# Transport Corpn v. D.T.C. Mazdoor

- **Citation:** (2013) 1 ILRA 256
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-02-21
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35086 of 1998
- **Bench:** Tarun Agarwala
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/transport-corpn-v-d-t-c-mazdoor-42468
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Article 226- U.P.
Industrial Dispute Act award -directions
to reinstatement 50 % back wageschallenged on ground as per law laid
down
by
Apex
Court-Irrigation
department is not factory as such award
given
without
jurisdiction-held-in
absence of any evidence either before
Labor Court or before High Court Writ
Jurisdiction performed by department
legal or sovereign-in view of law laid
down by Supreme Court in R.M. Yellati
case-such
judgment
can
not
be
accepted-petition
dismissed.
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. The Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur and another
257
Held: Para-27

The Supreme Court in R.M.Yellatti vs.
Assistant
Executive
Engineer
vs.
Assistant Executive Engineer, 2006(1)
SCC 106 was faced with the same
dilemma
wherein it
was
contended
before the Supreme Court that the
matter should be adjourned since the
judgment of the Supreme Court in
Bangalore Water Supply was referred to
a Larger Bench by a referral order, dated
5.5.2005 in State of U.P. vs. Jaibir Singh,
2005 (5)SCC 1. The Supreme Court
declined to adjourn the matter sine die,
in view of the fact that there was
nothing on record to indicate that the
Management had argued the point in
question. Taking clue from the Supreme
Court itself, the Court finds, that there is
nothing on record indicating that the
petitioner is not an "industry". Merely by
alleging that the petitioner is not an
"industry" does not take them outside
the realm of the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act.
The
dominant
nature
test
as
illustrated in Bangalore Water Supply
case (supra) has not been followed.
Consequently,
the
Court
is
of
the
opinion, that the matter cannot be
adjourned sine die.

Case Law discussed:
1978 (36) F.L.R. 266; 1988 (57) FLR 176;
1997 (5) SCC 434; 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 672;
1996 (7) SCC 562; 1998 (78) FLR 143; 2006
(1) SCC 106; 2005 (5) SCC 1

## Text

256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
open eyes and agreed to abide by the
terms on which the loan, etc. was offered
by the appellant. Therefore, the doctrine
of unconscionable contract cannot be
invoked for frustrating the action initiated
by the appellant for recovery of its dues.

24. The respondents' accusation that
the appellant had not treated them fairly
sans credibility. It is they who had failed
to repay the outstanding dues. Not only
this, after signing two compromise deeds,
they failed to fulfil their commitment and
delayed the payment of Rs.63.5 lakhs by
almost three years. We have not felt
impressed by the submission of the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondents that the default
amount was too small to warrant
initiation of proceedings under Section 13
of the Act.

24. The Court cannot lose sight of
the fact that the bank is a trustee of public
funds. It cannot compromise the public
interest for benefiting private individuals.
Those who take loan and avail financial
facilities from the bank are duty-bound to
repay the amount strictly in accordance
with the terms of the contract. Any lapse
in such matters has to be viewed seriously
and the bank is not only entitled but dutybound to recover the amount by adopting
all
legally
permissible
methods.
Parliament enacted the Act because it was
found that legal mechanism available till
then was wholly insufficient for recovery
of the outstanding dues of banks and
financial institutions. Reference in this
connection deserves to be made to the
judgments
of
this
Court
in
Delhi
Transport Corpn. V. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress, Central Bank of India V. State
of Kerala and united Bank of India Vs.
Satyawati Tondon. "

10. In view of the facts of the
present case and weight of the judicial
pronouncements of the Supreme Court as
well as of this Court, the petition lacks
merit and is accordingly dismissed.

