief Medical Officer, the complaint
under
different
provisions
of
Food
Adulteration Act 1954 was filed by the
respondent no.2, before first Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shahjahanpur.

5. The learned court below while
passing the impugned order directed for
registration of the case and summoned the
accused while fixing date.

6. It is proper to mentioned it here that
this order dated 10th November, 2009 has
been passed by way of rubber stamp in the
following manner:

"vkt ;g pkykuh fjiksVZ Fkkus ls izkIr gqbZ ntZ
jftLVj gks A

vfHk;qDr }kjk lEeu fnukWad 30-1-2010 fu;r
djds ryc dja A"

7. Heard Shri Siddharth, learned
counsel for the revisionist and learned
Additional Government Advocate.

8. It has been argued on behalf of the
revisionist that the manner in which the
cognizance has been taken, is against the
provisions of law. There is no indication in
the impugned order that the learned court
below has taken note of and has considered
the facts involved nor it has recorded any
finding that a prima facie case worth
proceeding trial against the accused persons
is made out.

9. It has also been argued that the
revisionists, not being the personal entity, the
Court below has not taken proper care in
summoning the accused by application of
proper proposition of law.

10. On behalf of the respondents, the
argument has been advanced in favour of the
impugned order.

11. By the impugned order the learned
court below has taken cognizance of the
offence on the basis of the complaint filed by
respondent no. 2 and thus, while deciding the
1532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
present revision it is incumbent on the part of
the Court to lay down as to what is the
import of the word "cognizance" and when a
cognizance is said to have been taken.
Further as to what are the requirements for
taking
cognizance
and
whether
such
requirements have been followed in the
present case.

12. The word "cognizance" has
repeatedly been used in different sections of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter
referred to as "Cr.P.C.". However, this word
has nowhere been defined in Cr.P.C.

13. The word "cognizance" has been
defined in different judgments of the Apex
Court. In the case of S. K. Sinha, Chief
Enforcement
Officer
Vs.
Videocon
International Limited and others (2008)2
SCC page 492. The word cognizance has
been narrated as follows:

"The expression "cognizance" has not
been defined in Cr.P.C.. But the word
(cognizance) is of definite import. It has no
esoteric or mystic significance in criminal
law. It merely means "become aware of" and
when used with reference to a Court or a
judge, it connotes "to take notice of
judicially". It indicates the point when a
Court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of
an offence with a view to initiating
proceedings in respect of such offence said to
have been committed by someone"

14. In the latest pronouncement of the
Apex Court in the case of Bhushan Kumar
and another Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and
another 2012(5) SCC 424, the expression of
cognizance has been described as follows:

"The
expression
"cognizance"
in
Sections 190 and 204 Cr.P.C. is entirely a
different thing from initiation of proceedings;
rather it is the condition precedent to the
initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate
or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases
and not of persons. Under Section 190
Cr.P.C, it is the application of judicial mind
to the averments in the complaint that
constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the
Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there
is sufficient ground for proceedings and not
Whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate
for supporting the conviction can be
determined only at the trial and not at the
stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground
for proceeding then the Magistrate is
empowered for issuance of process under
Section 204 Cr.P.C."

15. In view of the mandate of the Apex
Court discussed above, it is evident that the
cognizance is taken by the court whereby it
holds that sufficient grounds exist for
initiation of criminal proceedings against the
accused proposed to be summoned for trial.
Further that the cognizance is taken in
respect of a case and not in respect of the
accused-persons in a case. The fact that the
cognizance is taken by the Court is
equivalent to the statement that all the
condition requisite for the initiation of
proceedings are complete.