11. The petitioner may, if so
advised, seek settlement of his dues with
the respondent no. 5-Bank, in accordance
with law.
---------
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.02.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA,J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35086 of 1998

State
of
U.P.,
through
Executive
Engineer, Nichali Ganga Nahar, Phoolpur,
Kanpur

 ...Petitioner
Versus
The Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur and
another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
S.C.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri P.C. Jhingan, Sri Krishan Ji Khare
Sri G.C. Upadhyay, Sri R.K. Singh Rajput
S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 226- U.P.
Industrial Dispute Act award -directions
to reinstatement 50 % back wageschallenged on ground as per law laid
down
by
Apex
Court-Irrigation
department is not factory as such award
given
without
jurisdiction-held-in
absence of any evidence either before
Labor Court or before High Court Writ
Jurisdiction performed by department
legal or sovereign-in view of law laid
down by Supreme Court in R.M. Yellati
case-such
judgment
can
not
be
accepted-petition
dismissed.
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. The Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur and another
257
Held: Para-27

The Supreme Court in R.M.Yellatti vs.
Assistant
Executive
Engineer
vs.
Assistant Executive Engineer, 2006(1)
SCC 106 was faced with the same
dilemma
wherein it
was
contended
before the Supreme Court that the
matter should be adjourned since the
judgment of the Supreme Court in
Bangalore Water Supply was referred to
a Larger Bench by a referral order, dated
5.5.2005 in State of U.P. vs. Jaibir Singh,
2005 (5)SCC 1. The Supreme Court
declined to adjourn the matter sine die,
in view of the fact that there was
nothing on record to indicate that the
Management had argued the point in
question. Taking clue from the Supreme
Court itself, the Court finds, that there is
nothing on record indicating that the
petitioner is not an "industry". Merely by
alleging that the petitioner is not an
"industry" does not take them outside
the realm of the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act.
The
dominant
nature
test
as
illustrated in Bangalore Water Supply
case (supra) has not been followed.
Consequently,
the
Court
is
of
the
opinion, that the matter cannot be
adjourned sine die.

Case Law discussed:
1978 (36) F.L.R. 266; 1988 (57) FLR 176;
1997 (5) SCC 434; 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 672;
1996 (7) SCC 562; 1998 (78) FLR 143; 2006
(1) SCC 106; 2005 (5) SCC 1

(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala,J.)

1. The petitioner has challenged the
validity and legality of the award passed
by
the
Labour
Court
directing
reinstatement of the workman with 50%
back wages.

2. The facts leading to the filing of
the writ petition is, that in 1986 the
workman was appointed as a Sinchpal and
that his services was terminated on
31.12.1987. In 1992, the dispute was
referred under Section 4-K of the U.P.
Industrial
Disputes
Act
(hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act') with regard to the
validity and legality of the order of
termination. It transpires that an exparte
award dated 20.3.1993 was given in
favour of the workman, but, subsequently
on an application for recall filed on behalf
of the employers, the exparte award was
set aside by an order dated 18.3.1994.
Pursuant thereto, the employers were
allowed to file the written statement.

3. The employers, as per their
written statement, contended that the
workman was employed on exigencies of
service on a daily rate basis @ Rs.14/- per
day and that he worked intermittently
from
1.1.1987
to
31.1.1987,
from
1.6.1987 to 4.7.1987 and from 1.8.1987 to
31.12.1987. The employers contended
that the workman had never worked for
more than 240 days in a calendar year and
therefore, the provisions of Section 6-N
was not applicable. The employers further
submitted that the Irrigation Department
is not an "Industry" as defined under
Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no
industrial dispute could be referred to the
Labour Court.

4. The workman on the other hand
contended that he was appointed on
15.8.1986
and
that
he
worked
continuously without any break in service
till
31.12.1987
and
therefore,
had
completed 240 days in a calendar year.
The workman contended that he was not
given any compensation as per Section 6N of the Act nor any notice was given and
consequently, the order of termination
was illegal and that an order of
termination was liable to be set aside.
258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013

5. On behalf of the workman, an
application was filed for summoning the
documents, which were in exclusive
possession of the employers, namely, the
muster roll register, the attendance and
payment register from the date of
appointment of the petitioner till the date
of his termination. This application was
filed in order to strengthen the ground of
the workman, namely, that he had worked
continuously from 15.8.1986 onwards.
Inspite of repeated time being granted and
several opportunities being given, the
employers did not file any document. A
witnesses of the employer, P.W.-1, in his
deposition
admitted
that
between
August,1986 to December, 1986 the
workman had worked for some period of
time.

6.

The
Labour
Court,
after
considering the material evidence on
record held, that the employer, namely,
the Irrigation Department of the State of
U.P. is an industry as defined under
Section 2(k) of the Act. The Labour
Court, on the basis of the evidence, came
to the conclusion that the workman had
worked continuously for more than 240
days in a calendar year and that the
termination of the services of the
workman without complying with the
provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act was wholly
illegal. The Labour Court also came to the
conclusion that juniors to the petitioner
had been retained and the principle of
''last come first to go' was not followed
and that there was a violation of the
provision of Section 6-P of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court
also drew adverse inference against the
employer for not filing the documents.
The employer, being aggrieved by the
said award, has filed the present writ
petition.

7. This petition was heard and
dismissed by a judgment dated 23.5.2002.
The Court agreed with the finding
recorded by the Labour Court to the effect
that the workman had worked for more
than 240 days and accordingly, affirmed
the award. It transpires that against the
judgment
of
the
High
Court,
the
petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition
before the Supreme Court of India, which
was allowed by a judgement dated
31.10.2003, on the short ground that the
petitioner had raised a plea with regard to
the fact as to whether the department of
Irrigation, namely, the petitioner was not
an Industry as defined under the Act and,
on that short ground, the S.L.P. has
allowed and the matter was remitted again
to the High Court.

8. Heard Sri Anoop Kumar
Srivastava, the learned Chief Standing
Counsel for the employer-petitioner and
Sri Krishnaji Khare for the workmanrespondent.

9. The learned standing counsel for
the petitioner laid stress upon Annexure 1
to the writ petition contending that, as per
the written statement, a document had
been filed as Annexure to the written
statement, which indicated the period of
service of the workman which fact had
not been considered by the labour court.
The learned counsel stressed that the
finding of the Labour Court that the
workman had worked for 240 days in a
calendar year is against the material
evidence on record and that adverse
interfere drawn against the petitioner was
wholly illegal and illusory.
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. The Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur and another
259

10. The submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioner is patently
erroneous and cannot be taken into
consideration. Annexure-1 to the writ
petition is not the written statement of the
employer/petitioner. It is only a narrative
and it is not known as to whether this
narrative was ever filed before the Labour
Court or not. No such proof has been filed
before this Court. The written statement
has not been filed and therefore, the stand
of the petitioner can only be culled out as
recorded in the award, which only
indicates that the petitioner had worked
for certain period from January, 1987 to
December, 1987 and contended that the
workman had not worked for 240 days in
a calendar year. No proof was given by
the petitioner in their written statement
with regard to the fact that he did not
work from August, 1986 to December
1986.

11. However, this Court finds, that
one of the witness of the employers
admitted that the workman had worked
for some period of time from August,
1986 to December,1986. Since the
documents, which were in possession of
the employers were not filed, an adverse
inference was rightly drawn by the
Labour Court, to the effect, that the
workman had worked for more than 240
days in a calender year. This Court has
perused the award and finds that the
Labour Court had rightly drawn an
adverse interference and had rightly
concluded that the workman had worked
for more than 240 days in a calendar year,
and that, the provisions of Section 6-N
had not been complied with by the
employer. The petitioner had the best
evidence in its possession, namely, the
Muster Roll Register, the Attendance and
Payment Register. These registers would
have proved the number of days the
workman had worked. The best evidence
was not produced inspite of repeated time
being granted. Consequently, the Labour
Court was justified in drawing an adverse
inference against the petitioner. The
Labour Court was also justified in giving
a finding of violation of the provisions of
Section 6-P of the Industrial Disputes Act.