16. After the definition of the word
cognizance now the point arises as to how a
cognizance is taken by the Court.

17. In the case of S. K. Sinha, Chief
Enforcement Officer(Supra) quoted above,
the Hon'ble the Apex Court in para 20 has
defined as to how a cognizance is taken with
the following observation:

"Taking Cognizance" does not involve
any formal action of any kind. It occurs as
soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the
3 All] M/S V.K. Traders V. State Of U.P. & Another
1533
suspected
commission
of
an
offence.
Cognizance is taken prior to commencement
of
criminal
proceedings.
Taking
of
cognizance is thus a Sine qua non or
condition precedent for holding a valid trial.
Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of
an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has
taken cognizance of an offence depends on
the fact and circumstances of each case and
no rule of universal application can be laid
down as to when a Magistrate can be said to
have taken "Cognizance".

18. Now it has to be seen as to how the
Magistrate has taken cognizance in the
present case. On the basis of a complaint
filed by the respondent no. 2, Food Inspector
filed in the Court of the Magistrate, the
cognizance is said to have been taken. Thus
the cognizance was to be taken in view of the
provisions of section 190 (1) Cr.P.C. and the
order for summoning the accused was to be
passed under the provisions of section 204
Cr.P.C.

19. It has been argued on behalf of the
revisionists that the impugned order, which is
a composite order of taking cognizance and
issuance of process, no ground for issuing
summons for taking cognizance has been
mentioned. Since the order has been passed
without assigning any reason for the same,
hence it is liable to be quashed.

20. The cognizance on the basis of
complaint has been taken by the Magistrate
under the provisions of section 190 (1)
Cr.P.C and the provisions of issuance of
process to the accused to face trial are
embodied in section 204 Cr.P.C. In none of
the sections there is any mention that the
Magistrate while passing the order for taking
cognizance of the offence under section 190
(1) (a)Cr.P.C. or for issuance of process
under section 204 Cr.P.C has to record
reasons for the same.

21. The provisions of section 203
Cr.P.C. makes it clear that if the Magistrate
on the basis of the complaint and inquiry
under section 202 Cr.P.C comes to the
conclusion that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding, then he will dismiss the
complaint and shall record his reasons for
doing so. Thus, it is evident that the
Magistrate is supposed to record the reason
only when he passes an order to dismiss the
complaint and not when he passes order to
summon the accused persons.

22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West
Bengal, 2000 (40) ACC page 441 has laid
down as follows:

"The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain situations such
as dismissal of a complaint without issuing
process. There is no such legal requirement
imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed
order while issuing summons. The process
issued to accused cannot be quashed merely
on the ground that the Magistrate had not
passed a speaking order".

23. Again in the case of Deputy Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports vs.
Roshan Lal Agarwal and others 2003 (46)
ACC page 786, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:

"Whether the evidence is adequate for
supporting the conviction, can be determined
only at the trial and not at the stage of
inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to
the accused, the Magistrate is not required to
record reasons."

24. In the case of Bhushan Kumar
and another (Supra), the Hon'ble the Apex
1534 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Court has laid down the requirements for
summoning the accused.

"Section 204 Cr.P.C does not mandate
the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons
for issuance of summons. Section 204 Cr.P.C
mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion
as to whether there exists a sufficient ground
for summons to be issued but it is nowhere
mentioned in Section 204 that the explicit
narration of the same is mandatory, meaning
thereby that it is not a prerequisite for
deciding the validity of the summons issued.
Therefore,
the
order
passed
by
the
Magistrate cannot be faulted with only on
the ground that the summoning order was
not a reasoned order."

25. The result of the above discussion
is that the Magistrate at the time of passing
an order for taking cognizance or issuance of
process under section 204 Cr.P.C is not
supposed to record reason by way of any
detailed,or speaking order whether on the
basis of the facts a prima facie case is made
out against the accused worth calling for
them to face trial.

26. It is true that the Magistrate while
taking cognizance or issuing process to the
accused to face trial is not supposed to record
a detailed reason, but at the same time, it is
also true that the order must be indicate that
the Magistrate has taken the facts and the
evidence of the case into consideration and
has thereby passed such order.