12. On the question as to whether
the Irrigation Department of the State of
Uttar Pradesh is an "industry" or not as
defined under Section 2(k) of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, the Court at the
outset makes it clear that the petitioner in
their written statement, as culled out from
the award, has only made a bald
statement, namely, that the petitioner is
not an Industry as defined under the Act.
No detail of its activity as to whether they
are performing any regal or sovereign
functions or whether they are performing
any commercial activities, has been
specified. Even before this Court, nothing
has been indicated in the writ petition,
namely, as to whether the petitioner are
performing
any
regal
or
sovereign
function or whether they are performing
commercial activities. There is nothing to
indicate whether the petitioner's have
framed any service rules, which are
applicable upon the workman nor have
they indicated that there are no service
rules
for
daily
rated
employees.
Consequently, merely alleging that the
petitioner is not an Industry does not
mean that they will not be covered under
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Acts.

13. Section 2(k) of the Act defines
"Industry". For facility the said provision
is extracted herein:
260 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013

"(k) 'Industry' means any business,
trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling
of employers and includes any calling,
service,
employment,
handicraft,
or
industrial occupation or avocation of
workman;

14. Under Section 2 (c) of the
Amending Act No.46 of 1992, the
definition of Industry was amended in the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which till
date has not yet been enforced. But no
such amendment has been made in the
U.P. Act and therefore, the definition of
"Industry" as specified in 2(k) still holds
the field.

15. The law on Industry was
reviewed by a Seven Bench of the
Supreme Court in Bangalore Water
Supply vs. A. Rajappa, 1978(36) F.L.R.
266, in which the Supreme Court laid
down the dominant nature test to establish
whether the employer comes within the
ambit of Industry or not. For facility,
paragraph 143 of the said decision is
extracted hereunder:

"143. The dominant nature test:

(a) Where a complex of activities,
some of which qualify for exemption,
others not, involves employees on the
total undertaking, some of whom are not
`workmen' as in the University of Delhi
case (supra) or some departments are not
productive of goods and services if
isolated, even then, the predominant
nature of the services and the integrated
nature of the departments as explained in
the Corporation of Nagpur (supra), will be
the true test. The whole undertaking will
be `industry' although those who are not
`workmen' by definition may not benefit
by the status.

(b) Notwithstanding the previous
clauses,
sovereign
functions,
strictly
understood, (alone) qualify for exemption,
not the welfare activities or economic
adventures undertaken by government or
statutory bodies.

(c) Even in departments discharging
sovereign functions, if there are units
which are industries and they are
substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within Section 2(j).

(d) Constitutional and competently
enacted legislative provisions may well
remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be
covered thereby."

16. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court
considered
the
Irrigation
Department of the Punjab and Haryana
Government in Desh Raj and others vs.
State of Punjab and others, 1988 (57)
FLR 176 and, after reviewing all the
decisions,
held
that
the
Irrigation
Department was an Industry and over
ruled the Full Bench Decision of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court.

17.

The
Supreme
Court
in
Executive
Engineer
(State
of
Karnataka) vs. K. Somasetty and
others, 1997(5) SCC 434 held, that the
Telecommunication Department and the
Irrigation
Department
are
not
an
"industry" under the Industrial Disputes
Act and while coming to the conclusion
relied upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Union of India vs. Jai Narain
Singh, 1995 Supp.(4)SCC 672 and State
of U.P. Vs. Suresh Kumar Verma and
another, 1996(7)SCC 562 For facility,
paragraph 3 of the said judgment is
extracted hereunder:
1 All] State of U.P. Vs. The Labour Court (II), U.P. Kanpur and another
261

"It is not well-settled legal position
that
the
Irrigation
Department
and
Telecommunication Department are not
an "industry" within the meaning of
definition under the Industrial Disputes
Act as held in Union of India vs. Jai
Narain Singh and in State of H.P. vs.
Suresh Kumar Verma. The function of
public welfare of the State is a sovereign
function. It is the constitutional mandate
under the Directive Principles, that the
Government should bring about welfare
State is not an "industry" under the
Industrial Disputes Act. Even optherwise,
since the Project has been closed, the
respondent has no right to the post since
he had been appointed on daily wages. It
is brought to our notice that the
respondent has been reinstated. The order
of the reinstatement has been placed
before us which indicates that at the threat
of contempt of court, the order has been
enforced. It is stated therein that it is
subject to the final order of this Court in
this appeal."

18. The question whether the
Telecommunication Department was an
Industry or not was again considered and
referred to a three Bench decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of G.M.
Telecom vs. S. Srinivasan Rao and
others, 1998(78) FLR 143. The Supreme
Court held that this question has to be
answered in accordance with the decision
of the Court in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) which is a binding precedent and
that the dominant nature test specified
therein was required to be considered.
The Supreme Court, after applying the
test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply
held,
that
the
Telecommunication
Department of the Union of India is an
"industry" within the definition since it is
engaged in a commercial activity and that
the department was not engaged in
discharging
any
of
the
sovereign
functions of the State.

19. It was argued that Somasetty
decision stands impliedly over ruled in so
far as it relates to the Telecommunication
Department, but, the decision continues to
remain in existence in so far as it relates
to the Irrigation Department.

20. Such submission cannot be
accepted for the reason that the reasoning
given by the Supreme Court in Somasetty's
case
holding
that
Telecommunication
Department and Irrigation Department has
not been accepted by the Supreme Court in
G.M. Telecom case (supra) as it did not
consider the dominant nature test specified in
Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra). The
Supreme Court in G.M. Telecom case has
itself held that it is not permissible for any
Bench of lesser strength of the Supreme
Court to take a view contrary to that in
Bangalore Water Supply or to bye-pass that
decision so long as it holds the field. The
Supreme Court further held that judicial
discipline requires the Court to follow the
decision in Bangalore Water Supply case
(supra).

21. In the light of the aforesaid, this
Court has no hesitation in holding that the
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court
in
Somasetty's
case
holding
the
Telecommunication
and
Irrigation
Department is not an Industry has been
specifically over ruled by the Supreme
Court itself in G.M. Telecom case.

22. In the light of the aforesaid, the
dominant nature test as indicated in
Bangalore Water Supply, is required to be
taken into consideration in order to find
out as to whether it is an "industry" or not.
262 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013

23. In the instant case, there is
nothing to indicate either in the writ
petition or before the Labour Court to
indicate that the Irrigation Department is
carrying on sovereign function and
therefore, they are not an Industry. There
is nothing to indicate that the Irrigation
Department
is
carrying
on
welfare
activities nor anything has come on record
to indicate that separate Service Rules has
been made applicable to the employees of
the Irrigation Department. In the absence
of
any
activity
of
the
Irrigation
Department being brought on record, it is
not possible to hold that the Irrigation
Department is not an Industry.

24. This Court further finds that the
petitioner had come out with the case that
they are not an Industry. The Court is of
the view that the initial burden was upon
to the employers to prove that they are not
an "industry". No such evidence has been
filed either before the Labour Court or
before the Writ Court to show that their
activities were regal and sovereign
functions. Merely by alleging that the
Irrigation Department is not an Industry
by itself was not sufficient to shift the
burden upon the employee. The Court is
of the opinion, that the burden remained
with the employer and since it was not
discharged the onus could not shift upon
the workman.

25. In the light of the aforesaid, the
contention of the petitioner that the
Irrigation Department is not an Industry,
is not fortified by any material evidence
brought on record and cannot be accepted.