27. In the case of Mohammad Sayeed
vs. State of U.P and others 2011 (73) ACC
page 750, the order for taking cognizance
mentioned that the Magistrate has seen and
gone through the records, and took
cognizance, the order was held to be
justified.

28. Now the principles of law, which
have been laid down earlier to be applied in
the present set of facts. In the present case, a
perusal of the impugned order categorically
goes to show that the order has been passed
in a routine way and the facts of the case
have nowhere been taken into consideration
nor the Magistrate has given any indication
in the impugned order that he has gone
through the evidence or record at all.

29. The order in question as mentioned
earlier is by way of rubber stamp in which
the date for appearance of the accused has
subsequently been filled up. It is mentioned
in the order that the Challani report has been
received from the Police Station concerned.
The proceedings in this case have not been
instituted on the basis of charge sheet filed
by the concerned Police Station, but in the
present case, the proceedings have been
launched by way of complaint filed by the
Food Inspector, presently respondent no. 2.

30. There is no mention in the order
that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of
the offence. Thus, the impugned order can
never said to have been equivalent to the
statement that the Magistrate has taken
cognizance and after perusal of the
documents and evidence the summons were
issued to the accused to face trial.

31. Under such circumstances, the
order in question is violative of the manner
and procedure, in which the cognizance of an
offence is taken. This order being illegal is
bound to be set aside and the revision is
liable to be allowed.

32. It is true that the impugned order
taking cognizance and issuance of process
has been held to be illegal, but this Court has
not considered the merits of the case, hence
the only course open to is to remand the case
3 All] Zafarullah Khan V. Deputy Director Of Consolidation Gonda and others
1535
to the Magistrate concerned for a fresh
consideration and to pass a fresh order for
taking cognizance of offence and issuance of
process against the accused persons.

33. It has also been argued on behalf of
the revisionists that the Magistrate while
issuing summons for facing trial to the
accused persons has not taken into account
the fact that the accused persons, presently
the revisionist in the two cases, are not
private persons, but are the companies and
has also not considered the due provisions of
law in issuing summons to them as per law.
Since the matter is being remitted for fresh
consideration by the court below,and the
Court below by passing the impugned order
has not passed any order in this context, this
Court does not propose to issue any specific
direction to the Magistrate concerned.
However, the Magistrate while issuing
process to the accused persons shall take into
consideration all the relevant provisions
before passing any order.

34. Before parting with the case, the
Court shall like to record that section 18 of
the General Rules (Civil), 1857 provides for
the prohibition of the Rubber Stamp in
judicial orders and the use of Rubber Stamp
for passing any order has been forbidden by
the circular letter of the High Court,
Allahabad no. 6 of 2001 dated 7th February,
2001. By this circular letter it was impressed
upon the Judicial Officers of the Subordinate
Courts that for passing any judicial order, the
Rubber Stamp shall not be used. It is
unfortunate to observe that despite this
circular letter of the year 2001, the
Magistrate in the present case has passed the
impugned judicial order with the use of
rubber stamp and further by filling up the
date in it.

35. It appears that all the Judicial
Officers are not taking note of the circular
letter, hence the Registrar General is directed
to issue a direction to all the Judicial Officers
through the District Judges concerned to
ensure that any judicial order be not passed
by way of using the Rubber Stamp.

36. The revision is hereby allowed and
the impugned order dated 10th November,
2009 is hereby set aside.

37. The Magistrate concerned shall
pass a fresh order for taking cognizance in
the matter and shall thereafter, proceed with
the trial of the case in accordance with law.

38. Let a copy of this judgment be also
sent to the Registrar General for compliance.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.12.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.

Consolidation No. - 732 Of 2012

Zafarullah Khan

...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Director Of Consolidation Gonda
And Ors.

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ambhrish Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 226-Writ
against
rejection
of
revision
under
Consolidation
Act-on
ground
unexplained
long
term
delay-heldrejection of revision without touching
merit
on
ground
of
inordinate,
unexplained
delay-held-proper-