26. A submission was also made,
that the question as to whether the
Irrigation Department of the State of U.P.
is an Industry or not, has been referred to
a larger Bench and therefore the Court
should await the decision of the larger
Bench. The Court finds, that this question
was referred by a learned Single Judge on
20.12.2002 in Writ Petition No.52256 of
2002. The Court has made an inquiry and
has found that the matter is still pending
before a Division Bench of this Court.
The contention of the petitioner, that the
matter should be kept in abeyance till the
decision of the Division Bench is arrived
at, is not accepted. Quite apart from the
fact that the matter is pending before the
Division Bench for the past 10 years, the
Court finds, that the workman concerned
is suffering unnecessarily for the past
decade and a half. This matter was
remitted by the Supreme Court in the year
2003 on the question as to whether the
petitioner was an "industry" or not. The
Court is constrained to observe that no
evidence of any sort was filed either
before the Labour Court or before this
High Court in a writ jurisdiction to
establish that they are performing regal or
sovereign functions.

27.

The
Supreme
Court
in
R.M.Yellatti vs. Assistant Executive
Engineer
vs.
Assistant
Executive
Engineer, 2006(1) SCC 106 was faced
with the same dilemma wherein it was
contended before the Supreme Court that
the matter should be adjourned since the
judgment of the Supreme Court in
Bangalore Water Supply was referred to a
Larger Bench by a referral order, dated
5.5.2005 in State of U.P. vs. Jaibir
Singh, 2005 (5)SCC 1. The Supreme
Court declined to adjourn the matter sine
die, in view of the fact that there was
nothing on record to indicate that the
Management had argued the point in
question. Taking clue from the Supreme
Court itself, the Court finds, that there is
1 All] Kailash Narain Trigunayat Vs. State of U.P. & Others
263
nothing on record indicating that the
petitioner is not an "industry". Merely by
alleging that the petitioner is not an
"industry" does not take them outside the
realm of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
The dominant nature test as illustrated in
Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) has
not been followed. Consequently, the
Court is of the opinion, that the matter
cannot be adjourned sine die.

28. The writ petition consequently
fails and is dismissed.
---------
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.02.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI,J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35165 of 2010

Kailash Narain Trigunayat
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh
Sri Rajeshwar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri H.P. Mishra
Sri Pradeep Upadhyay
Sri V.K.S.Kushwaha

U.P. Intermediate Education Act 1921Chapter
III-regulation
21-retirement
notice-retiring petition at the age of 60
years-on ground as per G.O. 17.02.99not given option within one year from
due
date
of
retirement-direction
to
Regional
Joint
Diredtor
to
take
appropriate decisions as per law laid
down in Smt. Prabha Shanker casewithin specific period.

Held: Para-7
In view of the aforesaid facts, let the
Regional Joint Director of Education -
Respondent No. 3, proceed to pass an
appropriate order on the claim of the
petitioner and in view of the law laid
down hereinabove coupled with the
provisions of the Government Order
dated 17.2.1999 as well as taking in
account the ratio of the decision in the
case of Smt. Prabha Kakkar Vs. Joint
Director of Education, Kanpur & others
reported in 2000 (2) ESC Pg. 1118 within
a period of three months from the date
of production of a certified copy of this
order before the said respondent after
putting the Committee of Management
also to notice in this respect and giving
an opportunity of hearing.

Case Law discussed:
2000 (2) ESC Pg. 1118; Yamuna Narain Mishra
Vs. State of U.P. Writ Petition No. 17574 of
2007

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J.)

1. The petitioner has come up
against the notice of retirement issued to
him on the ground that the petitioner is
not entitled to continue upto the age of 62
years as per Regulation 21 of Chapter III
of the regulations framed under the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921.

2. Notices were issued and counter
affidavit has been filed by the respondent
State as well as by the Committee of
Management. Both the respondents have
taken a stand that the petitioner had not
exercised
his
option
within
time
according to the Government Order dated
17.2.1999 within one year of his attaining
60 years and therefore he is not entitled to
the benefits of continuance. They further
contend that in the absence of any option
having been exercised the petitioner